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Abstract 
 
 
In this dissertation I defend a non-indexicalist contextualist account of 
metaphorical interpretation. This theory, which works within Kaplan’s 
double-index semantic framework, claims that context does not have 
the only role of determining the content expressed by an utterance, but 
also the function of fixing the appropriate circumstance of evaluation 
relative to which that content is evaluated. My claim is that the 
metaphorical dimension of an utterance can be found in the 
circumstance of evaluation, and not in the content which is expressed 
by the utterance. To that effect, I introduce a parameter in the 
circumstance of evaluation of an utterance, which I call ‘thematic 
dimension’. I show how the introduction of this parameter is in 
harmony with a class of theories that have proposed a relativistic 
semantic treatment of other phenomena such as predicates of taste and 
knowledge ascriptions. At the same time, I question a number of other 
proposals, both semantic and pragmatic, which, I believe, do not reach 
the same level of empirical adequacy and formal correctness as my 
proposal. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simon Blackburn, in his influential book (Blackburn 1984: 179), 
wrote:  
 
Sadly…I incline to Hobbes’s view that understanding things 
metaphorically is not understanding them at all, although it may 
often immediately yield understanding, and guide it and increase it. 
On this account a good metaphor at the open-ended level is 
expressed by an utterance which does not say that such-and-such is 
the case, but rather expressed an invitation or suggestion that a 
certain comparison be followed up. In this respect such an 
utterance…does not have truth conditions, but is successful or not 
in a different dimension. 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to rebut Blackburn’s statement 
that metaphors require a ‘special’ sort of understanding which is 
disconnected from the knowledge of the truth-conditions of an 
utterance. In this respect, this dissertation is a defence of the claim 
that metaphors do have truth-conditions, whose understanding 
does not differ from the understanding of other phenomena for 
which a semantics has already been provided. 
However, these claims I am boldly stating here will require a 
lot of effort and care on my part to be made work properly. On the 
one hand, I need to accurately explore the notion of ‘truth-
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conditions’. For, it seems evident that the notion cannot coincide 
with that of ‘wordly’ conditions, that is, concrete conditions in the 
world that verify the truth or falsity of statements. Let me make 
this clear with an example: 
 
(1) The cat is on the mat. 
 
An appropriate semantic system must deliver correct hypotheses 
as to the truth-conditional profile of utterances of a sentence such 
as (1). Given the mundane topic of the sentence, the system does 
not have any problem in delivering the correct conclusion that an 
utterance of this sentence is true if and only if the wordly 
condition that the salient cat is on the mat obtains. 
Things are much less clear when we turn to the question of 
whether metaphorical utterances do have truth-conditions. What 
truth-conditions could a metaphorical utterance of a sentence such 
as  
 
(2) Juliet is the sun. 
 
have? If we stipulate that truth-conditions are just wordly 
conditions, then it is an a priori matter that sentences such as (2) 
do not have any verifiable truth-conditions and that, therefore, a 
semantic system cannot deliver any hypothesis concerning the 
meaning of (2).  
However, it is also true that a semantic system must be 
empirically adequate. I follow Predelli (2005a) in thinking that a 
semantic system must deliver not only correct hypotheses 
concerning the truth-conditions of utterances, but also respect the 
judgements competent speakers make as to their truth or falsity. 
Now, if it is true that we need to handle the notion of truth-
conditions with particular care in the case of metaphor, it is also 
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true that competent speakers of English (and of any other language 
I am acquainted with), assent or dissent to the contents expressed 
by metaphorical utterances in the same way they do with ‘literal’ 
utterances. Consider: 
 
(3) A: Jim is a Republican. 
B: No, he is not. I have seen him at the last democratic 
convention. 
 
(4) A: Jim is a bulldozer. We should hire him. 
B: No, he is not. I spent the last weekend with him, and I 
found out he is a very fragile person. 
 
Situations of this kind could be indefinitely multiplied. This 
particular example just shows that speakers follow patterns of 
acceptance/rejection of metaphorical claims identical to patterns of 
acceptance/rejection of literal ones. Thus it becomes clear that we 
must investigate how this is possible, and whether a semantic 
system should account for this fact. 
To repeat myself, my motivation in writing this dissertation is 
that there are positive reasons to believe that the prospects of 
having a systematic semantic account of metaphor are plausible. 
The claim I am going to defend is that there is a way to show that 
the notion of truth-conditions finds a clear application to the case 
of metaphor. Also, my claim will be supported by the empirical 
adequacy of the semantic system I propose.  
Leaving for a moment my project aside, I wish to give some 
reasons why my argument that metaphor is semantically 
explainable is not immediate. In fact, the reasons why my thesis is 
not easy to defend are several: first of all, it is only because 
important advancements in philosophical semantics and formal 
semantics have been made in the last twenty years that it is 
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possible for scholars like me to deal with Blackburn’s challenge. 
Secondly, Blackburn’s negative attitude towards a semantics of 
metaphor has been shared by most philosophers until very recent 
times. And like for any other scientific community, when a certain 
phenomenon is judged to be not treatable by the methods used by 
that community, the phenomenon is considered less worth being 
explored, if not totally hopeless. Thirdly, although philosophers 
and linguists have in recent times assumed a less negative attitude 
towards the idea that metaphors have truth-conditions, there is a 
strong trend today that takes figurative language on the model 
offered either by the Gricean pragmatics or by the so-called truth-
conditional pragmatics. The idea shared by many is that metaphors 
are clear cases in which a speaker does not say what the words 
literally used would mean, but means something by the very 
uttering of these words. This idea has been radicalised by many 
philosophers of language and linguists today. To mention the most 
known: Recanati, Sperber and Wilson, Carston, Bezuidenhout, all 
take semantics to be an hopeless project because it is unable to 
deliver appropriate hypotheses as to the meaning of expressions in 
context, including metaphors. Their belief is that truth-conditional 
semantics works only for a very limited range of expressions 
which are context-dependent: indexicals (i.e. words such as ‘I’, 
‘here’, ‘today’, etc.). In contrast, they propose to supplant the 
indexicalist account with a pragmatic framework which may 
explain all the forms of context-dependence without adding any 
rule to the expressive capacities of the language under study.  
Notwithstanding all this scepticism and the several challenges 
posed by the ‘new’ wave of pragmatic theories, I argue that there 
are positive reasons to believe that metaphor can be accounted for 
semantically, although the kind of semantics I have in mind 
departs in a number of more or less subtle ways from the 
traditional way of taking it: basically on the model of Davidson’s 
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truth-conditional semantics. Recent developments of relativistic 
semantics in a number of areas of discourse (e.g., knowledge 
ascriptions and predicates of taste) indicate an interesting way of 
treating metaphor: the basic idea would be to treat a metaphorical 
utterance as being accompanied with a ‘thematic dimension’ that 
specify the respect in which the content expressed by the utterance 
must be evaluated. Developing this idea has lead me to shed light 
on interesting aspects of metaphorical interpretation, which other 
accounts have clear problems to deal with. The last part of this 
dissertation is, therefore, devoted to discuss these issues and to 
show why my account is preferable to other proposals. 
In Chapter 1 I critically assess Davidson’s argument against 
metaphorical meaning. Two questions have guided my analysis: 
why was Davidson reluctant to the idea of metaphorical meaning 
and what was, in turn, his positive explanation of metaphor 
understanding? These questions have lead me to inquire how 
Davidson’s argument is related to his philosophical project of 
providing a semantics of a natural language such as English, as 
based on a Tarskian theory of truth. I argue that Davidson’s 
rejection of metaphorical meaning presupposes Davidson’s theory 
of meaning, and that the latter faces a number of important 
objections.  
My task in this chapter is not only to introduce the reader to 
Davidson’s ideas, but also to lay down a series of desiderata for 
any theory of metaphor: first of all, the theory should properly 
account for metaphor without violating the so-called ‘principle of 
compositionality’ (roughly, the idea that the meaning of a sentence 
is a function of the meaning of its constituent parts). Secondly, the 
theory should be empirically adequate in the sense that it should 
deliver correct judgments as to the truth-conditional profile of 
metaphorical utterances in accordance with the intuitive 
judgements of competent speakers. Thirdly, the theory should 
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have a plausible account of the role of context in the determination 
of a metaphorical interpretation.  
The outcome of the chapter will be that Davidson’s adherence 
to a strict version of the compositionality principle makes his 
account of metaphor unable to comply with the second and third 
desiderata I have just mentioned. Furthermore, Davidson fails to 
offer any serious hypothesis or sustained explanation of how a 
metaphor is interpreted. He appeals (1978: 47) to an ‘imaginative’  
power of metaphors to make us see things under a certain light or 
perspective, but he does not develop this claim in any systematic 
way. 
In Chapter 2 I assess a very different programme due to the 
British philosopher Paul Grice. Grice is without doubt one of the 
fathers of pragmatics, the discipline that deals with the uses of 
language in communication. Although Grice’s initial philosophical 
motivations were addressed to find ways to explain the practice of 
making certain controversial claims in philosophy (see Carston 
2002: 101ff.), soon he finished to develop an independent theory 
of conversation which is based on a clear distinction between what 
sentences literally say and what, on given occasions of utterance, 
these may further get across. Since then Grice’s theory of 
implicatures has been used to account for a range of data 
notoriously difficult to treat semantically: from the contribution 
certain words such as ‘even’ or ‘only’ have in the ‘total 
signification’ of an utterance to conditionals and figurative uses of 
language, including metaphor. Grice also developed a theory of 
meaning, which was essentially based on the idea that meaning is 
an intentional property, upon which, he believed, sentence 
meaning ultimately depends. 
In this chapter I intend to introduce the reader to the topic of 
implicatures (What are these and what is their connection to 
semantics? How do we distinguish between different types of 
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implicature? How do we derive them?), and to further investigate 
whether Grice’s theory properly accounts for the case of 
metaphor. Grice’s claim is that metaphor, like irony and other 
tropes, is another case in which a speaker says something but 
means something different. Grice also predicts that an interpreter 
of a metaphor works out its meaning by means of an inferential 
process that goes from the input given by its utterance, namely 
what is said, to the implicated content. The interpreter is helped in 
the recovery of the speaker’s meaning by the presence of a series 
of conversational maxims, which Grice introduces and discusses at 
length in his classic paper ‘Logic and Conversation’ (1975). The 
role of these maxims in communication is controversial and recent 
pragmatic accounts (especially relevance theory) have posed 
several criticisms to it (but see Soames 2004, 2008 for a defence 
of Grice’s maxims). Not only am I going to assess these criticisms 
but I shall also present a key pragmatic notion such as that of 
‘common ground’ (Stalnaker 1999, 2002), which I explore to shed 
light on Grice’s conception of conversational dynamics. 
The conclusion I reach at the end of the chapter is that although 
Grice’s contributions to the definition of the semantics/pragmatics 
interface are original and important, not so is his account of 
metaphor. An attentive analysis of Grice’s tests to detect 
implicatures is sufficient to reveal that metaphor hardly passes 
any. Besides, there are specific problems due to Grice’s 
assimilation of metaphor with other types of implicatures like 
irony, with which they do not seem to share any property and, 
also, to Grice’s reliance on the idea that the interpretation of a 
metaphor starts with the recognition of some semantic deviance 
inherent in the metaphorical utterance. Given all these problems, I 
reach the conclusion that Grice’s identification of metaphor with 
implicature is erroneous, and that a wholly different explanation 
must be sought. 
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However, Grice is not the only philosopher who has attempted 
to offer an explanation of metaphor in wholly pragmatic terms. 
Searle (1979) is another example. He attempts to offer an analysis 
of metaphor as a kind of speech act, whose structure is 
characterised by being indirect: in other words, by uttering a 
sentence with a certain literal meaning, the speaker manages to 
convey another speech-act. Accordingly, an utterance of: 
 
(2) Juliet is the sun, 
 
Should be considered similar in structure to an utterance of 
 
(5) Can you tell me the time? 
 
In which the literal meaning (a question regarding the hearer’s 
ability to tell the time) does not coincide with the speech act 
dimension of the utterance (a request of telling the time). 
I spend the first half of this chapter discussing Searle’s view 
and the advantages it has over Grice’s account and other more 
traditional views of metaphor (namely, Black’s interaction theory 
[Black 1962, 1979] and the comparison view). However, I reject 
Searle’s analysis on several grounds: first of all, it still adheres to a 
‘deviance’ model of metaphorical interpretation, in which an 
utterance is metaphorical if and only if it is deviant in some 
semantic respect. I reject this model because it is inadequate – it 
fails to cover all cases of metaphor –, but also entails the view that 
many ‘literal’ utterances should not be considered as such, after 
all. Secondly, the principles of metaphorical interpretation that 
Searle proposes either have a semantic flavour or do not impose 
any semantic constraint on the contextual nature of metaphorical 
interpretation. This second aspect is particularly relevant since any 
adequate account of metaphor needs to capture the exact nature of 
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the context dependence of metaphors. However, it is not sufficient 
to say that an expression used metaphorically conveys different 
contents depending on its context of utterance. We need to have a 
clear explanation of this fact, which is precisely absent in Searle’s 
account. Thirdly, Searle’s proposal fails to find an appropriate 
place for metaphor within his philosophy of intentionality (Searle 
1983). In other words, I argue that Searle is not able to explain 
what exactly metaphors represent and how they manage to 
represent. 
In the second part of Chapter 3 I examine two other accounts of 
metaphorical interpretation, which work within speech act theory: 
I assess Alston’s view (2000) and Barker’s (2004). These accounts 
are interesting because of their attempts to investigate not just the 
principles of metaphorical interpretation, but the nature itself of 
metaphorical assertion. Alston’s view pivots around the idea that 
speech acts are governed by conventions, whereas Barker’s view 
places emphasis on the speakers’ intentional activity. Accordingly, 
their attempts to explain metaphor go in the direction of 
determining the correct conventional or intentional structure of 
metaphorical assertions. However, I argue that these accounts fail 
to reach a satisfying answer to the question of how metaphorical 
assertions represent. In other words, I argue that they fail to tackle 
the issue regarding the truth-conditional profile of metaphors. I 
then propose an argument to the effect that metaphors are 
instances of conventional implicatures, namely, implicatures 
determined by some conventional element of an utterance. I 
propose to identify this element with ‘hidden’ quotation marks 
around the words or expressions used metaphorically. Although I 
find this account interesting, I do not endorse it for the reason that 
even if we accepted the presence of quotation marks, we would 
still owe an explanation of how it is possible that metaphors 
embed. An argument by Barker (2003) to the effect that 
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conventional implicatures intrude ‘what is said’ is considered and 
rejected on the ground that it does not comply with the proper 
logic of conventional implicatures, which keeps the level of ‘what 
is said’ on a firmly different semantic level. I conclude that 
metaphors are not instances of conventional implicatures, and that 
a proper logic of these (modelled on Potts’ 2005 semantics) must 
properly distinguish their semantic level from that of ‘what is 
said’. 
In Chapters 4 and 5 I focus my attention on the so-called ‘truth-
conditional pragmatics’, which is nowadays an important trend in 
the philosophy of language. This label is not intended to cover a 
single theory, but a bunch of contextualist accounts that share the 
assumption that literal meaning radically underdetermines truth-
conditions. In other words, according to truth-conditional 
pragmatics the meaning which is conventionally associated to a 
sentence fails to capture the possible truth-conditions that that 
sentence may come to have in context. Thus truth-conditional 
pragmatics does not confine the role of context to the 
determination of values to indexicals and free variables, but 
extends it to cover every expression of natural language. Given 
this picture, defenders of this approach propose to reconsider the 
phenomena traditionally considered to fall under the coverage of 
Grice’s pragmatics. They claim that many cases which Grice 
deemed to be implicatures, can now receive a proper truth-
conditional treatment, although this treatment marks a radical 
departure from the principles governing truth-conditional 
semantics. Accordingly, metaphor is seen as fully accountable in 
truth-conditional terms. 
My intent in Chapter 4 is to asssess some of the main 
contextualist proposals in the philosophy of language, especially 
focusing on Recanati’s writings and Sperber’s and Wilson’s 
relevance theory. After tracing the origins of truth-conditional 
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pragmatics back to Frege’s conception of semantics, I introduce 
the reader to some important issues currently debated in the 
philosophy of language: for instance, the issue of ‘unarticulated 
constituents’ (expression due to Stanley, see Stanley 2007) and 
Recanati’s proposal concerning the nature of ‘what is said’. My 
discussion of Recanati’s proposal is preceded by what I call the 
Fregean Premise: the idea that the role of context in determining 
the circumstance against which a given proposition is to be 
evaluated is considered by Frege and also by the contextualist to 
reduce to the fixation of contextual parameters in the proposition 
expressed by an utterance. In other words, the premise says that a 
contextual element has a role in the fixation of the truth-conditions 
of an utterance if and only if it is part of the proposition expressed 
by the utterance. The full significance of this premise will emerge 
in Chapter 7, when I shall provide an alternative to this view, more 
in line with the kind of semantics I favoured, which is relativistic 
in spirit.  
I conclude Chapter 4 with a discussion of relevance theory, the 
theory originally proposed by Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson 
(1986 [1995]), which has been further developed by Carston 
(2002). Leaving the issue of meaning aside for a section, I 
concentrate on the account of communication offered by these 
authors, which radically departs from the assumptions 
characterising the Gricean pragmatics. The main assumptions of 
this theory are that language understanding is not governed by 
norms, as Grice and other philosophers thought, but only moved 
by considerations of relevance. In other words, communication is 
possible only because humans are geared to the maximisation of 
relevance, that is, to the maximisation of stimuli worth being 
processed. In the last part of the chapter I therefore reflect upon 
the consequences of adopting the relevance theoretic account of 
communication, especially in relation to the topic of metaphor. As 
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far as metaphor is concerned, relevance theorists propose a 
‘deflationary’ model of metaphor understanding (Sperber and 
Wilson 2006), which is based on the assumption that the 
determination of a metaphorical content in context follows the 
same patterns of pragmatic determination of other more ‘literal’ 
cases (for instance, approximations). The final result of the 
interpretation is not an implicature, like Grice thought, but an 
‘explicature’, a conceptual representation to which the speaker is 
explicitly committed. In the case of metaphor, the explicature of 
an expression used metaphorically is an ad hoc concept, a concept 
created by the speaker on the spot, by broadening or narrowing 
some of the conditions associated to its lexical entry. On this 
account, an utterance of (2) expresses an ad hoc category: 
 
(6) Juliet is THE SUN*, 
 
a concept constructed pragmatically by the speaker which will be 
recovered by the hearer in the process of utterance comprehension 
(Carston 2002: Chapter 5). 
Although the truth-conditional pragmatic explanation of 
metaphor fares better than the previous accounts in dealing with 
the speakers’ judgements concerning the truth-evaluability of 
claims such as (2), it does so by paying a high price. In Chapter 5 I 
offer a battery of counter-examples and arguments against truth-
conditional pragmatics, showing that it is not a tenable doctrine. 
My criticisms touches the following main points: 
 
• Truth-conditional pragmatics and, in particular, Recanati’s 
proposal trivialises the notion of compositionality. 
• The truth-conditional pragmatic account of ‘ad hoc 
concepts’ does not fit well with the ‘Language of Thought 
Hypothesis’ (Fodor 1975), although Carston endorses it. 
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• Truth-conditional pragmatics is unable to distinguish 
expressions that can be metaphorical from expressions 
such as functional categories that cannot receive a 
metaphorical interpretation. 
• The lack of semantic constraints on the interpretation of an 
utterance: certain constructions involving VP-ellipsis and 
anaphora require that a semantic system put specific 
constraints on the acceptability of certain interpretations. 
No constraint whatsoever is offered by truth-conditional 
pragmatics. 
 
Given all these unwelcome features, I conclude that we must look 
for a theory of metaphor that deals with these issues better. With 
this conclusion in mind, I approach the final part of my 
dissertation. 
In chapter 6 I consider a first semantic account of metaphorical 
interpretation due to the philosopher Josef Stern. Stern’s account 
attempts to model the context-dependence of metaphor on the 
Kaplanian theory of demonstratives (Kaplan 1989). As Kaplan has 
shown that knowledge of indexicals is semantic insofar as there 
are rules (Kaplan’s characters) that allow speakers to determine 
contents, so Stern thinks that metaphors have characters that allow 
speakers to determine the propositional components of their 
metaphorical utterances. 
Following Kaplan’s theory of demonstratives, Stern develops a 
formal theory of metaphors in which metaphorical meaning is 
captured by the presence at the level of the logical form of 
sentences of an operator which he calls ‘Mthat’. The function of 
this operator is to attach to a literal vehicle !, so as to determine a 
new expression with a nonconstant character: a function which 
yields different contents on each possible context of use, where the 
context of use is to be intended in a sense wider than Kaplan’s 
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notion of ‘context’, an n-tuple of specific parameters such as 
agent, time, location, world, to include contextual presuppositions. 
Stern’s formal analysis covers a wide range of data, including 
VP-ellipsis and anaphora, with a lot of interesting predictions as to 
the semantic behaviour of metaphors in such constructions. 
However, although Stern respects my initial desiderata of a theory 
of metaphor (it respects compositionality, it is empirically 
adequate at least for the cases it covers, and it accounts for the 
essential context-dependence of metaphor), it does so by relying 
on doubtful syntactic operations inherent in his operator and, also, 
by overcharging the expressive power of the language. 
Furthermore, I will show that in order to save his system by 
troublesome objections, such as the difficulty his system has to 
treat cases of nominative metaphor (e.g., ‘The sun is knocking at 
my door’), he develops solutions that are convoluted and 
inefficacious. Finally, I object to Stern’s account on the grounds 
that neither does it offer a satisfying semantic explanation of the 
dependence of an expression’s metaphorical dimension on the 
literal meaning of its vehicle, nor does it have an explanation of 
what makes a metaphor ‘apt’ (Hills 1997). 
In Chapter 7 I am going to put forward a new proposal 
concerning metaphorical interpretation: the idea that the 
metaphorical dimension of an utterance is neither inherent in the 
meaning of an expression or sentence, nor inherent in the content 
expressed by one of its utterances, as all the accounts I have 
considered in this work have thought.  To be sure, the 
metaphorical dimension is something that arises in context. 
However, against the contextualist and indexicalist proposals I 
have examined, my view is that the role of context does not affect 
the content expressed by a metaphorical utterance, but determines 
the appropriate circumstance of evaluation at which the expression 
used metaphorically get assigned its proper extension. Although 
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this idea has already been explored in other areas of philosophical 
semantics, no one has ever tried to apply it to metaphor.  
In the first part of the chapter I present four cases that have 
received an explanation in harmony with my proposal. These 
include: Predelli’s treatment of Travis’s scenarios (Predelli 2005a, 
2005b), John MacFarlane’s ‘non-indexical contextualist’ account 
of adjectives like ‘tall’ and knowledge ascriptions (MacFarlane 
2007, 2009), Lasersohn’s relativistic semantics of predicates of 
taste (Lasersohn 2005, 2009), and Recanati’s ‘moderate 
relativism’ (Recanati 2007). In the second part of the chapter, I 
extend some of the ideas of these philosophers to metaphorical 
interpretation. In detail, I argue that an account for a non-indexical 
contextualist semantics of metaphorical interpretation, as based on 
the postulation of what I call ‘thematic dimension’ in the 
circumstances of evaluation of utterances. Much of my discussion 
is devoted to clarify the nature and function of these ‘thematic 
dimensions’. With that scope in mind, I investigate some puzzling 
cases involving operators that shift the dimension of evaluation, 
belief reports of metaphors and denials of metaphors. My claim is 
that my theory gives a clear account of these constructions, where 
other proposals have failed, or not even tried, to provide one. 
As for any new attempt to explain a phenomenon that has 
already received a good deal of attention, there will probably be 
issues my account will not touch, for which other theories have 
made specific proposals. I do not aim to offer a comprehensive 
analysis of metaphorical cases either. My proposal is here more 
modest: I want to introduce a semantic framework within which 
the behaviour of metaphors can be investigated. My aim is to 
convince my reader that her investigation within this framework 
can be fruitful. Besides, if she adheres to this view she will also 
avoid all the objections I posed to the other available accounts. 
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Probably no one will ever come up with a receipt which will 
allow an interpreter to evaluate any kind of metaphor. Besides, 
whenever I come across some scholar who claims to have found 
such a receipt, my reaction is similar to that I could have to the 
vision of a predicator on the telly, claiming: “Jesus loves you!”. I 
would smile and I move to a different channel. 
However, this is not to admit defeat, like Davidson prematurely 
did. I firmly believe that metaphors follow interesting patterns of 
production and interpretation, although I do not share at all Stern’s 
view that these can be subsumed under an indexicalist analysis. 
This chapter can be read as an attempt to offer a different key for a 
correct understanding of these patterns and, also, for the evaluation 
of the intrinsic nature of metaphorical ‘aptness’. 
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Chapter I 
 
Davidson’s Argument against  
Metaphorical Meaning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Aims of the Chapter 
 
Some of the most important aspects of any theory of metaphor 
concern the relationship between meaning and truth in 
metaphorical utterances.1 Do metaphors mean anything, and if they 
do, can they be the bearers of truth? More importantly, suppose the 
answer to both questions is affirmative, then a further question 
arises: is metaphorical truth a special sort of truth, or does it not 
significantly differ from other, more mundane truths (like, for 
instance, the one expressed by an utterance of the sentence ‘today, 
Friday 5th August 2011, most of the world market indices have 
gone down’ asserting that on the day in which the sentence is 
uttered most of the world market indices have gone down)? !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Talking about ‘utterances’, and not propositions, sentences or assertions is, 
perhaps, a petition principii, since I am taking for granted that utterances are the 
vehicle of metaphors. But I am not. It will turn out that my theoretical choice is 
for utterances as the vehicle of metaphors, and in due course this will be 
motivated by a series of arguments. For now, I am just using utterances in a non-
theoretical sense, but the reader will see, as from this chapter, how the question 
is an important one which philosophers tend to puzzle about a lot. 
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These questions will resonate through the whole dissertation, 
and therefore I will give particular attention to them in examining 
the theories rival to mine. 
My aim in this chapter is to assess Davidson’s view on 
metaphor as exemplified by his well-known paper ‘What 
Metaphors Mean’ (1978). As already explained in the introduction, 
I have chosen to start with Davidson because I think he has been 
the first, within the tradition of analytical philosophy, to attempt to 
offer an answer to the above questions. His own account can be 
summarised by looking at his answer to the first question I have 
started with: whether metaphors mean something. Davidson’s 
answer is negative, with a proviso that will be thoroughly assessed 
in the next sections: metaphors do not mean something, though 
they do not mean nothing. The proviso is, in fact, just this: 
metaphors have to be taken at face value, to mean just what their 
words taken in their most literal sense mean and nothing more. But 
if metaphors do not have any special (i.e., further) content attached 
to them, then the further question as to whether they express some 
truth, or some special truth, is senseless, at least according to 
Davidson. 
In what follows I will fully assess Davidson’s argument against 
metaphorical meaning, namely, against the idea that metaphors 
mean something over and above what the words literally express, 
trying to unpack the philosophical premises on which it is based, 
especially in the light of his overall semantic enterprise. In a 
nutshell, this enterprise, on which Davidson systematically worked 
at least for ten years from the late sixties of the last century,2 is the 
attempt of offering a theory of meaning for a natural language like 
English. According to Davidson, this project pivots around the 
notion of truth mathematically developed by Tarski in the first half 
of the 20th century (Tarski 1933, 1944). The core idea of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 See esp. Davidson (1967). 
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Davidson’s theory is to take Tarski’s notion of truth to be primitive 
and, on the basis of a finite base of axioms, to allow one to derive 
for each sentence of a language under study its truth-conditions. 
The assumption on which this theory is based is that the meaning 
of a sentence should be identified with its truth-conditions. 
A further step Davidson (1973) took was to consider such a 
theory to be the basis of any possible interpretation of any language 
spoken by a community of individuals, via some further empirical 
assumptions regarding the nature of evidence an interpreter may 
come to hold with respect to the new language she is trying to learn 
and the community she is trying to interpret. I will consider this 
other Davidsonian step in § 4, where my semantic analysis of 
Davidson’s argument will be integrated with a discussion of some 
of the philosophical reasons that may have led Davidson to reject 
the very idea of metaphorical meaning. 
To anticipate my conclusion, Davidson’s account of metaphor 
fails, and badly so. It fails for reasons internal to his philosophical 
theorising, but also for reasons external to it: on the one hand, 
Davidson’s account fails because in the attempt to explain the 
structure and content of a theory of meaning, it eschews, more or 
less deliberately, important connections between such a theory and 
metaphors or other tropes. On the other hand, Davidson’s account 
also fails because other accounts have in the meantime elaborated 
more precise and detailed analyses that go in the direction of 
answering those issues that Davidson had touched upon in his 
work. In particular, since Davidson’s early work some substantive 
progress has been made in the attempt to determine and systematise 
the exact nature of the context’s contribution to a theory of 
meaning and truth. Such a progress will also be shown to have 
strongly influenced the linguistic and philosophical foundations of 
metaphor studies. 
However, the failure of Davidson’s account is in a sense 
welcome to my project. I think that although Davidson’s answers to 
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the questions concerning the nature of metaphorical meaning and 
truth are clearly unsatisfying, they have nonetheless led me, and 
will hopefully lead the reader, to think more clearly about the 
ultimate project of having a linguistic theory that may say 
something constructive about what metaphorical truth is (or is not), 
what metaphors convey (or do not) and if they convey content, how 
they do so. 
Thus, the plan for the rest of the chapter is the following: in § 2 I 
introduce Davidson’s argument, which I then discuss at length in § 
3. In § 4 I offer some other philosophical reasons behind 
Davidson’s rejection of the very idea of metaphorical meaning. I 
think that although these reasons may have some initial 
plausibility, there is enough room for a sustained criticism of them. 
In § 5 I deal with Davidson’s suggestion that metaphor concerns 
the realm of pragmatics, and not semantics. I reject Davidson’s 
suggestion on the ground that it is quite approximative and does not 
even fit well with Davidson’s arguments against metaphorical 
meaning. In § 6 I discuss some more specific linguistic points 
concerning the nature of metaphorical interpretation, which create 
further problems for Davidson’s account.  
 
 
2. The argument 
 
Before exploring what Davidson’s argument against metaphorical 
meaning is, I should say that in dealing with the argument, or more 
appropriately with its rational reconstruction, I have had to isolate 
certain passages of Davidson’s paper, precisely those which 
present, more than establish, his main thesis: 
 
[M]etaphors mean what the words, in their most literal 
interpretation mean, and nothing more. (1978, p. 32) 
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This thesis certainly has a prominent role in Davidson’s paper, but 
it has often been considered only for its critical role, i.e., of 
showing how certain authors (Black and Searle above all) had 
mistakenly taken metaphors to express some special kind of 
meaning.3 This view can certainly find some textual support from 
Davidson’s more or less explicit attacks on those authors’ views: 
 
The central mistake against which I shall be inveighing is the idea 
that a metaphor has, in addition to its literal sense or meaning, 
another sense or meaning. 
 
It is of no help in explaining how words work in metaphor to posit 
metaphorical or figurative meanings, or special kinds of poetic or 
metaphorical truth. (op. cit., p. 33) 
 
However, I will try to convince the reader that Davidson’s thesis, 
far from being a stubborn thesis defended against an array of other 
philosophical views, is a respectable thesis that can be framed 
within Davidson’s philosophical semantics, putting some burden 
on metaphorical interpretation, which otherwise one could take as 
being totally unconstrained. Also, later on in this chapter, I will 
discuss a couple of Davidson’s more positive ideas about the 
linguistic and cognitive roles metaphors seem to have. But as to 
now, I am entirely focused on his ‘main thesis’, which I am going 
to assess with the help of my reconstruction of the underlying 
argument in support of it. This should offer some precise clues as 
to where Davidson is leading his readers in his attempt to ban 
metaphors from any additional realm of meaning.  
I present the argument below in order to show two basic features 
of Davidson’s account: on the one hand, the argument offers some !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 See in particular the first lines of page 32 in the article. I will deal with Searle’s 
account of metaphor in chapter iii. Strangely, Davidson ignores Grice’s account, 
which takes metaphor as a special kind of meaning, namely, a conversational 
implicature. I will devote next chapter to an exploration of such model. 
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ground for the thesis that if anything has a meaning, that is 
something that can in principle be explained by appeal to an 
adequate semantic theory, of the kind privileged by Davidson: a 
Tarski-style theory of truth, which for any sentence of a given 
language delivers a theorem assigning to the sentence its truth-
conditions. Metaphors, in this respect, are no exception: they also 
require a similar treatment if we want to maintain at least some 
connection with our semantic theorising about meaning. On the 
other hand, the argument has the role of determining the following 
complex conditional: if the thesis previously sketched holds (i.e., if 
meaning supervenes on truth-conditions), then any sentence that is 
assigned its meaning via an appropriate theorem of the theory will 
also respect whichever semantic property the system imposes upon 
it in order for the theorem to apply, and thus for the sentence to 
encode a meaning. For instance, if a condition for a sentence to 
have a truth-condition, and therefore to be assigned a meaning, is 
that its meaning (i.e., its truth-conditions) be a function of the 
meaning of its parts (i.e., their semantic values), then as the 
sentence is assigned its meaning through assignment of its truth-
conditions, it will automatically exemplify the feature of being 
compositional.  
That said, the first part of the argument can thus be 
characterised: 
 
1: The meaning of a metaphor is the meaning of the sentence which 
is its vehicle.          [Premise] 
 
This premise comes as no surprise if we follow Davidson in both 
taking metaphors to have a literal meaning, and taking sentences to 
be the kind of objects semantics is primarily engaged with. In fact, 
we know that for Davidson meaning and truth are strictly 
interwound as this further premise claims: 
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2: ‘To give truth-conditions is a way of giving the meaning of a 
sentence’ (1984: 24).         [Premise] 
 
Now, given that: 
 
3: The truth-conditions of any particular sentence s belonging to a 
language L is given by a T-theorem of the form ‘s is true iff p’, 
where ‘s’ is the name of a sentence of the object language and p is 
a correct translation of s in the metalanguage.       [Premise] 
 
We easily get 
 
4: The meaning of any particular sentence s belonging to a 
language L is given by a T-theorem of the form ‘s is true iff p’, 
where ‘s’ and p are as before.                           [from 2 + 3]  
 
Having got to this point in the argument, we may reach a first 
conclusion: 
 
5: The meaning of any metaphor with vehicle s in L is given by a 
T-theorem of the form ‘s is true iff p’, where ‘s’ and p are as 
before.                             [from 1, 4 given 2, 3] 
 
This conclusion covers the first essential aspect of Davidson’s 
argument. A further premise in the argument is needed to show 
how compositionality is a feature that is preserved in metaphorical 
sentences.  
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6: The literal meaning of a sentence is given by the literal meanings 
of its constituent parts, their mode of combination and nothing 
more.4            [Premise] 
 
Adding premise 6, which functions as an axiom in the semantic 
system theorised by Davidson, we reach the following conclusion: 
 
7: The meaning of a metaphor with vehicle s in L is given by the 
literal meanings of its constituent parts, their mode of combination 
and nothing more.               [from 5 and 6] 
 
Far from being two obvious results, the two results obtained 
from 5 and 7 deserve much more attention than it has usually been 
given in the literature, especially for the kind of constraints they 
seem to impose on a theory of metaphor. First of all, any theory of 
metaphor must explain how the metaphorical depends on the 
literal. Davidson has a straightforward answer: the metaphorical is 
nothing over and above the literal. The metaphorical dimension, so 
to speak, must not be sought in the meaning of the metaphor, but 
somewhere else. Secondly, metaphors must obey compositionality, 
for otherwise we should envisage new types of meaning and this is 
incompatible with the whole truth-conditional semantic enterprise. 
However, if we strictly follow Davidson’s reasoning we end up 
being committed to the view that given that all there is to the 
understanding of a sentence is the knowledge of the T-theorem 
associated to that sentence, then metaphor is no exception to this 
constraint. But even granting that the essence of what it is for 
someone to grasp the meaning of a sentence of L is fully captured 
by her knowledge of a T-sentence – a point that is far from being !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 More formally, a ‘semantic theory T is extensionally compositional iff there is a 
function f such that for every node [!["...][#...]] where[!...] dominates immediate 
daughters [" . . . ] and [# . . . ], if according to T Val(["...]) = x and Val([# ...]) = 
y and Val([!...]) = z, then f(x, y) = z.’ (Clapp, 2002: 267) I have changed a 
variable in Clapp’s formulation, which contained an error.  
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settled today and that I am accepting here only for the argument’s 
sake5 – it is very difficult to remain satisfied with Davidson’s 
argument. How could it even be possible to think that the 
understanding of a metaphor coincides with the grasping of the T-
theorem associated to the sentence which is its vehicle? Our ability 
to understand metaphors, to understand, for instance, what Romeo 
is trying to get across by asserting the sentence ‘Juliet is the Sun’, 
seems to go far beyond the mere tacit knowledge of T-theorems. 
Davidson’s attempts to provide in his paper some other positive 
clues as to how we interact with metaphors seems to recognise this 
point and thus divorces metaphor from a purely linguistic account. 
However, I am not interested here in the question of what kinds of 
cognitive mechanisms and processes are involved in metaphorical 
interpretation. This will be a matter I will deal with later on. Now I 
am interested in the question of what sort of linguistic competence 
speakers manifest in understanding metaphors. As to this question, 
given the extremely fixed nature of the competence required by 
Davidson I think his argument assumes a crucial importance in 
setting up a sort of ground zero for the successive philosophical 
debate around the nature of metaphorical interpretation. Thus, after 
having grasped Davidson’s argument in its basic lines, we are left 
with the following engaging task: we need to establish whether the 
kind of semantic knowledge or linguistic competence presupposed 
by Davidson in the understanding of metaphors is all there is to it, 
whether it provides only part of the story or whether it totally 
misfires at such a task.6 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5  See § 6 for a discussion of the consequences deriving from accepting 
Davidson’s idea of semantic knowledge. 
6 Here’s a possible reply to my line of arguing, which was communicated to me 
by David Beesley: “Isn’t Davidson essentially claiming that there is nothing at 
the level of semantics to distinguish between metaphors and other kinds of 
sentences? So there is no such thing as understanding a metaphor as such, at the 
semantic level. There is just the basic understanding of sentence meanings and 
the pragmatic features then deal with the identification of certain utterances as 
metaphors (in other words, metaphor is essentially bound with utterance and has 
nothing whatsoever to do with sentences in themselves)”. This is certainly a 
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What has been done so far is to provide an argument for 
Davidson’s rejection of metaphorical meanings. However, we do 
not yet know what philosophical reasons are given by Davidson in 
support of the argument, and therefore behind his rejection. The 
next section will provide a discussion of the linguistic evidence in 
favour of Davidson’s view. In § 4 I will then complete such a 
discussion with an examination of further, more philosophical, 
reasons behind Davidson’s rejection. After that, I think the reader 
will be ready to see why I think Davidson fails to ultimately 
provide a solid philosophical explanation of the linguistic and 
cognitive nature of metaphors. 
 
 
3. Understanding the Argument 
 
If Davidson’s approach to meaning is exemplified by step 4 
reached in the previous section’s argument, which directly leans on 
premise 3, it ultimately rests on the assumption, provided by 
premise 2, that the notion of meaning can be reduced to the notion 
of truth-conditions. But what justifies this assumption? The answer 
for Davidson is that since the content of premise 3 is a trivial 
thesis, whose material adequacy and formal correctness nobody can 
question, then the only way to deal with the slippery problem 
regarding the nature of meaning is to explain this in terms of the 
clearer and more stable notion of truth. Of course, Davidson had 
especially in mind those theories that try to identify meaning with 
entities like propositions, whose intensional nature made the very 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
possible reading of Davidson’s view. However, my interest is in the theoretical 
consequences of Davidson’s rejection of metaphor from the realm of semantics 
and, also, in his reasons for confining metaphor to the level of utterance 
interpretation. My whole claim is that Davidson does not offer a plausible story 
as to why we should exclude a semantic explanation of metaphorical 
interpretation. 
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attempt to provide solid foundations to semantics look suspicious 
to Davidson.  
    Be that as it may, Davidson’s move is not without its own 
theoretical problems, and has, in fact, been criticised on several 
grounds. I will mention here two problems that have some specific 
relevance in relation to the aims of this chapter. Before going to 
discuss these problems, it is important to stress a crucial difference 
between Tarski’s original treatment (1944) of the truth predicate 
and Davidson’s. While Tarski was trying to offer an explicit 
definition of the truth predicate, testing for its material adequacy 
and formal correctness, Davidson assumes the truth predicate to be 
primitive, and from this point tries to deduce a theory of meaning 
from a theory of truth (Foster 1976: 8-9).7  
Once this difference is properly spelt out, many authors have 
wondered whether Davidson is legitimate in his reduction 
(especially, the move from 2 to 4 in the argument of the previous 
section). I am not going to review here all the criticisms moved to 
Davidson, 8  but they all seem to share the following line of 
reasoning: either the Tarskian biconditionals used by Davidsons’ s 
type of semantic theory presuppose some clear knowledge of what 
the meaning of sentences is (in other words, what it takes for a 
sentence in an object language, say the English sentence ‘snow is 
white’, to have an appropriate description in the metalanguage, say 
snow is white); or, as a matter of empirical evidence, the truth-
conditions envisaged by Davidson do not tell us enough, i.e., they 
are not informative about the kind of semantic knowledge speakers 
of a language have. This point is made vivid by Dummett (1975, 
1976), who thinks that Davidson’s theory may only be taken as a 
modest theory of meaning, to be contrasted with a full-blooded !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Subtly technical questions arise when one considers whether truth itself is 
something that should be reduced to something more primitive. Field (1972) 
famously criticized Tarski for not having been able to reduce the truth-predicate 
to some more primitive physical entity, amenable to a physicalist conception of 
reality. 
8 Foster (1976), Dummett (1974), Soames (1992, 2002), Pietroski (2005). 
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theory of meaning, which should be able to clearly state under what 
conditions a speaker of a language manifests the knowledge of a 
sentence of her own language.9 
Now, I myself do not think that any of these objections have a 
tremendous impact on the Davidsonian enterprise. As to the 
circularity argument, for instance, Davidsonians may argue that the 
circle is not vicious since it is not the meaning of any sentence 
which is presupposed by the T-schemas, but only the obvious fact 
that if anything can legitimately fill in some variable ‘s’ of an 
object- language L, then it is possible for it to satisfy a T-schema 
relative to that language. In particular, the antecedent of this 
conditional can only be satisfied by a theory of syntax that deliver 
correct judgements about the syntactic well-formedness of the 
sentences of the language under study. In other words, given an 
appropriate logical form determined by the syntax of L with regard 
to a sentence of L, say s, it will be possible to associate a semantic 
reading to s by assigning to each of its syntactic phrases {s1, …, sn} 
an interpretation function that deliver its semantic value {Val(s1), 
…, Val(sn)}. Therefore, the only result the theory is responsible for 
is to assign a syntactically motivated semantic description of ‘s’ in 
the metalanguage, but it is silent as to which description this will 
be.10  
As to Dummett’s criticism, I think it has certainly some appeal, 
but I do not see why it should invalidate Davidson’s theory. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 In this sense, Dummett is proposing to shift the attention away from the issue 
of reducing meaning to knowledge of truth-conditions, a task about which 
Dummett has always professed himself to be sceptical, and towards a quite 
different project, i.e., of individuating the verifiability conditions for any 
sentence of a given language, say L. Presumably these are given not by what a 
speaker of L knows in understanding the meaning of a certain complex 
expression, but by what constitutes his having that knowledge. According to 
Dummett (1976 [1996: 37]), “since what is being ascribed to a speaker is implicit 
knowledge, the theory of meaning must specify not merely what it is that the 
speaker must know, but in what his having that knowledge consists, i.e. what 
counts as a manifestation of that knowledge”. 
10 The noxious problem of ‘indeterminacy of reference’ kicks in here, but since 
its presence is peripheral to my interests in this thesis, I do not have to attempt a 
solution here. 
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Davidson may reject Dummett’s ‘full-bloodedness’ condition, but 
then he has to answer the question of how his own theory of 
meaning, as fundamentally based on the attribution of truth-
conditions, is to be implemented so as to make sense of the rational 
behaviour of speakers of a determinate language. Davidson is well 
aware of this issue, as he claims: 
 
We are interested in the concept of truth only because there are 
actual objects and states of the world to which to apply it: 
utterances, states of belief, inscriptions. (Davidson 1999, in Lynch 
(ed.) 2001: 637. My emphasis)11 
 
His answer is a follow-up to Quine’s strategy of the radical 
translator (Quine 1960), who in the meantime has become more 
modestly a radical interpreter. Davidson’s hope is to integrate what 
he calls Principle of charity (PC), that is, all those interpretive 
strategies addressed to make sense of the speakers’ behaviour in 
the light of our own rationality,12 with his own theory of truth, so as 
to provide sufficient warrant for the interpreter to make correct 
hypotheses about what the speakers mean in saying what they say 
in their own language. This strategy leads us to the following view, 
which is an integral part of Davidson’s philosophical semantics: 
given the empirical value of the thesis that meaning supervenes on 
truth, and the further plausible hypothesis that an interpreter of a 
community C speaking language L will use PC to make appropriate 
hypotheses as to what the speakers of L mean by what they say, the 
interpreter may reach a point in his interpretation which is called 
disquotation. 
What is the property of disquotation and why is it so important? 
Following Larson and Segal (1995: 50ff.), it seems that the 
mechanisms of disquotation, which allows one to go from a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 See also Sainsbury (2009) in this respect. 
12 See, e.g., Hookway (1987: 173). 
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sentence of an object language, e.g., Italian, to the use of a 
corresponding sentence in the metalanguage, e.g. English, tell us 
how to go from the mention of a language to its usage. In doing so, 
disquotation relates a certain linguistic expression to the world. In 
other words, if, after having heard some Italian saying ‘La Spagna 
e’ una nazione Europea’, we are told that  
 
(1) La Spagna e’ una nazione Europea’ is true(-in-Italian) iff 
Spain is a European country,  
 
then, provided that we know ‘La Spagna e’ una nazione Europea’ 
is a true Italian sentence, we come to know something about the 
world, that is to say, we come to know that Spain is a European 
country. Therefore we can disquote (1), and come to use the 
English sentence ‘Spain is a European country’ to express 
something true about the world. 
Furthermore, from premise 3 and step 4 of the previous 
section’s argument, together with this property of disquotation, it 
follows that a semantic system like Davidson’s takes the linguistic 
competence of an English interpreter of a language like Italian as 
given by the tacit knowledge of theorems of the form of (1), and 
nothing more. 
It seems we are now in a position to assess Davidson’s argument 
against metaphorical meanings. If there were such meanings, 
premises 2 and 3 of the argument would not be sufficient to deliver 
the meaning for those sentences containing them. The high context-
sensitivity of metaphors, in fact, would make the task of finding 
appropriate translations of metaphorical sentences in the 
metalanguage impossible, so that other interpretive strategies 
should be sought. What is more, disquotation of a metaphorical 
sentence cannot lead to the gaining of any true piece of information 
about the world since there is no worldly condition that that 
sentence can stand to. What worldly condition could be said to 
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obtain by disquoting a metaphorical sentence like ‘Juliet is the 
sun’? None. 
Sure, we could postulate that T-theorems like (1) also apply to 
metaphorical sentences, but this would enormously increase the 
base of axioms that a speaker of a language should know. Besides, 
there would now be contradictory axioms, axioms that would 
supply the speaker with conflicting interpretive hypotheses: 
 
(2) ‘Juliet’ refers to Juliet. 
 ‘Juliet’ refers to the sun. 
 
We would envisage axioms of reference which stipulate that 
‘Juliet’ refers both to the individual Juliet and to the star around 
which the earth orbits.  
On the other hand, given the assumption that all there is to the 
meaning of a sentence is its truth-conditions, if we allowed that 
giving the truth-conditions were not sufficient to the meaning of 
some sentences of a language, the whole Davidsonian enterprise 
would collapse. In fact, if we allowed for metaphorical meanings, 
we would also discredit the role of disquotation in giving us 
information about the world, given that these meanings would be 
given by something over and above their T-schemas. 
Consequently, the strategy of the radical interpreter, guided only by 
the PC and disquotational techniques, would be destined to fail if 
we allowed for such transient and ephemeral meanings. Adding 
further T-schemas does not seem to be a viable strategy because the 
resulting T-theory would be not only difficult, if not impossible, to 
learn by a finite mind, but also inconsistent. Hence, Davidson 
concludes that metaphorical sentences (i.e., sentences containing 
expressions used metaphorically) do not have any meanings apart 
from the ones which result from composing the literal meanings of 
their parts.  
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Since metaphorical sentences are not the kind of linguistic objects 
that allow for disquotation, we need to consider a different story to 
account for whatever insight they give us and whichever 
mechanism they are governed by. 
Having assessed the linguistic evidence Davidson appeals to in 
order to contrast the idea of metaphorical meanings, I want to 
concentrate now on how to interpret such evidence in the light of 
Davidson’s philosophical foundations. This will lead me to discuss 
some of the core ideas of Davidson’s epistemology and 
metaphysics of language.  
 
 
4. General Problems for a theory of metaphor  
 
One very important feature of a semantic system such as the one 
envisaged by Davidson is that it should allow a user of a language 
L to make correct predictions of her interlocutor’s linguistic 
behaviour. In other words, it should allow anyone capable of 
handling the system to make correct attributions of semantic 
knowledge to the speakers of L. In particular, for any language L, a 
semantic system should allow a speaker of L, and indirectly an 
interpreter of the community C speaking L, to predict that 
whenever a speaker utters assertorically a sentence s of L, she 
means p (= s’s truth-conditions and nothing else) in virtue of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 The restriction introduced by ‘generally’ is important insofar as there are 
metaphors whose literal meanings are perfectly fine. For instance, ‘Jesus was a 
carpenter’ and ‘No man is an island’ are, literally speaking true, but they may be 
also taken as metaphors (see Hills 1997 for discussion). Thanks to Manuel 
García-Carpintero for making this point.  
CHAPTER I 
 
! "#!
implicitly grasping some theorem associating s with its literal 
meaning p. If this story is plausible (and I have expressed no reason 
yet not to take it as such), then two important constraints on 
semantic theorising are implicitly respected. First of all, there is the 
constraint that a semantic theory should satisfy the property of 
PUBLIC AVAILABILITY (Davidson 1990: 314): meanings are 
the kinds of things that should be available to the speaker of a 
language. Propositions, so Davidson thinks, do not satisfy this 
constraint, whereas meanings in the reductive sense of truth-
conditions associated to sentences do. Secondly, there is the 
important constraint of PRODUCTIVITY. Whoever understands, 
however implicitly, a theory of meaning of the sort envisaged by 
Davidson, should at least in principle be able to understand the 
meaning of any new sentence of the language spoken by her, in 
virtue of coming to hold a theorem that assigns to the new sentence 
its meaning via truth-conditions. 
Now, metaphorical sentences lead to the following epistemic 
problem, which may be called the ignorance of truth-conditions 
problem (echoing here Larson and Segal 1995: 47). Consider in 
fact, these sentences: 
 
(3) Anger is the fluid that love bleeds when you cut it. [C. S. 
Lewis] 
(4) John’s toothbrush is trying to kill him. [Larson and Segal 
1995: 47] 
(5) Colorless green ideas sleep furiously. [Chomsky] 
 
I have chosen a sentence that is clearly metaphorical (i.e., (3)), one 
that sounds quite bizarre (i.e., (4)) and another that does not make 
any sense at all, although syntactically fine. What is wrong with 
these sentences? Following Larson and Segal , we could say that 
although these sentences have truth-conditions, we are not in a 
position to evaluate them: 
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The truth-conditions all seem to involve some kind of 
misapplication of concepts that make it difficult for us to see how 
or in what situations they could actually apply. (Larson and 
Segal1995:47. My emphasis] 
 
Larson and Segal conclude that since a semantic theory cannot 
offer any plausible explanation of such cases, a ‘theory of 
aberrancy’ should be devised to face this difficult task. It is true 
that Larson and Segal do not discuss metaphorical cases (although 
(5) does seem to have some vague air of ‘metaphoricity’), but, 
presumably, since the case offered by (3) is not different from 
those of (4)-(5) in relation to the problem of (not) knowing their 
truth-conditions, I assume that Larson and Segal would think that 
any theory of metaphor should properly fall outside of any theory 
of semantics, as they suggest for (4)-(5). For, it seems prima facie 
obvious, we are barred from knowing the truth-conditions of most 
metaphorical sentences, where by ‘truth-conditions’ we mean 
something like ‘wordly’ conditions. Here Davidson would partake 
in this conclusion and possibly reinforce it with the following 
observation, which we will see to have some strong metaphysical 
implications: 
 
A theory of truth does more than describe an aspect of the speech 
behaviour of an agent, for it not only gives the truth conditions of 
the actual utterances of the agent; it also specifies the conditions 
under which the utterance of a sentence would be true if it were 
uttered. This applies both to sentences actually uttered, by telling 
us what would have been the case if those sentences had been 
uttered at other times or under other circumstances, and to 
sentences never uttered. The theory thus describes a certain 
complex ability. (1990: 310. My emphasis) 
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Now we could represent Davidson’s point by abstracting from 
some of its features. Davidson is saying that a theory of truth, say 
T, provides a pairing of each sentence s of L with its truth-
conditions, say !. In particular, we may start with a language 
actually spoken, e.g. L, with its own syntax and formation rules. 
We then go on to provide a recursive semantics for such a 
language, say TL, which assigns to each syntactic expression its 
interpretation. Although each expression will now be endowed with 
a semantic value only relative to its own interpretation, the final 
step of the recursive strategy, i.e., the assignment of a T-sentence to 
each sentence s of L, will characterise truth as an unrelativised 
notion, i.e. a notion that is not relative to any consideration external 
to the system (e.g., context, speaker’s intentions, points of 
evaluation).14 This step will take the form of a function " of T such 
that for each s of L,  "TL: (s)# ! (i.e. for each sentence s of L, T 
will deliver a function mapping s on to its truth-conditions). In 
virtue of holding a theorem of the form t = "TL: (s)# !, one should 
be able to assess in any actual situation, say $%, whether the 
extension of s & Truth or ' Truth in $% given !. However, 
Davidson is not trying to say that given a theorem of this form, the 
theory will unconditionally pair s with !. For there are many 
theorems that will minimally differ from t (e.g., t% = <s, !%> where 
!% !p ! 15 ), that will deliver correct judgments of truth-
conditionality. Though, as Davidson often repeats (see, for 
instance, Davidson 1977), it is only in virtue of the available 
evidence that a theorem of T may be verified. Once the available 
evidence is strong enough, we reach a point where it is possible to 
quantify over all the actual situations in which a given sentence s is 
verified, so that the meaning of s will be given by something like 
the following biconditional: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Although Davidson is willing to relativise the theory of truth to speakers of a 
language, times and occasions. 
15  ‘!p’ is the part-relation. 
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(6)  M(s) ! "#(s is true $ %(#)) 
 
(M is the meaning of the sentence s iff for every actual situation #, 
s is true iff the complex condition % obtains in #). Once the 
meaning of s is established in this way, any appeal to the context of 
use will become unnecessary and that, for Davidson, is the reason 
why “adverting to literal meaning and literal truth has genuine 
explanatory power” (1978: 33). 
With respect to all the available evidence, it seems that Davidson is 
reaching this strong conclusion regarding metaphor: 
 
The question regarding metaphorical truth is senseless because 
there is no evidence whatsoever that we could possibly gain from 
experience so as to verify a certain metaphorical sentence. 
 
What sort of truth-condition would, in fact, be the one represented 
by a metaphorical sentence like the following: 
 
(7)  Time becomes blind. ? (De Lillo) 
 
Given this semantic-ontological view, it becomes natural for 
Davidson to require a very different sort of explanation for the 
power of metaphors to give us insight.16 In fact, the basic view 
Davidson espouses is that metaphors do not stand for any fact, 
although they may provoke or prompt or make us see some fact. He 
says, for instance: 
 
Since in most cases what the metaphor prompts or inspires is not 
entirely, or even at all, recognition of some truth or fact, the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Something Davidson agrees with throughout the paper. 
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attempt to give literal expression to the content of the metaphor is 
simply misguided. (1978: 47) 
 
It seems, then, that from the epistemic problem of ‘the ignorance 
of truth-conditions’ we have reached a more ontologically-
burdened conclusion, which would prevent metaphorical sentences 
from being the object of our semantic theorising. This point seems 
the natural result of taking philosophical semantics as the discipline 
which tries to connect our theorising about language with how we 
come to recognise truths or facts in the world.17 It is also supported 
by a tacit argument Davidson accepts in his paper, which regards 
the paraphrasability of metaphors. Davidson (1978: 32) says: 
 
[M]etaphors cannot be paraphrased…because there is nothing there 
to paraphrase. Paraphrase, whether possible or not, is appropriate 
to what is said. 
 
We see in this quotation the appearance of a concept which will 
accompany us throughout the whole dissertation, namely, the 
notion of ‘what is said’. Davidson is telling us that while normal 
utterances of literal sentences say something which can be 
paraphrased, metaphorical sentences do not. For instance, while the 
sentence 
 
(8) I am hungry. 
 
can be appropriately paraphrased in the following way: 
 
(9) The speaker of (7), Francesco Gentile, is hungry at 2pm of 
the day 22 September 2011, 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Notice how Davidson is presupposing a theory of truth which appeals to the 
notion of correspondence in the abovementioned passage. 
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The utterance of (8) is barred from a similar paraphrase, 
presumably because there is no eternal content such that an 
inscription of (8) could be substituted for it.18 As a corollary of this 
argument, we can also state a first, Davidsonian definition of ‘what 
is said’ 
 
(10) The ‘what is said’ of an utterance of a sentence s = The 
literal meaning of s + the actual condition in which s is 
uttered. 
 
An opportune paraphrase should reveal how the literal meaning of 
s matches the actual condition for the obtaining of s. This is not 
possible in the case of metaphors. Therefore metaphors do not 
express any content beyond the literal meaning of the sentences 
which encode them. 
With this part, I conclude my analysis of Davidson’s vast attack 
on the notion of metaphorical meaning and metaphorical truth. 
There is, I think, much insight that can be gained from this view. It 
certainly fits well with a certain picture of language that was still 
predominant in the seventies of the last century, and has even today 
its illustrious defenders (Cappelen and Lepore 2005 above all) and 
also has the merit of offering us a first framework for our 
investigation into the nature of metaphor. However, it will become 
clear that it is completely inadequate to deal with important 
questions concerning the level at which contextual imports enter 
into the composition and comprehension of metaphors.  
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 ‘Eternal sentences’ are sentences which are always true or always false. The 
requirement of ‘eternality’ comes from Quine (1960), who appealed to it in order 
to avoid the need for propositions, whose nature Quine always considered to be 
suspicious. The requirement is that every non-eternal sentence can be translated 
into one eternal sentence which fully specifies the conditions of utterance of the 
non-eternal sentence. 
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5. Pragmatics?  
 
This section and the next one are entirely devoted to the array of 
problems which affects Davidson’s account as sketched in the 
previous sections. Before going to assess some potentially 
devastating arguments against Davidson’s account, I think it is 
useful to first assess a proposal made by Davidson regarding the 
proper interpretive level at which metaphors should be evaluated. 
 
Pragmatic Analysis: Davidson suggests that metaphorical 
interpretation does not concern linguistic meaning, but its use. 
Therefore it seems that, at least in some passages of his paper, 
Davidson is defending a pragmatic conception of metaphor. 
 
I think metaphor belongs exclusively to the domain of use. It is 
something brought off by the imaginative employment of words 
and sentences and depends entirely on the ordinary meanings of 
those words and hence on the ordinary meanings of the sentences 
they comprise. (1978: 33. See also page 43) 
 
But what, in Davidson’s account, motivates a pragmatic re-analysis 
of any particular metaphor? One may say that since a metaphorical 
sentence is generally literally false, its falsity would launch the 
search for some implicature (a concept which will be extensively 
discussed in the next chapter). However, Davidson is barred from 
making such move for the following banal reason: implicatures – 
as we will see – are propositional in character, and therefore if we 
appealed to them we would re-introduce the idea that metaphorical 
sentences do express some content, after all.19 Given this point, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Actually, this may be disputed to some extent. Sperber’s and Wilson’s early 
account of metaphor (1986/1995) pointed out that a characteristic of metaphor is 
the expression of what they call ‘weak implicatures’. This concept is different 
from that of the traditional category of ‘implicature’, in that it allows for non-
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Davidson’s appeal to pragmatics, at least in the most common 
sense in which the term is taken, is wholly mysterious, if not 
simply inconsistent with his own theoretical presuppositions.  
What about Davidson’s implicit suggestion that metaphors have 
a special force attached to them, which would make them more 
similar to other kinds of speech acts, e.g. assertion, question, lie, 
etc.? Consider this passage: 
 
[A]bsurdity or contradiction in a metaphorical sentence guarantees 
we will not believe it and invites us, under proper circumstances, 
to take the sentence metaphorically’ (1979: 40. Emphasis added) 
 
Here Davidson seems to be comparing the structure of 
metaphorical speech acts (if there is any such thing) to that of 
indirect speech acts. For instance, consider this utterance: 
 
(11) Can you pass me the salt? 
 
The literal meaning of this nondeclarative sentence is a question 
regarding the ability of the person to whom the question is 
addressed to pass the salt to the speaker. However, given the 
circumstance (in this case, the highly standardized circumstance 
imposed by the social context) the speaker is indirectly asking her 
interlocutor to pass her the salt.  
However, two points need to be made. First of all, Davidson 
takes ‘absurdity’ or ‘contradiction’ to be a necessary and sufficient 
condition for recognising a metaphor. This seems to be plainly 
false,20 as the following sentences demonstrate: 
 
(12)  Jesus was a carpenter. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
propositional effects of the kind Davidson would be satisfied with. I will discuss 
this notion in chapter iv. 
20 A point stressed by Leezenberg (2001). 
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(13) No man is an island. 
 
These sentences are literally true, but their preferred interpretation 
is clearly  
metaphorical. Thus it is at least unclear what Davidson would say 
about these constructions.21 It is instead quite important to stress 
that no theory of metaphor will be effective unless it theoretically 
motivates the choice of a metaphorical interpretation over a literal 
one. Only by giving an answer to the question regarding under 
which circumstances a sentence is metaphorical a theory would be 
worthy of consideration. Davidson does not provide any such 
answer, and therefore he fails to offer any principled reason to take 
metaphor as a sort of speech act. 
Secondly, Davidson is not even clear as to his positive proposal 
regarding the type of function a metaphorical speech act would 
serve: Imagination or seeing-as? He often talks of the ability of 
metaphors to make us see one thing in terms of another. But other 
times he says that metaphor ‘makes us appreciate some fact – but 
not by standing for, or expressing, the fact’ (1978: 31). Finally, as 
the initial quotation of Davidson in this section states, he 
generically takes a metaphor to be launched by ‘the imaginative 
employment of words and sentences.’ No effort whatsoever is 
made by Davidson to put together, within a coherent framework, 
the notions of ‘imaginative employment’ and ‘seeing as’. In fact, 
these two notions belong to two very distinct cognitive 
categories.22  
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 En passant, the same type of argument will be effective against Grice and 
speech-act theorists like Searle. 
22 The reader may look at Camp (2009), who brings some insight on this issue. 
CHAPTER I 
 
! "#!
6. Beyond Disquotation 
 
The problems for Davidson’s account are even more radical and 
touch the essence itself of his philosophical semantics. Remember 
that in § 2, at the bottom of Davidson’s argument, I stressed the 
following commitment of Davidson’s theory: “given that all there 
is to the understanding of a sentence is the knowledge of the T-
theorem associated to that sentence, then metaphor is no exception 
to this constraint”. I see two ways to attack the conclusion that 
Davidson wants to draw from his commitment, namely, that the 
understanding of metaphors only requires the grasping of T-
sentences: on the one hand, it is possible to directly show that 
metaphors are exceptions to Davidson’s constraint that sentences’ 
meanings are given by T-sentences (or to put in another way, that 
the knowledge of the sentences’ meanings is given by the grasp of 
their corresponding T-sentences). On the other hand, it is possible 
to indirectly show that Davidson’s argument does not even get 
started since there are examples of sentences whose literal truth-
conditions are not fine-grained enough to individuate the actual 
situations which make the utterance of those sentences come out 
true. But then one may legitimately wonder whether disquotation 
provides a sufficient warrant to preserve any theoretically useful 
connection between truth and meaning, and whether Davidson’s 
overall project is to be abandoned or revised consequently. 
 
6.1. Within the first type of counterarguments to Davidson’s view –
 those that directly attack the claim that metaphors’ linguistic 
understanding is fully captured by the grasp of T-theorems – lay 
two arguments which I call the ‘Embeddability Argument’ and the 
‘Representation Argument’. 
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Embeddability Argument: metaphors embed, therefore there must 
be a content (i.e. a fully interpreted semantic structure) to be 
embedded. Just consider these sentences, which are, respectively, 
nondeclarative, embedded under the scope of some sentential 
operator (like the modal operator ‘perhaps’), deeply embedded in 
an intensional context, embedded in the antecedent of a conditional 
and, finally, embedded in a report: 
 
(14)  Is Juliet the sun? 
(15)  Perhaps Juliet is the sun. 
(16)  I wonder why Romeo still considers Juliet his sun.  
(17)  If Juliet is the sun for Romeo, then he should try to avoid 
any further contact with her.  
(18)  Romeo said that Juliet is the sun. 
 
If we follow Davidson’s suggestion that the interpretation of 
metaphors is a matter of interpreting the force of such utterances, 
then we should not expect metaphors to embed.23 But since we can 
intuitively assess the truth-conditions of the metaphorical clauses 
of these sentences, it looks as if we are also able to determine how 
the truth-values of these clauses compose with the larger 
constructions in which they are embedded, so as to determine the 
truth-value of the whole sentences. Besides, if we take the 
suggestion that metaphors belong to some special sort of speech-
act, e.g., the speech act of ‘metaphorizing’ or ‘inviting 
comparisons’,24 then it would be impossible for a metaphor to be 
preceded by an attitude verb or by a report one. But clearly the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 I am ignoring cases of so-called ‘biscuit conditionals’ (e.g., ‘If you are 
interested, there are some biscuits in the cupboard’). Cases like biscuit 
conditionals are special because the evaluation of the antecedent of the 
conditional does not have any relation with the truth-evaluation of the 
consequent (whether you are interested or not, it is always the case that there are 
biscuits in the cupboard). For a semantic treatment of biscuit conditionals, see 
Predelli (2009a). 
24 I’m using these expressions from Leezenberg (2001: 117), whose analysis has 
inspired the present criticism I am making of Davidson’s view.  
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metaphorical interpretation is independent from ‘my’ attitude in  
(16) and from the reporter’s perspective in (18).25 
 
Representational problem: If metaphors do not stand for any facts, 
could it still be possible to claim that they have some sort of 
representational power? A possible solution to this question is 
given by Reimer (2001), who focuses on Davidson’s account of 
metaphor from a purely communicative point of view.26  
Reimer defends Davidson’s idea that metaphors are not 
propositional in character, where by propositional she means 
sentential.27 But she goes on to say that there may be a way for the 
Davidsonian to say that metaphors do express some propositional 
content, e.g., by appealing to Stalnaker’s conception of proposition, 
according to which “something is propositional just in case it 
represents the world as being a certain way” (Reimer 2001: 145). 
Therefore when a metaphor makes us notice certain things, it 
makes us notice certain similarities, there’s no need to “entertain 
any proposition (i.e. a sentence or set of sentences) affirming these 
similarities” (Reimer 2001: 147). 
However, Stalnaker’s view on proposition (1986, 1999) is more 
complicated than Reimer thinks: the representational (i.e., 
conceptual) power of a proposition lies in pinning down a set of 
possible worlds in which the proposition holds. If so, to understand 
a sentence is to represent that set, and this implies that one is able 
to represent the sentence as being true in those worlds. Thus, it 
looks like the Stalnakerian picture presupposes a classical view of 
proposition. Therefore, on such a view if one comes to see the 
similarities that a metaphor brings about, it is because she has 
effectively been able to see what the world should be like in order !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 I will give an explanation of this fact in Chapter 7. 
26 In this chapter I have distanced myself from accounts such as Reimer’s 
because I think it is better to first explain Davidson’s theoretical reasons to reject 
metaphorical meaning, before assessing Davidson’s view on metaphor in 
communication. 
27 She appeals to a suggestion put forward by Moran (1996). 
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for the proposition (Stalnakerian sense which includes the classical 
view) to be true. This seems to imply that metaphors do have 
representational, i.e. fully conceptual, power. 
 
6.2. Within the second type of counterarguments, i.e. those which 
indirectly attack not just Davidson’s account of metaphor but 
Davidson’s semantic programme, lay two arguments that are 
addressed to show how disquotation is not a theoretical virtue after 
all. 
 
Paraphrasability argument: Davidson has provided a number of 
arguments against taking metaphor to express any content. One of 
such arguments states that metaphors are not paraphrasable in the 
way ordinary literal sentences are. However, consider the following 
sentences: 
 
(19) France is hexagonal. 
(20) Jim is tall. 
(21) Guinness is tasty. 
 
Now, the argument goes as follows: First we consider the relevant 
T-sentences for (19)-(21): 
 
(19!) ‘France is hexagonal’ is true iff France is hexagonal. 
(20!) ‘Jim is tall’ is true iff Jim is tall. 
(21!) ‘Guinness is tasty’ is true iff Guinness is tasty. 
 
Then we ask whether competent speakers of English, in virtue of 
grasping (19!)-(21!), are endowed with a semantic knowledge 
which provides necessary and sufficient conditions to truth-
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evaluate those sentences.28 Clearly, even granting that (19!)-(21!) 
impose some constraint on the interpretation of (19)-(21), these 
alone are not sufficient to deliver the right truth-conditions of those 
sentences. For there are too many ways in which (19)-(21) can be 
true, and thus there are too many ways to paraphrase their contents. 
For instance, (19) may count as true in a context of elementary 
geography class, but not in a context where the precise borders of 
France are salient. Similarly, (20) may be true in a context where 
Jim’s height is evaluated with respect to the average height of his 
class, but not true with respect to some other standard of evaluation 
(e.g., the local basketball team). Finally (21) cannot be evaluated 
without some implicit reference to the speaker’s standard of taste, 
or something along those lines.  
But the point I am making here is not that these sentences can 
express too many contents – this is something on which several 
lines of research have expressed different examples. In fact, it 
could be replied that it is still possible to find appropriate truth-
conditions of those sentences in the metalanguage or to play some 
semantic tricks at the level of their logical form.29 The point is 
instead that once we allow extra-material to determine the semantic 
evaluation of those sentences, disquotation becomes subject to an 
open-endedness that is methodologically suspicious given the 
compositionality constraint implicit in our semantic theorising.30 
The right conclusion to draw is that T-sentences alone fail to 
provide the correct semantic generalisation for a class of sentences !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Indexicality provides instead an obstacle to the necessity of a semantic 
analysis based on T-sentences. Consider an utterance of the sentence ‘It is sunny 
today’ which we want to evaluate tomorrow. Thus, ‘It is sunny today’ is true iff 
it was sunny yesterday is uttered. In order to preserve truth, a T-schema should 
also preserve sameness of content, but this goes against ‘homophonic’ 
interpretations of the kind Davidson privileged. 
29 The problem of unarticulated constituents comes in here, i.e. the problem of 
whether these sentences contain elements which are not realised in their surface 
structure, but that are articulated at the deeper level of their logical form, whose 
semantic representation is made necessary to fully truth-evaluate them. Perry 
(1986) is a locus classicus. We will find this problem again especially in 
Chapters 4 and 6. 
30 I will deal with this issue in Chapter 5. 
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that are not metaphorical. They fail because they are unable to 
specify under what circumstances the sentences of the left-hand 
side would be true or false. As a consequence of that, disquotation 
is blocked and cannot deliver any substantial piece of information 
about the world. Therefore, Davidson’s theory fails to provide the 
kind of ‘complex ability’ Davidson himself had described as being 
a theoretical virtue of his system (See § 4). It seems then that 
Davidson is not warranted to conclude that metaphorical sentences 
and literal ones are distinguishable in virtue of their 
paraphrasability, which indirectly leans on the issue of whether T-
sentences provide a complete answer to the question of what kind 
of semantic knowledge speakers of a language hold. Simply, T-
sentences do not provide a complete answer to that question. 
The very last problem for Davidson’s programme concerns the 
relationship between the strict extensionalist demands that a 
Tarski-style theory of truth imposes on a theory meaning. Consider 
this example, which is offered by Pietroski (2005: 268): 
 
(22)  France is hexagonal, and France is a republic. 
 
Now, this sentence may be considered true since both conjuncts, 
given appropriate circumstances, are both true. By logic alone, we 
have the following inference, which is clearly valid: 
 
(23)      
! ! !!! ! !!!!! ! !!! !!!! 
               
However, it seems that by validating this kind of inference we 
are forcing now the meaning of (22) to allow for a new meaning 
that clearly does not make any sense, as there is nothing in the 
world which is an hexagonal republic.  
If this example shows something, it may be taken to further 
strengthen my conclusion that a Davidsonian semantics is unable to 
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capture all there is to be said about the meaning of natural language 
expressions because, as a matter of empirical evidence, important 
aspects concerning the semantics of the sentences of a natural 
language like English have been shown to be rather reluctant to be 
fully captured by a Tarski-style theory of truth. I will come back to 
this example later on since it has a straightforward similarity with a 
test provided by Stern (2000, 2006), i.e. the ‘VP-ellipsis Test’, for 
mixed literal/metaphorical contexts.  
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
My view in this dissertation approaches a less pessimistic 
perspective to the semantic study of metaphor than that reached by 
Davidson. For contrary to what Davidson thinks, I will show in the 
last chapter that there is ample space of manoeuvre to treat 
metaphors semantically. The arguments presented against 
Davidson here make it already problematic to maintain that the 
meaning of a metaphor is captured by the literal truth-condition 
associated with the sentence which is its most superficial vehicle. 
For metaphors embed and they also determine possible scenarios 
the representation of which make them propositional, and therefore 
at least partially paraphrasable. The question we are left with is 
then at what level metaphors express content: semantics or 
pragmatics? 
According to Davidson, a metaphor cannot implicate anything, 
because that would make it propositional, against his assumption 
that metaphors do not have special meanings. But what if Davidson 
had followed the Gricean view that metaphors do implicate 
something over and above their literal meaning? That would help 
Davidson’s semantic programme to keep on doing its proper job, 
leaving to pragmatics the extra-work required by these ‘accidents’ 
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of language. For reasons not entirely clear to me Davidson opted 
for a less than fully explicated view that metaphors give rise to 
some special speech-act of ‘metaphorising’. We saw how such a 
view is doomed to fail from the start given the embeddability of 
metaphors. 
What needs to be done now is to understand what is the proper 
level of representation of a metaphor. One initial suggestion, 
following Sainsbury (2009), is that the meanings of certain 
sentences that require some special treatment in order to express 
some truth-evaluable content are unspecific; these sentences 
express the same content irrespective of their context of utterance. 
However, Sainsbury proposes this treatment in defence of 
Davidson’s truth-conditional semantics in the light of the kind of 
examples Travis (1985) originally presented against such a theory. 
For instance, consider 
 
(24)  John grunts. 
 
According to Travis this sentence cannot be evaluated without 
appeal to some specific, occasional understanding of what it is for 
John to grunt. Sainsbury thinks that a Davidsonian may reply by 
using a test: the DENIABILITY test. Consider the denial of (23): 
 
(25) John does not grunt. 
 
It seems that you can deny (24) without having in mind any 
particular way in which John grunts. This strategy seems to 
safeguard Davidson’s semantics for this particular kind of example, 
but can it be applied to examples such as (19)-(21)? No, it cannot. 
It is in fact impossible to understand the denial of these sentences 
without having in mind some particular way in which the content 
embedded in the denial has to be taken. A fortiori, the same 
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situation will be present in the denial of metaphorical sentences, 
like: 
 
(26) Juliet is not the sun. 
 
I conclude then that this kind of strategy does not resolve 
Davidson’s troubles, but accentuates them in a way which makes 
my search for a valid theoretical alternative quite urgent. It will 
turn out that all the problems metaphorical interpretation poses for 
Davidson’s theory can be resolved only by considering a 
theoretical machinery that goes against Davidson’s extensional 
semantics. In fact, I will later consider the idea of relativising truth 
to points of evaluation, where a point of evaluation will be treated 
along the lines indicated by Kaplan (1989) with the further 
introduction of a parameter, which I call ‘thematic dimension’, that 
will play a role in determining the truth-value of a content at a 
world. But before reaching that moment, other problems and other 
solutions inherent in the foundations of metaphor studies will have 
to be considered, and to these I now turn.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Metaphor and Implicature  
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Grice’s project 
 
In the previous chapter I discussed how Davidson tried to preserve 
his semantic system from the intrusion of content that could be 
inferred from metaphorical utterances, by denying that metaphors 
express any propositional content beyond that which is 
encapsulated by the sentences that are their vehicles. Davidson’s 
argument was shown to be not very plausible for a number of 
reasons concerning not only his very narrow conception of 
semantics, but also his inability to spell out a positive conception of 
metaphors and their connection with context. Consequently, 
Davidson was unable to reach a level of systematic analysis of how 
language users interpret metaphors, and this was taken as a further 
weakness of his view. However, the issues Davidson touched on in 
his paper on metaphor are still of great value since they clearly 
indicate a crucial dilemma concerning metaphors, at least as far as 
this investigation is concerned. The dilemma is as follows: either 
metaphors express some content that exceeds the semantic 
information encoded by the literal meanings of the sentences used 
to convey them, and then any compositional semantics is 
CHAPTER 2 
 
! ! !"#!
unsuitable to explain this fact; or metaphors do not express any 
content beyond that which is encoded by the literal meaning of the 
sentences which are their vehicles, but then semantics alone cannot 
deliver the proper understanding of metaphors.  
In this chapter I am going to assess a very different programme, 
which was started in the same years Davidson developed his own, 
but which took a very radical turn away from the kind of 
assumptions philosophers of language, semanticists and logicians 
had been making about communication. I am going to assess 
Grice’s theory of conversation, summarised by his well-known 
lectures held at Harvard in 1967 [1975]. Given that the conception 
of communication originated by this programme has effectively 
changed the way philosophers and non-philosophers conceive of 
communication today, it would be no mistake to consider Grice’s 
programme as a sort of theoretical revolution, whose effects are 
still not completely, even adequately so, assessed. Metaphor is a 
good test for such a programme since not only may it serve the 
purpose of showing the strengths and limits of Grice’s theory of 
conversation, but it also indirectly casts doubt on his conception of 
meaning as based on intention recognition. 
A basic claim of such a programme is that we do not need to 
enlarge the expressive power of the semantics of a natural 
language, in order to account for certain linguistic phenomena that 
are difficult to treat semantically. On the other hand, this 
programme aims at recognising that semantics alone cannot 
provide a full assessment of what speakers convey with their 
utterances. This, far from disproving the need for a notion of literal 
meaning, may be shown to presuppose it. We can, in fact, 
determine what the speakers mean in these cases only on the basis 
of what the speakers say, plus by reasoning on certain normative 
maxims that presumably govern any conversation. What the 
speakers say, in turn, can be determined only on the basis of the 
literal meanings of the words they choose in order to express the 
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proposition(s) they want to get across to their audience. What-is-
said is therefore considered by Grice as the theoretical glue which 
serves to systematically connect the literal meaning of words and 
sentences to what these may be used to convey on some particular 
occasions.1  
The idea that saying something does not fully capture what the 
speaker may mean by saying it was not new. Austin (1962) had 
already started his own programme on speech acts, which was 
based on similar distinctions, and in particular on the idea that 
locutionary acts (the acts of saying something) should be clearly 
separated from illocutionary and perlocutionary ones (respectively, 
the acts of performing a speech act by saying something and the 
acts of moving the hearer to do something in virtue of the 
illocutionary acts made). Searle was going to give his contribution 
to speech act theory soon. Strawson (1950, 1952) had opposed 
Russell’s logical conception of language, claiming that the logical 
form of sentences does not univocally determine contents unless 
we also consider the role of speakers, and possibly of contexts, in 
achieving reference or making assertions. 
What radically changed with Grice is, I think, that phenomena 
once considered to properly fall under the aegis of rhetoric were 
now receiving a systematic investigation, which made them appear 
no longer as the effects of some merely decorative function of 
language, but as crucial elements of the speakers’ mental life, 
which could in principle be explained by appealing to systematic 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 From now I follow the convention of conjoining the three words constituting 
the complex expression ‘what I said,’ in order to form a syntactically unique 
expression. This is to signal that I am here dealing with a technical notion. 
Furthermore, I will use subscript letters to define, in a second moment, each 
conception of what-is-said that I am going to consider here (e.g., Bach’s view on 
what-is-said will become what-is-saidB). On the other hand, whenever I talk of 
the content expressed by an utterance, I will stick to the normal use of the 
expression ‘what is said’. 
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norms of language and communication.2 Far from being linguistic 
epiphenomena, it became evident that the cases Grice started 
investigating were core aspects of the language users’ mental life, 
which the investigation of language alone could not possibly fully 
explain. 
After having analysed Grice’s programme, I will focus on his 
notion of ‘conversational implicature’ to see whether metaphor can 
be assimilated to it. My answer is negative: metaphors are not 
implicatures, and, in fact, they do not satisfy any of the conditions 
Grice associated to conversational implicatures. In particular, 
metaphors are not easily cancellable, they are detachable (the 
change of a term used metaphorically with another which is co-
referential to it does not assure sameness of metaphorical 
interpretation), and they are not calculable in the way standard 
cases of conversational implicatures are. But there are further 
problems for Grice. One of these concerns Grice’s idea that 
speakers of metaphors only ‘make as if to say’ something. This 
notion creates problems when we consider cases of embeddability 
of metaphors under some logical operators such as negation. 
Finally, having shown how Grice’s view of metaphor fails to 
offer any necessary condition for metaphor to be taken as 
conversational implicature, I will go on to further argue that it does 
not even offer a sufficiency criterion since, by identifying cases of 
metaphor with cases of irony, Grice ends up with the view that two 
very different phenomena should be considered as belonging to the 
same category.  
The plan of the chapter is therefore as follows: In § 2, by 
reflecting upon certain utterances involving a discrepancy between 
their truth-conditional meaning and the truths apparently expressed 
by them, I discuss the limits of two philosophical theories which !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Sure Black (1962) had already stressed the cognitive function of metaphors, but 
his interaction theory made them appear the result of almost magical properties 
of language, and therefore quite unpredictable from a theoretical point of view. 
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historically precede Grice’s work, so as to pave the way for Grice’s 
theory of implicatures, which I fully explore in § 3. There I present 
Grice’s taxonomy of implicatures: conventional implicatures, 
generalised and particularised implicatures. In particular, I will 
focus on the notion of particularised conversational implicature, 
and show how it is supposed by Grice to apply to different 
phenomena (e.g., standard examples of conversational implicature, 
irony, metaphor). In § 4 I will present the battery of objections 
against Grice’s analysis, and show that a proper account of 
metaphor does not require the notion of implicature at all.  
 
 
2. Quineans vs. Austinians 
 
The starting point of my discussion is an idea which has already 
emerged, namely, that a proper distinction should be made between 
the literal meaning of a sentence and what the speaker manages to 
convey by uttering that sentence. Furthermore, it will soon become 
clear that such a distinction does not capture all types of meaning 
that a systematic theory of language should explain. For, we will 
also need to make room for what a sentence, when uttered on some 
particular occasion, conveys, irrespective of any assessment of the 
speaker’s intentions. A great merit of Grice (1975 [1989]) is that he 
first advanced a comprehensive taxonomy of these cases. 
However, before giving an assessment of Grice’s programme as 
being based on these distinctions, I would like to propose a 
comparison, partially based on historical considerations, between 
two schools of thought that will help me frame Grice’s ideas better. 
I decided to call these two schools Quinean and Austinian after 
their respective philosophical fathers, Quine and Austin.3 These !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 One may wonder whether Quine himself or Austin would have adopted the 
views which I am respectively calling Quinean and Austinian. Whether or not 
they would, my claim here is only that these schools of thoughts started within 
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two schools were dominating the philosophical scene of the fifties 
of the last century, before new important philosophical currents 
such as Grice’s pragmatics and possible world semantics made 
their appearance. In particular, I am going to start my analysis by 
introducing some examples that are classically considered to 
require a treatment in terms of Grice’s notion of implicature. I will 
explain why these examples pose problems to these two schools of 
thought and why Grice’s theory of implicatures becomes then so 
appealing. By the end of this section, it will also be clear how 
strategic the notion of literal meaning is in Grice’s programme. In 
the next section, I will be more specific about the different types of 
implicature, and also about the role of conversational maxims in 
calculating them. 
Thus, let’s first consider this bunch of cases: 
 
(1)  They got married and had a child. 
(2) John will do his homework or he will be punished.  
(3)  If it rains, the match will be cancelled. 
 
There are two questions such sentences pose: first of all, under 
what wordly conditions are these sentences true or false? Secondly, 
what is their meaning? It seems to me that we can individuate a 
Quinean and an Austinian type of answer, depending on how we 
judge the questions to be interrelated. In between, there is Grice’s 
option, which is a sort of middle ground for those who do not want 
to be fully committed to either of the two answers I am going to 
consider.4  
On the one hand, there is the Quinean school of thinkers, which 
takes the two questions to be strictly related in that answering the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
two distinct philosophical traditions that can be traced back to these 
philosophers. 
4 See, for instance, Grice (1989: 372). 
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first provides an implicit answer to the latter. Its basic assumption 
is the following claim:  
 
Quineans: Truth-conditions determine meaning. Facts 
about meaning are exhausted by facts about truth-
conditions. According to such a view, issues about 
meaning can only be resolved by appealing to a theory 
of truth extensionally defined for a language of first-
order logic. Whatever does not square with such a 
language should be eliminated from its underlying 
ontology unless it is opportunely paraphrased in it.  
 
On the other hand, there is another school of thinkers, which 
goes in the exact opposite direction of the Quineans. According to 
such thinkers, let’s call them Austinians, truth is a property not of 
sentences but of statements.5 In other words, it is not by virtue of 
some extrinsic or intrinsic property of a language such as English 
that sentences belonging to that language are true or false. It is 
only when a speaker, under certain contextual and normative 
conditions, utters such sentences that the question of truth arises. 
Hence the study of such further conditions becomes essential to 
the understanding of truth. If so, the study of meaning becomes an 
integral part of the study of truth, since the latter notion cannot be 
understood without having a firm grasp of the former.  
According to the Austinian, the way we use the predicate ‘is 
true’ should be considered on a par with the use of any more 
mundane predicate like ‘is red’ or ‘is funny’. That is, both kinds of 
predicate have their own conventions regulating their use, and 
failure to handle those results in failure to apply them in 
appropriate situations. ‘This sentence is true’, ‘What you have just 
said is true’ and ‘It is true that I am Italian’ are all sentences where !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Austin (1950) is the locus classicus.  
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the predicate ‘is true’ or the sentential operator ‘it is true that’ are 
used in order to communicate that something has the property of 
‘being the case’. Understanding under what conditions these 
statements manage to communicate this requires a previous 
understanding of a series of elements, whose knowledge is given 
by a mixture of linguistic competence and wordly information. In 
‘This sentence is true’ and ‘What you have just said is true’, for 
instance, we need to know, respectively, which sentence is being 
talked about and what the addressee has previously said. In ‘It is 
true that I am Italian’, we need, in addition, to know who the 
speaker is, and make sure that her statement provides an answer to 
a question specifically asking in that regard. Summarising:  
 
Austinians: Truth is not a special property that sentences 
have or fail to have. Truth is what our uses of the 
predicate ‘is true’ or of any other similar device tell us 
about a certain class of things, i.e., statements. What 
these uses tell us is that some statements about states of 
affairs hold in virtue of a complex relationship between 
these states and the conventions governing the sentences 
used to represent them. 
 
A crucial element that distinguishes these two schools regards 
the applicability of the predicate ‘is true’: while for the Quineans 
the predicate applies to sentences, for the Austinians it applies to 
statements, in virtue of the conventions associating sentences to the 
world. Given this distinction, it is worth noticing that, for the 
Austinians, the applicability of a predicate like ‘is true’ or a 
sentence-operator like ‘it is true that’ admits degrees of 
successfulness (Austin 1950: 130), as with the usage of any other 
predicate. For instance, someone asserting ‘It is true that the 
average American family has 2.3 children’ should be taken to have 
asserted something being itself true provided that what she has 
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stated fulfils the scope and interests of the conversation. This 
strategy is clearly not available to the Quineans, who hold that the 
predicate ‘is true’ is absolute, and hence not interest-relative or 
open to degrees of applicability. 
Whether or not ‘true’ or ‘false’ are interest-relative, they are 
relative in another sense, for the Austinians: they can apply to 
statements only if some historic situation is being referred to by 
their utterances. It seems, in fact, correct to say that an utterance of 
‘The average American family has 2.3 sons’ can be truth-evaluated 
only relative to some historic situation, say, the current year 2012. 
And it seems correct that an implicit reference to a situation is 
always being made by an utterance. The importance of this point 
will become apparent later on, especially in relation to my 
discussion of the possibility of an account of metaphorical truth 
along the lines suggested by Austin.6 
For the time being, I will concentrate on the Quinean strategy to 
deal with sentences (1)-(3). If we adhered to the Quinean view that 
the truth of these sentences should mirror a purely extensional 
principle of compositionality,7 then we would have to say that these 
sentences are true when and only when their truth-conditional 
profile is sufficient to deliver the correct assignment of truth-values 
to them. Their truth-conditional profile is, of course, given by the 
truth-conditional tables, which are here reported for pedagogical 
purposes: 
 
 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 The Austinian view will be properly discussed in the Chapter 7, in relation to 
the conception of ‘Austianian Proposition’ which is essential to characterise a 
version of situational semantics, which I myself espouse.  
7 See discussion in the previous chapter.  
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Given these tables, the truth-conditions for (1)-(3) are restricted to 
the set of four logical situations each of these tables represents. In 
particular, (1) will be true iff both conjuncts are true, (2) will be 
true iff neither of the two disjuncts is false, and (3) will be 
vacuously true whenever the antecedent is false or its consequent 
true.  
However, common sense would seem to tell us that things go 
differently than the way the Quineans describe. Certainly, the order 
of the two conjuncts matters for the assessment of (1), or doesn’t 
it? If the order were not important, then the subjects of this 
sentence could have had their child and then got married. Would 
(1) be true under those conditions? Intuitions here waver, but most 
would certainly find something inappropriate with a restatement of 
the conjunction with inverted conjuncts. Similarly, the truth of (2) 
seems to be sensitive to the relation of the situations described. 
Suppose the second disjunct is true; then it seems that the first must 
be false for the second disjunct to be true. But suppose now that the 
second disjunct is true, and the first also. According to our truth-
conditional table for disjunction, (2) should still be true, but 
according to our intuitive evaluation, it is not. Finally, as to (3), 
suppose it is true that the match is cancelled but false that it rains 
on the match’s day. Then by the truth-conditional profile of 
conditional, we will have that (3) is true, but, once again, it seems 
that what (3) states is different (Strawson 1952: 83-84). Quineans 
are clearly exposed to difficulties in explaining these cases, which 
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are far from constituting minor aspects of the corpus of linguistic 
data that a semantics of natural language has to provide an 
explanation of. 
It seems that, on the other hand, if we go with the Austinians 
and say that the truth-conditional profile of (1)-(3) is directly 
influenced by factors external to the meaning encoded by them 
(e.g., a temporal connotation in the meaning of ‘and’ or a causal 
one in the meaning of ‘or’), then we open even the most basic 
elements of a language, i.e., its truth-conditional operators, to an 
unwelcome massive ambiguity.8  
But the problems do not end up here. What about utterances in 
which some specific element is responsible for the emergence of 
some meaning over and above the truth-conditional one? Consider: 
 
(4)  He is rich but honest. 
(5) He is Italian; therefore, he is a good cook. 
 
Here we have two utterances whose truth-conditional profile is 
given by the truth-table for conjunction: in other words, (4) and (5) 
are true iff the subject picked out by ‘he’ has both the properties 
which are predicated of him (‘being rich’ and ‘being honest’ in (4) 
and ‘being Italian’ and ‘being a good cook’ in (5)). However, in 
addition to the truth-conditional profile we have two words, ‘but’ 
and ‘therefore,’ which are responsible for generating some further 
meaning, that is to say, a contrast in (4) and a sort of entailment in 
(5).  
Again, even though the Quineans are clearly not at ease in 
dealing with such sorts of example, Austinians would probably not 
go very far, either, if they claimed that the truth-conditions of these 
utterances are influenced by how things stand with the contrast 
implied by the word ‘but’ in (4) and the implication conveyed by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Against this hypothesis, see Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (2000). 
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‘therefore’ in (5). In fact, (4) and (5) would still be true if the 
relevant contrast and the implication were false. The problem 
becomes more acute when we consider that whichever meanings 
(4) and (5) further convey, they can be captured in propositional 
terms, as many philosophers of language have pointed out (Bach 
1999, Neale 2001, Predelli 2003). But if these meanings are 
propositional, then they are certainly truth-evaluable.9 Thus we 
have two truth-conditional contents in just one sentence, which 
makes the entire project of providing a clear-cut semantics of these 
utterances more complex than Quineans and Austians could 
possibly admit. It is at this point that Grice’s theory of implicatures 
appears as a natural solution to all these problems. To this I shall 
now turn.  
 
  
3 The theory of implicatures and the role of maxims in 
communication 
 
In this section I shall introduce the reader to Grice’s theory of 
implicatures. In § 3.1 I will be considering the role of ‘what is said’ 
according to Grice, and also his notion of ‘conventional 
implicature’. I shall use two tests, the ‘disagreement test’ and the 
‘deniability test’, to judge the correctness of Grice’s distinction 
between ‘what is said’ and ‘what is conventionally implicated’. I 
will show that, contrary to what Bach thinks, Grice’s distinction is 
empirically correct. In § 3.2 I will move to discuss Grice’s notion 
of ‘conversational implicature’. I shall look at several applications 
of this notion and suggest that we should distinguish between two 
types of Gricean implicatures: those which ‘add’ something to what !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Under the assumption that propositions are the privileged truth-bearers. This 
assumption has been challenged by some, but I won’t explore their challenges 
here. I will touch on this issue again in Chapter 3, in relation to Barker’s account 
of conventional implicatures. 
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is said and those which require that ‘what is said’ be judged by the 
hearer as deviant in order for the implicature to arise. I shall use 
Stalnaker’s notion of common ground to make this distinction more 
vivid. Towards the end of this sub-section I will further delineate 
the location metaphor has within Grice’s taxonomy of implicatures 
whose calculability is due to either the flouting or the violation of 
some conversational maxims. 
Since his article ‘Meaning’ (1957), one of Grice’s most pressing 
worries was to define a psychologically real, and theoretically 
explanatory, notion of speaker’s meaning. According to Grice, 
defining this notion requires one to specify the basic effect reached 
by a speaker on her audience through the uttering of a sentence 
endowed with a particular mood. This effect can be characterised 
as the hearer’s recognition of the fact that the speaker has uttered 
certain words having a specific communicative intention in mind, 
which he or she, in turn, intends the hearer to recognise. The 
process is throughout intentional, and Grice attempts to reduce 
semantic notions such as meaning, entailment and what-is-said to 
the intentional activity of speakers. Such a reduction has been 
severely criticised (Ziff 1967), while some have made attempts to 
redefine it (Searle 1969, Schiffer 1972, even Neale 1992).  
It is not my interest to discuss such a Gricean line of research, 
which I take in any case to be uninteresting for the scope of this 
dissertation.10 Instead of focusing on Grice’s attempts to reduce 
semantic notions to what he considered to be more fundamental 
concepts such as speaker’s beliefs and intentions, I will be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Even if some Gricean scholars were to offer a successful reduction of semantic 
notions, this would, in my view, be completely irrelevant to the purpose of 
explaining what makes, for instance, a certain semantic interpretation more 
plausible than another. What is more, attempts to define semantic notions in 
terms of intentions will always presuppose knowledge of such notions. Similarly, 
to take an example from the philosophy of mind, the fact that a certain mental 
state could be theoretically reduced to a certain physical state will not, in my 
view, get rid of the phenomenon to be reduced. Actually each reduction of a 
certain phenomenon will always presuppose a higher, and independently 
specifiable, interpretation of it. 
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considering in this section Grice’s important contributions to the 
definition of the semantics/pragmatics interface. My main goal here 
is to introduce the reader to the realm of what we may call the 
Gricean pragmatics, which has been considered for years and years 
the privileged home for metaphor. In the next section I will cast 
more than one doubt on this assumption, which I take to be 
unwarranted for several reasons, both descriptive and theoretical.  
 
3.1 What is Said & Conventional Implicatures 
 
Suppose someone utters ‘It’s cold in this room.’ She has thereby 
made a certain act endowed with a mood, in this case the assertive 
mood that is usually indicated by the symbol ‘!’ (to be read 
‘turnstile’), and a content, that is, the proposition that it is cold in 
the room the speaker is. The same proposition can be expressed by 
a sentence whose mood is not that of an assertion, but, e.g., of an 
interrogative: ‘Is this room cold?’. In this case the speaker is not 
committed to the truth of that proposition, as the interrogative 
mood associated to her utterance indicates. Other moods, such as, 
for instance, the imperative (conventionally indicated in written 
language by ‘!’), introduce other kinds of commitment. What this 
shows is that it is possible to keep a content, the proposition 
expressed by the utterance of a sentence, fixed, while changing the 
mood or way of presenting such a content (e.g., assertively, 
interrogatively, imperatively, etc.). 
Furthermore, it seems we can define the notion of speaker’s 
meaning in two ways: on the one hand, we can look at the 
speaker’s type of commitment in relation to the content expressed 
by her utterance. Generally, in an assertion this will be the 
commitment to the truth of the proposition expressed, while in a 
question – assuming a Hamblin-style semantics for questions – the 
commitment is lessened to the truth of at least one proposition in 
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the set of answers which is the extension of the question. On the 
other hand, Grice stresses the importance of the rational activity of 
language users in determining the nature not only of the speaker’s 
main commitment, but, more generally, of ‘the total signification’ 
of her speech act. In the light of such a task, it becomes important 
for him to distinguish each level of contribution an utterance makes 
to the total signification intended by the speaker. 
Within this framework, we can make the following preliminary 
distinction regarding the specific contribution of an utterance to the 
total signification of a speaker’s speech act: 
 
(i) Sentence level (or utterance’s type level): Words, 
expressions and the mode in which these compose to determine 
contents. 
(ii) What is said: the content actually determined on the basis of 
(i).  
 
It is a very debated question nowadays whether Grice intended (ii) 
to be determined exclusively on the basis of (i), or whether further 
inferential processes should intervene in this process.11 One could, 
for instance, appeal to Kent Bach’s conservative reading of Grice’s 
notion of what-is-said as based on what Bach calls the Syntactic 
Correlation constraint:12  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 The reader may consult: Neale (1992), Recanati (2004) Carston (2002: Chap. 
1), Camp (2006). The theoretical notion of what-is-said is assumed by Grice only 
to ‘a considerable extent’ of ‘intuitive understanding’. Here is his sketchy idea: 
“In the sense in which I am using the word say, I intend what someone has said 
to be closely related to the conventional meaning of the words (the sentence) he 
has uttered” (1989: 25). He adds that for “a full identification of what the 
speaker said” one has to proceed to the disambiguation of any indexical element 
of the sentence uttered, and also to the particular understanding of the meanings 
on the particular occasion of utterance. Again, Neale (1992) provides good 
discussion of these aspects of Grice’s project. 
12 Cf. Bach 2001: 15. 
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Syntactic Correlation Constraint: what is said = “the 
elements of [the sentence], their order, and their syntactic 
character” (Grice 1989: 87). 
 
This formulation is, I think, a good approximation of Grice’s view, 
and is certainly supported by Grice’s explicit endorsement. 13 
However, it cannot be considered the whole story since Bach is 
deliberately avoiding an aspect of Grice’s theory that he rejects. 
This aspect is constituted by the category of what Grice calls 
‘conventional implicatures’. Grice has in mind a class of words and 
expressions whose contribution, he thinks, goes beyond what is 
said by an utterance.14 Following Bach’s characterisation (1999) of 
the phenomenon, we can divide such a class in two sub-classes: 
 
(6) a.   ‘but’, ‘therefore’, ‘still’, etc.  
    (Contrastive particles) 
b.  ‘confidentially’, ‘honestly’, ‘between you and me’, 
‘amazingly’, etc.    (Speech-act adverbs) 
 
Examples of the first class are the abovementioned utterances (4) 
and (5). Examples of the second class could be: 
 
(7)   Honestly, I’m not going to eat your pasta. 
(8)  Between you and me, she is not my girlfriend. 
 
The kind of effect that words like ‘honestly’ or expressions like 
‘between you and me’ are generally considered to bring about is to 
modify the way the utterance is to be interpreted, while what is said 
by the utterance is not affected by such encoded information. Thus !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 See also Grice (1989: 25) and Recanati (2004: 7). 
14 See also the very beginning of ‘Further Notes on Logic and Conversation’, 
where he strengths the idea that to the distinction between what is said and what 
is implicated one should add the distinction between ‘what is part of the 
conventional force (or meaning) of the utterance and what is not’ (Grice 1989: 
41). 
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the core intuition is that there are elements in the utterances of (4)-
(5) and (7)-(8) which are supposedly responsible for generating 
some implicatures over and above what is said by them.15  
Now, if it we adopted Bach’s definition of what is said, let’s dub 
it what-is-saidB, we could not have a special category of 
conventional implicatures. The reason is simple. Since it is possible 
to find in the sentences’ surface of (4)-(5) and (7)-(8) some 
syntactic elements which are responsible for what Grice considers 
implicatures, then by the Syntactic Correlation Constraint such 
elements should instead be part of what-is-said. This is, in its 
essence, the core of Bach’s attack on the notion of conventional 
implicature (Bach 1999). 
 
What is said and Impliciture 
 
This is not the place for surveying the details of Bach’s argument. I 
mentioned it because it seems to me a good starting point for those 
who are interested in defining the criteria for a theoretically useful 
notion of what-is-said. Bach’s syntactic criterion may be one of 
these and it is certainly relevant to assess the current 
minimalism/contextualism debate.  
A form of the Syntactic Correlation Constraint is, I think, 
implicit in Cappelen’s and Lepore’s semantic minimalism 
(Cappelen and Lepore 2005) whereby the notion of what-is-said is 
defined in conservative terms as the proposition semantically 
expressed by an utterance of a sentence after every 
ambiguous/polysemous expression has been disambiguated, as well 
as every vague expression and indexical element.16 According to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 According to Christopher Potts (2005), at least another class of cases, namely, 
the class of appositives, requires an analysis in terms of conventional 
implicature, for which Potts himself provides an elegant semantics.  
16 Notice how even Grice allows for such operations on what is said by an 
utterance. See fn. 11. 
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such a definition of what-is-said, all the reports of (9) would not 
count as what is said by (9). 
 
(9)  Francesco lives in 39 Premier Road. 
 
(10) Francesco Gentile lives in 39 Premier Road. 
(11)  Alba’s son lives in 39 Premier Road, Nottingham. 
(12) The seminar leader of ‘Nature of Meaning’ lives in 39 
Premier Road, Nottingham. 
 
Although in a sense (10)-(12) say the same thing said by (9), they 
do not under the interpretation of what-is-said which is favoured 
here. A more complex case is given by sentences which seem to 
require a completion in order to express a full proposition. 
However, they still would count as having said something under 
this analysis. For instance: 
 
(13)  Jim is ready. 
(14)  I’ve had breakfast. 
(15)  This steak is tough. 
 
Here Bach’s theory departs from Cappelen’s and Lepore’s 
minimalism in that the latter, but not the former, considers (13)-
(15) to express complete propositions, while Bach takes them to 
fail to do so. In order for the hearer to fully understand (13)-(15), 
she must make explicit what is implicit in them. In other words, she 
must elaborate on the content lexically articulated by (13)-(15) to 
the point they express: 
 
(13*)  Jim is ready to go. 
(14*)  I’ve had breakfast today. 
(15*)  This steak is not properly cooked. 
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Bach calls the process by means of which (13*)-(15*) are derived 
completion, whereas the expressions added in this process 
implicitures (not to be confused with implicatures). Sentences (13)-
(15) are instead considered propositional radicals in that they do 
not determine full propositions by themselves, but some of their 
elements manifest a degree of negative acidity which indicates their 
need of completion. We could adopt the following convention of 
using ‘+’ and ‘–’ to indicate the semantic polarity of each syntactic 
element in (13)-(15). ‘+’ indicates that the element is semantically 
complete, while ‘–’ indicates that the element requires completion. 
 
[S[NP Jim]+ [VP is ready]–] 
[S[NP I]+ [VP have had breakfast]–] 
[S[NP This steak]+ [VP  is rough]–] 
 
With some distinctions yet to be made, Bach’s notion of impliciture 
(Bach 1994, 2001) can be assimilated to Sperber’s and Wilson’s 
notion of explicature. This concept will be investigated in chapter 4 
since radical contextualists generally appeal to this category to 
explain metaphor. 
 
Coming back to Bach’s conception of what-is-said, I think we must 
distinguish his view from the one actually held by Grice, since 
Grice’s would be best defined as: 
 
what-is-saidG ! (what-is-saidB – {conventional implicatures}) 
 
That is, Grice’s notion of what-is-said is equivalent to Bach’s 
notion less the class of conventional implicatures, which Bach 
takes to be part of what-is-said. Grice would, in fact, respect 
Bach’s criterion so long as no conventional implicature were to be 
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considered. 17  When an expression belonging to the class of 
conventional implicature triggers is present in an utterance, Grice 
would take the Syntactic Correlation Constraint to break down, so 
as to produce a bifurcation of the total signification of the 
utterance. Consider, in fact, an utterance of: 
 
(16)  Even Mr. Berlusconi was sober last night. 
 
Grice would say that what is said by it, what-is-saidG, is: 
 
(17) Mr. Berlusconi was sober last night. 
 
The further content triggered by ‘even’ would be something like: 
 
(18) Mr. Berlusconi is usually not sober at dinner parties. 
 
Crucially, Grice thinks that (18) could be false without affecting 
the truth-conditions of (17). Interestingly, there are two tests that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 As Manuel García-Carpintero makes me notice, Grice's notion of "what is 
said" has a speech-act component ("dictiveness"), which Bach rejects. Now, 
García-Carpintero has objected that in a later chapter I appeal to Bach’s 
distinction between locutionary and illocutionary levels to criticise relevance 
theory. In particular, since there I defend the notion of locutionary level, which is 
the core of Bach’s conception of what-is-said, it could seem that I am both 
adopting Grice’s notion of what-is-said and Bach’s, which would make my view 
inconsistent. I do not think that adopting Bach’s distinction makes my notion of 
what-is-said inconsistent. I think García-Carpintero assumes that I am espousing 
Grice’s dictiveness condition on what-is-said. This is not the case. I take what-is-
said to be partly determined by the sentence’s locutionary level. However, 
contrary to Bach’s view, I also take what-is-said as an interpreted string, namely, 
a clause to which a semantic system assigns an interpretation. It is this notion of 
what-is-said which can be equated to the (set of) truth-conditions expressed by 
an utterance. Potts’ notion of ‘at issue’ content (Potts 2005) sufficiently captures 
this notion of what-is-said. Also, this notion of what-is-said obviously constrains 
the commitments in which the speaker when uttering a sentence. However, these 
commitments do not enter into the definition of what-is-said at any stage (pace 
Camp 2006). Thus, the notion of “dictiveness” García-Carpintero mentions in 
relation to Grice’s view is irrelevant to mine. Furthermore, the distinction 
between what-is-said and conventional implicatures comes from taking into 
consideration further semantic properties of these other meanings, which Bach’s 
account may cover only by adopting a model of multiple propositions which is 
similar, in some respects, to Potts’ semantic analysis of conventional 
implicatures. 
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may be considered in order to distinguish the level of what-is-said 
from the level of what is conventionally implicated.18 These are the 
disagreement test and the deniability test. Let’s first consider the 
disagreement test, which I will present in form of an empirical 
hypothesis:  
 
Disagreement Test.Ø1. Disagreement between A and B 
about a certain topic X is possible only when speaker A 
has rejected what speaker B has said about X (or vice 
versa). 
 
Clearly, the notion of what-is-said invoked by Bach passes this test 
easily. Suppose, in fact, I assert (16). Then you could not reply by 
saying: 
 
(19)  ?? I disagree. The movie was not funny. 
 
Semantically, (19) is an irrelevant reply to (16), as anything can be. 
Clearly, its content does not contradict the semantic content 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Actually, there is a third test considered by Bach, namely, the ‘Indirect 
Quotation Test’: “an element of a sentence contributes to what is said in an 
utterance of that sentence if and only if there can be accurate indirect quotation 
of the utterance (in the same language) which includes that element, or a 
corresponding element, in the ‘that’-clause that specifies what is said” (Bach 
1999: 340). Accordingly, an indirect report of, for instance, 
 
A: ‘Even George Bush said something intelligent in his life.’ 
 
should include ‘even’, on pain of misreporting the speaker. Bach concludes that 
this test shows that words like ‘even’ contribute to what is said of an utterance. I 
take the test to be inconclusive. First of all, there are contexts in which a report 
that does not include ‘even’ would still be adequate (just imagine a context in 
which we are interested in whether A believes that Bush said something 
intelligent in his life). Secondly, allowing a proper distinction between the 
locutionary level of a speech act and the illocutionary one (and Bach is certainly 
sympathetic to the distinction), it results that what-is-saidB has nothing to do with 
the speech acts conveyed by A. The fact that the semantic contribution of ‘even’ 
does not enter into the composition of the proposition that Bush said something 
intelligent in his life, but operates on it, is sufficient evidence to semantically 
treat it as not part of what the speaker has primarily conveyed. 
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expressed by (16). Syntactically, the situation is specular in that no 
element of (16) is present in the denial of (19).  
Furthermore, given the notion of what-is-saidB, conventional 
implicatures also pass the test, and therefore should be counted as 
part of what-is-said. In fact, it seem perfectly legitimate to reply to 
an utterance of (16) by saying: 
 
(20) I disagree. Mr. Berlusconi is generally very sober at dinner 
parties. 
 
However, although these data seem to support Bach’s view, I 
claim that we cannot define the notion of what-is-said in the terms 
required by his Syntactic Correlation Constraint, for a second test 
clearly shows that at least one important logical operation requires 
that a distinction be made between the level of content to which the 
speaker is semantically committed and the level of what he or she is 
further implying: 
  
Deniability Test.Ø2. In a conversation, only what is said 
by an utterance can be semantically denied. 
 
Now, if we adopt what-is-saidB, then it should be possible to deny 
(16) in one of the two following ways: 
 
(21)  It is false that even Berlusconi was sober last night. 
(22) Even Berlusconi was not sober last night. 
 
In (22), ‘not’ works as predicate denial, its function being that of 
denying that the extension of ‘Berlusconi,’ i.e. !Berlusconi", 
belongs to the extension of ‘sober’, i.e. !Sober". Said otherwise, 
‘not’ is a constituent of the proposition  <Not <Sober, 
Berlusconi>> and not of the proposition <Not <Usually <Sober, 
CHAPTER 2 
 
! ! !"#!
Berlusconi>>>. Clearly ‘not’ has not here the function of denying 
the implicature (18). 
On the other hand, in (21) ‘it is false that’ is a propositional 
operator that turns the truth-value of a proposition p into its 
reverse. Does (21) deny (16)? According to the view I defend, it 
does not. It does not because semantic operators are not sensitive to 
implicated content in that it is not a matter of their semantic 
jurisdiction to deliberate on what is implicit in an utterance. Grice 
is right, after all.19 However, the same test can be used to show that 
Grice is wrong to think that metaphor does not concern what-is-
said. Metaphors can be denied, as will be shown in the next section 
after the discussion on implicatures is completed. 
 
3.2 What is Said & Conversational Implicatures 
 
The role of what-is-said is crucial to Grice’s theory for another 
reason. For it is one of the aspects that allows for the derivation of 
what Grice calls non-conventional implicatures. The purpose of 
this sub-section is to introduce the reader to this topic and to allow 
him or her to form an idea as to whether metaphor can be 
accounted for in terms of this model. I will try to be as much 
exhaustive as I can, analysing not only what Grice thought of such 
cases, but also what more contemporary philosophers have added 
to Grice’s original account. 
To begin with, the utterances below, though apparently very 
different, are all taken by Grice to be cases of non-conventional !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 A possible strategy is to appeal to some ‘metalinguistic’ devices that scope 
over the implied content. Horn’s (1989) ‘metalinguistic negation’ is one of such 
devices. Metalinguistic negation works by denying the assertability conditions of 
an utterance, which also include the assertability conditions for its implicatures 
and presuppositions. However, it should be noticed that in order for such 
operator to work, the linguistic context must be broader than a single utterance 
of, e.g., (22). Generally, metalinguistic negation applies whenever the denied 
sentence is followed by another sentence which makes explicit the speaker’s real 
target of her denial, namely, some implied content (consider: ‘We didn’t eat 
some biscuits; we ate all of them’, in which the denial affects the implied content 
of the first clause, namely, the proposition that we ate not all biscuits). 
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implicature in that they express propositions the determination of 
which is not achievable by simply decoding what the sentences 
literally say. Nor are these propositions part of the conventional 
force of their respective utterances. They arise as the result of the 
speakers’ general inferential capacities to derive conclusions from 
what has been said by an utterance. Sticking to Grice’s way of 
talking, I will use the term conversational implicatures hereafter. 
Here are some examples of conversational implicatures: 
 
(23)  A: Would you like some coffee? 
             B: I have an examination tomorrow.  
+> Yes, I’d like to have some coffee.  
 
(24)  A: Did your students pass the exam this time? 
B: Some students passed. 
    +> Not all of them passed. 
 
(25)  Mark lives either in Italy or in France. 
   +> It is possible that Mark lives in France.  
 
(26)  Bush is a genius. 
    +> Bush is an idiot. 
 
(27)  You’re the cream of my coffee. 
    +> You are very important to me. 
 
Many questions can be raised as to the exact nature of these 
utterances, and, in particular, as to whether they belong to some 
unique genus, as Grice thought. But I shall proceed with order by 
first sketching Grice’s own view. In the next section I will present 
some objections to Grice, especially addressed to confute his 
reasons to conflate irony with metaphor, and metaphor with other 
cases of implicatures.  
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In (23) the speaker B is implying that he likes the idea of coffee 
since he has an exam the following day. Given, in fact, our 
background knowledge that someone who has to deal with an exam 
may prefer to stay awake the night before the test for revision, (23) 
can be taken as a basis to infer the speaker’s intention to accept the 
stimulant drink. (24) is a case of so-called scalar implicatures, i.e., 
implicatures whose calculability is due to the presence of elements 
belonging to a certain class which is ordered in a scalar way.20 In 
(24), the denial of an element belonging to a particular class (in this 
case, the class of quantifiers) gives rise to an implicature to the 
effect that any higher element of the scale does not hold. By 
uttering (24) the speaker implicates that not all students passed the 
exam. If they had, the speaker would not have been cooperative in 
asserting the weaker proposition, thus contravening Grice’s 
cooperative principle (see fn. 24). (25) is a case of clausal 
implicature, in that one of the two clauses of the utterance (either 
‘Mark lives in Italy’ or ‘Mark lives in France’) may hold, but the 
speaker does not know which.21  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Scalar implicatures involve Horn’s scales (Horn 1989), namely, classes of 
predicates having the same range of things to which the predicates belonging to 
the class can apply, and a thematic dimension that distinguishes the class from 
others in some relevant sense. A Horn’s scale is structured in such a way that the 
first element on the left is the most negative exemplar of the class, whilst the last 
one is the most positive. Below are some examples of such scales: 
 
 {impossible, possible, certain} 
{bad, good, great} 
 {cold, warm, hot} 
 
The number of predicates for each class has here been reduced to only three, but 
certainly more fine-grained characterizations can be given. Suppose an 
intermediate element of one of these classes has been negated (e.g., ‘possible’, 
‘can’, ‘warm’). It is then assumed that only intermediate elements generate 
implicatures to the effect that if something is said to exemplify P, where P is an 
intermediate element of a Horn’s scale, then it is not the case that that something 
is Q, where Q is a higher element of the scale, or possibly the highest.20 A 
fortiori, if something is said not to be P, the same implicature will be in force 
here, possibly reinforced by the presence of the negative marker.  
21 Clausal implicatures belong to the class of Quantity Implicatures, implicatures 
based on the hearer’s ability to infer that the speaker is observing or flouting the 
Maxim of Quantity (see below).  
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Finally, (26) and (27) are figurative cases of, respectively, irony 
and metaphor. Since in both cases what is (strictly) said is not what 
the speaker has plausibly in mind, the hearer must be able to 
determine what the speaker is trying to get across by uttering those 
sentences. In relation to these examples, Grice discusses the idea 
that speakers only ‘make as if to say’ the content expressed by (26) 
and (27). Since, on his view, saying something entails meaning it, it 
does not seem plausible that someone really means that her 
interlocutor is identifiable with the cream of a coffee or with 
incandescent matter, as Romeo with her Juliet.22 Thus, following 
Grice’s more or less explicit characterisation of such cases, I 
attempt to draw in the table below the main difference Grice 
attributes to utterances (23)-(25) and (26)-(27), which is that of 
involving two distinct relations between the speaker and the 
proposition she literally conveys, i.e., ‘saying’ or ‘making as if to 
say’: 
 
Saying 
 
Making as if to say 
 
• Particularised implicatures 
 
• Scalar implicatures 
 
• Clausal implicatures 
• Irony 
 
• Metaphor 
 
• Metonymy  
  
Someone may ask whether I am suggesting that there are two 
distinct types of implicatures here. My answer is both positive and 
negative. Negative in that the pragmatic mechanisms underlying 
these two types of implicatures are basically the same (see below). 
Positive in that the way an implicature of the ‘saying’ type affects a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Bach (1999: 337) criticises Grice’s appeal to the notion of ‘making as if’ on 
the ground that the notion is ‘too restrictive’ and also ‘conflates the locutionary 
and illocutionary levels of speech-act analysis’. 
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context is not the same as the way an implicature of the ‘making as 
if to say’ type does. Following Stalnaker’s notion of ‘common 
ground’ (Stalnaker 1999, 2002), let’s define a context set as the set 
of possible worlds which is compatible with the information shared 
by the participants in a conversation at a certain stage of it. Then an 
implicature of the ‘saying’ type will be defined in the following 
way: 
 
IMPLICATURE  TYPE #1   
c = (p & q) ! {w} 
 
(Read: the asserted content p and the implied content q belong to 
the set of worlds in the context set or common ground c.) 
In other words, such type of implicature is always added to what is 
said, and both contents belong to the set of possible worlds which 
are compatible with the common ground. 
On the other hand, in the case of an implicature of the ‘making 
as if’ type, we have the following formula: 
 
IMPLICATURE TYPE #2 
c = (p & q) – (p) ! {w} 
 
Here, the relation of membership is defined only between the 
implicature and the set of worlds compatible with it. This is easily 
demonstrable: suppose I utter ‘Bill is a good friend’ intending to 
convey that he is not a good friend. Then the implicature will affect 
the common ground shared between me and my audience by 
impacting those worlds which are compatible with the belief that 
Bill is not a good friend, discarding those worlds which would be 
compatible with the asserted content, namely, the false belief that 
Bill is a good friend. In fact, since there are no possible worlds 
compatible with the conjunction of the asserted and the implied 
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content in the simple case of irony, the hearer must be in a position 
to update his common ground consistently.   
Another difference that should be at least mentioned is that 
while (23) is considered by Grice to be a type of implicature arising 
only in some specific context (hence the expression 
‘particularised’), while (24) and (25) are cases of so-called 
‘generalised’ implicatures, i.e., implicatures arising as general 
features of the contexts which trigger them. 
These differences notwithstanding, what lumps utterances (23)-
(27) together is that in order to make sense of the speakers’ overall 
speech act, the hearers need to infer some other propositions which 
are not semantically expressed by the utterances (in Grice’s words, 
which are not part of the ‘utterance’s type level’).23 
Following a taxonomy-oriented reading, these examples 
represent nonminimal departures from literal meaning, Griceanly 
intended as conventional meaning, and in this sense they should be 
counted as ‘nonliteral in the ordinary sense’ (Recanati 2001). Here 
I take Recanati’s ‘ordinary sense’ to approximate Grice’s general 
idea of conversational implicature, whose clearest definition is 
Grice’s: 
 
CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE (CI). A man who, by (in, 
when) saying (or making as if to say) that p has implicated that q, 
may be said to have conversationally implicated that q, provided 
that (i) he is to be presumed to be observing the conversational 
maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle24; (ii) the supposition !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Chierchia and others have challenged the idea that generalised implicatures are 
inferable. The hypothesis they make is that these implicatures are computed 
locally and are part of a specific linguistic module. While the hypothesis is 
certainly fascinating, I would like to suggest that it does not, by itself, disprove 
Grice’s analysis. A generalised conversational implicature could be computed 
locally, but only accessed globally, in virtue of the kind of inference I mentioned 
in the discussion of (24). 
24 Grice (1989: 26): "Make your contribution such as it is required, at the stage at 
which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in 
which you are engaged". Grice took this principle to be at the basis of any 
rational conversation. 
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that he is aware that, or thinks that, q is required in order to make 
his saying or making as if to say p (or doing so in those terms) 
consistent with this presumption; and (iii) the speaker thinks (and 
would expect the hearer to think that the speaker thinks) that it is 
within the competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp 
intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (ii) is required. (Grice 
1989: 30-31) 
 
This definition of CI is centred on the important idea that there 
must be some mutual assumption of cooperativeness among the 
speakers in order for an utterance to be interpreted correctly. In this 
regard, Grice goes on to elaborate a model of communication as 
based on four maxims, the function of which is to guide any correct 
interpretation of a speaker’s utterance. These maxims are: 
 
QUALITY: ‘Try to make your contribution one that is true’. 
1. Do not say what you believe to be false. 
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.  
QUANTITY: Make your contribution as informative as is required 
and not more informative. 
RELEVANCE: Be relevant. 
MANNER: Be perspicuous. 
 
Armed with CI’s definition and the four maxims, Grice observes 
that utterances of (23) to (27) share a first property: this is the 
property of calculability. 
 
Calculability.Ø3. Given a proposition p, which is the result 
of decoding the semantic information associated to an 
utterance u, a conversational implicature Q is what the hearer 
needs to infer, through the help of the maxims, in order to 
tackle one of the following cases: 
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(a) accommodate an apparent mismatch of such 
maxims; 
 
(b) integrate the proposition p with a proposition p* 
such that p is consistent with the abovementioned maxims 
only if p* is derived; 
 
(c) make sense of the speaker’s blatant violation of 
some maxims of conversation.25  
  
In all these cases, it is crucial for Grice that the speaker put the 
hearer in a position to grasp his or her intention behind such a 
violation, mismatch or request of qualification by uttering u with 
meaning p. The resulting idea is that whenever one implicates 
something, the hearer can infer the implicature by reasoning on 
such maxims and on the input proposition that is decoded from the 
utterance, which, according to Grice, is the first step of any correct 
interpretation.26  
However, since what is said does not contain the conversational 
implicata as its meaning, something has certainly to be added. In 
Grice’s words:  
 
[T]he implicature is not carried by what is said, but only by the 
saying of what is said, or by “putting it that way.” (1989: 39) 
 
What does Grice mean by this sentence? The key, it seems to me, is 
to understand the nature of ‘putting it that way’. Let’s then try to be 
less vague and specify three types of case that may fall under this 
label: 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 I am skipping, for the sake of brevity, the case in which no apparent maxim is 
violated (See Grice 1989: 32).  
26 We will see in Chapter 4 how this assumption is radically attacked by recent 
works both in pragmatics. 
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(a’) Under this class fall all those cases described in (a) 
above. For instance, a speaker who is asked to tell where a 
certain individual lives may assert that he or she lives 
somewhere in the South of France. The speaker seems to 
have asserted less than what required by the question, 
therefore contravening the maxim of Quantity. However, if 
she has done so it is because she has respected another 
maxim, i.e., the maxim of Quality, which requires one to 
assert what he or she has sufficient evidence for. 
 
(b’) Under this category fall all examples discussed in the 
exhibit on Bach’s notion of conversational impliciture plus 
some cases where no apparent maxim is violated (cf. Grice’s 
example ‘There is a petrol station round the corner’ +> There 
is an open petrol station round the corner). 
 
(c’) Some of these maxims are flouted, that is, blatantly 
violated, so as to invite the hearer to recognise that the 
speaker is trying to get across something over and above 
what is said by his or her utterance. Take again the case of 
B’s answer to A’s question in (23). The answer is not a direct 
answer to A’s question. In this, it violates the maxim of 
relevance, but by violating it the hearer can start an 
inferential process which is addressed to determine the 
speaker’s real intention. By saying whatever B said, A is left 
with the task of finding a proposition such that B’s answer 
makes sense within the conversation (clause ii in Grice’s 
definition of CI). By a simple reasoning based on 
expectations and mutual beliefs, A is finally able to realise 
that B’s utterance is indirectly answering his question, 
provided B’s implicature is within A’s ability to calculate 
(clause iii). 
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Metaphor and related tropes (e.g., metonymy and synecdoche27) 
are, for Grice, to be accounted for in terms of this third category. In 
particular, by blatantly violating the maxim of Quality, a speaker 
who utters a metaphorical sentence puts his or her audience in the 
position of having to infer the proposition(s) that best captures her 
communicative intention. For instance, suppose someone utters the 
sentence ‘Berlusconi is a virus in the Italians’ blood’.28 Grice 
thinks that she does not say that Berlusconi is a virus in the 
Italians’ blood since this is a too blatant violation of the maxim of 
Quality (Berlusconi is not literally a virus). However, by violating 
such a maxim in such an overt manner the speaker is 
communicating that some further proposition has to be inferred by 
the hearer, so as to make her literally false (more appropriately, her 
categorically mistaken) claim consistent. 
Notice how, under this account, any figurative trope is 
individuated, and then interpreted, only after its semantic 
‘deviance’ has been recognised. We will see in the next section 
how this assumption is unwarranted, as well as other propositions 
that Grice’s theory of implicatures entail. Notice, also, that Grice’s 
theory does not offer any clue as to what kind of inference is in 
play when the hearer has to infer the proposition(s) the speaker of a 
metaphor is possibly trying to get across. This aspect will only be 
tackled in the next chapter, after the Relevance-theoretic idea of 
what counts as an inferential process is properly discussed.  
In this section, I have sketched Grice’s theory of conversational 
implicatures. However, I have only discussed one feature of this !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 A metonymy is a trope in which something is not named by the word or 
expression standardly used to refer to that thing, but a word or expression closely 
connected to it. In Grice’s theory, an utterance of the sentence ‘The ham-
sandwich left without paying’ +> The client who ordered a ham-sandwich left 
without paying’. A synecdoche is that figure of speech by means of which a part 
is named by its whole, and vice versa. As for metonymy, the implicature model 
predicts that an utterance of, e.g., ‘Italy lost the last European final against 
Spain’ +> Italy’s football team lost the last European final against Spain’s 
football team. 
28  This is an adaptation of Indro Montanelli’s unforgettable definition of 
Berlusconi. Montanelli was a renowned journalist in Italy. 
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class, that is to say, the property of calculability. In the next 
section, I provide direct evidence against the applicability of this 
model to metaphor by considering two other classic features of 
implicatures: cancellability and non-detachability. None of these 
properties apply to metaphor, which alone should provide enough 
evidence for not taking metaphors as implicatures. The interested 
reader may refer to the next exhibit to integrate my study of Grice’s 
theory of implicatures with some recent contributions of 
philosophers of language, such as Saul and Recanati, to such a 
topic. 
 
Some Recent Views on Implicature and Nonliterality 
 
For Grice the ‘presence of an implicature’ must be worked out by 
elaborating different data: on the one hand, intentions, context, and 
background knowledge are important insofar as they establish or 
influence the content of the utterance and its evaluation; on the 
other hand, according to Grice, the conventional meanings, 
corresponding to his theoretical notion of ‘what-is-said,’ which 
give the truth-conditional content of an utterance, and the 
aforementioned maxims pose two different kinds of normative 
constraints on the part of both the speaker and the hearer.29 In (23), 
for instance, words like ‘just’, ‘examination’, ‘tomorrow’ are not 
randomly selected by the speaker, but chosen in quite an accurate 
way so as to discharge a double function: first, to allow the hearer 
to recognise in the features of the sentence the speaker has uttered 
the same features of a sentence she is already familiar with in her 
language. Secondly, through these features the hearer will be able 
to recognise that whoever utters a sentence possessing them, as in 
the context of (23), will produce in her a certain kind of response !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Saul (2002a: 241) says that Grice’s relying on the notion of what is said is a 
way to limit the import of speakers’ intentions in an otherwise too full-blooded 
intention-oriented account of ‘saying’, which, according to him, required a 
balanced ratio between speaker’s meaning and sentence meaning. 
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the speaker intends her to have.30 In order for the communication to 
be successful, the cooperative principle and its maxims are to be 
respected either at the level of what-is-said or at the level of what-
is-implicated (or both as a limiting case). When the level of what-
is-said does not set down the interpretation, its burden will be 
assessed at the level of what-is-implicated. This seems enough to 
approximate Grice’s letter for my purposes. 
Now Recanati considers the examples discussed here, with the 
exception of metaphor, as ‘nonliteral in the ordinary sense’. So he 
presupposes there is a nonordinary sense in which an utterance may 
be nonliteral, and also a sense in which we have ordinary literal 
sense, and perhaps one in which there is nonordinary literal sense 
as well. Where to draw a line, and how to motivate the distinction 
between the two senses of nonliterality just invoked? Here I only 
sketch the direction we could take in order to respond to the latter 
question, leaving more fine-grained distinctions to come along in 
the following sections.  
There are two senses in which the nonliteral cases treated so far 
are distinguishable. One sense is that they all belong to the Gricean 
level of what-is-implicated as opposed to what-is-said. This level is 
the realm of implicature, which according to Grice is just “a 
blanket word to avoid having to make choices between words like 
‘imply’, ‘suggest’, ‘indicate’, and ‘mean’” (1989: 86). Following 
the useful characterisation of conversational implicature offered by 
Jennifer Saul (2002b: 229), I say that an implicature is ‘what is 
made available’ by the speaker to her audience through the uttering 
of a sentence possessing certain features. The interesting question 
is to what extent ‘what is made available’ by a speaker is under her 
rational control, and to what extent it is in the audience’s 
responsibility to infer it. The second interesting question is whether !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 I’m probably simplifying the story, but at least I hope to be faithful to Grice’s 
general description. See Schiffer (1972: chap. II) for a careful discussion of 
Grice’s ideas. See also Neale (1992). 
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degrees of ‘availability’ should account for the differences between 
all the categories subsumed by Grice under the name of 
‘implicature’.   
Grice was certainly aware of having gone too far in his 
generalisation (see Grice 1989: 86). In that case, his not having 
cared much about possible subtler interactions between the two 
poles of a speech (speaker and possible audience) seems to open 
some gaps in his original account. In fact, if we follow Grice, an 
implicature is calculated whenever clause (ii) of the definition of 
(CI) obtains. But this is not always the case, as with Saul’s example 
of Bill Clinton saying ‘I don’t have any sexual relationship with 
this woman’, which, irrespective of our assessment of Clinton’s 
intentions, implicates that Clinton may have had sex with 
Lewinsky in the past. Either weaker or stronger clauses are then 
required for other kinds of implicature to arise, or simply some 
other level between what-is-said and the implicature has to be 
taken into consideration. Also, the connection between (ii) and (iii) 
is revisable since the passage from (ii) to (iii) seems to be barred by 
considerations concerning the point I have just made in relation to 
clause (ii). In other words, it seems possible to implicate something 
without intending the hearer to recognise the intention behind the 
implicature. The terminology of ‘making available’ is sufficiently 
neutral with respect to the demands imposed by clause (ii). A re-
consideration of Grice’s notion of implicature is pressing, though.  
The other sense can be characterised ‘phenomenologically’. 
Recanati (2001), for instance, claims that implicatures and indirect 
speech acts are all cases in which the hearer’s interpretive response 
is sensitive to their secondary and indirect characters. Hearers are 
generally aware that a secondary meaning (implicature) is in their 
responsibility to derive through a two-step procedure which 
emerges whenever the indirectness’ property of the speakers’ 
utterances is evident to them. Thus, hearers depend on what 
Recanati calls the ‘transparency condition’, according to which an 
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utterance expressing an indirect act or conveying a secondary 
meaning (i.e., those uses of words in Recanati’s ordinary sense of 
nonliteral) has something special which “is, or can be, perceived by 
the language users themselves” (2001: 270-71. His emphasis). 
Recanati calls whatever respects this condition p-nonliterality (for 
reasons of space I will not comment on Recanati’s terminology). 
According to Recanati, metaphors should not count as nonliteral in 
the ordinary sense, since they do not respond to this condition. 
However, I think that there are reasons to resist Recanati’s 
condition. In fact, hearers are not always aware of the indirectness. 
Prescinding from metaphor and irony, if you consider the previous 
examples, i.e. (23)–(27), it is at least arguable that in each case the 
hearer is aware of the underlying structure of the act. Speakers do 
not generally have immediate access to the primary act performed, 
but they respond directly to their interlocutors’ utterances without 
calculating the further level implicated.31 Similarly, it seems too 
strong to say that the hearer of (23.B)’s utterance is conscious of 
going through a two-step procedure to determine its relevant 
interpretation.32 And, finally, in support of this line of thought, 
there are also reasons to doubt that the speakers’ intentions or the 
audience’s awareness of them are necessarily required for an 
implicature to be raised. Saul (2002b) gives a number of cases 
where either an implicature arises even though the speaker was not 
trying to convey it, or where a speaker is trying to convey it, but 
her audience fails to notice it. My concern is then about the 
necessity of a biconditional here between indirectness (of the act) 
and secondariness (of the perceived meaning). There are cases 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Bach (1995) suggests that, for instances, cases of indirect speech acts go 
through a process which he dubs ‘standardization’. It is very likely that 
something like this process happens in the case of scalar and clausal 
implicatures. 
32 Cf. Camp (2006: 288). But see Bezuidenhout for a contrary reading (2002: 
110). 
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where indirectness does not seem to imply secondariness, and other 
cases where secondariness does not seem to imply indirectness. 
However, if indirectness always implies secondariness, as stated 
by Recanati (2001: esp. p. 270), then there are cases where the 
secondariness is not perceived by the hearers (without considering 
the cases where the indirectness is not intended by the hearers). So, 
Recanati’s clause that whenever a conveyed meaning has 
secondary character, then it is satisfied by the ‘transparency 
condition’ (271), breaks down and is, to say the least, not 
conclusive. Recanati seems to have fallen in a common mistake in 
the philosophy of language: the fact that a certain description, say 
D, nicely applies in most cases usually grouped under a certain 
vaguely collective phenomenon, say P, does not entail that D is the 
correct explanation for any element belonging to this class by 
default. Nor does it provide sufficient ground for the claim that P 
should necessarily be accounted for as if it were a single 
phenomenon.  
 
 
4. Criticism of Grice’s model 
 
For years, if someone asked a philosopher to tell what a metaphor 
is, he or she would probably have replied that Grice, when he 
identified metaphor as a typical case of conversational implicature, 
had already given a plausible answer to that question. Nobody 
seemed to be willing to challenge this claim, but, what is worse, 
nobody seemed to be willing to test cases of metaphor against the 
tests Grice offered for something to be counted as a conversational 
implicature. The purpose of this section is therefore to integrate my 
previous discussion of Grice’s programme with the presentation of 
his tests for conversational implicature, and to discuss whether 
these are applicable to metaphor. Not surprisingly, metaphors do 
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not pass any of these tests. The conclusion I then draw is that the 
classification of metaphor as conversational implicature is a 
philosophical myth. More generally, the classification of metaphor 
as a pragmatic phenomenon is called into question. 
In the previous sections, I have explicitly discussed one classic 
test for detecting implicatures, i.e., the ‘calculability test’: 
Implicatures must be capable of being inferred by the hearers. 
Recent studies, such as those discussed in the previous box, have 
somewhat challenged this test, but, generally, they have only 
shown the need of some refinement of this notion, without 
invalidating the basic idea that implicatures are inferable 
implications.  
However, conversational implicatures are implications which, 
contrary to what happens in the case of entailments, are 
contextually defeasible. This can be highlighted by the following 
‘cancellability test’.  
 
Cancellability.Ø4. An implicature, which is a highly 
contextual implication, is always defeasible on the light of 
some further considerations. 
 
An example of cancellability can be given in relation to negative 
sentences containing definite descriptions. For Grice, a sentence 
such as ‘The King of France isn’t bald’ conversationally implicates 
that there is a king of France. When someone wants to deny such 
implication, she may be adding a rejoinder of the following kind: 
 
(28)  The king of France isn’t bald; there is no king of France. 
 
Other examples of cancellable implications are the following; 
 
(29) There is a petrol station round the corner. But I don’t 
mean to imply/say/suggest that the station is open. 
CHAPTER 2 
 
! ! !"#!
(30)  Some students passed the exam. Actually, all of them did. 
(31)  Martin is such a good friend. I mean, he really is, but 
when he behaves like that he annoys me.33  
 
For instance, let’s ask what the speaker of (30) is trying to convey: 
what the total specification of the speaker’s utterance is. We can 
take the truth-conditional content of the utterance as the 
conjunction of the propositions that there are some students who 
passed the exam and that all of them did.  
Now, there is clearly a gain of semantic information in passing 
from the first context of utterance to the second utterance, resulting 
from the reinforcement of the existential assumption with a 
universally quantified statement to the effect that all students 
passed the exam. 
Furthermore, the information of the first conjunct is already 
contained in the second in virtue of being entailed by it. The 
introduction of the universally quantified statement in the common 
ground of the conversation has the effect of defeating the obvious 
implicature that the only utterance of the first conjunct has 
launched, i.e., the implicature that some students failed to pass the 
exam. Against this implicature, the total specification of the 
speaker’s utterance must not only convey that all students passed 
the exam (where ‘All x’ ! ‘Some x’), but also that the speaker does 
not imply that some failed. In symbols: 
    
 
"x (Sx # Px) # $x (Sx % Px)   
(32)  cg =    
~ Imps ("x (Sx # ¬Px)) 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 The implicature here being something like: a friend always treats you well. 
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where  ‘cg’ is common ground, ‘S’ and ‘P’ are variables standing 
for the properties of being student and passing the exam, ‘x’ is a 
variable bound by the existential and universal quantifiers, and 
‘Imp’ stands for an operator similar to the classic ‘Belief’-operator 
in epistemic logic. Its meaning is that the speaker (represented by 
the subscript variable ‘s’) implies the content which is under its 
embedding force. 
It is easy to verify how (32) contains information which could 
turn out to be inconsistent. Just consider the information contained 
in the last clause: that the speaker does not imply that there are 
students who did not pass the exam. Subtracting the most external 
operators from the left, ‘~’ and ‘Imp,’ what is left is the proposition 
<!x (S(x) " ¬P(x))>, i.e., the proposition that some students did 
not pass the exam. This proposition is what the first conjunct 
conveys if the second conjunct were not to be uttered. Such a 
proposition is obviously inconsistent with the focal information 
contained in the central clause, i.e., the proposition that all students 
passed the exam (i.e., <#x (S(x) $ P(x))>). Since the hearer 
mentally represents not only this proposition, but the whole 
representation in which this proposition is embedded, he or she is 
in a position to consider the first sentence uttered (i.e., the 
existential quantified one) as inadequate because potentially 
leading one to infer a proposition inconsistent with the upheld 
information that all students passed the exam.  
We can then draw an intuitive principle from the considerations 
above:  
 
P1. A proposition p expressed by an utterance of a 
sentence s in context c is accepted in the common 
ground iff it is not inconsistent with any relevant 
information in the common ground. 
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In other words, P1 allows for a proposition p to be part of the 
common ground if it is entailed by a proposition q just introduced 
in the common ground, or if p is already entailed by the common 
ground.34 However, a proposition p, expressed by an utterance of s 
in context c, is discarded from the common ground if it is an 
implicature or a presupposition which is inconsistent with q, a 
proposition just introduced in the common ground, or inconsistent 
with the information already available in the common ground at the 
moment of its utterance. If a sentence s expresses a proposition p 
which is entailed by a proposition q just introduced in the common 
ground, but triggers an implicature which is inconsistent with q, the 
implicature must be discarded in order for the common ground to 
be correctly updated. 
P1 provides an empirically testable hypothesis as to how the 
participants in a conversation update their common ground. By P1, 
the proposition expressed by the sentence ‘some students passed 
the exam’ can be accepted in the common ground. However, 
always by P1, its implicature must be discarded because it is 
inconsistent with a successive update of the common ground. 
Participants in a conversation resort to cancellability whenever 
their common ground results in a conflictive update due to an 
inconsistent implicated content. Since the first clause of (3) triggers 
an implicature which is inconsistent with the information 
introduced by the assertion of the universally quantified statement, 
the hearer must discard it in order to update her common ground 
correctly. Thus, whenever an implicature is cancelled by the 
speaker, the hearer must discard it from the common ground, so 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Here we should consider some restriction on the notion of ‘entailment’ in 
order to avoid the unwelcome consequence that the common ground be taken as 
closed under entailment. So the proposal would be to confine this notion to that 
of ‘relevant entailment’, according to which a proposition is entailed by another 
only if the two are topic-related. For a discussion of ‘relevance logic’, see Edwin 
Mares’ entry ‘Relevance Logic’ in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-relevance/. 
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that its update can proceed smoothly. However, we must be careful 
here: not every proposition that gets discarded is also cancelled. 
For instance, we do not want to suggest that cases of sense 
disambiguation of a word (e.g., BANK1 VS. BANK2) involve 
cancellability. In particular, the case in which a word is taken in its 
wrong sense does not lead to a manifestly inconsistent common 
ground, just to a different one. Thus, cancellability is one way, 
among many others, in which a speaker may avoid a wrong update 
of the common ground. 
The resulting picture is a recipe for individuating implicatures 
and explaining why they can be cancelled, although someone has 
objected to the effectiveness of such test. Recanati (personal 
communication) has objected to the test on the ground that, for 
him, it is also possible to cancel what is said by an utterance. For 
instance, consider an utterance of: 
 
(33)  That chair is blue. But I don’t mean to say that that 
[follows demonstration] chair is blue, I mean that one [follows 
another demonstration] is blue. 
 
The argument states that since it is possible to use the same kind of 
cancellation device deployed in implicatures denials to discard a 
certain explicature35 of an utterance, then the cancellability test 
does not provide a sufficient criterion to single out implicatures. 
This argument is, I think, unsound since it is based on a false 
premise. The premise is that the speaker is cancelling some 
information, although such information is not an implicature. My 
reply is that the speaker is not cancelling anything, but only making 
clear which proposition his or her audience must uphold. His or her 
operation has more to do with disambiguation than with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 ‘Explicature’ is a technical term used by relevance theorists, and occasionally 
by other contextualists, to define the truth-conditional content of an utterance. I 
explore this concept in chapter 4, and criticise it in chapter 5. 
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cancellability. In particular, the speaker is not discarding a 
proposition because of its triggering an inconsistent implicature or 
presupposition. I conclude that the cancellability test provides a 
valid criterion for distinguishing implicated content from what-is-
said, contrary to what Recanati believes.36  
We must now ask whether the cancellability test applies to 
metaphor. The answer, as already anticipated, is negative. Consider 
these utterances: 
 
(34)  Juliet is the sun. But I don’t mean to say that she is the sun. 
(35)  Mark is a pig. But I don’t mean to imply that he is dirty. 
[from Leezenberg 2001: 114] 
 
There is something odd with these utterances, which I think I am 
now in a position to explain. Remember that, according to the 
principle I stated above, a sentence can be rejected if the 
proposition expressed by one of its utterances is potentially 
misleading because one of its implicata may result to be 
inconsistent with what is already part of the common ground. Now, 
neither the content expressed by (34) nor by (35) can be cancelled 
because the intended interpretations are expressed, and therefore 
are part of what is said, not of what is implicated. Given the 
intended interpretation of an utterance of ‘Juliet is the sun’, the 
second clause of (34) is just a way to contextually disambiguate the 
sense in which the first conjunt should be taken. Accordingly, (34) 
is importantly analogous to (33), demonstrating that metaphors, 
like indexicals and demonstratives, contribute to the truth-
conditional content of an utterance, not to what is implicated.37 On !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 Thanks to Greg Currie for discussion on this point. 
37 Sure, more has to be said about how exactly metaphors contribute to the truth-
conditional contents of an utterance. I devote the last chapters of this dissertation 
to discussing different answers to this question. In particular, in the last two 
chapters I focus on two proposals, Stern’s demonstrative theory and my non-
indexical account, which both offer a semantic explanation of the truth-
conditionality of metaphors. 
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the other hand, in (35) we have two possible interpretations, and 
neither is a case of cancellability. According to the first 
interpretation, (35) is a case in which a metaphorical sentence is 
uttered, and then its propositional content denied. But, obviously, 
asserting a sentence and ‘cancelling’ the content expressed by the 
utterance of that very sentence is just irrational. According to the 
second interpretation, (35) is ‘disambiguating’ the sense in which 
being pig is to be taken: precisely, not in the sense of being dirty.38 
In this, it is similar to the correct reading of (33). 
The conclusion I draw is that metaphors are not cancellable in 
any obvious sense. If so, one of the most important tests Grice 
proposed to distinguish what-is-said from implicated content 
cannot be used to argue for the claim that metaphors are 
conversational implicatures. What about the other tests Grice 
devised? 
There is one test we have not considered so far, and is the non-
detachability test. Generally, an implicature will survive when what 
is said by the utterance which launches the implicature is changed, 
but its meaning preserved. In this sense the implicature is said to be 
non-detachable. In other words: 
 
Non-detachability.Ø5. Given an utterance U of a sentence s 
meaning a proposition p in context c, and an implicature q 
arising in c from uttering s, if you substitute x1, …, xn 
elements in s with elements y1, …, yn which are in relation of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 Cf. Leezenberg (2001: 114). Incidentally, many people I have interviewed 
about this metaphor have resisted the stereotypical (and fully lexicalized) reading 
of ‘pig’ as dirty. Others have insisted that this case involves an implicature being 
cancelled. However, it cannot be an implicature since the sense dirty of the word 
‘pig’ is fully lexicalised. It is true that this kind of metaphor is so conventional 
that it can hardly be used to convey new information. In the last chapter I offer 
an explanation of why this is so, based on the idea that it is difficult to provide a 
new thematic dimension relative to which a conventional metaphor can be 
interpreted. Be that as it may, I still believe that no implicature is involved and 
that cancellability is not the right test here since no potentially inconsistent 
proposition is cancelled by uttering (35). What we have instead is a case in 
which a fully lexicalised sense of the word ‘pig’, i.e. ‘dirty’, is rectified as it is 
not part of the utterance’s at issue content. 
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synonymy, so as to form a new sentence s! which still 
expresses p, or a sufficiently similar proposition, then q still 
arises if s! is uttered in c instead of s.39 
 
For instance: 
 
(36)  Bush is a genius. 
 
(37) Bush is an extremely 
clever guy.    
 
(38) That idiot is a genius 
 
 
 
+> Bush is an idiot. 
 
In the sentences (37) and (38) some element has been changed or 
altered from the original sentence (36). In (37), we have the same 
proper name but a different predicate, whose extension, if not the 
same, at least connotes the meaning of ‘genius’. In (38) we have 
the same predicate but a different NP, a definite description and a 
deictic expression. All the same, the proposition expressed is 
basically the same, namely, that Bush is a genius (or a sufficiently 
similar proposition) as well as the implicature that Bush is an idiot. 
Thus, we have:  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 In the first draft of this chapter I had made the mistake of requiring extensional 
equivalence to define non-detachability. This is obviously too strong since there 
are many extensionally equivalent terms of, e.g., ‘is a genius’ that do not 
preserve the irony that could arise from uttering ‘Bush is a genius’, intending 
that he is an idiot (consider: ‘Bush has an IQ of exactly 180’). Thanks to Stefano 
Predelli and James Andow for pointing this out to me.  
Conversational implicature:  
 
Same content ! same implicature. 
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In contrast, metaphors are detachable in that they do not survive 
when some element which is merely extensionally equivalent to it 
is changed. For instance, 
 
Nothing in (40) and (41) warrants an inference to the implicature(s) 
on the right,40 although both predicates are extensionally equivalent 
to ‘the sun’ in (39). Consequently, another test devised by Grice to 
detect implicatures fails in the case of metaphor.41 
It comes then as no surprise that metaphor passes a test which 
identifies not implicatures, but what is said by an utterance. This is 
the ‘deniability test,’ which we have already discussed. 
 
Deniability Test.Ø2. Only what is said by an utterance can be 
semantically denied. 
 
In §! 4.1 we saw how conventional implicatures dot not pass this 
test. Instead, metaphors do seem to pass the test quite easily:!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 But, as someone made me notice in conversation, there seem to be contexts in 
which it is possible to preserve the metaphorical interpretation of (39) by 
asserting (41). 
41 The test also fails in the case of manner implicatures, namely, implicatures 
calculated on the basis of how the content of an utterance is said. 
 
(39)  Juliet is the sun.  
 
(40)  The Capulet’s daughter is 
the largest gaseous blob in the 
solar system.                  
     
(41)  Juliet is the star at the centre 
of the Solar System.  
 
And so on.  
  
 
 
 
 
Not +> Juliet is warm, 
bright, very important, 
… 
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(42)  Juliet is not the sun. 
(43)  Jim is not a bulldozer. 
(44)  The king of France (said of Sarkozy) won’t be re-elected. 
(Compare: The king of France won’t be re-elected; there is 
no king of France) 
 
A theory of metaphor should clearly individuate what the speakers 
of (42)-(44) are saying, and what they are exactly denying. My 
theory of metaphorical denial will be elaborated in Chapter 7, but, 
for now, I am keen on the idea that whatever the speakers of (42)-
(44) are actually denying, it is not an implicature, but some items 
which bear strong syntactic and semantic connections with the 
uttered sentence. 
There is a final worry against Grice’s account, which has been 
formulated by some in the literature (Leezenberg 2001; Carston 
2002). This concerns Grice’s identification of metaphor with an 
implicature of the ‘making-as-if’ type. For instance, according to 
Carston it would result from such identification that the speaker 
says nothing, when it is clear that something has been meant with 
those words, although the conventional form of such words does 
not reflect the proposition being expressed. Moreover, if, according 
to Grice, a maxim of truthfulness, that is, the maxim of quality (‘do 
not say what you believe to be false’), has been flouted, then if 
nothing is said (but only ‘as if said’), technically no maxim is 
violated. Whether or not this is an insurmountable theoretical issue, 
there is an underlying objection which really creates problems for 
Grice.  
If metaphor were really of the ‘making as if’ type, then, 
according to the definition of this implicature I gave before, it 
would be possible to eliminate the proposition literally expressed 
from the common ground once the implicature has been calculated. 
However, as the cases of extended metaphors and embedded 
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metaphors show, it is not possible to discard the content literally 
expressed by a metaphor so easily. Consider: 
 
(45)  Read o’er the volume of Young Paris’ face, 
 And find delight writ there with beauty’s pen; 
 Examine every married lineament, 
 And see how one another lends content; 
 And what obscur’d in this fair volume lies 
 Find written in the marge of his eyes. 
 This precious book of love, this unbound lover, 
To beautify him, only lacks a cover. (Romeo and Juliet; I. 
iii, quot.  from Tirrell 1989: 17) 
 
Understanding a complex metaphor like the one instantiated by 
Shakespeare’s passage requires not so much the derivation of 
implications and the discarding of the literal message, but the 
ability to understand what it takes for ‘Young Paris’ to count as a 
book. The literal meanings of the words used by Shakespeare – 
whatever these are, I have not yet expressed my view – remain 
alive during the interpretation.42 But on Grice’s model they are 
simply functional to derivation of implicated content.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In conclusion, the reader should by now be convinced that 
assimilating metaphors to implicatures is not an available option. In 
contrast to implicatures, metaphors are not easily cancellable, they !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 A point stressed by an interesting paper by Carston (2010). Interesting because 
it puts emphasis on the notion of literal meaning in the interpretation of poetical 
metaphors, against the general trend of contextualists like Carston herself to 
discount such a notion. Unfortunately, I won’t be discussing this recent proposal 
of hers since I have decided to focus in this dissertation on more ‘conventional’ 
metaphors. 
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are detachable and also deniable. Their relationship with the literal 
meaning of the expressions used metaphorically is also much 
stronger than the implicature model predicts. Further evidence has 
been adduced to reinforce a separation between these two 
categories. I would like to add just a word against Grice’s 
assimilation of metaphor to irony. Even if metaphors were 
implicatures, they would not be of the same irony type. For it 
seems right to me to say that in irony, speakers really make as if to 
say something in the sense of pretending to say something, while 
conveying something else. This is not always the case, as the 
notion of pretence cannot be completely understood as a verbal 
action (see Currie 2006). But let’s grant that Grice was certainly 
into something in his discussion of irony. 
However, Grice is doubly wrong to consider both metaphorical 
and ironical interpretations to arise only because of the presence of 
some underlying semantic deviance. This is clearly false, as these 
example show: 
 
(46)  Jesus was a carpenter. (Ted Cohen) 
(47)  You certainly know a lot. 
 
Both utterances do not contain any semantic deviance and both, 
literally speaking, are true. So their interpretation is to be fixed 
elsewhere.  
One may then wonder whether the whole project of explaining 
metaphor by appealing to speaker’s intentions is undermined by the 
failure of Grice’s account to provide one. In the next chapter I will 
deal with another account that has attempted to improve on Grice’s 
view. Searle (1979) proposes a theoretically more articulated 
notion of metaphorical meaning in terms of speaker’s meaning, 
which is based on principles the calculation of which should 
determine the particular metaphorical meaning expressed by each 
metaphorical utterance. Although these principles do seem to do 
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some good interpretive work, I follow Leezenberg (2001) in 
criticising Searle as having basically offered semantic principles in 
disguise. In fact, most of Searle’s principles concern semantic 
properties of the sentences used metaphorically. I then propose a 
modification of Searle’s argument, which takes metaphors to be 
conventional implicatures, i.e. implicatures that are determined on 
the basis of the conventional (i.e. literal) profile of the sentences 
uttered. Although I find the argument attractive, I reject it for the 
following reason: were it possible to treat metaphors as 
conventional implicatures, then it would not be possible to 
logically and pragmatically operate on the metaphorically 
implicated content. However, as a matter of fact, we do operate on 
metaphorical content in many different ways (e.g., we negate it, we 
use it in counterfactuals and belief reports, we also take it as input 
to further pragmatic operations such as irony). Some additional 
reflections upon conventional implicature and quotation will 
complete my discourse there.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Metaphor and Speech-Act Theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
  
Searle’s contribution to the study of metaphor can be found in his 
paper ‘Metaphor’ (1979a). Searle shares with Grice the idea that 
metaphor belongs to the realm of speaker’s meaning. Unlike Grice, 
though, Searle advances a more elaborated explanation of how a 
speaker determines the meaning of her metaphorical utterance, and 
how the hearer latches onto that meaning via some interpretive 
principles. 1  In addition, Searle proposes ways to distinguish 
metaphor from other tropes, in particular irony, which appears to 
be an advance on Grice’s account. 
However, I will show that Searle’s account of metaphor fails in 
its attempt to identify the meaning of a metaphorical utterance with 
the notion of speaker’s meaning. There are different problems 
Searle faces, which I am going to consider here. First of all, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Leezenberg (2001: 118) points out that a main difference between Grice and 
Searle is that Searle is a descriptivist, while Grice a referentialist about 
metaphorical interpretation. Such a distinction amounts to the way a 
metaphorical content is determined: at the level of thought, for the descriptivists, 
while at the level of how things resemble to each other, for the referentialists.   
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although Searle’s principles are plausible, these appear to be 
semantic principles in disguise. In fact, it is legitimate to ask 
whether a semantic theory could incorporate them. Secondly, the 
distinctions Searle advances to distinguish metaphor from other 
tropes, especially irony, are not a real advance on Grice’s account 
since they are based on the same superficial generalisations as 
Grice’s. Thirdly, I will argue that Searle’s account is inconsistent 
with some of the tenets of his theory of intentionality, as developed 
in (Searle 1983). Finally, Searle’s account of speaker’s meaning 
does not offer any empirically testable way to distinguish between 
assertive and implicated contents. Actually, his theory is unable to 
implement such a distinction. 
In light of Searle’s failure to offer an account of the 
representational properties of metaphorical utterances and his 
failure to distinguish asserted content from implicated one, I will 
analyse two other accounts within the tradition of speech-act 
theory, Alston’s and Barker’s, which have attempted to specify 
what a metaphorical assertion is. I do not think such accounts fare 
any better than Searle’s. Therefore, I will offer a further argument 
to the effect that speech-act theorists would be better off 
considering metaphor as a kind of conventional implicature 
triggered by the implicit or explicit presence of quotation marks 
around the lexical items used metaphorically. I will first shed light 
on a number of properties that metaphors and conventional 
implicatures share. I will then reject such argument for the reason 
that whether or not implicatures are embeddable, the supposedly 
active conventional implicatures in the case of metaphor are 
irrelevant to the truth-evaluation of a metaphorical utterance.  
Finally, I will consider an argument by Barker (2003) in favour 
of the view that since conventional implicatures are embeddable, 
then truth-conditional semantics must be false. I will reject this 
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argument because it does not square with the proper logic of 
conventional implicatures. 
 
 
2. Searle’s account 
 
Searle is the champion of the view that metaphors are a kind of 
speech act, whose structure is not dissimilar from that of other 
speech acts, such as indirect speech acts (see Searle 1979b: chap. 
2). According to Searle (1979a: 92), the general problem 
surrounding metaphor, as well as other non-literal cases, is the 
problem of ‘explaining how speaker meaning and sentence or word 
meaning come apart.’  
Searle (1979a: 94) asks:  
 
How do metaphors work? …What are the principles that enable 
speakers to formulate, and hearers to understand, metaphorical 
utterances? And how can we state these principles in a way that 
makes it clear how metaphorical utterances differ from other sorts 
of utterances in which speaker meaning does not coincide with 
literal meaning? 
 
In other words, Searle is asking to find a set of principles that 
enable one not only to interpret metaphorical utterances, but also to 
distinguish them from other nonliteral cases. Some speech acts 
theorists (Bach and Harnish 1979; Martinich 1984) have basically 
recognised this as the problem of metaphor, while others (Alston 
2000 and Barker 2004: 53-55) have more focused on the specific 
problem of distinguishing the structure of a literal assertion from 
that of a metaphorical one. 
Let’s first focus on Searle’s problem. To begin with, Bach and 
Harnish (1979: 68) have taken three sorts of relations to what is 
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said by an utterance to determine the possible value of the 
speaker’s meaning as far as nonliteral utterances are concerned. 
These are: 
 
(R1) Sarcasm, Irony: the opposite of what is said. 
(R2) Figure of Speech: a figurative or metaphorical connection. 
(R3) Exaggeration: the next evaluation toward the midpoint of the 
relevant scale. 
 
Unfortunately, these relations are based on generalisations that are 
either false or too general to allow us to make any serious 
hypothesis or distinction as to what the speaker intends to get 
across with her nonliteral utterance. For instance, we already saw 
in the previous chapter how the idea that an irony conveys the 
opposite of what is said is, to say the least, misleading. As to R2, 
the idea of a metaphorical connection does not explain much, but 
itself requires an explanation. Besides, R2 fails to distinguish 
metaphor from metonymy. In metaphor, the ‘connection’ may be 
itself metaphorical, while in metonymy it can be traced at the level 
of logical form. Consider: 
 
(1)  The ham sandwich left without paying. 
(2)  Sally is a block of ice. 
 
In (1) the relation between the individual to whom the definite 
description metonymically refers and the lexical item ‘the ham 
sandwich’ can be captured at the level of the logical form: 
 
(1*)  (The x) (x R the ham sandwich) 
 
In (1), we may take the individual standing for the definite 
description ‘the ham-sandwich’ to bear relation R to the ham-
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sandwich which is contextually most salient. The underlying rule 
could be stated thusly: in order to pick out such individual, look for 
the most salient value in the context of utterance that saturates the 
relation in question. The relationship between Sally and a block of 
ice cannot be traced in the same way since the context of utterance 
alone does not suffice to saturate any such relation. It is not the 
context of utterance alone which determines how Sally is related to 
the class of blocks of ice, although it may facilitate the task by 
imposing constraints that need yet to be explored (see chapter vi). 
Be that as it may, Searle believes that ‘metaphorical 
connections’ are indeed systematic and predictable, although he 
thinks that it is pragmatics and not semantics that should explain 
their occurrence. They are systematic in the sense that there are 
recurrent patterns of signification in metaphorical utterances. They 
are predictable in that there are interpretive principles the 
knowledge of which should allow us to interpret a broad class of 
metaphors based on them. 
According to Searle, the first step in the interpretation is always 
determined by looking at whether the utterance is metaphorical or 
not. Like Grice, Searle (1979a: 114) maintains the strategy that the 
hearers should look for a meaning different from the sentence 
meaning whenever ‘the utterance is defective if taken literally’. 
Defectiveness, in turn, can be present in different guises, as 
‘obvious falsehood, semantic non-sense, violations of the rules of 
speech acts, or violations of conversational principles’. Thus, given 
a defective utterance of a sentence, such as ‘S is P’, the final task is 
to determine the speaker’s meaning ‘S is R’.  
How to compute the value of R? To begin with, Searle discards 
two options, which are related to two classic theories of metaphor, 
the comparison view and the interaction view. The comparison 
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view (hereafter CV) states that the metaphorical meaning is given 
by a restatement of the metaphor as a literal assertion of similarity.2 
For a defender of such a view, an utterance of 
 
(3)  Sally is a dragon 
 
is equivalent in meaning to a statement of the form 
 
(4)  Sally is like a dragon. 
 
However, Searle points out that there are two unwelcome features 
inherent in such account. The first is ontological and has to do with 
the fact that, on such account, (3) licenses the following inference: 
 
(5) !x (x is a Dragon). 
 
(5) is of course false since there are no dragons, and therefore, 
Searle concludes, the comparison view is inconsistent. But there is 
another argument against the CV, this time more semantic than 
ontological. On the CV, (3) and (4) have the same truth conditions, 
given that (3) is supposed to be elliptical for (4), but this is false 
insofar as a metaphor and a statement of comparison, more often 
than not, differ in their truth conditions. This is clearly shown by 
another of Searle’s examples. Consider: 
 
(6)  John is a gorilla. 
 
Now, for Searle, (6) is roughly equivalent in meaning to: 
 
(7)  John is rough, nasty and prone to violence. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 This account can be found in the works of Aristotle and ancient rhetoricians 
(see Hills 2012: § 2). A contemporary defender is Fogelin (1988).  
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According to the CV, (7) is derivable only because there is a true 
literal statement of similarity. In other words,  
 
(8) John is like a gorilla, 
 
is true. But, suppose, ethological investigation shows that gorillas 
are not rough, nasty or prone to violence at all. Then (8) would turn 
out to be false, and by modus tollens, (6) would be false too. But 
this is not the case, (6) does in fact communicate something true, so 
the CV, once again, must be in error. 
The other theory that Searle considers inadequate is Black’s 
interaction theory (Black 1962, 1979). According to such a theory, 
a metaphorical meaning results as the interaction of a literal frame 
and a metaphorical vehicle. Apart from considering this 
relationship of ‘interaction’ to be unclear, Searle notes that there 
are cases where there is no literal frame, and therefore the 
‘interaction’ is by no means predictable.3 For instance, in 
 
(9)  The bad news is a block of ice, 
 
the definite description ‘the bad news’ refers metaphorically to 
Sally and therefore cannot be used as a literal frame for the 
metaphorical predicate ‘is a block of ice’. The conclusion one may 
draw from this counter-example to the interaction theory is that a 
theory of metaphor should not just account for the simple case of 
predicates used metaphorically. Since the subject of a metaphorical 
utterance may be itself metaphorical, no interaction with the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 An extensive discussion of the problems affecting the interaction theory is in 
White (1996). 
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predicate needs to be in force in order for the subject to express a 
metaphorical content.4  
Having refuted these two theories, Searle is left with the task of 
offering a positive view as to how a metaphor is interpreted. He 
comes up with eight principles, which given a term X, should allow 
an interpreter to compute what the speaker means by uttering X. 
These principles are: 
 
1. Things which are P are by definition R. 
2. Things which are P are contingently R. 
3. Things which are P are often said or believed to be R. 
4. Things which are P are said to be R according to our own 
sensibility, ‘culturally or naturally determined’. 
5. P things are not R by definition, nor contingently R or 
believed to be R, but the condition for being P is like the 
condition for being R. 
6. P and R are similar or the same; however, R results as a 
broadening of the application conditions associated to P. 
7. Like (6) except that the P term is a relational predicate. 
8. The P term conveys the semantic content of the R term by 
some principle of association (metonymy and synecdoche). 
 
Searle considers and then rejects a ninth principle. The principle 
could be stated in this way: 
 
9. Given two grammatical subjects S and S! and a predicate P 
used metaphorically, P will be taken to mean two different 
R-values, R! and R!!, depending on the juxtaposition of P 
with either S or S!. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4  Ironically, Searle does not consider at all the problem of metaphorical 
reference, but only focuses on the simple subject-predicate cases, where the 
predicate is the element to be metaphorically interpreted. 
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This principle is a version of the interaction principle, already 
rejected by Searle. But here the principle is rejected on a different 
ground. According to Searle, a metaphor is never created, but only 
discovered, so to speak. In other words, given his set of principles 
there is no need to appeal to a principle of juxtaposition, which 
would entail that new metaphors can always be created by just 
juxtaposing two terms. What the terms S and S! do is only to 
restrict the possible R-values, and that is all.  
While I wait to comment on these principles in the next sub-
section, I wish to conclude my discussion of Searle’s theory with 
his attempt to distinguish metaphor from other tropes and, in 
particular, irony. 
According to Searle, irony and metaphor are two uses of 
language that share the following properties: both emerge as the 
result of a ‘defective’ utterance of a sentence endowed with a 
certain literal meaning, and both do not require any extra-linguistic 
convention to be correctly interpreted. They differ in the way 
sentence meaning and speaker meaning ‘come apart’. While in a 
literal utterance, sentence meaning and speaker meaning coincide, 
in irony, the sentence meaning is used as an input to determine the 
opposite of what the speaker says, and in metaphor it is processed 
through the principles Searle has offered to determine a possible 
value of the speaker’s meaning. Schematically, 
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If we consider that, according to Searle, the literal meaning of an 
utterance is interpretable only relative to a certain background of 
assumptions, we get the following picture: an interpreter starts by 
checking whether the literal meaning of an utterance fits with the 
situation he is presented with. If the situation does not match the 
literal meaning of the utterance, he will recognise the utterance to 
be defective and therefore will proceed with the computation of a 
possible value for the speaker’s meaning. If the speaker is speaking 
ironically, then he will simply negate the sentence meaning and 
obtain in this way what the speaker means. On the other hand, if 
the speaker is speaking metaphorically, he will use one of the eight 
principles Searle gives to compute what the speaker means. Finally, 
Searle contemplates the possibility of open-ended metaphorical 
Literal utterance Ironical utterance Metaphorical 
utterance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
     
 
 
 
In this table, which reproduces Searle’s (Searle 1979a: 122), we have the three 
basic ways in which, according to Searle, the speaker’s meaning of a literal, 
ironical or metaphorical utterance can be determined. Given that S is the literal 
subject of the utterance, P its literal predicate and R what the speaker means by 
uttering P, we have the following scenarios: in the first column, P and R 
coincide, in the second column the semantic value of P must be inverted, in the 
third column R is determined through P via one of Searle’s principles. 
$! $!$!
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utterances, i.e., utterances whose contents cannot be reduced to a 
single R-value. Unfortunately, Searle does not say anything as to 
how the interpretation of these metaphors should proceed. 
 
 
3. Criticism of Searle’s account 
 
As anticipated, there are different criticisms connected to Searle’s 
view. To begin with, it seems to me that the principles offered by 
Searle have much more semantic weight than he recognises. 
Actually, Searle himself admits that metaphors do have a semantic 
role, namely, ‘to plug’ semantic gaps, where by a ‘semantic gap’ 
Searle means a linguistic context in which no literal expression 
could semantically express what a metaphor, within such context, 
conveys. According to Searle, in such cases no literal paraphrase 
can fill the gap that would result by eliminating the metaphorical 
expression in the sentence uttered.5 As an example, Searle gives 
 
(10)  The ship ploughed the sea,6 
 
which is a relational metaphor in that two nouns are related by a 
metaphorical predicate. Searle notes that, as in the case of (10), we 
often know what a metaphor means, though we are unable to 
reformulate such knowledge in literal terms. This transparency of 
metaphorical meaning seems to be a plausible feature of many 
metaphorical utterances, but the question is where exactly this 
knowledge comes from. My guess is that we have to look for better 
candidates than pragmatics, at least the kind of pragmatics we have !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 This goes against Searle’s principles of expressibility (Searle 1969), according 
to which every thought can be literally expressed. 
6 Here, as with other examples, Searle seems to focus on fully conventionalised 
metaphors, that is to say, expressions whose metaphorical meanings have been 
lexicalised.  
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treated so far. I believe it is, in fact, quite implausible to assume 
that such knowledge is given or mediated by the knowledge of the 
speaker’s intentions since these are not essentially involved in the 
determination of the favoured interpretation, as in the case of 
conversational implicatures. To repeat a point already stressed in 
the previous chapter, an implicature of an utterance is calculated 
from what is said by the utterance and the very fact that the speaker 
said whatever she said. This is the hallmark of all those cases that 
Recanati (2004, 2010) calls post-propositional in that their 
meaning is determined only once a full-blooded proposition has 
already been semantically decoded. Now, if Searle’s view is a kind 
of post-propositional pragmatics, then all the objections that 
applied to Grice’s apply also to it. In addition, some further 
objections can be devised and a question be raised: is Searle’s 
account compatible with a non-post-propositional account of 
metaphorical interpretation? I leave this question open until the 
next section, and concentrate now on the main objections to Searle, 
under the supposition that he is really offering a post-propositional 
account of metaphor. 
I am not denying that the speaker’s intentions can be important 
to fix the right interpretation of a metaphorical utterance. What I 
am denying is that these have any special role to play in 
metaphorical interpretation. Speaker’s intentions can be important 
to fix the interpretation of a literal utterance. Sometimes we need to 
check what the speaker has in mind in uttering a literal sentence, 
as, for instance, when one says ‘I went to the bank this morning’, 
having in mind the river bank and not the financial institution. 
However, we do not conclude that speakers’ intentions have a 
substantial explanatory role in normal cases. Similarly, we may 
need to check the speaker’s intentions in her uttering a metaphor 
which turns out to be also literally true, as in (11): 
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(11)  Jesus was a carpenter.7 
 
But more often we latch onto the metaphorical meaning without 
any intentional detour. A lot of research in psycholinguistics has 
fleshed out this aspect of metaphorical interpretation.8 Metaphors 
can be as easily accessible as most literal uses of language.  
Therefore, Searle’s ‘deviance’ model, which we already rejected 
in Grice’s account, cannot have empirical force either. Apart from 
being disproved by those metaphorical examples where no 
semantic defectiveness is traceable, this model is disconfirmed by 
the same type of experiments above-mentioned. 
However, I am here especially interested in the theoretical 
framework endorsed by Searle because I think that, actually, it 
shows that a semantic account of metaphor is better able than a 
pragmatic one to explain the sort of knowledge we deploy in the 
understanding of metaphorical utterances. Searle’s principles are, 
in fact, concerned either with semantic and conventional properties 
of sentences and words or with stereotypical properties, which at 
the end collapse into the category of conventional properties (see 
Leezenberg 2001: 121:122). For instance, principle 1, which states 
that the R value is by definition a P value, is certainly semantic 
insofar as it states the rather obvious fact that if a predicate is 
associated, by definition, with a certain set of properties {P1, …, 
Pn}, then one of these properties must be actually instantiated by 
the individual of whom something is said by the use of that very 
predicate. Then the resulting claim will be true iff the subject’s 
extension is in the extension of the predicate iff the subject has one 
of these properties. An example could be: 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 This is a metaphor which belongs to the category for which Ted Cohen once 
dubbed the term ‘twice-true metaphors’. 
8 To name just a few: Gibbs (1994: 99-106) Giora (2003), Glucksberg (2008). 
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(12)  Jim is a giant, 
 
where ‘giant’ entails ‘being big’. Also, principles 2, 3 and 4 
basically say that some predicates can be used to classify things in 
terms of their conventional or stereotypical properties. But then if 
something is said by the metaphorical use of one of these 
predicates in a given context, it is because these terms have 
conditions of application the knowledge of which a semantics of 
natural language can in principle include. Moreover, as Leezenberg 
notes (2001: 122), principle 3 is actually incoherent in that it does 
not make any sense for one to assert something she knows to be 
false, but believes to be true. In other words, if the speaker knows 
that gorillas are not violent, then she cannot assert ‘Jim is a gorilla’ 
on the basis that she believes that gorillas are violent. 
Still, principles 5 to 7 presuppose knowledge of application 
conditions, or in any case, are based on an extension of those. 
Principle 8, on the other hand, presupposes both some interaction 
between S and P in the determination of R and, also, some ways of 
constraining the resulting metaphorical interpretation. The very fact 
that Searle recognises this interaction and the existence of possible 
constraints on metaphorical interpretations is indicative that an 
explanation of metaphorical interpretation should be looked for at a 
level other than pragmatics. In fact, I think it is impossible to 
respond, within Searle’s framework, to a number of questions, 
which are crucial to a correct assessment of the problem of 
metaphorical interpretation. What counts as an acceptable 
metaphorical interpretation? What constraints are there for a 
metaphorical interpretation to be acceptable? Why, for instance, is 
an utterance of (13) felt as unacceptable  
 
(13)  # Juliet is the sun, and Achilles is, too ? (Stern 2000) 
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None of these questions receives any attention in Searle’s account 
and, for that matter, in any other speech-act theoretic account of 
metaphor.  
Besides, Searle’s attempts to classify tropes in terms of different 
conditions imposed on the derivation of speaker’s meaning are 
unsatisfactory. For, as we already noticed for Grice, to say that an 
irony is based on the derivation of the opposite of what the speaker 
says is a false generalisation, while to say that in literal utterances 
sentence meaning and speaker meaning coincide seems to be a 
harsh conclusion. Take, for instance, these utterances: 
 
(14)  France is hexagonal. 
(15)  The room was silent. 
(16)  It is raining. 
(17)  Vegemite is tasty. 
 
All these utterances are considered by the average speaker as literal 
(sure, at least in the case of (14) we need enough scene setting) 
though, in none of these examples the speaker means what the 
sentences uttered literally express. For France’s shape is very 
irregular and only to a very large approximation may it be taken as 
hexagonal; in (15) the speaker is not talking of the only room in the 
world, but she has in mind a specific room. Besides, the room in 
question can be silent only to a certain degree, but not totally silent, 
which would be physically impossible. In (16) the speaker means 
that it is raining in Nottingham, while in (17) she is asserting that 
she finds vegemite tasty.9 As these examples show, it is difficult to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Predicates of taste such as ‘is tasty’ or ‘is fun’ have been widely discussed 
within the debate between contextualists and relativists. Lasersohn (2005) 
provides a good starting point in the literature. It should also be noticed that 
there is at least a third theoretical option constituted by the kind of minimalism 
favoured by Cappelen and Lepore (2005). On this account, although the 
proposition expressed by an utterance of (17) is the same across contexts, what 
the speaker means by uttering it varies. I do not have much to say about 
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accept Searle’s claim that sentence meaning and speaker meaning 
coincide in literal utterances.  
Searle seems to have reasoned in this way: since the literal 
meaning alone does not determine a metaphorical interpretation, 
then it must be pragmatics that determine such meaning. As noted 
by some scholars (Stern 2000, Leezenberg 2001), Searle’s 
reasoning is vitiated both by a naïve conception of literal meaning 
and by insufficient attention to the constraints imposed by the 
context of utterance on determining a metaphor’s interpretation. 
But there are two other problems afflicting Searle’s theory, 
which have not received sufficient attention in the literature, I 
think. Both points are related to Searle’s theory of intentionality, as 
developed in Searle (1983). First of all, according to Searle (1983), 
the problem of meaning is  
 
how does the mind impose Intentionality on entities that are not 
intrinsically intentional? How is it possible that mere things can 
represent? And the answer I am proposing is that the utterance act 
is performed with the intention that the utterance itself has 
conditions of satisfaction. (1983: 167)  
 
For Searle a meaning intention is an intention that “the physical 
events which constitute part of the conditions of satisfaction (in the 
sense of things required) of the intention should themselves have 
conditions of satisfaction (in the sense of requirement)” (ibid., 166-
167). In other words, a condition of satisfaction of an utterance is 
that the event described has truth-conditions.10 However, since !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Cappelen and Lepore’s speech-act pluralism since it seems to me to collapse in 
one of the pragmatic options already available (Grice’s or Relevance Theory). 
Besides, as I will show in the next chapter, there are independent syntactic 
reasons to avoid minimalism. I will come back on the issue of predicates of taste 
in Chapter 7, where I will sketch its consequences for the understanding of 
metaphor. 
10 Another condition of satisfaction may be, for instance, that the presuppositions 
of the utterance be satisfied. 
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most metaphorical utterances, when taken literally, are false or 
absurd, then one may wonder how they acquire intentionality. One 
answer is that they have derived intentionality insofar as there are 
literal paraphrases of them. However, we already saw that there are 
cases in which no literal paraphrase is available but where we 
nevertheless understand the metaphor perfectly well.  
Another answer, which is in Searle (1983: 148-9), is that 
metaphorical understanding is the result of non-representational 
capacities. However, this claim obviously contrasts with the 
previous explanation offered by Searle, which takes metaphors to 
have truth-conditions in virtue of there being principles that assign 
new truth-conditions to utterances containing them. Thus, either 
metaphors have truth-conditions or they do not. If they do, it cannot 
be just a matter of there being some literal paraphrase (because in 
some cases, metaphors that we judge as true do not have any 
paraphrase); if they do not, then Searle’s account collapses into 
Davidson’s non-representational account, which I have already 
rejected in the first chapter. Besides, allowing this solution would 
be to give up the important, though difficult, task of explaining 
how metaphorical utterances are endowed with intentionality. 
Secondly, if metaphorical utterances can be characterised as 
being composed out of representational intentions, so can literal 
utterances as well as implicatures. On Searle’s account, how do we 
distinguish these types of utterances? There does not seem to be 
any way to distinguish a metaphorical interpretation from a literal 
one or an implicature if all these acts are characterised by having 
the same kind of intention at their basis. Thus, the way these acts 
differ must be found somewhere else. Where exactly? 
Can it be a difference in the mode in which these utterances are 
presented? The mode characterising literal utterances is the 
asserting force, which can be epistemically delineated as the 
commitment of the speaker to the state of affairs described by her 
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utterance. Generally, metaphorical utterances cannot commit the 
speaker to the states of affairs described, since there are not any. 
Shall we conclude that there is a special metaphorical force 
attached to metaphorical utterances? The problem is that nobody 
knows what this force is or how it could be devised in terms of 
linguistic evidence. Could it be a commitment to a possible state of 
affairs? The problem is that it is difficult to cash out a notion of 
commitment to impossible states of affairs, unless you are a 
dialetheist about impossible worlds and the like.11  
In conclusion, it seems we have reached two main issues that 
Searle’s account leaves unaccounted for: 
 
(i) Is a metaphorical utterance an act of assertion? If yes, how 
to distinguish it from a literal assertion? 
(ii) What does a metaphorical utterance exactly represent? 
 
These questions are certainly crucial to any theory of metaphor, 
and therefore will be receiving particular attention in the following 
chapters. In the present context, there are some speech-act theorists 
who have particularly attempted to respond to the first question. To 
their views I shall now direct my attention. To anticipate, I think 
that these accounts fail to offer any insight into metaphorical 
interpretation for two reasons: first of all, they fail to offer a 
satisfying answer to question (ii); secondly, they fail to see that an 
answer to (i) cannot be separated from an answer to (ii). 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Dialetheism is the view that there true contradictions. The most well-known 
defence of dialetheism is Priest (1987).
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4. Metaphorical Assertion? 
 
There are two types of account in speech-act theory that have 
attempted to answer the question of what sort of speech act 
metaphorical utterances stand for. There is the rule-based account 
of Alston (2000) and the intention-based account of Barker (2004). 
After having examined their proposals, I will reject both accounts 
for the reason that they have avoided question (ii) of the previous 
section, and therefore have thought it possible to give an answer to 
question (i) without solving first the representational problem 
inherent in (ii). 
According to Alston, there are two types of metaphorical 
utterances: on the one hand, metaphors that have a literal 
paraphrase and, on the other, metaphors that do not. For Alston 
(2000: 233), only the former type is to be appropriately considered 
as belonging to the category of assertion insofar as the speaker is 
taking responsibility for some proposition that is a literal 
paraphrase of what the metaphor expresses.  
In normal contexts, Alston’s notion of ‘taking responsibility’ 
can be cashed out in terms of the speaker’s commitment to there 
being an illocutionary rule associated to the sentence uttered, which 
makes the sentence have a certain meaning. In other words, for 
Alston, a sentence has a meaning iff there is an illocutionary rule 
which establishes how the sentence is to be used. Given this 
account, figurative utterances are considered to be parasitic on 
utterances whose I-rules (i.e., illocutionary-rules) are already 
defined. 
The problem I have with such a view is that, first of all, it 
divorces the notion of meaning from the notion of truth-conditions 
rather drastically. For instance, Alston (2000: 191) lays down the 
following rule for any act of assertion: 
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D8. In uttering S, U R’s that p–In uttering S, U subjects his 
utterance to a rule that, in application to this case, implies 
that it is permissible for U to utter S only if p. 
 
In other words, a speaker U who assertively utters a sentence S, 
takes responsibility (R’s) that p (the proposition normally 
expressed by an utterance of S) in virtue of there being a rule 
permitting U to assert S only if p. Whether or not there is such a 
rule – in my opinion, we do not need to postulate any such rules 
over and above the linguistic conventions – Alston makes the 
further attempt to reduce the notion of meaning to this rule-
conception of speech-acts.  
He defines the meaning of a sentence in the following way: 
 
X. A sentence’s having a certain meaning consists in its 
being subject to a certain illocutionary rule. (Alston 2000: 
192) 
 
I believe this further reductive step is unwarranted for the 
following reason. If a sentence has a certain meaning in virtue of 
there being a certain illocutionary rule like D8, the rule itself exists 
only because we already know what it is for the sentence to have a 
certain meaning. We know how to use the sentence because we 
know under what conditions the sentence is true or false (to limit 
the discussion to the case of assertives). Similarly, we do not know 
what to do with the meaning of a word unless we know what kind 
of possible or actual state of affairs that word may contribute 
towards representing.12  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 This objection against Alston’s reductive analysis of meaning should remind 
the reader of my general objection against intention-based accounts of meaning 
in the previous chapter (See Chapter 2, §3, fn. 9). The only difference between 
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Secondly, I do not think that someone who utters a metaphor is 
only derivatively asserting something so long as the content of her 
utterance is determined by whatever is required by the I-rule 
governing its literal paraphrase. For there may be no literal 
paraphrase of metaphors that we legitimately recognise to have 
meaning (see, e.g., Searle’s ship metaphor) or there may be too 
many literal paraphrases (e.g., ‘Juliet is the sun’), and this makes 
absurd the task of individuating which paraphrase the speaker is 
exactly committed to.  
Thus, I do not think that a metaphorical assertion can be 
characterised along the lines proposed by Alston. What about 
Barker’s intentional account? Barker (2004) looks more closely at 
the intentional activity of speakers in order to distinguish a literal 
assertion from a metaphorical one. In what follows, I will claim 
that such account does not fare any better than Alston’s. 
Barker disagrees with rule-based accounts of figurative 
assertions because he thinks that such assertions do not involve any 
pre-established set of rules, such that knowing them allow one to 
determine that the speaker is speaking figuratively. I basically 
agree with such a view, so I can skip it altogether.  
However, I disagree with Barker when he takes a metaphorical 
assertion as being similar in structure to sarcastic assertions. For 
Barker, the similarity is based on the idea that, in both cases, the 
speaker does not have an intention to represent whatever the 
sentence uttered literally says. However, he adds that there is an 
implicit commitment to having an intention to defend some 
representational complex which is either the opposite of what the 
sentence literally says (irony) or modelled by the form of what the 
sentence literally says (metaphor).  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
the two approaches is that their reductions go in opposite directions: top-down in 
the case of the reduction of meaning to intentions, ultimately its reduction to the 
biological world, while bottom-up in the case of the reduction of meaning to 
conventions, ultimately its reduction to the social structure of reality.  
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In Barker’s terms, a metaphorical assertion can thus be defined 
as: 
 
Metaphor: U asserts metaphorically that P by uttering S iff: 
(i) U performs A(S)pro 13  (but lacks the intentions 
advertised); 
(ii) U advertises intentions (a) to represent her belief 
that a complex obtains whose form is metaphorically 
modelled by the form of <P>; and (b) to defend the 
state in (a); 
(iii) U has the intention advertised in (iib). (Barker 2004: 
53) 
 
Barker’s account is a more elaborated version of Grice’s in that it 
takes metaphor as being based on the speaker’s making as if to say 
a certain thing in order to communicate something else. In other 
words, he takes the speaker to be pretending to assert that S, and by 
manifesting this pretended intention she adverts to the hearer that 
she has another intention, that of representing a metaphorical 
complex, namely, the complex <Juliet, P*>, where P* is a property 
associated to the literal vehicle ‘the sun’. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 This is Barker’s way to represent the idea that the speaker performs what he 
calls a ‘proto-assertion’, which is one of the two features of Barker’s account of 
assertion. According to Barker (2004: 45), an assertion is composed, in fact, by 
two acts: a proto-assertion, which is the act of uttering a sentence advertising an 
intention to represent a complex; and a proto-communicative act, which is the 
act of uttering a sentence advertising an intention to defend a commitment 
property !. For instance, someone who utters ‘It is probably raining’ makes an 
act of assertion to the effect that she is uttering a sentence advertising her 
intention to represent that she has a certain subjective probability state and, at the 
same time, she utters that sentence with the intention to defend the possession of 
such state. The reader should also notice that, according to Barker, the assertion 
of ‘It is probably raining’ counts as an expressive act insofar as it purports to 
represent a certain internal state of the speaker, in the particular case, the one 
corresponding to her subjective probability state. This account falls within 
Barker’s expressivist philosophy, which radically departs from the main trends 
in philosophical semantics nowadays, especially the possible worlds semantic 
framework. 
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I believe that Barker’s account leaves more questions untouched 
than those it answers. To begin with, I disagree with those accounts 
of metaphorical assertion based on the notion of making as if or 
pretence intended as an illocutionary force of some kind. First of 
all, speakers do not pretend to assert, but actually make assertions 
by uttering metaphors.14 Just consider the case of conventional 
metaphors, i.e., metaphors whose meanings are nowadays 
lexicalised. Would we be willing to say that speakers only pretend 
to assert these metaphors, while having in mind different truth-
conditions? As for Egan’s pretence account of idioms (2008), 
Barker seems to make the wrong prediction that hearers first 
recognise that the speaker is speaking in pretence, and therefore 
that the literal truth-conditions of the utterance must be discarded, 
and only then elaborate a new meaning, i.e., assign new truth-
conditions to the sentence uttered. 
This objection reminds me of a criticism Jason Stanley (2001: 
51) poses to hermeneutic fictionalists. 15  The objection is the 
following: suppose we deem the Davidsonian theory of adverbs as 
the best semantic theory for adverbs. Since this theory postulates !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14  One could object that they still assert the metaphorical content, while 
pretending to assert the literal content. There are two main problems with this 
objection. One is that it simply resumes Grice’s notion of ‘making as if to say’, 
which I already dismissed in chapter 2. Secondly, even if one buys this story, it 
would still be a mystery how, in this view, metaphors represent whatever they 
represent. Sure, this reply presupposes that metaphors do have representational 
properties, and that it is in virtue of these properties that they embed, for 
instance. One could dismiss this reply and stick to a non-representational account 
of metaphor. However, she would incur in the same kind of problems that 
Davidson faces to explain the compositional properties of metaphorical 
expressions. This point is remarked in the text. 
15 Matti Eklund writes in the entry to ‘Fictionalism’ in the Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy: “Hermeneutic fictionalism about a discourse D is a thesis about 
the actual nature of the discourse: according to hermeneutic fictionalism we 
actually do not aim at the literal truth but only appear or pretend to do so. 
Revolutionary fictionalism, by contrast, insists that when engaging in D we 
ought only to make such pretend-assertions; the point of engaging in D would be 
achieved by pretend-assertions”. This terminology was introduced by Stanley in 
the paper I refer to in the text. Stanley introduced the distinction between 
hermeneutic and revolutionary factionalism having in mind Burgess’s distinction 
between hermeneutic and revolutionary nominalism. 
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events, then it would follow that an average speaker should be 
committed to their existence. But someone may well reject such 
commitment, without making her attitude to the content uttered by 
her be that of pretence. Similarly, someone who utters a 
conventionalised metaphor, for instance ‘The table’s legs are 
asymmetric’, could reject a commitment to the existence of legs for 
a table without it being possible for us to say that she was only 
pretending to assert that the table she had in mind has legs. 
Be that as it may, an account like this also makes the 
interpretive process quite a heavy matter. However, it ignores a 
large number of psycholinguistic and philosophical studies (Gibbs 
1994; Gibbs and Tendhal 2006; Giora 2003; Bezuidenhout 2001; 
Guttenplan 2006; Glucksberg 2008) that have pointed out how 
metaphorical interpretation is immediate, direct and transparent. 
And even if there were no intention in the speaker’s mind to 
represent what the sentence uttered literally says, I do not think it 
follows that there is another intention on her part to advertise that 
she lacks that intention. 
Secondly, and more importantly from my perspective, there is 
no attempt whatsoever in this account to explain how a sentence 
used metaphorically has the representational properties it has. 
Barker talks of a ‘form’ metaphorically modelled on the 
proposition literally expressed by the sentence uttered. What is this 
form and what is the relationship with the proposition ‘literally’ 
expressed? Unless Barker gives us an account of what a ‘form’ is 
and of how it is represented by our minds, his account sheds no 
light on the representational problem inherent in metaphorical 
interpretation. My suspicion is that Barker, like Davidson, has 
espoused a rather bare causal account of metaphorical 
interpretation. 
However, we understand metaphors in the same transparent way 
as we grasp literal uses of language and we also accept some 
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metaphors as more acceptable than others. We reject mixed 
contexts (for instance, contexts characterised by VP-ellipsis) on the 
basis of some principles, whose nature must be investigated, and 
compose complex utterances by embedding metaphors in more 
literal contexts. In other words, metaphors do seem to have 
compositional properties, but if we followed any of the speech-
theoretic accounts here discussed the behaviour of such properties 
would be hardly explainable.  
Before concluding this chapter, I will present another argument 
to the effect that metaphors could be considered as conventional 
implicatures, propositions whose logical and compositional nature 
is separated from what is said by an utterance. This argument is 
offered as a way for the supporters of a pragmatic theory of 
metaphor not to throw the baby (i.e., an explanation of metaphor 
appealing to pragmatic principles) out with the bathwater (i.e., all 
the pragmatic accounts I have been dealing with so far).  
 
 
5. Metaphor, quotation and conventional implicature 
 
One way to argue that metaphors are still in the domain of 
pragmatics is, I suggest, to consider metaphors to be akin to 
conventional implicatures, implicatures which, albeit determined 
by the conventional profile of an utterance, are evaluated at a level 
other than the asserted one. Then, given some further premises 
concerning the semantics/pragmatics division, one could conclude 
that metaphor is a special type of speaker’s meaning. If the 
argument were on the right track, then the defenders of a pragmatic 
account of metaphor would have something to appeal to. The 
purpose of this section is therefore to spell out this suggestion in 
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some detail, and to rebut the argument for it on the basis that its 
premises are disputable and its theoretical benefits unclear.  
Let’s first review the essential features of conventional 
implicatures, some of which we have already encountered in the 
previous chapter: 
 
i. Conventional implicatures are typically non-core-
truth-conditional aspects of an utterance; 
ii. Conventional implicatures are generally preserved 
under their embedding of truth-functional operators; 
iii. Conventional implicatures are triggered by some 
conventional element of an utterance. 
 
As to (i), following Potts’ (2005) analysis of the phenomenon,16 I 
take that it is a matter of the logic of conventional implicatures that 
they require a level of assessment other than the core truth-
conditional one. In other words, although conventional implicatures 
typically have truth-conditions, they are not the primary bearers of 
the truth (falsity) of an utterance. Thus, consider some classical 
examples of conventional implicatures involving appositives, 
contrasting particles and speech-act adverbs: 
 
(18)  Mario Monti, who is the Italian First Minister, won’t run 
in the next elections. 
(19)  Jim is rich but nice. 
(20)  Confidentially, he likes her very much. 
 
In none of these examples, the conventionally implicated content 
modifies the truth-conditional profile of the sentences uttered. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 While, as far as I am aware, Potts (2005) is the most detailed analysis of the 
phenomenon, we already saw in the last chapter that Grice (1989) was the first to 
pin down this class of implicatures. See also Neale (1992) for a careful 
discussion of Grice’s taxonomy of implicatures. 
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Whether or not Mario Monti is the Italian First Minister, the 
primary proposition, i.e., the one whose evaluation will allow one 
to say that the utterance is either true or false, is that he won’t run 
in the next election. The utterance is true (false) iff this proposition 
is true (false). In turn, such proposition is true or false irrespective 
of who the First Minister in charge in Italy is. Similarly, (19) is true 
iff Jim is rich and nice, irrespective of whether there is a contrast 
between being rich and being poor, and (20) is true iff the subject 
likes a woman, who is salient in the discourse, to a high degree, 
irrespective of whether the information given is known only to the 
participants in the conversation. These data are, I think, intuitive 
enough to allow for the following generalisation: 
 
iv. Conventional implicatures are aspects of meaning 
logically and compositionally independent of what-is-
said (=asserted content). (See Potts 2005) 
 
The distinction between conventionally imparted content and 
asserted content may be shown with some concrete examples. For 
instance, take an utterance of an unembedded sentence such as 
 
(21)  Messi, who is very short, is a great talent. 
 
With an utterance of (21) the speaker is primarily committed to the 
truth of the proposition that Messi is very talented, be he also 
conventionally implicates that he is very short. Now, consider (21) 
under negation: 
 
(22)  It is not the case that Messi, who is very short, is a great 
talent. 
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Here the content conventionally implicated is not affected by 
negation, which is working in its standard ‘hole’ way, i.e., allowing 
the conventionally implicated content to be projected beyond the 
syntax of the simple sentence now embedded.17 Incidentally, as 
others have pointed out,18 conventionally implicated content is not 
cancellable in the way conversational implicatures are. Thus, on 
pain of inconsistency, you cannot assert: 
 
(23) # Messi, who is very short, is a great talent, but I don’t 
mean to say he is very short. 
 
Thus, a conventional implicature’s meaning dimension is best 
configured as that of an entailment, which licenses inferences like 
the following ones: 
 
(24) Messi, who is very short, is a great talent. 
 ! Messi is very short. 
 ! Messi is very short and Messi is a great talent.19 
 
All these facts are interesting in themselves, but they still do not 
suggest an answer to the question concerning the nature of the 
relationship between asserted content and implicated one. The 
theory I most favour in this sense is the one according to which 
conventional implicatures are comments on what is said by an 
utterance, or on aspects of the utterance itself. In this sense, they 
belong to the category of other meta-cognitive phenomena, e.g., 
quotation, and in particular, certain uses of quotation such as mixed 
quotation and scare quotes, of which more below. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17  Karttunen and Peters (1979) were the first to notice this behaviour of 
conventionally implicated content. 
18 See García-Carpintero (2011: 125). 
19 Compare with an ironic utterance of ‘He is a fine friend,’ which does not 
license the inference to the ironic content ‘He is not a fine friend’.  
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Finally, as to (iii), what conventional elements of an utterance 
are the best candidates to signal that the expression or sentence 
uttered metaphorically is to be interpreted pragmatically? 
Metaphors could be considered instances of what Carpintero, 
following Davidson, calls ‘double-duty quotation’. The 
phenomenon embraces different cases, such as mixed quotation, 
scare quotes,20 and even cases of metalinguistic negation: 
 
(25) Saddam Hussein did not pose an ‘immediate threat to the 
security of our people’, as Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said. 
 
(26) A ‘fortnight’ is a period of fourteen days. 
 
(27) We didn’t eat ‘[Abricots]’; we ate ‘[Eibricots]’. 
 
These cases are characterised by the following features: (i) there is 
a mix of use and mention of the material quoted, in that the 
quotation may serve both the function of calling attention to the 
sign itself without preventing the material quoted from being used 
to contribute a content to the proposition primarily expressed by 
these utterances, whether or not this meaning coincides with what 
the words under quotation marks standardly mean; 21  (ii) the 
presence of meta-commentaries, whose function is to 
specify/rectify certain aspects of the utterances of which they are 
comments of. For instance, the meta-commentary inherent in an 
utterance of (25) could be taken as roughly: 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 ‘Mixed quotation’ is the phenomenon in which a word or expression is 
mentioned but also used with its standard meaning, whereas ‘scare quotes’ is 
when a word or expression is under quotation, implying that it should not be 
taken with its standard meaning. 
21 This is the most important difference with cases of pure quotation, in which 
we have the ‘semantic inertia’ of the material quoted. See Cappelen and Lepore 
(2007b), Predelli (2009b) and García-Carpintero (2011). 
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(25*)  That Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said it by using a 
sentence including ‘immediate threat to the security of our people’. 
[García-Carpintero: 2011: 126] 
 
To be fair, the assessment of (25) to (27) is not so uniform in the 
literature. We could, in fact, distinguish at least two theoretical 
options here. One option – the one more akin to the general 
hypothesis that metaphors involve some kind of quotation to be 
accounted in terms of conventional implicature – would be to treat 
these elements as contributing two types of content: semantically, 
what the lexical element, which is under quotation marks, encodes 
and, pragmatically, whatever the speaker has in mind by quoting 
that element. Under this view, the quotation marks are a referential 
device used to refer to the index demonstrated, i.e., the quoted 
material which serves as an index for whichever feature the speaker 
intends to refer. Alternatively, we could treat the quotation marks 
not as a referential device, buts as an echoic use of language22 
which serves to bring one’s attention to properties the quoted 
lexical item possesses, the determination of which is crucial to 
assign new truth-conditions to the utterance. This seems to be the 
direction taken up by Recanati over the years and confirmed in his 
recent book Truth-Conditional Pragmatics (2010).  Here, I will 
mainly be focusing on the first option since it is the one which 
could constitute an advance on the type of account Searle has 
offered.23 
Thus, such a theory distinguishes two (or even more) levels of 
meaning: on the one hand, the primary proposition (the message in 
Predelli’s words, Predelli 2003) which corresponds to what-is-said, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22  Sperber and Wilson (1986 [1995]) provide a detailed analysis of the 
phenomenon.  
23 Reasons of space and time have prevented me from discussing the alternative 
view. In any case, it would have been some highly speculative material, so 
nothing is lost in my discussion. 
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and the ancillary propositions (the attachment also in Predelli’s 
words) which constitute comments on the primary proposition or 
aspects of its utterance. The further claim is that such attachments 
may serve the function of helping the hearer determine the 
speaker’s meaning. 
Now, according to the view which I am going to suggest more 
than to endorse, metaphors are elements of an utterance that are 
either implicitly or explicitly put under quotation marks. For 
instance, when Romeo utters  
 
(28)  Juliet is the sun, 
 
we should take his utterance to be properly represented as 
 
(28*)  Juliet is ‘the sun’, 
 
where the quotation marks refer to the index demonstrated, i.e. the 
definite description ‘the sun’, implying that it is not used with its 
standard meaning.24,25 Accordingly, we get the following picture: 
 
ASSERTED CONTENT: Juliet is the sun. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 I think the possibility of hidden quotation marks around expressions used 
metaphorically could gain support from Stanley’s argument for hidden semantic 
constituents (Stanley 2000 [2007]). This should prevent a possible objection that 
I am appealing to strange entities (i.e., quotation marks) that are not realised at 
the level of the sentence surface. Thanks to Greg Currie for discussion on this 
particular point.  
25 The fact that metaphorical utterances do not always make explicit use of 
quotation marks could be a mere accident, due to some sort of pragmatic 
laziness. In fact, it is often the case that in written language, especially in formal 
contexts, quotation marks are used to enclose words used metaphorically. Also, 
people using online instant message services such as msn or skype often resort to 
quotation marks, showing that they are somewhat aware of using words or 
expressions metaphorically. Some examples: ‘Getting to the ‘heart’ of the 
matter’ (From John Perry’s blog: 
http://www.structuredprocrastination.com/); “The obsessions are difficult to 
walk away from. They stay with me wherever I go as ‘added baggage’” (quot. in 
Schwartz 1996: 89); “It’s always nice to realise that the ‘cup’ is still good to fill 
in” (from a msn chat). 
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CONVENTIONALLY IMPLICATED CONTENT: that the 
expression ‘the sun’ is used non-standardly [+> look for an 
alternative meaning] 
 
SPEAKER’S MEANING: Juliet is warm, central to Romeo’s life, 
etc. 
 
Under this account, the contribution a metaphorical expression 
brings to the fore is double: on the one hand, we have the semantic 
content that an utterance of the sentence without quotation marks 
would convey and which, incidentally, is still conveyed by the 
actual utterance. On the other hand, there is the content that must 
be elaborated, taking into account the role of quotation marks. This 
second dimension of meaning, one could argue, is part of 
pragmatics in virtue of both the way it is determined and the fact 
that it is not part of the literal meaning of the expressions quoted. 
As to the way such content is determined, one could implement the 
theory just sketched with Searle’s principles presented in section 2 
of this chapter. Also, it could be conceded that speaker’s intentions 
play a crucial role to actually determine which property is exactly 
demonstrated by the very act of mentioning the expression(s) used 
metaphorically.26 
This account is, as I take it, an advance on the model proposed 
by Searle for the following reasons. First of all, appealing to 
quotation avoids the unwelcome feature present in Searle’s account 
that metaphorical interpretations are determined on the basis of 
some semantic or other deviance. We saw how this model is 
descriptively inadequate – there are cases where no deviance 
whatsoever can be found in a metaphorical utterance – and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 This seems to be recognised even by Carpintero (2011), who otherwise 
attempts to offer a more semantically oriented account of double-duty quotation. 
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psychologically implausible – it is discredited by almost any 
psycholinguistic theory in circulation. On the other hand, this new 
account preserves some intuitive properties of metaphorical 
interpretation: first, the dependence of the metaphorical meaning 
on literal meaning. In fact, the search for a metaphorical meaning is 
at least partially constrained by the presence of the token under 
quotation marks, whose metarepresentation at the level of the 
conventionally implicated content allows one to determine whether 
the properties expressed by the utterance are associated with its 
type or are to be derived pragmatically. Second, it seems to 
corroborate some ‘epistemological’ theories of metaphor, like, e.g., 
Camp’s (2009), which insist on the double perspective 
characterising metaphorical experience at once: i.e., the capacity to 
see something as something else, and in particular to see a 
particular phenomenon under a new light through the employment 
of a literal vehicle used in a ‘new’ context. 
Thus, to recapitulate, according to the account of metaphor I 
have presented here the quotation marks function as a conventional 
device for referring to the index demonstrated and, indirectly, for 
signalling that the speaker is not using the material quoted with its 
standard meaning. In virtue of this referential act, the speaker 
brings attention to features of the quoted lexical item, in the same 
way scare quotes are used in other contexts such as, for instance, 
sarcastic utterances. Searle’s principles could then be implemented 
in such a theory, so as to determine the exact value of the speaker’s 
meaning, some proposition along the lines Searle’s account 
suggests. This analysis would have that the hearers have access to 
both dimensions of meaning, and this seems to be a virtue of the 
theory, contrary to the nowadays obsolete view (explicitly adopted 
by Searle) that in metaphorical interpretation we first reject the 
literal meaning of the expression(s) used metaphorically, and then 
we look for an alternative meaning. In conclusion, I take this 
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account to be a more adequate and elegant version of a Serlean 
speech-act account of metaphor. 
Why do I want to resist it then? One reason is that even by 
considering metaphors to be surrounded by quotation marks, with 
conventionally imparted content, we still need an explanation of 
how it is that metaphors are the primary objects of embedding 
under different operators. Consider:  
 
(29)  Jim is not a shark. 
(30)  Perhaps Jim is a shark. 
(31)  Even Jim is a shark. 
 
These utterances have metaphorical expressions which are 
embedded under truth-conditional operators (i.e., ‘not’), modal 
operators (i.e., ‘perhaps’), even pragmatic operators like ‘even’. 
The fact that we may distinguish these operators from the 
utterances’ primary contents, and that the contents expressed by 
metaphorical expressions are clearly relevant to this assessment, 
makes clear that metaphors interact with operators semantically, 
i.e., truth-conditionally. Thus, if we treat metaphorical content as 
belonging to the realm of speaker’s meaning we still owe an 
explanation of how it is that metaphors compose with operators of 
different kinds, apparently in the same way as literal contents do. 
No explanation is given by Searle’s theory, and by extension, the 
revised theory I have proposed in this section does not do any 
better. 
I want to conclude with a last point. One may say that the 
conventionally imparted content is irrelevant to the semantic 
assessment insofar as this is taken on board in the conversation 
without affecting the evaluation of the primary content under the 
embedding. However, we saw that the quotation marks would serve 
a semantic function, i.e., to refer to the material used as an index 
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within quotation marks in order to conventionally implicate that a 
hearer must determine its correct semantic value in a non-standard 
way. Now, as often happens in philosophy, a claim like this can 
serve for some philosopher to draw a modus ponens and for 
another to draw a modus tollens. There is a type of philosopher that 
may say: “Yes, this is cool, we have shown that there is some 
semantic composition in there, and therefore we can conclude that 
the phenomenon is semantic”. On the other hand we have an 
immediate reply from the adversary of the first philosopher: “No, 
this is not cool at all. Conventionally imparted content intrudes into 
what is said, and given Grice’s pragmatic taxonomy, we must 
conclude that pragmatics is more pervasive than Grice thought”. 
Let me take this issue from the point of view of the second 
philosopher. An argument like the one expressed by my 
hypothetical philosopher is actually given by Stephen Barker 
(2003), who reasons in this way. Barker is impressed by the fact 
that whenever a conventional implicature is not assertable, the 
whole sentence in which the implicature is embedded is not 
assertable either. For instance, an utterance of 
 
(32)  Even Mother Teresa was pious, 
 
would be infelicitous if, as is the case, Mother Teresa is taken to be 
an exemplar of piousness. Given this aspect, Barker attacks both 
disquotational variants of truth-conditional semantics 27  and 
minimalist versions of truth28 by saying that the following two 
disquotational principles are false. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 See Davidson (1984). 
28 Horwich (1990). 
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Disq1: Where a quotational expression of the form ‘S’ 
denotes an interpreted sentence type, all instances of the 
following schema are assertable: ‘S’ is true iff S.  
 
Disq2: Where a quotational expression of the form ‘S’ 
denotes an interpreted sentence type, the assertability 
conditions of ‘ “S” is true’ are identical to those of ‘S’.  
 
Barker’s complex argumentation can be reduced to the following 
schematic argument:  
 
(1) Implicatures intrude into what-is-said (Premise defended by 
Barker’s theory and truth-conditional pragmatics29) 
(2) A sentence ‘S’ is assertable iff S and the speaker has 
expressive property ! and is committed to defend such a 
property (Premise of Barker’s theory)30 
(3) (Disq1) is false (from (1) and (2)) 
(4) (Disq2) is false (from (1) and (2)) 
(5) Truth-conditional semantics is not correct (from (3)) 
(6) Minimalism is not correct (from (4)) 
 

30 We do not need to go into the details of Barker’s analysis of what ! is, but see 
fn. 12 in this chapter. Suffice it to say that, according to Barker, conventional 
implicatures encode properties instead of propositions. My argument is not 
affected by this theoretical move. 
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In particular (3) follows, according to Barker, because there may be 
instances of T-sentences such as ‘ “S”  is true iff S’ that are 
assertable, while instances of only ‘S’ that are not. These are the 
cases in which a conventional implicature is infelicitous. Also, (4) 
follows the assertability conditions of ‘ “S” is true iff S’ diverge 
from the assertability conditions of ‘S’ in that the former may be 
licensed without requiring that the latter be also (insofar as these 
must taken into account the conventional implicature properties). 
Barker’s concerns seem to be debatable, especially as far as his 
attack on truth-conditional semantics is concerned. For, once we 
take the theoretical care of keeping the primary truth-conditional 
import of an utterance of a given sentence S separated from all the 
ancillary contents S may further convey, no problem arises for 
truth-conditional semantics. Besides, as Barker recognises (2003: 
27), Disq1 should be kept separate from Disq3: 
 
Disq3: Where a quotational expression of the form ‘S’ 
denotes an interpreted sentence type, all instances of the 
schema—‘S’ is true iff S —are true. (Barker 2003: 27).31  
 
Disquotational truth-conditional theories are not required to follow 
Disq1, but only Disq3. Barker does not provide any knock-down 
argument against this type of theory since, in my view, his view 
illegitimately assumes that the theory should be committed to 
Disq1. But since truth-conditional semantics is not a theory of 
assertability conditions, it is unwarranted to claim that it should be 
bothered by principles like Disq1.32 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Of course, I am not considering here those problems that affect a Davidsonian 
theory of truth, already discussed in chapter I. I am just suggesting that a 
disquotational principle of the kind presented by Barker is not affected by his 
criticism, whether or not there are other independent reasons to reject it. 
32 So Barker is, I think, legitimated to only claim that disquotational theories do 
not provide much insight in the semantics of expressions triggering conventional 
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Perhaps Barker’s argument is more to the point in the case of 
minimalism about truth, showing that ‘S’ and ‘ “S”  is true’ have 
different assertability conditions, but even there I am not sure 
whether the minimalist could not resort to the sort of distinction 
between primary and ancillary contents I have appealed to and 
dispose of Barker’s criticism. 
However, if the ambitions of the second type of philosopher are 
reduced to a considerable extent, our first philosopher should 
refrain from claiming victory. Even if we granted that she is right 
in claiming that the presence of quotation marks around 
metaphorical expression serve a semantic role, still this would be a 
very weak role. A sentence uttered metaphorically would now have 
a conventional device, i.e. quotation marks around the expression 
used metaphorically, to refer to it, so as to indicate that the 
expression requires a new interpretation. However, no semantic 
further mechanism has been activated in order to fix such 
interpretation. Supporters of pragmatics could then legitimately 
claim that we still need pragmatics to determine the final 
interpretation. In the next chapter, I will address all the strategies 
the ‘new’ pragmatic wave of language and communication has 
deployed in order to take over the ‘terrain’ of metaphor and 
figurativeness against the so far rather timid attempts to explain 
those otherwise. In particular, the main novelty introduced by such 
new accounts is that metaphor is not a post-propositional 
phenomenon, but involves mechanisms that occur before a full-
blooded proposition is determined. 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
implicatures. However, his further claim that the notion of ‘truth remains 
mysterious’ (Barker 2003: 31) is a step that simply does not follow.  
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5. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I have argued that Searle’s account of metaphor 
fails to offer a systematic pragmatics of metaphorical 
interpretation. First, I have shown that his principles are either 
semantic or presuppose some semantic constraints, which Searle’s 
theory does not spell out at all. Second, I have rejected his 
‘deviance’ model as being obsolete insofar as it is based on the 
view that hearers first interpret and reject the literal meaning of the 
sentence uttered and then look for some alternative meanings. Such 
a view is neither descriptively adequate nor psychologically 
plausible. Third, I have pointed to some potential problems 
inherent in the combination of Searle’s account of metaphor and 
Searle’s theory of intentionality. On the one hand, it seems that 
Searle’s account of intentions is unable to theoretically distinguish 
metaphors from other uses of language, including literal uses and 
implicatures. On the other, I have expressed perplexities 
concerning how his more recent view, which takes metaphors to 
involve non-representational capacities, adheres to the account 
presented in his paper on metaphor. In the light of Searle’s failure, 
I have then discussed two more recent accounts of metaphor from 
the perspective of speech-act theory. Neither of these accounts 
seems to make any substantial progress, although I have been able 
to focalise two important problems any account of metaphor should 
tackle: first, is a metaphorical utterance an act of assertion and if 
so, how should we characterise such an act in comparison to literal 
assertions? Second, what do metaphorical utterances represent? In 
the last section of the chapter, I have presented the view that 
metaphors are associated with acts of quotation. I have suggested 
that the information involved in these acts may be appropriately 
characterised in terms of conventional implicatures, and I have 
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discussed some of the basic features of these. However, I have 
concluded that the argument for such a theory is not fully 
convincing, insofar as we still need a substantial explanation of 
how it is possible that metaphors feature in larger constructions. 
This has led me to revisit the debate concerning the 
semantics/pragmatics division, which at this point of the 
dissertation is getting more ‘hot’.  !
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Chapter 4 
 
Metaphor & Truth-Conditional 
Pragmatics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
All the analyses I have dealt with so far share a common 
assumption, namely, that the literal meaning of a sentence, in 
whichever way it has been characterised, has both a descriptive and 
an explanatory priority over the understanding of any figurative use 
that that sentence may have. Descriptively, a speaker of a language 
interprets another by first decoding the semantic content associated 
to her utterance, and only after each indexical has been assigned a 
value and each ambiguous expression has been disambiguated. 
Explanatorily, each interpretation of an utterance that does not 
correspond to the semantic content encoded by the sentence uttered 
is to be accounted for pragmatically (or in some other way, if you 
push forward a Davidsonian line, at least as far as the case of 
metaphor is concerned). This has been the most prominent literalist 
stance on the problem of metaphor until at least the end of the last 
century. 
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However, things have radically changed in the last fifteen years 
and today the trend goes generally against the literalist stance. A 
new wave of contextualist theories have attacked the literalist 
stance, trying to show how communication requires another model 
of language understanding. In the course of this dissertation I have 
mentioned certain cases that seem to pose troubles for this view. 
There are, in fact, utterances whose literal meaning, i.e., the one 
encoded by the sentences uttered, still underdetermine the possible 
interpretations which, given a context, they may receive. 
Approximations (e.g., ‘France is hexagonal’), predicates of taste 
(e.g., ‘liquorice is tasty’), restrictions on quantifier domains  (e.g., 
‘Everybody is present’) are just a small sample of examples where 
the literal truth-conditions do not seem to perfectly square with 
what the speaker intends to get across. The extent to which these 
cases tell against approaches traditionally considered to subscribe 
to some version of truth-conditional semantics is currently under 
intense discussion. One of the purposes of this chapter is to assess 
the debate in the light of its relevance to the study of metaphor.  
In this chapter I am going to assess a whole class of theories 
which are grouped under the heading of truth-conditional 
pragmatics. In a nutshell, truth-conditional pragmatics (henceforth 
TCP) opposes the literalist claim that pragmatics intervenes only 
after the decoding of a sentence’s truth-conditional content, so as to 
determine new meanings with different truth-conditions and 
properties. Instead, TCP claims that pragmatics affects the truth-
conditional content of utterances vastly and incessantly, so that the 
literalist descriptive and explanatory story is called into question as 
to its adequacy from the very start of the interpretative process of 
almost any utterance. The cases mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, and a few more others that I am going to consider here, 
are the evidence mostly adduced by TCP. The explanation of 
metaphor falls into this picture since the defenders of TCP press the 
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analogy between metaphors and these other cases. In particular, it 
has been suggested (Recanati 2001, 2004, 2010; Bezuidenhout 
2001; Sperber and Wilson 2006; Carston 2002; Wilson and Carston 
2006, 2008) that, like for approximations, predicates of taste and 
adjectives in general, processes of so-called modulation affect the 
meanings conventionally associated to expressions uttered 
metaphorically or metonymically. Accordingly, for each new 
context of utterance, a sentence is assigned different truth-
conditions depending on which modulation is at hand. 
Within TCP, the relevance-theoretic approach to language and 
communication (henceforth RT) is particularly important insofar as 
it encapsulates crucial elements of the contemporary contextualist 
debate in the philosophy of language, but it also has its own 
theoretical features. In particular, contrary to other contextualist 
proposals, the theory stresses the role of inferential mechanisms in 
the determination of truth-conditional contents – in contrast with 
associative processes described by other accounts like Recanati’s –, 
and the intervention of implicatures during this process, and not 
just after it has been accomplished.1  
If TCP’s predictions are right, we should make room for a 
number of adjustments to our conception of language and 
communication. In a nutshell, these adjustments would amount to 
recognising that: 
 
(i) Besides functioning as evidential factors in the 
derivation of an utterance’s implicatures, contextual 
factors are crucial to determining its content (and not 
only the content of demonstratives and indexicals), and 
therefore to fixing its truth-conditions via modulation 
and other pragmatic processes; ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
1 In this sense, RT is a radical version of contextualism, in contrast with more 
moderate forms that do not subscribe to this point. 
!"#$%&'()((
(((( *+,(
(ii) The composition of an utterance’s content, metaphorical 
or otherwise, is not just the fruit of bottom-up processes 
but also of top-down influences (in a motto, pragmatics 
intrudes semantics). 
(iii) Metaphors do not form a natural kind; instead, they lie 
on a continuum with more literal utterances.  
(iv) Metaphors do have truth-conditions in a primary sense 
and, therefore, are normally asserted by the speakers.2 
 
These points seem to have some ‘revolutionary’ flavour. If, in the 
light of the hypotheses TCP make, metaphor really turns out to be 
theoretically indistinguishable from other literal uses, then many 
tenets of truth-conditional semantics, as broadly taken, should be 
abandoned, making the whole enterprise a doubtful theoretical 
operation. One of these tenets is, I think, particularly important. It 
concerns the compositionality of language, i.e., the idea that the 
meaning of a sentence is determined by the meaning of its 
constituent parts and their mode of combination (and nothing else). 
If this principle, whose nature will be investigated in the next 
chapter, were judged as unreliable, then semantics would lose 
much of its traditional appeal.  
Given the centrality of TCP within the contemporary philosophy 
of language, I have decided to give it particular attention, thus 
opting to have two chapters instead of one: in this chapter, I present 
the main ideas of TCP, including RT. In the final section, I will 
focus on the RT’s account of metaphorical interpretation. In the 
next chapter, I will present my main counterarguments to TCP and, 
in particular, will focus on some linguistic evidence against the 
contextualist treatment of metaphor. One sort of evidence which ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
2 ‘Normally’ in the sense that they are asserted directly, and therefore are neither 
to be taken as indirect speech acts of some sort, nor to be made rely on the 
presence of paraphrases for their assertability (See Chapter 3, § 4, for a criticism 
of this model). 
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contextualists account find difficult to systematise concerns VP-
ellipsis and anaphora in metaphorical settings. In this I will mainly 
follow Stern’s discussion (2000, 2006), although it will turn out 
that I take distance from his semantic explanation of the 
phenomenon. The reader will have to wait for Chapter 7 to see my 
own proposal, which is more in line with recent developments in 
relativistic semantics. 
 
 
2. Truth-conditional Pragmatics  
 
2. 1 The Fregean Premise.  
 
It was Frege who, about one hundred years ago, presented the issue 
I will be focusing on in this section, and which is nowadays highly 
discussed both in the philosophy of language and linguistics 
literature. The idea is that, roughly speaking, there are thoughts 
whose completion requires someone to fill in conceptual material 
into the propositional forms associated to the sentences used to 
convey such thoughts.3 To fully understand how this works, let’s 
do some basic Fregean semantic analysis, which I will use as a toy 
model for my discussion to come.  
Frege’s original view (1892b) is that a sentence expresses a 
thought if and only if each expression in the sentence is endowed 
with a sense that, when composed with the other senses, form this 
thought.4 In turn a thought, and only a thought, is something ‘for ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
3 Frege (1918 [1997: 15]): ‘Thus the contents of a sentence often go beyond the 
thoughts expressed by it. But the opposite often happens too, that the mere 
wording, which can be grasped by writing or the gramophone does not suffice 
for the expression of the thought.’ In the paragraph immediately before this 
passage Frege had just recognised the phenomenon of conventional implicature, 
although he used the metaphor of ‘colouring’ to name it. 
4 There is a problem lurking in the way I have put Frege’s thought. ‘Form’ is 
ambiguous between two readings: it may have a transitive form, in which case it 
means ‘create’ or it may be intransitive, in which case it means ‘shape’. If the 
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which the question of truth arises’ (1918 [1997: 11]). Given these 
two premises, the Fregan picture is as follows: first of all, we start 
with predicates, ‘unsaturated’ entities that need to be completed by 
the right kind of entities, in this case objects.5 For instance, the 
predicate ‘is made of wood’ may be represented as a first-order 
concept, i.e., a function whose argument can only be taken by 
objects. In symbols: 
 
(1)  Made of wood (_).  
 
The brackets indicate that the predicate requires completion by an 
object of the appropriate type.6 When we want to consider whether 
there is in reality something which is made of wood or not, we 
consider an object, for instance the chair I am sitting in whilst 
writing, and check whether this object ‘saturates’ the predicate.7 
The result of this operation is a full-blown proposition, which I 
have below indicated by enclosing the now saturated predicate with 
pointy brackets: 
 
(2)  <Made of wood (chairi)>.8 
 
The Fregean semantics ends up claiming that the proposition (or 
thought) which is now expressed refers to another kind of object, 
the Truth or the Falsity. In symbols: (((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
sense is ‘create’ then the resulting conception of compositionality is at odds with 
Frege’s adherence to his ‘contextuality principle,’ the principle according to 
which only in the context of a sentence words have meaning (See Janssen 2012 
for a discussion of Frege’s views on compositionality). 
5 Second-order concepts, like quantifiers, are instead functions from first-order 
concepts.  
6 I take that abstract objects would not be the proper type of object to saturate 
such function. Sortal restrictions should be implicitly in force here. 
7 In contrast an object is, for Frege, semantically saturated in that it does not 
require any completion. The idea of saturation is discussed by Frege in ‘Über 
Begriff und Gegenstand’ (1892a). 
8 The subscript ‘i’ indexes the noun phrase to the salient chair of the context of 
utterance. 
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(3)  <Made of wood (chairi)> = T iff The salient chair is made 
of wood.  
 
(4)  <Made of wood (chairi)> = F iff The salient chair is not 
made of wood. 
 
Leaving the issue of what kind of objects the Truth and the 
Falsity are, this semantic account works so long as no elements of 
indexicality are considered. However, when we consider the 
question concerning which thought sentences containing indexical 
elements (e.g., tense predicates, locational adverbs like ‘here’ and 
‘there’ and temporal adverbs like ‘yesterday’ or ‘tomorrow’, 
pronouns) express, this procedure does not suffice to deliver the 
result expected. In other words, the assignment of a truth-value for 
an indexical sentence is not possible tout court, for no ‘eternal 
thought’ is expressed by sentences containing indexicals.9 Hence, 
sentences which do not express complete propositions pose a 
problem to those who, like Frege, strive to justify a whole body of 
knowledge (in his case, mathematical knowledge10) by appealing to 
a formal system in which logical proofs based on valid inferences 
can be carried out. 
Thus Frege claims that for the purposes of doing logic, there 
cannot be thoughts which are incomplete, in the sense of not being 
fully specified. The question of truth, in fact, does not admit 
degrees, and therefore half thoughts have to be considered as not 
thoughts at all. Consequently, a sentence like ‘Today it is raining’ ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
9 And, arguably, even when each indexical element of an indexical sentence is 
assigned a precise extension, the contents expressed by the two sentences, i.e., 
the indexical sentence and the eternalized one, are different in that the indexical 
feature gets lost in the latter. 
10 Frege’s original interest was in the conceptual justification of mathematical 
knowledge (see Currie 1982 in this regard), while he then moved to a different 
project, i.e. the project of reducing arithmetic to logic, giving rise to a 
programme which has since then been called logicism (Wright 1983).  
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does not express a complete thought by itself because of the 
presence of the indexical ‘today’, whose contribution for Frege 
(i.e., the sense which the expression contributes to the proposition 
expressed by an utterance of the sentence) varies from context to 
context. In order for an utterance of this sentence to express a 
complete proposition it must be completed by a sense for ‘today’. 
Senses are, in fact, for Frege stable and eternal. In particular we 
may consider, in Fregean terms, an indexical like ‘today’ to be a 
function from the sense each of us may associate with the day in 
which the sentence is uttered to the day at hand. Since functions are 
characteristically unsaturated for Frege (i.e., they require 
completion), the propositional function associated with such kind 
of sentences will deliver different truth-values when evaluated 
relative to different contexts. 
Now, there are inescapable problems with such a view, 
especially concerning the exact nature of the semantic contribution 
of an indexical. First of all, if thoughts or propositions are the kinds 
of objects that are truth-evaluable, and these are constituted by 
senses, then the proposition expressed by me, on the 30th of May 
2012 in Nottingham, will be different from the proposition 
expressed by Greg Currie on the same day, in the same location. 
Since we attribute different senses to ‘today’ (I think of today as 
my ex girlfriend’s birthday, Greg Currie may think of today as the 
day in which he has to finish his paper), we therefore end up 
expressing different contents. But if context provides such a messy 
contribution, it is very difficult to explain the systematicity inherent 
in our uses of indexicals, and the intuition that I and Greg Currie 
have said the same thing, i.e., referred to the same day.11 The 
problem is, of course, in Frege’s idea that thoughts are composed 
by senses, when it is clear that in order to understand the 
((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
11 Cf. Perry (1977 [1997: 699]). 
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propositions expressed by indexical utterances we need to supply 
objects (e.g. days, speakers, locations, etc.) instead. 
Secondly, notice how context enters twice into this picture: as 
the determinant of the utterance’s content and as the circumstance 
at which the content is evaluated, where the latter should be 
intended as the particular sense each of us associates with the 
indexical in question. Frege does not distinguish these two 
components and, as a result, he goes on to say (1918 [1997: 24]) 
that the circumstance enters into the content. Let’s call this 
assumption the Fregean Premise (FP) – it will in fact have that role 
in my successive presentation of TCP. However, there is a clear 
sense in which circumstances are external factors and are therefore 
neither linguistic nor conceptual. This is a serious problem for 
Frege since it makes his system unable to account for the 
‘essential’ element of indexicality present in indexical sentences.12 
In other words, if an utterance of the sentence ‘It is raining today’ 
expresses the thought that it is raining on my ex girlfriend’s 
birthday, then it is unclear how you should evaluate my utterance 
tomorrow. Would you evaluate it as the proposition that it was 
raining on my ex girlfriend’s birthday? Clearly this new thought 
does not preserve the robust sense in which an utterance of a 
sentence like ‘It is raining today’, when evaluated the following 
day, must be translated into ‘It was raining yesterday’, so as to 
preserve the element of indexicality which was essential to it.13  
Taking v and n to be variables ranging over circumstances, FP 
can be thus formulated: ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
12 Perry (1979) is a locus classicus. 
13 The conclusion is, according to Perry (1977 [1997: 706]), that ‘there is no 
reason to believe we are on each occasion each equipped with some 
nondemonstrative equivalent of the demonstratives we use and understand.’ This 
point has, I think, an important analogy with metaphor in that it is difficult to 
believe we are on each occasion each equipped with some nonmetaphorical 
equivalent of the metaphors we use and understand. I already criticized 
arguments to the effect that it is possible to essentially paraphrase metaphors, but 
I will come back on this point again in the next chapters. 
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(i) An utterance u of a sentence s expresses the proposition 
<s, v> in c. 
(ii) An utterance u! of the same sentence expresses the 
proposition <s, n> in c!. 
(iii) Therefore, <s, v> may be true in c!!, while <s, n> false, or 
vice versa. 
 
In other words, although u and u! are type-identical, in virtue of 
being instantiated in two different contexts, i.e., c and c!, they 
express different contents, i.e., <s, v> and <s, n>, which can be 
assigned distinct truth-values when evaluated relative to another 
context, say c!!. It follows from this that content variation entails 
variation of truth-values (and vice versa). This argument is crucial 
to the kind of contextualism I am assessing in this chapter. It will 
also have important implications for my account of metaphor, 
which rejects it. 
 
2. 2 Contextualism.  
 
Frege’s approach has been enormously important for two reasons: 
first of all, it was the first semantic account proposed for indexical 
languages (and it doesn’t matter if successive work14 has outclassed 
it); secondly, and most importantly, it contains some of the features 
of contemporary contextualism. We can, in fact, deem 
contextualism, and in particular its more recent variant TCP, as the 
theory to which a generalisation of Frege’s ideas apply. For 
instance, Recanati says: 
 
((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
14 See Kaplan (1989). His account will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
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In the case of indexicals, the propositional contribution made by an 
expression depends upon the context and is not fully determined by 
the (context-independent) meaning which the expression (type) 
possesses in virtue of the semantic rules of the language. 
Contextualism is the philosophical position which generalizes that 
feature to ‘ordinary’ expressions. It holds that, in general (i.e. not 
only in the special case of indexicals), the propositional 
contribution of an expression is not fully determined by the 
invariant meaning conventionally associated with the expression 
type but depends upon context. (Recanati 2010: 17) 
 
In short, there is more to an expression’s propositional contribution 
to the truth-conditions of a sentence in a given context than its 
encoded linguistic meaning,15 and this applies not just to indexicals 
but also to a whole class of non-indexical items. In the next section 
I will offer a comprehensive list of such items, and see what 
Recanati means exactly with his claim. 
It must be noticed that, in the same passage, Recanati 
distinguishes two versions of contextualism, a moderate one and a 
radical one. Moderate contextualism holds that the linguistic 
meaning of a non-indexical expression ‘needs not be’ what 
contributes to the proposition expressed by an utterance of a non-
indexical sentence (under the pretence that there are non-indexical 
sentences), whereas radical contextualism says that it can never 
contribute to such a proposition since contextual factors enter 
predominantly into its determination. 
Now, I think that Recanati’s distinction is slightly misleading 
because even the defenders of semantics, or at least of a certain 
type of semantics which may be called parametric, may grant that 
context is absolutely central to the determination of content. What ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
15  This is so even if you take a more liberal view about the sense of 
‘conventional’ in force here, which also include an utterance’s illocutionary 
force and the utterance’s conventionally implicated contents (see García-
Carpintero 2001: 107). 
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differs between radical contextualism and this other version of 
contextualism is the way context is said to contribute to truth-
evaluable contents. For radical contextualists contextual factors 
help determine the content of our utterances in an uncontrolled, i.e., 
non-parametric, way. What I mean by this can be illustrated by 
considering the following utterance: 
 
(5) It is raining. 
 
Since the seminal work of Perry (1993) philosophers of language 
and linguists have claimed that this kind of utterance is a 
prototypical case involving an unarticulated constituent (UC). An 
UC is an element of an utterance which does not appear in the 
grammatical surface of the sentence uttered, but which, 
nevertheless, is represented at some level or other in order for the 
utterance of that sentence to express a truth-evaluable proposition. 
The idea is that since it is a metaphysical fact that an event of 
raining must occur in some particular location, (5) must be 
provided with a location in order to express a thought.16  
Stanley (see the essays in Stanley 2007) has defended the truth-
conditional semantic view that (5) contains a variable for location 
at the level of logical form (LF). Arguably, the presence of such 
parameter in form of a variable in the LF is traceable to its being 
bound by high-order quantifiers appearing in immediately 
precedent clauses, as in (6): 
 ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
16 Objection: well, certainly it is a metaphysical fact that an utterance of ‘Mary 
danced’ presupposes a location of Mary’s dancing. Why then don’t we need the 
same treatment for this utterance, and postulate UCs? Recanati’s reply (2002: 
306) is that we need to differentiate between two senses in which the 
requirement of UCs must be intended: metaphysical and communicational. 
Although both utterances of ‘It is raining’ and ‘Mary danced’ require that there 
is an UC for location in the metaphysical sense, from a communicational point of 
view only an utterance of ‘it is raining’ requires it to be part of the total package 
of information that constitutes the speaker’s meaning. 
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(6) Every time John lights up a cigarette, it rains. 
 
Here, the most intuitive truth-conditions for this utterance are that it 
rains at the location where John is situated. Whether we quantify 
over contexts, situations or what you have, the intuitive reading 
will always be one in which the raining event occurs 
simultaneously to the class of contexts, situations or what have you 
that we have quantified over. 
However, Recanati (2002, 2010) has insisted that we should 
resist the kind of conclusion drawn by Stanley in favour of truth-
conditional semantics (henceforth TCS). According to Recanati, 
the essential feature of UCs is not their ‘boundability’, and 
therefore their being variables at the level of the LF, but their 
optionality. In other words, it is sometimes optional for someone to 
represent an unarticulated constituent at the level of thought since 
this is not mandated by the sentence’s LF. To show this, Recanati 
appeals to an example in which detectors have been placed around 
the earth. The story tells that the earth is in a phase of drought, and 
events of raining have become extremely rare. Now, imagine a 
light starts to flash, and someone in the laboratory says: ‘It is 
raining’. In this scenario, her utterance would be taken to mean that 
‘it is raining in some place or other’, without requiring the speaker, 
and even the hearer, to think of a particular place.17  
The availability of an indefinite existential reading for 
utterances like (5) seems to pose troubles for TCS, or at least to the 
parametric version defended by Stanley. The details of this debate 
are beyond the scope of this chapter (see Zeman 2011 for a nice 
overview), but it is worth noticing that the two following points 
((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
17 People have tried to resist Recanati’s intuitions by saying that the utterance of 
‘it is raining’ in this scenario should be counted as having a maximal location 
implicitly assigned by the context: ‘the whole earth’ (Stanley 2005a; Neale 
2007) or ‘the territory’ (Martí 2006). 
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constitute essential features of the contextualist approach to 
language and thought proposed by truth-conditional pragmatics: 
 
TCP1. The determination of truth-conditional content is a 
matter of optional pragmatic processes (in a sense yet to be 
explained). 
TCP2. The level appropriate for the fixation of an 
utterance’s truth-conditions is neither linguistic nor extra-
linguistic (or a combination of both), but conceptual, i.e., it 
concerns the level of thought. 
 
While I take both theses to be central to any account within TCP, I 
think that it is TCP2 which essentially characterises the whole 
truth-conditional pragmatic enterprise (see also Carston 2002: 74). 
For it seems to me that TCP may appropriately be considered as an 
intentionalist approach to the study of language and 
communication, and as such it seeks to reduce semantic 
phenomena to intentional constructs of some kind. The reader may 
also notice the similarity between this approach and Frege’s 
philosophical view, in that both take the realm of thought to be the 
privileged object of investigation.18 
To anticipate, I think TCP is wrong in claiming that the whole 
evaluation of truth-conditions lies at the cognitive level. Whether 
or not propositions are mental constructions, and whichever 
internal composition they turn out to have, the connection between 
linguistic and extra-linguistic factors need not be curtailed, in the 
way TCP does by only considering the role of the mental in the 
explanation of semantic data. In Chapter 7 I will explore and 
defend this last claim, showing that a proper distinction between ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
18 My point concerning this conceptual connection should not make us forget 
that Frege was primarily interested in very different sorts of projects (See fn. 10 
for references). His interest in language itself came later and, in any case, his 
concerns are not comparable to those of TCP. Also, it should be noticed that 
according to Frege, thoughts are abstract entities and not mental ones.  
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content and circumstance of evaluation has to be in force if we 
want to properly understand metaphor, and give it the right place in 
language and thought. For now, I need to further investigate TCP 
and the arguments offered in its support. 
 
 
3. Recanati on what-is-said 
 
Recanati’s contribution to the philosophy of language has the 
marks of a systematic and coherent defence of TCP. The writings I 
will mostly be focusing on in my discussion of Recanati’s ideas are 
those he has defended in the last decade (Recanati 2001; 2002; 
2004; 2010), but early versions of his particular contextualist 
account have been proposed since the early 1990s. It must also be 
recognised that Recanati has interestingly explored other 
approaches and he has recently defended a form of relativism, 
which he calls ‘moderate’ (Recanati 2007). I will discuss this other 
approach of his in chapter six. Here I am interested in spelling out 
Recanati’s idea that the meaning of an expression is endowed with 
a certain semantic potential. 
 
3. 1 Saturation vs. Free Enrichment.  
 
We already saw that Recanati claims that the true hallmark of UCs 
is their optionality: an UC is not a linguistically mandatory 
requirement in the interpretation of an utterance since there are 
possible contexts where no such provision is demanded to make 
sense of the sentence uttered. Recanati extends this feature to all 
those cases that belong to the category that he dubs ‘free 
enrichment’. Free enrichment (henceforth FE) is a kind of optional, 
i.e., not mandatory, pragmatic process in which a propositional 
function is enriched by contextual factors, so as to determine a 
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truth-evaluable proposition. The optionality of FE contrasts with 
the mandatory nature of another process that Recanati considers to 
be fully pragmatic, specifically ‘saturation’. Saturation is the 
process by means of which a contextual value is assigned to the 
argument place of an indexical or demonstrative. Such process is 
mandatory insofar as it is the LF of the sentence itself that requires 
the assignment of a value to each of its slots.19 Accordingly, there 
are no contexts in which saturation can be dispensed with, but there 
are contexts in which FE is dispensed with without loss of 
information relevant to the truth evaluation of an utterance. 
Now, someone could think that all cases of UCs are of the ‘free 
enrichment’ variety. However, Recanati (2002) distinguishes two 
types of UCs: A-type and B-type. B-type UCs are actually 
mandated by the LF of a sentence containing them since an 
utterance of that sentence would not allow for the full 
determination of a proposition without one of these UCs being 
provided. In this category fall all those cases for which Bach uses 
the term ‘completion’ (see Chapter 2 for a discussion of Bach’s 
notion of ‘impliciture’). These cases may be distinguished in two 
ways, depending on whether the unarticulatedness is merely 
syntactical or parametric: 
((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
19 On this role of context within a semantic theory, see Stanley and King (2005 
[Stanley 2007: 138-9]) and Predelli (2005: chapter one). 
Syntactic unarticulatedness  Parametric unarticulatedness 
Jim completed. (what?) 
Jim is ready. (for what?) 
Jim prefers blond girls.  
(to what?) 
Jim’s intelligence is not 
sufficient.  
Those shoes are cheap/old/small.  
(relative to what?) 
Mary is talented (in which 
respect?) 
Everybody is present. (in relation 
to what? 
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According to Recanati, it would be a mistake to conflate B-type 
UCs with cases of FE because B-type UCs are linguistically 
mandated by the LF of their sentences. In other words, the 
utterances of the sentences appearing in the table do not express a 
truth-evaluable content unless some material is added.20 In the case 
of syntactic unarticulatedness, this material is purely syntactical 
and therefore straightforwardly linguistic. In the case of parametric 
unarticulatedness, the material is more conceptual, having to do 
with the provision of comparison classes or the restriction of 
domain quantifiers.  
In contrast, A-type UCs are completely free, in the sense that 
there is nothing in the LF that mandates a syntactic completion or 
conceptual provision of extra-material. Any utterance of a sentence 
like ‘it is raining’ does, for Recanati, belong to such a class. 
Moreover, as far as the provision of a location is concerned, the 
lexical entry for ‘to rain’ would be identical to that for verbs like 
‘to sleep,’ while dissimilar to that of verbs like ‘to arrive’, in which 
a slot for a location variable is instead marked: 
 
(7)  !rain" = !e [RAINING(e)] 
!sleep" = !e !a [SLEEPING(e), AGENT(a, e)] 
!arrive" =  !e !a !l [ARRIVING (e), AGENT (a, e), 
LOCATION (a, l)]. 
 
Since the need for UCs of this ‘strong’ (i.e., not mandated) variety 
is purely a contextual matter, how does Recanati intend to preserve ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
20 With the exception, I think, of ‘Mary came too’, which is truth-evaluable 
irrespective of the conventional implicature triggered by ‘too’. 
(for what?) Mary came too.  
(in addition to whom?) 
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the intuition that, in most cases, a location is needed to evaluate an 
utterance of a sentence containing a verb like ‘to rain’? It is, I 
think, at this point that the Fregean Premise, as presented in the 
previous section, comes back with all its dialectical force. FP is the 
idea that a circumstance is not something external to the 
propositional contribution of an utterance, but part of it. Recanati 
(2002: 319) finds this premise attractive and thus attempts to 
formalise it in his account. Thus, in the case at hand he 
characterises the circumstance as a relational function, i.e., a 
function that takes a property, e.g., the property of raining, into an 
n-ary + 1 property like Raining__in (l). In other words, a relational 
function is a function that transforms an n-ary relation into an n + 
1-ary relation, where the nth + 1 argument is the circumstance 
(Recanati 2002: 319). Recanati gives a number of examples, from 
adverbs (e.g., ‘too’) to prepositional phrases (e.g., ‘in Paris’), 
which semantically seem to work in the way these variadic 
functions do.21 Formally: 
 
Circlocation (P(x1,…, xn)) = P*(x1,…, xn, l) 
 
[where P is the predicate to which the variadic function ‘Circlocation’ 
applies, x1,…, xn are its arguments, and P* is the new predicate 
whose arguments are x1,…, xn and the location l.] 
An example of how this work is the following: take an utterance of 
‘It is raining in Nottingham’: 
 
(7) It is raining in Nottingham. 
 
The semantic function of ‘in Nottingham’ is to provide a variadic 
function which modifies the acidity of the predicate ‘is raining’, so 
as to determine a new predicate: ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
21 For further discussion and references see Zeman (2011: 87ff). 
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(8)  Circlocation:Nottingham (rain) = Rain_in Nottingham.22 
 
As I said, it is not my intention to fully engage with Recanati’s 
proposal concerning unarticulated constituents. However, before 
presenting Recanati’s further meaning taxonomy, I wish to raise a 
point concerning what I have been discussing so far. It seems to me 
that the evidence for Recanati’s distinction between A-type and B-
type UCs is not that clear. It is, I think, possible to imagine 
scenarios which do not require the provision of B-type UCs in the 
form of comparison classes or restrictions of quantifier domains. 
For instance, consider Mary, who is a very talented girl. You may 
ask: what is her particular talent? My answer is that Mary is 
talented in basically every human activity, whether or not she 
actually exercises a particular one. Based on my knowledge of her, 
I could certainly go on to offer a detailed list of her talents. But my 
assertion is stronger. As far as I can figure out, if Mary had enough 
time to participate in a particular activity, she would excel at it. So 
I am entitled to think and assert that she is talented, full stop. If this 
is so, then there does not seem to be a strong reason to take B-type 
UC to be actually mandated by LF alone.  
Recanati may reply that, after all, this is not a serious problem 
for contextualists but it would still be one for truth-conditional 
semanticists à la Stanley since these examples show that there is no 
variable in the LF of these sentences that needs to be saturated. 
Granted, these data would still be compatible with some non-
parametric version of minimal semantics (such as Cappelen and 
Lepore 2005), in which propositions are allowed to be fully 
expressed by utterances of sentences containing elements that 
Recanati groups under the category of B-type UCs. ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
22 I leave to the reader the exercise of finding a solution to Stanley’s cases of 
bound readings by adopting this strategy. 
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However, this kind of minimalism remains an odd view because 
it maintains that even in the presence of syntactic 
unarticulatedness, full-blown propositions are expressed. This 
cannot be right, for if it were we should get rid of an important 
connection between semantics and a syntactic criterion, namely, 
the ‘!-criterion.’ The principle can be stated in this way: 
 
!-criterion. Every phrase appearing in subject or complement 
position must bear a thematic role, and every thematic role 
determined by a phrase must be assigned to a subject or 
complement phrase. (Larson & Segal 1995: 97) 
 
For instance, ‘complete’ describes an action involving two 
arguments (x, y), therefore it assigns two thematic roles: an agent 
and a theme (contrast with ‘give’ which assigns three thematic 
roles: an agent, a theme, and a goal). If a thematic role does not 
appear in the sentence surface, it must be provided by the hearer in 
his interpretation. The reason why a thematic role does not 
necessarily appear on the sentence surface is, I believe, purely 
pragmatic, we just lean on all sorts of shortcuts in communication 
whenever it is possible (See Bach 2006 on this point). Of course, 
the same kind of argument applies to restrictions of quantifiers 
domains and provisions of comparison classes, we speakers just do 
not bother to fully articulate them since we rely on the hearers’ 
tacit knowledge (See Carpintero 2001 for an elaboration of this 
view). 
Thus, the form of minimalism defended by Cappelen and 
Lepore (2005) is, to borrow a Recanati title (Recanati 2006), a 
crazy theoretical view and I won’t be trying to defend it. The 
question is, however, whether other solutions may be explored and, 
actually, the answer is positive: in the last chapter I will argue that 
relativism can have the cake (accounting for all forms of UCs) and 
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eat it too (without appealing to additional variables in the LF of 
sentences). 
Secondly, there is I think an issue concerning Recanati’s 
semantics which has to do with what I called the Fregean Premise. 
If circumstances are variadic functions in the way characterised by 
Recanati, then they will take contents as input and get new contents 
as output. However, on the traditional Kaplanian view of semantics 
(Kaplan 1989), circumstances are functions from contents to 
extensions. Whether or not this move is functional to Recanati’s 
contextualist account, he should motivate it more clearly. However, 
his account is not very clear as to the exact nature of these variadic 
functions, and as to how they are generated or supposed to modify 
the input property/relation to get the output property/relation in 
case of missing constituents. Like Frege, Recanati wants to 
preserve the intuition of what I will dub propositional plenitude: 
only full-blown propositions can be evaluated. However, what are 
the theoretical costs of allowing circumstances to enter into the 
propositions? Besides the problems already evinced in Frege’s 
treatment of indexicality, in the next chapter I will argue that 
further problems can be found if we adhere to this sort of 
contextualism defended by Recanati and others. 
Let’s take stock now, and review the basic ideas of Recanati’s 
picture discussed so far. We have two types of processes, 
saturation and free enrichment: the first consists in the assignment 
of contextual variables to indexicals, while the second has the form 
either of a provision of an UC or of a restriction/provision of a 
domain quantifier/comparison class. In the case of UCs, we have 
two types: B-type and A-type, the main difference being that the 
latter is of a ‘strong’, i.e., linguistically unconstrained, variety, 
while the former are only weakly ‘free’ in the sense that there is an 
actual input from the syntax/semantics of the sentences to the 
provision of an UC. Leaving aside my doubts on the necessity of 
!"#$%&'()((
(((( *)+(
such a distinction, the resulting conception of what-is-said for 
Recanati, in short what-is-saidR, is the following: 
 
If we compare this first definition of What-is-saidR with the notion 
of what-is-said given by Grice, it is immediately clear that we are 
dealing with a broadened conception here: what-is-saidR is not 
limited to the content expressed by an utterance modulo its 
saturation, but also includes the class of its enrichments. This class 
contains two sub-classes: B-type unarticulated constituents, which 
are syntactically or semantically mandated, and A-type 
unarticulated constituents, which, in contrast, are completely free. 
 
3. 2. Modulation 
 
The picture just offered is not exhaustive. It lacks, in effect, an 
important aspect of Recanati’s account. Such an aspect 
characterises the class of utterances that require some conceptual 
adjustment, namely, modulation, of lexical items. According to 
Recanati (2004, 2010), metonymy and metaphor are exemplars of 
modulation in that one or more items are subject to the hearer’s 
adjustments of their encyclopaedic, stereotypical or definitional 
What-is-saidR 
 
 
                          Saturation                    Free enrichment 
                                    
 
  
B-type UCs         A-type UCs 
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features. The results of such conceptual operations are occasional 
meanings, which get into the truth-conditional content of an 
utterance. Like for UCs, modulation is an optional process; 
contrary to UCs, modulation does not provide additional 
constituents, but operates on the meaning of a word or expression. 
Accordingly, classic examples like 
 
(9)  The ham-sandwich left without paying. 
(10) There is a lion in the square. 
 
may be taken to mean, respectively, 
 
(9*)  The client-who-ordered-a-ham-sandwich left without 
paying. 
(10*)  There is a statue-of-a-lion in the square. 
(10**)  There is a strong-man in the square. 
 
While (9) can be used only metonymically, (10) may have either a 
metonymical or a metaphorical interpretation. Interestingly, and 
contrary to what Recanati thinks, (10*) and (10**) do not seem to 
have much in common. (9*) and (10*) seem to be both derived 
from the same mechanisms providing B-type UCs, in which an 
input is given by the semantic system to articulate the propositional 
form associated to the sentences, so as to reach their full 
propositional completion.23 In (10**), in contrast, there is neither a 
syntactic completion of the proposition expressed by (10) nor a 
semantic rule that transforms the content expressed by ‘a lion’ into 
the resulting content ‘a strong man’ – for one thing, there is no 
((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
23 Cf. Nogales (1999: 12) 
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semantic entailment that validates inferences to ‘lions are strong’ or 
‘humans are lions’.24  
Be that as it may, Recanati takes both the metonymical and 
metaphorical cases to implement some modulation-functions, 
which operate on the senses of some expressions to modify their 
conventionally encoded meanings. Formally: 
 
(11)  F(µ!) = µ!(!)  
 
(11) describes a function F (relative to context C) whose argument 
is the meaning  µ associated with a certain expression ", and whose 
value is a new interpretation µ! of " (where µ!(!) ! µ(!), i.e., the 
interpretation conventionally associated with !). 
Finally, it is important to notice that cases that Grice would take 
to be conversational implicatures are now part of what-is-saidR. For 
instance, consider these utterances: 
 
(12)  You’re not going to die. (from that cut) 
(13) They married and had a child. (They married and then had 
a child) 
 
According to Grice, an utterance of (12) conversationally 
implicates that the addressee is not going to die from the cut to his 
finger, while an utterance of (13) normally implicates that the 
subjects first married and then had a child. Instead Recanati takes 
(12) to be more akin to cases of FE, while (13) to cases of 
modulation (i.e., sense-extension).25 All these examples, though, 
share something, namely their primary non-m-literal meanings, i.e., ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
24 This poses the interesting theoretical question as to whether metaphor and 
metonymy belong to the same genus. Defenders of TCP think they do, for the 
same pragmatic mechanisms are active in their understanding. 
25  Carston (2002) provides a comprehensive case for the ‘enriched’ truth-
conditionality of utterances like (11) and (12). 
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primarily communicated meanings that differ from the 
conventionally encoded meaning (t-meaning in Recanati’s saying) 
in non-minimal ways.26 Hence, we have here a theoretical choice 
which has important consequences for the study of metaphor. 
Metaphor, as other figurative uses, results now as being put on a 
par with other literal uses of language. In contrast, ‘real’ cases of 
non-literalness are said to be conversational implicatures and 
indirect speech-acts, whose secondary pragmatic character involves 
inferences from what is said to the speaker’s meaning. In this 
sense, only secondary pragmatic processes are, for Recanati, fully 
inferential, while primary pragmatic processes are associative 
processes which determine modulation functions for lexical 
items.27 
 
3. 3 The ‘Availability Principle’  
 
What justifies this very broad notion of ‘literality’? According to 
Recanati, it is justified by a principle, which he calls the 
‘Availability Principle’: 
 
[W]hat is said must be analysed in conformity to the intuitions 
shared by those who fully understand the utterance – typically the 
speaker and the hearer, in a normal conversational setting. 
(Recanati 2004: 14) 
 
The principle has clearly a phenomenological flavour: it is up to the 
hearer to determine whether a given utterance is true or false in 
virtue of the content she grasps. On this basis, if a contextual 
feature is relevant to the truth-conditions of an utterance then it is ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
26 Cf. Recanati (2001; 2004). See also Bezuidenhout (2002: 111-2). 
27  I have already expressed doubts about this ‘phenomenological’ 
characterisation in chapter two, so I won’t be repeating myself. The reader 
should be here interested in the taxonomy provided by Recanati, more than in his 
phenomenological considerations in its support.  
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part of what is said. Moreover, the principle provides justification 
for all those cases that today philosophers tend to call ‘Travis 
scenarios’. 28 A Travis scenario can be described as a pair of 
situations (s ! s!, though there is a third global situation s!! such 
that both s and s! are physically identical to s!!, but different in 
some contextual aspects surrounding their physical environment) in 
which an utterance of the same sentence is made, leading to the 
assignment of distinct truth-values (suppose that in C an utterance 
u of s is true, while in C! an utterance u! of s is false).29 If this 
happens, then we have evidence – so the contextualist argues – that 
different propositions have been expressed and that some elements 
in the sentence uttered is responsible for the variation of truth-
values.  
Can we agree with the contextualist conclusion that the meaning 
of almost any linguistic expression is context-dependent in the 
sense of contributing different contents in different contexts? With 
this question we reach, I think, the very core of the current debate 
surrounding the semantics/pragmatics distinction. Without 
presuming to be exhaustive, I propose to consider three possible 
answers to that question: 
 
A. Yes, all those linguistic expressions that are usable in a 
Travis scenario are context-dependent. 
B. Yes, all those linguistic expressions that are usable in a 
Travis scenario are context-dependent, but not in the sense 
of A. Those expressions are instead ambiguous between ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
28 Travis (1985) was, of course, the first to have brought the philosophers’ 
attention to them.  
29 The classic example discussed by Travis, which I will discuss in the next 
chapters, is the so-called ‘Pia’s case’. Pia has a maple whose leaves are red, but 
she decides to paint them green. Then, “intuitively”, an utterance of ‘The leaves 
are green’ is true in a situation in which a photographer needs to take a picture of 
a tree with green leaves, whereas an utterance of the same sentence will be false 
in the presence of a botanist. The conclusion contextualists draw from this kind 
of examples is that meaning radically underdetermines truth-conditions. 
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different readings, which themselves are context-dependent 
in the way indexical expressions are (so in principle 
amenable to semantic treatment). 
C. No, all those linguistic expressions that are usable in a 
Travis scenario are not context-dependent. They do not 
contribute different contents in different contexts. However, 
they are context-sensitive in the sense that they are sensitive 
to features of the circumstances of evaluation, and therefore 
end up assigning different extensions relative to different 
contexts. 
 
In this chapter, I am mainly focusing on the A-type answer, which 
characterises contextualism as the philosophical approach 
according to which the majority of linguistic expressions are 
context-dependent. In the last chapter, after criticising an account 
of metaphor (i.e., Stern’s) modelled on a B-type answer, I will 
defend a C-type approach. Let me now conclude this section by 
completing Recanati’s conception of what-is-said with the 
following diagram. 
 
What-is-saidR 
 
 
 
 
            
 
 
Saturation 
                 
   Free enrichment    Modulation 
(metaphor, metonymy, 
sense extension) 
 
B-type UCs 
 
A-type UCs 
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Secondary Pragmatic Processes 
(implicatures, indirect speech-acts, irony) 
 
 
Although the diagram may be accepted by any contextualist theory 
subscribing to TCP, there is an important caveat: the picture still 
adheres to the traditional view that pragmatic processes in the 
strong sense of Recanati’s secondary pragmatic processes are the 
final output of semantic (and, of course, syntactic) inputs. RT, 
which I am going to assess in the next section, challenges this 
view, claiming that the pragmatic level of implicatures has a 
backward direction of influence on ‘semantics’, helping 
inferentially determine the truth-conditional content of an 
utterance, which should be supplanted by the relevance-theoretic 
notion of ‘explicature’. 
 
 
4. Relevance Theory  
 
In this section I shall introduce the theory which goes under the 
name ‘relevance theory’ (RT) after Sperber and Wilson (1986 
[1995]). Although RT shares the basis assumptions of other truth-
conditional pragmatic accounts, it emphasises the inferential aspect 
of communication and meaning construction. It is also important 
because it offers the most comprehensive account of metaphorical 
interpretation available nowadays within TCP. 
I will split my discussion of RT in two halves. In this section I 
am interested in sketching the general picture of language and 
communication defended by the relevance theorists, trying also to 
connect their ideas to other versions of TCP like Recanati’s. In the 
next section I will present the relevance-theoretic approach to 
metaphorical interpretation.  
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Historically, RT originated in the 1980s of the last century, in 
line with the emergence of other contextualist proposals such as 
Travis’ and Recanati’s. In the span of fifteen years, from the first 
edition of Relevance (Sperber & Wilson 1986) to the appearance of 
Carston’s book Thought and Utterances (Carston 2002), relevance 
theorists have made important contributions in several sub-fields of 
pragmatics, challenging the Gricean taxonomy of implicatures30 
and providing new explanations of meta-cognitive aspects of 
communication, in which they include irony. An important 
contribution they have made is to have clearly shown the need for a 
distinction between irony and metaphor, which previous accounts, 
like Grice’s, had conflated.31 In my exposition I will mainly follow 
the material of a course in pragmatics and RT, which was run at the 
Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, Oslo, in 2008. I was lucky 
enough to participate in the event, and to meet people like Wilson 
and Carston, who introduced me to their theory. I shall divide my 
discussion of RT in four main sub-sections concerning the 
following issues: (4.1) whether language is governed by specific 
norms; (4.2) whether the model of language understanding based 
on some notion of ‘code’ is appropriate; (4.3) what role 
‘explicatures’ have in the relevance theoretic framework; finally 
(4.4), what the significance of the claim ‘meaning underdetermines 
truth-conditions’ is. 
 
4. 1 Is language governed by norms? 
 
Before going to assess RT, I wish to look back at the history of 
analytic philosophy, and mention a work that has some important ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
30  For instance, relevance theorists do not believe in the existence of 
conventional implicatures, which they take to be higher-order explicatures. 
31 They have shown this by appealing to a distinction between descriptive and 
interpretive uses of language. See the next section for a brief discussion of the 
distinction. 
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connections with what will follow. Thus, an important date to 
remember is Unger’s publication in 1975 of Ignorance: A Case for 
Scepticism, which, according to some (DeRose 2009), is a crucial 
work in the history of contextualism. There Unger proposed to 
consider the term ‘knowledge’ as an absolute term, a term whose 
semantics is inflexible in that it does not admit degrees of 
application, but purports to denote ‘an absolute limit’ (Unger 1975: 
55). Terms that are absolute in this sense are, for instance, ‘empty,’ 
‘full,’ ‘square,’ ‘flat,’ etc. Context, according to Unger, plays an 
important pragmatic role in determining how we are actually able 
to use those terms, and Unger himself sketched a number of 
pragmatic principles to that effect. 
Now, it is interesting to observe that until very recently, 
whenever a philosopher was reluctant to engage with a particular 
theoretical discourse, she had two options: either to follow an error-
theory for that discourse – the option defended by Unger in the 
case of knowledge-ascriptions –, or to adopt a Gricean stance and 
distinguish two levels of contents, the level of semantic content of 
an utterance and the level of implicated content, that is, what the 
speaker intends to further convey by uttering a sentence having that 
semantic content.32 It was a great merit of Sperber and Wilson, I 
think, to have shown that other options could be profitably 
explored. One of these options was going to be their RT, whose 
principles were in direct opposition to the philosophical trends of 
those times. 
One such philosophical trend was to think that speakers follow 
maxims of truthfulness or literalness. An example is given by 
Lewis, in his classic paper ‘Languages and Language’ (1975 
[1983]). There Lewis responds to a hypothetical criticiser of his 
((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
32 On this point, see Stanley and King (2005 [Stanley 2007]). On Grice’s 
philosophical background, see Carston (2002: first chapter). 
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idea that language has a stratified basis of conventions upon which 
human communication emerges: 
 
Objection: Suppose the members of a population are untruthful in 
their language L more often than not, not because they lie, but 
because they go in heavily for irony, metaphor, hyperbole, and 
such. It is hard to deny that the language L is used by such a 
population. 
Reply: I claim that these people are truthful in their language L, 
though they are not literally truthful in L. To be literally truthful in 
L is to be truthful in another language related to L, a language we 
can call literal-L. The relation between L and literal-L is as 
follows: a good way to describe L is to start by specifying literal-L 
and then to describe L as obtained by certain systematic departures 
from literal-L. This two-stage specification of L by way of literal-L 
may turn out to be much simpler than any direct specification of L. 
Objection: Suppose they are often untruthful in L because they are 
not communicating at all. They are joking, or telling tall tales, or 
telling white lies as a matter of social ritual. In these situations, 
there is neither truthfulness nor truth in L. Indeed, it is common 
knowledge that there is not. 
Reply: Perhaps I can say the same sort of thing about this non-
serious language use as I did about non-literal language use. That 
is: their seeming untruthfulness in non-serious situations is 
untruthfulness not in the language L that they actually use, but only 
in a simplified approximation to L. We may specify L by first 
specifying the approximation language, then listing the signs and 
features of context by which non-serious use can be recognised, 
then specifying that when these signs or features are present, what 
would count as untruths in the approximation language do not 
count as such in L itself. Perhaps they are automatically true in L, 
regardless of the facts; perhaps they cease to count as indicative. 
(1983: 183)  
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Lewis concludes this passage, somehow unhappy, by indicating the 
two possible directions of analysis: on the one hand, we could 
consider non-serious uses as inevitable violations of the convention 
of the language. This can be tolerated because such violations 
occur only occasionally and do not create real problems to the 
definition of Ll (literal language, approximately the language 
where a sentence meaning coincides with its truth-conditional 
content), which is strong enough to predict minimal deviations of 
truthfulness in L.33 On the other hand, we could define what it is 
for a communicator to be literally truthful in L (to say something 
which would approximate truth in Ll) by reflecting on a 
hypothetical situation, in which what would be defined is instead 
what it is for a communicator to be untruthful in the 
complementary language of L, say Anti-L. Call the first option 
conservative, the second one creative. 
Under the first option (the conversative one), we have to tacitly 
know an idealised language, Ll, in order to have a term of 
comparison for how to use L; under the second option (the creative 
one), we become the users of a different language whenever we 
speak figuratively. The first option seems to entail that we have an 
internalised language, which functions as a mirror of the language 
we actually speak, whereas the second one dissects whatever we 
take to be a good approximation of, say, English into two 
languages, the approximately literal L34 and the Anti-L, but, for the 
most part, it is hard to say exactly which one of them we are 
actually speaking. 
Be that as it may, following these models, when an interpreter 
processes what a speaker expresses literally or metaphorically, she 
always unreflectively refers to an idealisation of the language, ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
33 We could consider the relation between Ll and its approximations, to be 
ancestral such that, if Ll and {L1, L2, ..., Ln} are related to each other, then all 
the properties essential to Ll are R-heredited by {L1, L2, ..., Ln}. 
34 Supposedly, such a literal language could be identified with what Fodor (1975) 
calls the Language of Thought (LOT) or Mentalese. 
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either a literal–L or an anti–L, in order to understand the content 
the speaker is trying to get across. In general, literal language is 
measured in terms of strict effectiveness and informativeness, 
while figurativeness is taken to be either a departure from those 
ideals or as based on a quite distinct linguistic and communicative 
model with its own conventions.35  
 
4. 2 Against the Code Model 
 
 Relevance theorists attack this picture from a cognitive point of 
view. According to them (See esp. Sperber and Wilson 1986 [1995: 
chapter one]), the picture is inadequate because it presupposes a 
psychologically unrealistic model of communication based on 
some notion of code. A code is a system which pair messages to 
signals (SW 1986 [1995: 4), where a message is an internal 
representation and a signal is the external modification of an 
environment which can reach a communicating device from 
another. Knowledge of the syntactic and semantic rules inherent in 
the code are sufficient to allow one to ‘decode’ the message, i.e. to 
extract information from the signal. A hypothetical Begriffsschrift 
would instantiate this model, but, as Frege and Russell already 
knew, natural languages are far from even approximating that ideal. 
Linguistic communication does not, in fact, respect this ‘simple’ 
picture in that signals are massively disturbed by their surrounding 
environments, and therefore there is nothing that warrants a perfect 
decoding once they reach their destination. Now, according to 
relevance theorists, the main problem with philosophical accounts 
such as Grice’s and Lewis’ is that they both subscribe to this 
((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
35 Perhaps an example of the latter way of explaining figurativeness is Walton’s 
make-believe theory of metaphorical interpretation (1993 [2005]). 
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model, whereby the derive normative constraints on the 
explanation of figurative uses of language.36 
Thus, the first move made by relevance theorists to show that 
this model is inadequate is to claim that the notion of ‘code’ is 
unnecessary to define the practice of communication. It is not 
necessary since for each message conveyed by a coded signal, there 
are infinitely many ways in which the same message could be 
conveyed without using some code. For example, consider the 
following scenario: 
 
(14) A bee is approaching B. 
 
A: ‘Careful, a bee is approaching you.’ 
A takes B’s arm. 
A emits a scream. 
A totally disregards what B is saying, looking at the 
direction of the bee. 
 
As you can see, there are many ways in which A may draw B’s 
attention to the approaching bee. Most of these ways are not coded, 
but lean on A’s behaviour to obtain the same effect reached by A’s 
utterance that the bee is approaching. The first conclusion 
relevance theorists draw from this kind of example is that 
communicative intentions (i.e., intentions to the effect that one has 
an informative intention) are not necessarily coded messages. 
Similarly, an informative intention to the effect that a set of 
assumptions holds does not require the use of a code, but can be ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
36 What distinguishes Lewis’ approach from Grice’s then? Wilson and Sperber 
(2002) argue that both see figurative meanings as generated by systematic 
departures from literal meanings. But Grice needs the level of literalness to 
account for all figurative cases in which some of his maxims have been violated 
or flouted. His analysis of figurativeness could be defined as indirect. According 
to Lewis, indeed, literalness is fundamental because it functions as a meta-
theoretical level where it is possible to screen off literal uses from figurative 
ones in a theoretically predictable pure way.  
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instantiated by the activation of other inferential mechanisms. The 
second conclusion is that inferential processes, as the ones 
activated by A’s behaviour, are quite as important for 
communicative purposes. In any case, whether we intend to 
communicate something by using some code or just by activating 
inferential processes in our interlocutors, our intentions, as well as 
those of our interlocutors, are tuned to the maximisation of 
relevance. From this it follows: 
 
Cognitive principle of relevance: Human cognition tends to 
be geared to the maximisation of relevance.  
 
In other words, cognitive systems like ours are attracted to relevant 
stimuli, namely, stimuli the processing of which are likely to hold 
positive cognitive effects.37 
Crucial to this picture is that a certain assumption, or set of 
assumptions is mutually manifest to both speakers and hearers, in 
the sense of being cognitively accessible to them.38 According to 
RT, this is most frequently the case since speakers and hearers 
share cognitive environments, i.e., environments in which a highly 
relevant set of assumptions is available to them, which are also 
ordered in terms of their accessibility (from the most accessible to 
the least accessible ones).  
The second move relevance theorists make against the model of 
communication presented in § 4. 1 is to show that truthfulness is an 
inessential property of communication. In fact, if communication is 
successful whenever speakers and hearers exchange relevant ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
37 These may take the form of warranted strengthening of certain assumptions, or 
warranted revision of them. 
38 In this sense, this model reject the so-called ‘mutual knowledge hypothesis’ 
(Lewis 1969, Schiffer 1972), based on the idea that in order for a communication 
to be possible there must be a common ground of assumptions shared by the 
participants in a conversation. One problem such a view has always been faced 
with is the possibility of a regressus ad infinitum. See Tendhal (2009) for 
discussion. 
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contextual information, then modelling it on norms of 
communication which have ‘truthfulness’ as an ideal limit39 will 
always lead to an inappropriate model since relevant stimuli cannot 
be defined in its terms. A relevant stimulus is not something for 
which the question of truth arises. Also, a stimulus is something 
that admits degrees of relevance, depending on a large number of 
factors (e.g., assumptions available to the participants in a 
conversation, degrees of accessability of those assumptions, 
interests and abilities of the participants, etc.).  
The third move is to show that if language is one way, among 
others, humans have to communicate and exchange information, 
then the same, or sufficiently similar, mechanisms of understanding 
already active in other, fully inferential, forms of communication 
should be found here. Hence, even a coded system like language is, 
after all, understandable only by activating the same inferential 
mechanisms which are addressed to the maximisation of relevance. 
These mechanisms are already active in the process Recanati calls 
‘saturation,’ i.e., the assignment of contextual values to indexicals, 
and in the disambiguation of meanings in an utterance (e.g., 
BANK1, financial institution, vs. BANK2, river bank, in ‘Mary 
went to the bank’). In both cases the hearer constructs the 
interpretation that is most accessible and relevant both to her and to 
the speaker. The inferential mechanisms become even more 
important when communication may look, at first glance, bizarre. 
Consider: 
 
(15) What is past is past. (Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian 
Gray) 
(16)  The pretty girl is pretty. (Carston 2002) 
 ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
39 Consider Grice’s insistence (1975) that the most important of his maxims is 
the maxim of Quality. 
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Taken literally, the propositions expressed by these two utterances 
are tautologies. Tautologies are generally considered faults of style 
(cf. O. E. D.). A model of communication based on the notion of 
code would not be able to explain how it is possible to recover 
extra-relevant information from these examples. A fully inferential 
model is instead required. Moreover, a scrutiny of the behaviour of 
Unger’s absolute terms shows that although truthfulness may not 
be a reachable end, there are contexts in which using one of these 
terms may lead to the gain of relevant information. For instance, 
consider an utterance of 
 
(17)  The fridge is empty. 
 
Although the fridge is not completely empty (there is some salad 
and a pot of marmalade in it), it certainly invites the hearer to visit 
the local shop and provide some food. Again, an inferential model 
is required in order to explain how language users are able to make 
sense of this sort of utterance. RT claims that such a model is likely 
to be based on the following principle: 
 
Principle of Relevance. Every act of ostensive communication 
communicates a presumption of optimal relevance. (Sperber and 
Wilson 1986 [1995: 158]) 
 
In turn, this principle is based on the following presumptions:  
 
Presumption of Optimal Relevance.  
(a) The set of assumptions I which the communicator intends to 
make manifest to the addressee is relevant enough to make it 
worth the addressee’s attention to process the ostensive 
stimulus. 
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(b) The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one the 
communicator could have used to communicate I. (Sperber and 
Wilson 1986 [1995: ibid.]) 
 
All these principles have to be understood psychologically and not 
normatively. What relevance theorists are looking at is a 
cognitively plausible model of communication, not normative 
principles or maxims à la Grice. According to RT, language users 
do not obey maxims of any sort, but only follow a ‘path of least 
effort’ in deriving implications from an utterance, stopping 
whenever their expectations of relevance are met or abandoned.  
There is a final consideration relevance theorists make, and it is 
worth mentioning it because it leads me to pose a question 
concerning the processes of metaphor creation. According to 
Sperber (1994), a code system does not allow for creativity, since 
the activity of encoding and decoding are purely based on the 
manipulation of internal representations. In contrast, an inferential 
model, in which hearers work out more layers of meaning, 
accounts for this property. Question: is the creation and 
comprehension of a metaphor an inferential matter? More 
generally, can creativity be accounted for only by appealing to an 
inferential model? My answer is that if Sperber is right in claiming 
that inferential processes are creative, creativity does not (wholly) 
coincide with inferentiality. My model of metaphorical 
understanding won’t be based on an underlying inferential model, 
so I will take the burden of the proof to provide an alternative 
explanation of creativity. For now, I am content with making the 
strongest case for the relevance theoretic account of metaphor. 
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4. 3 Explicature 
 
What consequences does this model of communication predict in 
language understanding? Given the RT’s insistence on the 
fallibility of inferential processes, one important consequence is 
that, according to such a theory, an interpretation of an utterance 
will never perfectly match what the speaker intended to say with it. 
An interpretation is always a fallible guess, so to speak. 
Accordingly, if a speaker U utters a sentence s expressing a 
proposition p, it is very likely that the hearer will interpret U’s 
utterance as having expressed p*, a proposition sufficiently similar 
to p in that it shares a number of its relevant features, but not all. 
RT then proposes to get rid of Grice’s notion of what is said, 
which is psychologically too thin to have any useful application, 
and replace it with the notion of ‘explicature’. An explicature is ‘an 
ostensively communicated assumption which is inferentially 
developed from one of the incomplete conceptual representations 
(logical forms) encoded by the utterance’ (Carston 2002: 
Appendix, p. 377).40 For instance, to use a Chomskyan example: 
 
(18)  Visiting parents can be boring. 
 
(17) has two LFs, depending on whether ‘visiting’ functions as an 
adjectival modifier of ‘parents’ or as the sentence’s subject: 
 
(18!) [Visiting parents] [can be boring]. 
(18!!) [Visiting] [parents] [can be boring]. 
 ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
40 The association of the word ‘explicature’ with ‘explicit content’ is misleading. 
Following Bach, it seems that RT confuses the etymology of ‘explicature,’ 
cognate of ‘explicate’ with that of explicit, which is not. This, as Bach says 
(2006: 5), obscures ‘the fact that this content is partly implicit.’ I have more to 
say about the consequences of the explicature hypothesis in the next chapter. 
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Suppose (18!) is the LF used to communicate the actual explicature 
of (18), i.e., that parents who visit their offspring are boring. How 
does the hearer latch onto this reading? Since (18) is uttered in a 
context in which someone is talking about the recent visit she has 
received from her parents, (18!) is the most relevant LF accessible 
to the hearer, and therefore the most likely to be accessed.  
Moreover, implicatures may come at an early stage of the 
interpretation, and may have the form of implicated assumptions or 
implicated conclusions. Take this dialogue: 
 
(19)  Bill: I’ve heard you moved from Manhattan to Brooklyn. 
Sue: The rent is lower. (From Wilson’s Oslo Lectures) 
 
Here RT predicts the following pattern of interpretation: 
 
(19a)  Lower rents are a good reason to move. (implicated 
assumption) 
(19b) The rent in Brooklyn is lower than the rent in Manhattan. 
(explicature) 
(19c) Sue moved to Brooklyn because the rent was lower there. 
(implicated conclusion) 
 
As you can see, the processes of interpretation run in parallel and 
therefore do not follow the linear process predicted by code 
models, in which the information encoded by Sue’s utterance is 
first minimally accessed, and then a conversational implicature is 
derived from it.41 
The degree of explicitness of an utterance is inversely 
proportional to the contribution of pragmatic inference: the more 
explicit an utterance is, the smaller the activation of inferential 
mechanisms will be. As an example: ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
41 Borg (2004) provides the most comprehensive defence of this model.  
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(20)  Bill: Would you like to have supper with us tonight? 
Sue (i): No, thanks. I’ve eaten. 
Sue (ii): No thanks. I’ve eaten tonight. 
Sue (iii): No thanks. I’ve eaten soup tonight. (Wilson’s 
Oslo Lectures) 
  
Although the explicature of (20) is (iii), the way the hearer may 
arrive at it varies depending on how explicit Sue is with her 
utterance and, therefore, how much contribution Bill has to 
inferentially provide.  
Summarising, we have the following picture of language 
understanding adopted by RT, and at least by some other defenders 
of TCP, like, e.g., Bezuidenhout: 
 
 
 
 
 
utterance    !                   !  LF "" ! Enrichment ! Implications 
 
 
Once an utterance of a sentence is made, the first pragmatic 
operation is to disambiguate its possible logical forms. The second 
pragmatic operation is to enrich the LF just selected. The third 
pragmatic operation is to derive further implications from the 
explicature derived. These may also have a backward effect on the 
previous level, that is, the level in which the explicature is derived. 
One may wonder what role semantics is left with in this picture. 
The answer is that semantics has no role except for the encoding of 
LFs, which have to be pragmatically enriched in context. As 
Pragmatics1 Pragmatics2 Pragmatics3 
((((-."(((((-.""(((((-."""((
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Bezuidenhout (2002) points out, adoption of TCP means nothing 
but to leave the whole truth-conditional semantic enterprise behind.  
 
4.4 Underdeterminacy 
 
A further thesis that has been discussed in the literature since the 
work of Atlas and Grice himself, is what Carston and Bezuidenhout 
refer to as the ‘Underdeterminacy thesis:’ In Carston’s words: 
 
           U.   [T]here are no eternal sentences in natural languages 
(that is, no sentences which encode a proposition or thought 
which is constant across all contexts), from which it follows 
that linguistic underdeterminacy of the proposition expressed 
by an utterance is an essential feature of natural language. 
(Carston 2002: 42. My emphasis) 
 
Typical examples of U to be resolved by means of pragmatic 
adjustments are, according to Carston (2002: 28), lexical 
ambiguities, indexical references, missing constituents, unspecified 
scope of elements, underspecificity or weakness of encoded 
conceptual content, overspecificity or narrowness of encoded 
conceptual content:  
 
a. He went to the bank. [financial institution/river?] 
b. She said to her teacher that she needed a break. 
c. She’s ready. [for what?] 
d. Every bottle was empty. 
e. That movie is hard.   
f. I’ll bring some food. 
  
[I highlighted or clarified in brackets those elements which are 
supposed to radically underdetermine the interpretation.] Two 
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points are worth considering. First of all, underdeterminacy should 
not be confused with indexicality, which is narrower than it. 
Secondly, it is also worth stressing that not all contextualists think 
of underdeterminacy in the strong sense of U. For instance, 
Bezuidenhout (2002: 125) defends a weak effability thesis, 
according to which ‘every possible thought can be communicated 
by means of some sentence of L’.42 Carston (2002: 33) herself 
accepts a weak effability thesis (First principle of effability), but 
she changes Bezuidenhout’s ‘some sentence of L’ with ‘some 
utterance of some sentence’. The shift is significant insofar as, for 
Carston, sentences are not truth-bearers (very few would maintain 
this conception nowadays). For, the set of propositions is larger 
than the set of L-sentences. In fact, as already stressed, there are 
many well-formed sentences which fail to express propositions, but 
every proposition is a well-formed sentence. However, Carston’s 
position is stronger in that, for her, no L-sentence encodes a 
proposition unless contextual assumptions are added. 
The importance of this debate would certainly deserve more 
attention than I give it here. However, if I have to take sides, the 
most reasonable hypothesis seems that offered by Bach (2006: 2), 
who argues, as Bezuidenhout indeed does, that humans tend to find 
more economic ways to express thoughts in communication. They 
do so by massively leaning on every linguistic means – think about 
anaphora and ellipsis cases – which allow them to communicate the 
same content that a sentence could fully express in shorter, less 
than explicit but more economic (so cognitively more fruitful) 
sentences. But then the radical contextualist seems at least not 
warranted in concluding that no thought or proposition can ever be 
explicitly expressed by some sentence from the fact that we ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
42  This principle should not be confused with Searle’s ‘Principle of 
Expressibility’ (Searle 1969), according to which any thought can be fully 
expressed by some sentence of L. It goes without saying that Carston rejects 
such a principle.  
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generally opt not to express it in fully explicit ways. In the next 
chapter, I will briefly take up this point again in one of the 
examples I use against RT. I shall now move to discuss the 
relevance-theoretic approach to metaphor. 
 
 
5. The Relevance-theoretic Approach to Metaphor 
 
In this section I introduce the reader to the relevance-theoretic 
account of metaphorical interpretation. 
 
5.1 The Continuity View 
 
Consider the following BASEBALL SCENARIO: 
 
(21)  A. Where is your son? 
        B. He’s playing baseball in the garden with his father.  
 
I have chosen this example, an adaptation from Bezuidenhout’s 
(2002: 109), since it strikes me as different from the cases we 
discussed earlier. Apparently, everything looks in order here: there 
is no missing link in the two sentences, for the pronoun ‘he’ and 
the possessive ‘his’ are anaphorically linked to the ‘son’ in the 
question. Nor is there any incompleteness (missing constituents) in 
the B-sentence; hence this sentence seems to encode a proposition. 
But the contextualist claims that, strictly speaking, the son is not 
playing ‘baseball’ in the usual sense of the term. In fact, to play 
baseball one should play in a real team of nine players, on a field 
with a diamond-shaped circuit of four bases, and so on. One plays 
baseball in the garden only in a miniaturised sense, so to speak. 
Hence the sentence, as it stands, does not capture a truth-evaluable 
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proposition. Something has to be pragmatically adjusted, that is, 
‘modulated.’  
Nevertheless, this ‘imprecision’ cannot be attributed to any 
transparent feature of the utterance, for the hearer does not seem to 
be aware that she is processing something less-than-literal, though 
the meanings of the sentence are directly accessible to her. For one 
thing, it would not make sense to say that the speaker is successful 
in implying something over and above the sentence’s literal 
meaning, which is, strictly speaking, false. But it would certainly 
be absurd to respond to B by saying ‘Wait a minute, he’s not 
playing baseball!’ either. Thus, what is meant by the speaker B is 
not detached by the conventional meanings he has opted for in 
communicating the proposition  <son, father, play baseball, in l 
(garden), at t (present)>; it is just that the conventional meaning of 
a word is to be adjusted through some minimal departure from its 
original sense in order to convey a true proposition. In particular 
the concept associated to the word ‘baseball,’ say BASEBALL, has 
to be broadened so as to apply to instances of baseball-in-the-
garden.43 This process is local – in our case it affects only the word 
‘baseball’ –, and ‘top-down’ in the sense of depending on 
contextual assumptions and background knowledge. For 
Bezuidenhout (2002), an example like this shows the ‘nonself-
interpreting’ character of language. In fact, she claims that only 
against a background of assumptions, and only through the 
particular understanding of the occasion in which a sentence is 
uttered, can it be interpreted. This is what Travis often calls 
‘occasion-sensitivity’, a phenomenon whose import is supposed to 
radically undermine the possibility of any semantic analysis.44 
((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
43 On the notion of ‘broadening’ or ‘loosening’ of a concept associated with a 
word, and the opposite operation of ‘narrowing,’ see Carston (2002: chapter v), 
Wilson and Carston (2006), Rubio-Fernández (2008). 
44 The extent to which this claim creates serious problems to semantics will be 
investigated in the next chapters. 
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These examples are also extensively discussed by Recanati. He 
argues for a meaning taxonomy, which goes from the conventional 
meaning of the words (their t(ype)-literal character), and the 
minimal deviations of an interpretation from the sentence’s 
components (m-literal character), to the nonminimal deviations in 
the meanings characterising tropes such as metaphor and 
metonymy. Here the process involved is still primary (hence their 
p-literal character, which emerges from the interpretation of the 
underlying m-nonminimal deviations), in contrast with cases 
involving secondary processes like Gricean implicatures and 
indirect speech acts. Crucially, according to Recanati (2004: 77) 
there is a continuum of cases which goes from the minimal 
deviations of our baseball scenario to the more ‘dramatic’ (sic) 
cases of poetic metaphors.45 This account is largely anticipated by 
Sperber & Wilson (henceforth SW) who argue in their classic 
(1986 [1995]) for a ‘continuity view’, according to which there is a 
continuum of cases from the clear examples of literalness to the 
most creative metaphors. Since the continuum’s elements are 
governed by the same principles and understood via the same 
interpretive methods, this view naturally leads to their advocated 
‘deflationary’ approach to metaphor.  
 
The continuity view. ‘[T]here is no mechanism specific 
to metaphors, no interesting generalisation that applies 
only to them. In other terms, metaphorical 
interpretations are not a natural kind, and “metaphor” is 
not a theoretically important notion in the study of 
verbal communication.’ (SW 2006: 172) 
 ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
45 This includes intermediate cases of metonymy (‘The hamburger left without 
paying’) and sense extension, when a predicated is extended (loosened) to cover 
new instances under its conceptual range (‘The ATM swallowed my credit 
card’). 
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As it stands, this view is largely negative: not only do metaphors 
not form a natural kind, but their function in verbal communication 
is not very interesting either. What motivates such strong 
conclusions? In the remaining part of this chapter, I will discuss the 
main hypothesis of RT, the one involving the formation of ad hoc 
concepts. In an early stage, relevance theorists used to lay more 
emphasis on the notion of weak implicatures.46  
 
5.2 Underdeterminacy, Relevance and Metaphor  
 
Underdeterminacy, as shown above, implies that what speakers 
communicate is never fully encoded in a proposition and so cannot 
be comprehended by a hearer except by massively inferential 
adjustments. We are also told (SW 1995: 231) that the 
propositional forms of utterances are never identical to their 
speakers’ thoughts, and that in order to determine the latter we 
have to guess what relationship exists with the former. The only 
means we have to do this is to take such propositional forms (or 
templates, schemas) as clues for their underlying conceptual 
contents, which they somehow resemble. Metaphors as well as 
metonyms and approximations do not constitute an exception to 
this, as they require the same inferential mechanisms that are active 
in the understanding of literal cases. Conversely, if the mechanisms 
which govern metaphorical interpretations are the same as the ones 
governing more literal uses, then RT argues that no presumption of 
literalness can be postulated, since in any case it is not the 
interpreters’ default interpretation. But if literalness is not required, 
then any Gricean maxim leaning on it is redundant, if not out of 
place.  
((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
46 The reader may consult Pilkington (2000) for an overview of these two 
strategies. 
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Thus, what distinguishes such an account from Grice’s? To 
respond to this question I have isolated four further questions, 
whose answering will be necessary to understand the relevance-
theoretic approach:  
 
• At what level does RT situate the metaphor’s interpretation? 
 
• How predictable are metaphors?  
 
• What relationship is there between a metaphor’s lexical 
constituents and the same metaphor’s thought-constituents? Does 
an explicature of an utterance reflect some deeper underlying 
conceptual structure?  
 
• What explanatory virtues has this pragmatic approach over 
Grice’s?  
 
First answer (Level of interpretation): Explicatures and Ad 
Hoc Concepts 
RT rejects the Gricean-implicature approach to metaphor, for this 
seems to behave strangely. Take this example 
 
(22)      A. Did Caroline clean her room? 
            B. She is a princess. 
 
According to Grice the speaker is just ‘making as if to say’ 
Caroline is a princess, leaving then open a range of implicatures to 
be calculated by the hearer. This view has been presented with 
various problems by the relevance theorists (SW 2002; Carston 
2002). For instance, it would have the result that the speaker 
actually says nothing, when it is clear that something has been 
meant with those words, although the sentence’s conventional form 
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does not reflect the proposition being expressed. Moreover, if the 
problem (provided that there is one here) is that a maxim of 
truthfulness, that is, the Maxim of Quality, has been flouted, then if 
nothing is said (but only ‘as if said’), technically no maxim would 
be violated. So there is a theoretical issue here, which Grice was 
unable to see. In consequence, RT shifts away from Grice’s 
account of metaphor in terms of conversational implicture. 
According to RT, ‘metaphor affects not only the implicatures of 
an utterance but also its truth-conditional content’ (Wilson and 
Carston 2006: 405). The truth-conditional content we are 
discussing here is, of course, that which any truth-conditional 
pragmatics deems to be crucial for the understanding of any 
utterance: broader so as to include material that Grice’s restricted 
notion of what-is-said counted as implicature. In order to make 
room for this larger truth-conditional content, a new category is 
then advanced by SW, namely, that of ‘explicatures’. As we saw in 
the previous section, an explicature is an assumption 
communicated by an utterance, which is explicit insofar as it is a 
development of the logical form encoded by the sentence uttered. 
In one of the aforementioned examples related to U, as ‘Every 
bottle was empty’, an interpreter has to develop the underspecified 
logical form of the sentence by providing conceptual material 
which may pragmatically fill it out: restricting the domain of ‘every 
bottle’ to every-bottle-on-the-table or narrowing the concept 
associated to the lexical entry ‘bottles’ to the wine’s bottles, and so 
on. The same mechanisms are requested for the baseball scenario, 
where the hearer unreflectively broadens the lexical entry 
‘baseball,’ associated to an atomic concept in the language of 
thought, so as to form an ad hoc category BASEBALL*, which 
adds encyclopaedic information to the features characterising 
(analytically?) the atomic concept, and relaxing some of its logical 
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implications, so as to enable the communicators to highlight 
potential uses of the word outside its strict applicative range.47 
The explicit content of an utterance is then determined, 
according to RT, only by the online and mutual adjustments of 
contextual assumptions and implications. As the previous example 
showed, the explicit content of the utterance ‘Caroline is a 
PRINCESS*’ is obtained by mutual adjustments of contextual 
assumptions and implications made by the hearer while 
interpreting: the propositional form of (21.B)’s utterance – its 
encoded meaning – is in fact gradually enriched through the 
exploitation of both general and particular assumptions:  
 
CONTEXTUAL ASSUMPTION1: A princess is spoiled, indulged, 
etc. 
CONTEXTUAL IMPLICATION2: Caroline is spoiled, indulged, 
etc. 
CONTEXTUAL ASSUMPTION3: A princess is not committed to 
any domestic work. 
CONTEXTUAL IMPLICATION4: Caroline is not committed to 
any domestic work. 
 
This set of assumptions/implications offers the ground for 
uncovering an explicature to the effect that Caroline is a 
PRINCESS*. This explicature is constructed by the interpreter who 
forms an ad hoc concept, viz., PRINCESS*, which can be 
predicated in that context of Caroline (said otherwise, Caroline 
instantiates in such a context the property of ‘being a princess*’, if 
there is any such property). From here on, the hearer has enough 
material to implicate that Caroline did not do what she was ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
47 Carston (2002: 322) and Barsalou (quoted in Glucksberg 2001: 44) provide 
clear pictures of what ad hoc concepts are supposed to be. On the role of ‘ad hoc 
categories’ in the interpretation of idioms and metaphors, see also Glucksberg 
(2001; 2008). On the difference between Glucksberg’s account and RT’s see 
Wilson and Carston (2006: 414-415).  
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expected to do, because she is just that kind of princess who is 
unable to help her mother manage any domestic work. Notice also 
how this implication anticipates, with positive cognitive effects to 
gain on the part of both speakers and hearers, any further question 
regarding the reasons why Caroline did not help her mother.  
Wilson and Carston are aware of the fact that the encyclopaedic 
entries they associate to ‘princess’ are hardly responsible for the 
emergence of such assumptions; nevertheless, they consider that 
the hearer will elaborate them without any difficulty, for they 
predict that the resulting explicature is the only interpretation which 
is accessible after the process of mutual adjustments via forward 
inference from available encyclopaedic assumptions and backward 
inferences based on the implied conclusion has been completed. 
Crucially, they think that no hypothesis about what is said is 
considered by the hearer without first assuming the implied 
conclusion of the utterance and then hypothesizing about the 
speaker’s meaning.  
In conclusion, ad hoc concepts are constructed in the process of 
uncovering an explicature. Their role is to strengthen inferentially 
warranted implicatures and, in the presence of metaphorically 
richer context-discourses, to amplify the resonance of further weak 
implicatures (Carston 2002: 358). They have the apparently 
important cognitive function of orienting the hearer into a 
conceptual space. Ad hoc concepts are like functions which take as 
input the logical, encyclopaedic and lexical entries of a given 
atomic concept and give as output a superordinate category that 
shares some sub-set of the original concept’s features, those 
relevant to the context-discourse. Hence, the hypothesis is that 
(atomic) concepts can be modelled to accommodate the shape of 
things (objects, events, states of affairs, whatever is in your 
ontology). In a way which is characteristic of relevance theorists, 
the ontological and semantic status of these concepts is left 
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unexplained, since their focus is exclusively on the hearer’s 
heuristics. Accordingly, the only factors which are determinant are 
the specific presumption of an assumption’s relevance and the 
order of expectations its interpreters have. I assess the question of 
what determines this ratio in the next sub-section. 
 
Second answer (RT’s comprehension heuristics).  
What warrants the uncovering of an explicature? And what 
guarantees do we have that the process does not lead to conflicting 
explicatures? According to RT, utterance interpretation is generally 
goal-directed so as to take into consideration only two factors: the 
presumption of an utterance’s relevance and the expectations raised 
regarding how such a presumption must be satisfied. One may 
legitimately wonder how the ratio between this presumption and 
the expectations surrounding it could be calculated. However, this 
is unproblematic because the measurement of this ratio, so RT 
argues, comes for free from the ‘Communicative Principle of 
Relevance’: every utterance comes with its ‘presumption of 
optimal relevance.’ This means that any act of verbal 
communication, as any other ostensive stimulus, is interpreted in 
the correct way when the ratio between the cognitive efforts and 
effects of processing it are well-enough balanced.  
Since human cognitive capacities are strongly constrained by 
their physical structure which imposes limits for processing stimuli 
coming from the environment, the hypothesis is that humans have 
developed a strategy for getting the best results from these limits. 
This strategy is that of ‘following a path of least effort’ in 
processing ostensive stimuli, until the most relevant interpretation 
(the one which your cognitive system has latched onto after having 
ruled out other less advantageous alternatives) is eventually 
accessed. Since humans also tend to the maximization of relevance 
(‘Cognitive Principle of Relevance’), RT claims that we are able to 
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achieve communication even by means of any kind of error, 
misuse, imprecision, and in general massive underdetermination: 
all these cases will introduce assumptions that our cognitive 
abilities are able to latch on to and maximise their relevance.   
Here, therefore, lies RT’s response to our second question 
regarding the predictability of a metaphorical utterance. In (21.B), 
Wilson and Carston (2006: 422) argue that the justification for the 
uncovering of the explicature ‘Caroline is a PRINCESS*’ is that it 
defeats its logically possible alternatives (whereby Caroline will 
help manage housework), since ‘this is the first accessible 
interpretation to make the utterance relevant in the expected way, 
and it is therefore the one selected by the relevance-based 
comprehension heuristic’.  
 
Third answer (Resemblance).  
A controversial notion defended by SW and Carston is that of 
resemblance. In one sense, we already know that every thing 
resembles some other in certain respects and not in others. 
However, this blatant truth has however pressed many important 
researches in human rationality, from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations to the works of Tversky (1977) and Rosch (1973) in 
cognitive and experimental psychology or Lakoff’s (1987) in 
cognitive linguistics, to mention but the most known. At the basis 
of verbal communication we are now told (Carston 2002: chap. V; 
also SW 1995: 228 ff.) that utterances can represent in two 
different ways: first of all, their propositional forms upwardly 
represent tokens of our language of thought, sentences of our 
Mentalese (Fodor 1979). But secondly, propositional forms can 
downwardly represent states of affairs, when the utterances are 
descriptive, or further thoughts when they are used in a meta-
representational (i.e., interpretive) way, i.e., when they have high-
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order representations as the objects of their representations (so they 
are interpretations of these representations).48  
Now in the case of metaphors, metonymies and approximations, 
concepts are less-than-literal on RT’s account, so their encoded 
content is in a relation of non-identical resemblance with their 
conceptual counterpart in the language of thought. According to 
Fodor, concepts in the language of thought (LOT) are individuated 
on the basis of their syntactic, compositional properties. But 
whereas, as far as the LOT is concerned, one has to think of 
concepts as types potentially determined by all their admissible 
syntactic operations, one can think of them semantically only on 
the basis of how we individuate them in the interaction with the 
physical world. In this wordly sense, two individuals have the same 
concept when they respond to the properties instantiating such 
concepts in the same way. Since our cognitive structures form a 
natural kind, we are expected to react in the same way to the 
environment, and hence to entertain the same concepts. Differences 
between two individuals as to the grasping of a certain concept are 
individuated by the fact that they have different MOPS (modes of 
presentation) of such concepts or, alternatively, different kinds of 
responses to the concepts’ stereotypes whose experiencing permits 
them to get locked to the properties instantiating such concepts 
(‘having a concept is something like “resonating to” the property 
that the concept expresses’ [Fodor 1998: 137]).  
At the communicative level, this has the following consequence 
according to Carston: that the concepts communicated via an 
utterance only resemble those which the sentence uttered encodes, 
the two differing in what encyclopaedic and defining (analytic) 
features speakers and hearers will highlight in the particular 
((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
48 Irony is given an account by the relevance-theorist in this latter sense. 
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occasion of exchange.49 Similarly, at the propositional level, the 
two propositional forms, the one which is conveyed by the 
utterance, the other which is processed in the interpretation, will 
differ in a generally nonpredictable way once their logical and 
encyclopaedic properties are filtered in and out. When asked how 
communication is made possible if the exchange will always be 
somewhat defective, Carston would probably reply that this is not a 
problem insofar as it is not by assessing the meanings of words in 
isolation that we can understand the tokening of a particular 
utterance-type, but only letting our understanding of the context of 
utterance be guided by the relevance principles and the relevance-
theoretic heuristic, so as to recover an explicature sufficiently 
resembling the thought(s) the speaker has managed to 
communicate. 
 
Fourth answer (Advantages over Grice’s account).  
I conclude this survey of RT by mentioning the supposed 
advantages of its account of metaphor over especially Grice’s 
implicature model.  
First of all, against Grice’s hasty treatment of metaphor, RT 
gives significant attention to the fact the speaker’s communicated 
content can be determined even in the slippery case of metaphor. 
By having considered metaphor as a case involving ‘making-as-if-
to say,’ and by having relied only on the mechanisms of 
implicature to explain what a metaphor conveys, Grice has 
deprived metaphor of its cognitive value, delimiting its role to the 
one rhetoric traditionally gave to it, namely that of merely 
ornamental function. Relevance theorists do not deny that a ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
49 There is a complication here. Carston appeals to a conception of concepts 
according to which they are defined by their analytic (logical) properties, in a 
way that calls to mind Carnap’s meaning postulates. Since Carston leans also on 
a philosophy of thought which is a tribute of some of Fodor’s ideas, this is 
idiosyncratic with Fodor’s view that concepts are not definable at all since they 
lack underlying conceptual structure.* 
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metaphor can give rise to further implicatures (captured by their 
notion of ‘weak implicatures’ of which I have said almost nothing 
since I am less concerned here with poetic metaphors), but clearly 
states that its basic function is comparable to that of other 
legitimate uses of words, i.e., to communicate explicatures. 
Secondly, an implicature enters into the metaphorical 
intepretation through the mutual inferential adjustments I have 
already discussed. This point is worth stressing: a compositional 
system, of the kind underlying Grice’s notion of what-is-said, is 
now made superfluous by the occurring of top-down processes, 
which determine the ‘truth-conditional’ content of an utterance. In 
this system there is no space for a notion of minimal proposition,50 
which we can find in the work of many philosophers of language 
such as Grice (1975), Cappelen and Lepore (2005), Borg (2004). 
Thirdly, the indeterminacy many see in metaphor is due to the 
extra assumptions and implications the speaker is not generally 
fully aware of having implicated or assumed to be true, but which 
are however part of the process which leads the hearer to derive the 
utterance’s explicit content. Again, the weaker the implicatures, the 
less explicit the (truth-conditional) content, and vice versa (the 
more explicit the content, the weaker the implicatures). The 
mechanism of metaphor is more complex than the implicature 
model suggests since the hearers’ responsibility to derive the 
correct interpretation is very often pressed by factors a speaker 
does not fully control.  This implies that there is no presumption of 
uniqueness in what the audience may responsibly infer from the 
speaker’s metaphorical utterance. Indeed, this is the case for every 
utterance. Consistency between speaker’s and hearer’s assumptions 
is finally a matter of degree, but strongly constrained by 
considerations of relevance, which are sufficient for the 
determination of the explicit content of a metaphorical utterance. ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
50 See also Recanati (2004: 64-5). 
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Since Grice’s account is based on notions such as code and 
truthfulness, it cannot deal with the communicative nuances of 
utterances, and therefore should be regarded with suspicion.   
As far as other contextualist analyses are concerned, there is no 
extensive literature which compares the pros and cons of their 
conceptions of metaphor over RT’s. They are pretty much 
considered RT’s strong allies, though I think there are elements that 
should be more carefully analysed. In particular, Recanati takes 
modulation functions, which apply also to metaphors, to be non-
inferential (2004: 29), while we just saw that RT envisages a fully 
inferential model. Moreover, what emerges from a comparison 
with Recanati’s work is that the French philosopher is not disposed 
to follow RT in giving up the Gricean distinction 
saying/implicating, which he supports with his distinction between 
primary and secondary processes, whereas RT drops not only this 
distinction, but also the former notion, which is substituted by that 
of explicit content, i.e., encoded meaning that is pragmatically 
enriched. While I have already expressed doubts about the 
possibility of nailing down the Gricean distinction by means of 
Recanati’s phenomenological considerations, I still need to 
challenge RT’s arguments for its suppression, which I am going to 
do in the next chapter. 
In conclusion, RT has been motivated by two orders of 
consideration to defend the explicature/ad hoc concepts hypothesis. 
First, RT subverts the Gricean explanation of lots of phenomena: 
where Grice assumed the rising of a conversational implicature, RT 
says that it is indeed a phenomenon due to top-down 
underdetermination, and that pragmatic adjustments are sufficient 
to construct the correct hypothesis about what the speaker 
explicitly says. Second, cases that Grice would explain by 
appealing to the idea that the speaker is only making-as-if-to-say 
brings about an inconsistency in his system, so that it is difficult to 
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logically guarantee the derivation of what the speaker actually 
meant. This has lead relevance theorists to supplant Grice’s notion 
of ‘what is said’ with their notion of ‘explicature.’  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Where am I now? In this chapter I have discussed some of the most 
controversial views within TCP, including RT’s, and shown their 
connection with the topic of metaphor. While RT can be considered 
as a particular version of TCP, both RT and TCP belong to the 
philosophical doctrine of contextualism. Their main assumption, 
which I have highlighted in the chapter, is that whichever 
contextual feature is crucial to the determination of the truth-value 
of an utterance, that feature is part of the content expressed by the 
utterance.51 I have also shown that such an assumption is implicit 
in Frege’s writings, to which Recanati, for instance, often appeals. 
Of course, given the acceptance of what I call the ‘Fregean 
Premise,’ the resulting notion of ‘what is said’ defended by TCP is 
incompatible with Grice’s and minimal semantics’, but also, we 
will see, with the notion of semantic content inherent in non-
indexical contextualism and relativism, which relativize truth to 
circumstances of evaluation and/or of assessment. According to 
these other accounts, not every aspect relevant to the assignment of 
a truth-value to an utterance is part of the content expressed by the 
utterance since we need to envisage circumstances of evaluation as 
well. I will explore these other views in the last chapter of the 
dissertation. Finally, what is the place metaphor has within the 
truth-conditional pragmatic accounts? Metaphor does not have a 
particularly interesting place in them since its linguistic and ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
51 Contextualism about knowledge ascriptions adopts the same kind stance (see 
DeRose 1996: 194).    
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communicative mechanisms are said to be on a continuum with 
other phenomena (metonymy, approximations, vague predicates, 
predicate of taste, and so on). Sure, there are differences within 
these accounts (Recanati appeals to modulation functions, RT 
privileges inferential processes), but they all agree on the ‘top-
down’ nature of those mechanisms.  
The advantages of TCP’s account of metaphor over the other 
theories I have explored so far are several: by broadening the 
application of semantics to phenomena that a Davidsonian account 
was shown to be unable to cover, TCP offers a comprehensive 
explanation of language understanding. By developing a pragmatic 
story of how the content of an utterance is contextually determined, 
TCP is immune to the problems affecting the Gricean model, which 
is entirely based on implicature. Similarly, by putting forward some 
hypotheses as to the construction of metaphorical interpretations, 
which are clearly psychological in nature, TCP avoids the 
idiosyncrasies of Searle’s account. Actually, a new field of 
investigation, lexical pragmatics, is being developed and its 
connection with TCP’s tenets are under investigation. It would 
seem therefore that the specific problems posed by metaphor are 
adequately covered by TCP. But how adequately, and how 
explanatory is its account?  In order for a theory of metaphor to be 
part of a theory of language understanding, some essential 
problems inherent in the latter theory must find appropriate 
answers. These problems concern (at least) the following points: 
 
(i) The nature of compositionality; 
(ii) The general cognitive architecture in which language 
understanding must be integrated; 
(iii) The nature of contextual factors determining the felicity 
conditions of an utterance. 
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In the next chapter I will argue that none of these problems find 
adequate solutions within those accounts subscribing to TCP. 
Therefore, its explanation of metaphor will be called into question. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Don’t Scratch  
Where it Doesn’t Itch:  
Some Objections to Truth-
conditional Pragmatics 
  
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
While in the previous chapter I made a case for truth-conditional 
pragmatics (TCP), and, also, for the relevance-theoretic account of 
metaphor, in this one I am going to argue against both TCP and 
such an account on several grounds. As I said at the end of that 
chapter, in order to have an account of metaphor that is both 
explanatorily satisfactory and descriptively adequate, we must first 
have a clear grasp of some important issues surrounding any theory 
of meaning. These issues concern, on the one hand, how meaning 
constrains the features of context that are important to the truth-
evaluation of an utterance, and, on the other, what best hypotheses 
we can formulate as to the way meaning is structured in both 
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language and thought. My opposition to contextualist models of 
meaning is mostly due to their lack of satisfactory solutions to 
these issues, which, in turn, can be explained by the extremely 
relaxed way in which contextual factors are allowed to determine 
the content of complex expressions. 
Having said that, my focus in this chapter will pivot around the 
following objections to TCP: 
 
• Overgeneration – TCP’s accounts massively overgenerate 
interpretations, so that it is difficult to make any principled 
prediction concerning what a speaker is communicating 
with an utterance. Actually, given the TCP’s maximal 
treatment of many expressions, there could be contextual 
adjustments of the propositional forms associated to 
sentences, such that the resulting truth-conditions would be 
absurd, illogical, or simply unmotivated.  
• Lexical Meaning – TCP does not make any principled 
distinction between expressions that can receive a 
metaphorical interpretation and those that cannot. Hence, 
TCP predicts that there are expressions that may be 
interpreted metaphorically when, clearly, they cannot 
receive a metaphorical interpretation. This is highly 
counter-intuitive and, thus, we should abandon TCP.  
• Compositionality – For some the idea that a semantic 
system be compositional is a non-negotiable feature, for 
others it is still unclear what this feature amounts to. Here I 
will be presenting some versions of the compositionality 
principle, and I will show that a system that totally 
disrespects or trivialises it is in a worse position than a 
system that allows for some version of the thesis in terms of 
both explanatory power and descriptive adequacy. 
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• Language of Thought – The hypothesis that thinking 
requires the presence of a language of thought (LOT) is a 
controversial but fascinating hypothesis. Here I won’t be 
attempting a particular defence of (LOTH). My aim is just 
to show that Carston’s appeal to Fodor’s hypothesis is 
unmotivated given the relevance theoretic hypothesis of ad 
hoc concepts (more generally, given TCP’s emphasis on 
top-down processes intruding semantic encoded 
information). Moreover, I will show that the ‘ad hoc 
concepts’ hypothesis contrasts with an early thesis of 
Sperber and Wilson, which I find more plausible. 
 
As far as metaphor is concerned, the problems just evinced extend 
to the contextualist explanation of metaphorical utterances. Stern 
(2006) has, for instance, argued that contextualism about metaphor 
overgenerates metaphorical interpretations. What does Stern 
exactly mean by this claim? The chapter will conclude with an 
analysis of this objection and, in particular, of the tests Stern uses 
in its support: 
 
• VP ellipsis and Anaphora – There are metaphorical 
utterances or mixed utterances containing VP-ellipsis or 
anaphora that result to be unacceptable to a more or less 
high extent (e.g., ‘Juliet is the sun and Achilles is, too’, 
‘Quine demolished Carnap’s argument, and so did John 
with Charlie’s house’). These tests are taken by Stern 
(2000, 2006) to support his semantic approach, while Camp 
(2006) disagrees with Stern and opts for a pragmatic 
explanation. My intention is to show why contextualists 
find problems to accommodate these data.  
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Before kicking off, I would like to consider a particular sort of 
strategy that opponents of contextualism have adopted. This is the 
stance of those who, like Predelli (2005), take the whole challenge 
of contextualism to semantics, as traditionally intended, to be 
misguided. In the next section not only do I address this strategy, 
but I also start considering certain semantic properties of 
indexicals, the knowledge of which will become useful later on. In 
the next chapter, I will assess Stern’s account of metaphor, which is 
based on some controversial analogies with indexicals. 
 
 
2. The Objection from Misunderstanding 
 
We saw in the previous chapter that TCP argues against TCS (= 
truth-conditional semantics) on the basis that two utterances of a 
non-indexical and non-ambiguous sentence can receive distinct 
truth-values on two separate occasions in virtue of their 
manifesting different truth-conditional profiles. Since, according to 
TCP, TCS encapsulates the view that to each non-indexical and 
non-ambiguous sentence one, and only one, set of truth-conditions 
is associated, 1  then given two distinct but sufficiently similar 
contexts, say C and C’, the same non-indexical and non-ambiguous 
sentence s should not have more than one set of truth-conditions. 
However, given the ‘intuitive’ possibility of distinct truth-
evaluations in these two contexts, we must conclude – so the 
defenders of TCP argue – that s is associated with disjointed sets of 
truth-conditions, after all.  
 
One way to bypass this argument is to defend the view that a 
non-indexical expression is associated with two or more distinct 
characters instead of one.  ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((*(#.(/0123(4516720895.(54(8:9;(<9/=(9;(9.(>/012/(?*@+AB(CC-DE(
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Character & Index in Kaplanian Semantics 
 
What is a character? Following the traditional semantic picture 
(Kaplan 1989, Predelli 2005), a character is nothing but the 
meaning of an expression, i.e., a rule that, given a context of 
utterance, picks out a content. For instance, the character of an 
indexical expression e appearing in an utterance u of a sentence s is 
the rule that delivers the appropriate parameter of the index i of u. 
An index2 is an n-tuple of parameters relative to which each 
expression of an utterance receives its appropriate referent. 
Usually, an index will look as follows: <iA, iL, iT, iw>, where iA is 
the agent of the index, iL is its location, iT its time, and iw its world.  
To illustrate with an example, the character of ‘here’ is the 
particular rule that, given a context of use, returns the referent of 
‘here’ for iL. More formally, the character of ‘here’ is a non-
constant function, i.e., a function that will deliver different contents 
in different contexts.3 Here’s, however, a problem. According to a 
naïve way of seeing the role of characters (see Predelli’s discussion 
of the ‘Simple-Minded View’ in Predelli 2005), the character of, 
for instance, ‘here’, is the rule that returns the appropriate location 
of the utterance’s index. In an uncontroversial case, such as an 
utterance of ‘I am here’, the character of ‘here’ returns the location 
in which the speaker is located. But what about an utterance of ‘I 
am not here’, as recorded by an answering machine? In this case 
the appropriate referent for ‘here’ is not the speaker’s location, but
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possibly the place where she intends the message to be heard. 
Hence, on pain of inconsistency, the character of ‘here’ cannot 
return the speaker’s location for iL in this case.4 Similar examples 
can be constructed for other indexicals (see Predelli 2005: chapter 
two and Romdenh-Romluc, K. 2007). 
In response to this problem, one option is to assign different 
characters to the lexical entry for ‘here’ (and similarly for the other 
indexicals); in this case, we would have a character that picks out 
the location in which the speaker is and another character that picks 
out the location of the decoding.5 Of course, now the expression 
‘here’ turns out to be ambiguous between at least two readings. The 
main problem with such a view is that it envisages a radical change 
of meaning in expressions like ‘here’, by postulating a massive 
ambiguity of readings in its entry (See Predelli 2005: 49, 57). 
However, is it really plausible to say that the mastery of an 
indexical expression is fragmented into the mastery of many 
unrelated characters for that expression? 
 
The idea presented in the box may apply to non-indexical 
expressions, too. For instance, take the well-known case, originally 
introduced by Travis, of the leaves of Pia’s tree. The story tells that 
the leaves of Pia’s tree are russet, but Pia decides to paint them 
green. Thus, in a scenario in which a botanist asks for the natural 
colour of the leaves, an utterance of ‘The leaves are green’ is false, 
while in a scenario in which Pia’s friend Charlie, a photographer, 
asks to take a picture of a tree with green leaves, an utterance of the 
same sentence is true. Recently, Kennedy and McNally (2010) 
have proposed a semantic analysis in which colour adjectives like ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((V(#;( $1/I/229( G59.8;( 578N( 8:9;( T9.I( 54( /L06G2/;( 01/( J2/0123( 9.( 8/.;95.( =98:(F0G20.M;(9.;9;8/.J/(54(=51T9.P(=98:(=:08(:/(J022;(KG15G/1(J5.8/L8;MN(J5.8/L8;(?9E/EN( 9.I/L/;D(=:5;/( G0106/8/1;( 02=03;( J59.J9I/(=98:( 8:/( 0P/.8N( 25J0895.N(896/N(=512I(9.(=:9J:(8:/(788/10.J/(7.I/1(/<0270895.(80T/;(G20J/;E()($1/I/229(?CAA)B(V,D(0G823(J022;(8:9;(<9/=(K8:/(Q0.3(!:010J8/1;(W9/=ME(
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green are taken to be ambiguous between different readings; in 
particular, they are ambiguous between a reading in which the 
colour is taken to be gradable and one in which it is not.  
Although Kennedy and McNally do not work within a 
Kaplanian framework, it would be a rather straightforward move, I 
think, to assign Kaplanian characters to each of the new lexical 
items that, under their analysis, belong to the same word-type. 
Would then knowledge of each character guarantee the correct 
applicability of the term in the context in hand, and therefore the 
obtaining of the right truth-evaluation of an utterance containing it? 
Not really. In their account, correlation properties are also required 
to determine the non-gradable reading of the colour term. As far as 
Pia’s case is concerned, suppose we want to determine the 
extension of ‘green’ in the context concerning the botanist’s 
interests. In that case, we are interested in whether the leaves can 
be correctly classified as green. To that end, we must consider 
whether the property denoted by the term is correlated with some 
other property that makes ‘greeness’ somehow available to the 
interpretation. If there is such property, then we are able to 
determine the extension of the colour term:  
 
(1)  !greennongr"= !x.P (x) ! cor(P , green)6  
 
((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((,(R.( 8:/( P10I0H2/( J0;/N( ( =/( 01/( 9.8/1/;8/I( /98:/1( 9.( 8:/( X70.8983( 54( J52571(?/EPEN( 8:/( /L8/.8( 85( =:9J:( 8:/( 5HY/J8( 9;( J5</1/I(=98:( 8:08( J52571D( 51( 9.( 98;(X702983(?/EPEN(H19P:8./;;DE(R4(8:/(6/0;71/(9;(2/;;(8:0.(0(J/1809.(;80.I01I(49L/I(J5.8/L870223N(8:/.(=/(=572I(.58(J57.8(8:/(788/10.J/(0;(817/E(>5(=/(.//I(85(T.5=(8:/(<027/(54(8:9;(X70.8983E(%:/(1/;7289.P(I/.580895.;(01/B((0E( ((((!P1//.X70.8"(Z([LEX70.8?P1//.D?LD((HE( !P1//.X702"Z([LEX702?P1//.D?LD((%:9;(0JJ57.8( 9;(651/(J5.;8109./I(8:0.('58:;J:92IM;(0.I(>/P02M;( 9.I/L9J029;8(0JJ57.8N( 9.(=:9J:( 0( J52571( 8/16M;(6/0.9.P( 9;( 0.( 9.I/L/I( G15G/183E( R.( 8:9;(0JJ57.8N(.5(J5.;8109.8(=:08;5/</1(9;(96G5;/I(5.(8:/(G5;;9H2/(/L8/.;95.(54(0(J52571(8/16(?>//(F/../I3(0.I(QJ\0223(CA*AB()],DE(
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What to say about this option? As for the similar treatment of 
indexical expressions, we must consider the costs of postulating 
different characters for non-indexical expressions. Besides, we 
must also offer some story as to the exact nature of these 
characters. If context is required to provide correlation properties, 
which allow for the correct assignment of truth-values to 
utterances, how constrained is this approach respect to, e.g., the 
indexicalist one? In any case, I find this approach interesting, 
especially for the role it gives to correlation properties in fixing an 
interpretation, which, I think, could also be investigated in the case 
of metaphors (See next chapter). On the other hand, if we adopt a 
‘moderate’ contextualist account of, e.g., colour terms, and say that 
a comparison class is provided contextually, so as to determine the 
property of a colour term,7  such a provision turns out to be 
practically unconstrained. It seems then that as far as the first 
option is concerned, meaning becomes highly complex, involving 
several characters for each word-type, while, as to the second 
option, meaning is simply too relaxed to allow us to make any clear 
prediction. Moreover, this situation bears a similarity with the case 
of metaphors. In the next chapter, I will present both Stern’s 
proposal and Leezenberg’s, which rely on both the ‘indexical’ and 
the ‘ambiguity’ views, in that they claim that for each expression, 
there are two distinct characters, one literal and another 
metaphorical. The latter, in virtue of being non-constant, delivers 
different contents in different contexts. My discussion there will 
show that it is not necessary to appeal to this heavy semantic 
machinery to account for the ‘context-sensitivity’ of metaphors. 
Be that as it may, this discourse leads me to formulate the 
following objection to TCP, which is in line with Predelli (2005): 
under all the analyses I have mentioned in the previous paragraphs, ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
7 Szabo ! (2001). 
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it is a commonplace that most, if not all, sentences containing non-
indexical expressions will be evaluated differently relative to 
different contexts (leaving this notion of ‘context’ vague here). 
Indexicalist accounts, ambiguist accounts, and even minimalist 
accounts à la Cappelen and Lepore agree that an utterance of a 
sentence containing, say, a colour adjective may communicate very 
different things, that is, express different properties in different 
contexts. What differs in these accounts is the way contextual 
features are taken to enter in the determination of content. A 
properly indexicalist account will assign unstable characters to 
indexical and non-indexical expressions in order to deal with 
improper indexes, while an ambiguist view will probably assign a 
limited number of stable characters to each non-indexical 
expression but countenance only proper indexes. On the other 
hand, minimalism will assign only one character to each 
expression, and account for the ‘strange’ cases by appealing to 
some pragmatic story (this is, in fact, the spirit of Cappelen’s and 
Lepore’s speech-act pluralism in Cappelen and Lepore 2005). 
Finally, TCP takes the character of a non-indexical expression to be 
an identity function, which takes an expression as argument and 
always returns the expression itself as value. Under TCP, an 
expression’s contribution to an utterance’s truth-conditions can 
only be determined by pragmatic processes of the kind discussed in 
the previous chapter.8 ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((+(>71/( /</.( 8:/( 10I9J02( J5.8/L87029;8( =572I( 0P1//( 8:08( 0( =51I( 29T/( KH27/M(J0..58( H/( 80T/.( 85( 6/0.( K1/IM( ?028:57P:N( 25P9J0223( ;G/0T9.PN( :/1( 0JJ57.8(96G29J08/;( 8:08( 7.I/1( J/1809.( 0IY7;86/.8;N( KH27/M( J572I( 5JJ0;95.0223( 6/0.(K1/IMDE( %:7;N( =:08( P7010.8//;( 8:08( ;7J:( 8=9;8;( I5( .58( ;3;8/6089J0223( 80T/(G20J/^(#(:3G58:/;9;( 45167208/I(H3(1/2/<0.J/( 8:/519;8;( ?_19PP9(0.I(>G/1H/1(*@@+`( >G/1H/1( 0.I( a92;5.( *@@+`( !01;85.( CAA)B( J:0GE( WD( 9;( 8:08( =51I;(47.J895.( 0;( KG59.8/1;MN( <9bEN( 0;( ;J:/60;( G59.89.P( 85( I944/1/.8( G59.8;( 9.( 8:/(;/60.89J( ?<9bE( 2/L9J02D( ;G0J/E(a:08( 9;( 9..08/( 0.I(7.9</1;02( 9;( 8:/(=03( ;7J:(G59.8/1;(01/(;817J871/I(9.(571(J5P.989</(294/E(a:08(9;(J5.89.P/.8(9;(:5=(8:/3(01/( I91/J8/I( 85=01I;( 8:/( ;/60.89J( ;G0J/( H3( H58:( 8:/( :760.( ;G/J9/;( 08( 0(J/1809.(;80P/(54(98;(/<527895.013(:9;8513(0.I(H3(/0J:(9.I9<9I702(:760.(H/9.P(08( 0( J/1809.( G:0;/( 54( :/1( G/1;5.02( :9;8513N( I/G/.I9.P( 5.( :5=( 1/02983( 9;(G1/;/.8/I( 85( :/1( 0.I( 02;5( 5.( 8:/( J5.</.895.;( ;:01/I( H3( 8:/( 20.P70P/(
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 Character for a non-indexical 
expression 
Indexicalism 
Ambiguity theories 
Minimalism 
Contextualism 
 
One unstable (i.e., nonconstant) 
character 
More than one stable character  
One stable character 
Identity function 
Table indicating four different views concerning the character of a non-
indexical expression. 
 
Thus, except perhaps for minimalism, all these accounts share with 
radical contextualism (viz. TCP) the view that one and the same 
non-indexical sentence s, as uttered on different occasions, may be 
assigned distinct truth-values in virtue of the difference in the 
contents expressed by each new utterance of s. Said otherwise, all 
these accounts (with, again, the exception of minimalism) assume 
that s may be paired with more than one set of truth-conditions. 
This, in turn, would explain why the sentence can receive distinct 
truth-evaluations across the board.  
Given this picture, it seems strange that radical contextualists 
accuse all these semantic accounts to subscribe to a more 
substantial assumption, namely that the meaning of a sentence 
encapsulates its truth-conditions. Under the indexicalist analysis, 
for instance, a sentence s expresses truth-conditions only relative to (((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((;G/0T/1;(54(:/1(J5667.983E(#JJ51I9.P(85(8:/(J5I/(65I/2N(8=5(9.8/125J7851;(=922( H/( 7.0H2/( 85( 9.8/1G1/8( /0J:( 58:/1( =:/./</1( 8:/1/( 9;( 0( 69;608J:( 54(J5I/;(7;/I(H3( 8:/6N( 9E/EN(=:/./</1( 8:/( J5I/;(7;/I( 2/0I( 85( 8:/( ;/2/J895.(54(I944/1/.8( G59.8;( 9.( 8:/( ;/60.89J( ;G0J/E( #JJ51I9.P( 85( 8:/( 9.4/1/.8902(65I/2(G15G5;/I(H3(1/2/<0.J/(8:/519;8;N(.58:9.P(G1/</.8;(8=5(KI944/1/.823(;98708/IM(G59.8/1;(4156(H/9.P(I91/J8/I(08(8:/(;06/(G59.8(?9E/EN(6/0.9.PDE(%:/(J:59J/(54(0( G0189J7201( G59.8/1( 5</1( 0.58:/1( I/19</;( 4156( 98;( H/9.P( 651/( 0G8( 85(I9;J:01P/( 98;( G15G/1( 47.J895.N( 8:08( 54( P9<9.P( /<9I/.J/( 8:08( 8:/( 9.45160895.(8:/( ;G/0T/1( 9.8/.I;( 85( J5667.9J08/( 9;( H/;8( /<5T/I( H3( 7;9.P( 8:08( G59.8/1(?0.I( .58( 8:/( 58:/1DE( #28:57P:( 8:9;( 9;( 0.( 9.8/1/;89.P( ;8513N( 98( ;8922( I5/;( .58(0<59I( 8:/( 25P9J02( G5;;9H92983( 54( 10I9J02( 8=9;8;( 54( 6/0.9.PE( R( 10I9J029;/( 8:9;(5HY/J895.(=98:(63(/L06G2/;(H/25=E(
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a context; under the ambiguist analysis, s is associated with a 
precise set of truth conditions {p1, …, pn} such that, given a 
particular context, say C, one particular truth-condition, say pi, is 
selected to represent how things are in C. Still the ambiguist may 
subscribe to the claim that for each sentence, there is more than one 
truth-condition. The radical contextualist only takes the further step 
of claiming that such a picutre entails the (metaphysical) view that 
meaning radically underdetermines truth-conditions.9 Given that 
semantic accounts that are either indexicalist or ambiguist agree 
with the contextualist on this issue,10 where does the contextualist 
challenge really reside?  
Moreover, all these accounts clearly adopt what in the previous 
chapter I called ‘The Fregean Premise’. Whenever a contextual 
feature is relevant to determine the appropriate truth-conditions of 
an utterance, that feature is part of what the utterance has 
expressed, i.e., of its ‘meaning’. This is the case for moderate 
contextualist theories of vague or colour terms, which require that 
context provides comparison classes, but also for the ambiguist 
positions of the kind proposed by McNally and Kennedy, which 
require the contextual provision of correlation-properties for one of 
their favoured readings. Under these views, there is a level of 
semantic representation that can be properly identified with the 
truth-conditional content of an utterance: 
 
(1) Meaning* = Truth-conditional content 
 
((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((@(>819J823(;G/0T9.PN(8:/(<9/=(9;(402;/(P9</.(8:08N(/EPEN(608:/6089J02(;/.8/.J/;(I5( .58( J/1809.23( 4092( 85( I/8/169./( 8178:]J5.I9895.;( 9.( 8:/( =03( 8:/(c.I/1I/8/169.0J3(8:/;9;(;:572I(1/X791/(9.(51I/1(451(98(85(H/(J5.;9I/1/I(0;(0(20=]29T/(P/./1029;0895.E(*A (!2/0123( 8:/3( I5( .58( /;G57;/( 8:/( 6/80G:3;9J02( 420<571( 54( 8:/(7.I/1I/8/169.0J3(8:/;9;N(H78( 8:/(G59.8( 9;( 8:08( 8:/3(0JJ/G8( 8:/(J:022/.P/(54(8:/(J5.8/L87029;8;E(
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This second sense of meaning, which I have indicated as 
Meaning*, captures all those contextual elements that are relevant 
to the assignment of a truth-value to an utterance. As such, it ought 
not to be confused with the notion of meaning as character, which 
is context-independent (but still context-sensitive).11 
However, this way of talking of meanings blurs some essential 
distinctions. Following Perry (1997), we must take (1) cum grano 
salis if it is based on the disputable assumption that the meaning of 
a sentence encodes or expresses its truth-conditions or truth-
conditional content.12  The level which is appropriately connected 
to truth-conditions is content, in the technical sense given by 
Kaplan (1989) of a function from circumstances of evaluation to 
extensions. Since a circumstance of evaluation is initialised by 
some context of utterance, context always plays a determinative 
role.  Since an extension is determined only at a circumstance, 
context also plays an evaluative role (MacFarlane 2009). On the 
other hand, meaning is a property of expression types, which is 
fixed by the conventions of the language and does not require the 
knowledge of any particular context. On the necessity of keeping 
these two levels firmly separate I will base my own theory of 
metaphor in the next chapter. 
Keeping this distinction in mind, the kind of semantics I mostly 
favour does not have problems to admit that a sentence usually 
manifests different truth-conditions, depending on the context of 
utterance at hand. As a matter of fact, semanticists working within 
the Kaplanian framework actually agree with this view (see 
Predelli 2005a, 2005b; MacFarlane 2007, 2009). More accurately, 
they insist on the following point: a sentence can be assigned ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((**(O/8M;(;03(8:08(0.(/LG1/;;95.(9;(!"#$%&$'(#)%*%#)%#$(94(98;(6/0.9.P(I5/;(.58(I/G/.I( 5.( 0.3( 4/0871/( 54( 8:/( J5.8/L8E( R8( 9;( !"#$%&$'+%#+($(,%( 94( 98;( ;/60.89J(152/(9.8/10J8;(=98:(4/0871/;(54(8:/(J5.8/L8E(*C(>//(02;5(>85Y0.5<9J(?CAA-B(@-D( 451(0(I9;J7;;95.(54($/113M;(G59.8N(=:9J:( 9;(/6G:0;9b/I(H3(8:/(4718:/1(J5.;9I/10895.(8:08(98(9;(69;2/0I9.P(85(;03(8:08(0.(788/10.J/(/LG1/;;/;(Y7;8(5./(J5.8/.8E(
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different truth-conditions since it may be evaluated at different 
circumstances, where a circumstance is traditionally taken to be a 
pair consisting of a world and a time. But once a circumstance of 
evaluation is fixed, no underdeterminacy follows: the semantic 
system will tolerate one and only one truth-value assignement.13 
Thus, one could argue that the whole challenge of the 
contextualists to the semanticists is based on a calculated 
misunderstanding: the idea, perhaps inherent in the Davidsonian 
programme but not in the Kaplanian one, that a sentence encodes 
its truth-conditions. Once this idea is deprived of its force, the 
contextualist challenges becomes something slightly different:  
 
Contextualist: Now that you have showed me that we must 
separate two levels of representation, meaning and content, 
you semanticist still have to tell me what the exact 
relationship between these two levels is. Besides, you seem to 
agree with me that context enters predominantly into the 
determination of content (the level we contextualists are 
really interested in), whether you’re an indexicalist, an 
ambiguist or even a minimalist. 
 
Semanticist: I take your challenge, my dear friend 
contextualist. I will show you what the relationship between 
meaning and content really amounts to. But before doing that 
(you will have to wait for the next chapter, I’m afraid), I need 
to clear the way for a correct understanding of the issue. 
 
Also, don’t think I’m pedantic, but I must warn you from 
considering me as an indexicalist, an ambiguist or even a 
minimalist. I’m none of these philosophers. If you have ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((*U(%:/( J:022/.P/( =572I( 8:/.( H/( 85( ;:5=( 0( ;J/.0195( 9.( =:9J:( 8:/( ;06/(J91J76;80.J/(=/1/(49L/I(9.(H58:(J5.8/L8;N(H78(8=5(I9;89.J8(8178:]/<0270895.;(=/1/(0;;9P./I(85(8:/(8=5(788/10.J/;(54(8:/(;06/(;/.8/.J/E(
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patience enough I will tell you what exactly my school is, my 
dear friend.  
 
 
3. The Objection from Overgeneration 
 
In this section I shall discuss a worry against TCP, which concerns 
the highly unconstrained nature of their pragmatic processes 
affecting what is said by an utterance. In particular, Cappelen and 
Lepore (2007a) and Saul (2002a: esp. 357-358) attack the 
relevance theoretic notion of explicature. Such a notion, as we saw 
in the previous chapter, is based on the idea of ‘resemblance’. In 
other words, an explicature is said to resemble the thought(s) the 
speaker intends to communicate, but will hardly be identical to it 
(them). However, this notion of ‘resemblance’ seems to carry the 
unwelcome consequence that any interpretation of a speaker’s 
thought may be acceptable under certain conceptual adjustments. 
But similarity (resemblance) is not transitive: if I say what you’ve 
said, and what you’ve said is what another person said, then what 
this person said is identical to what I say. But, if I say something 
only similar to what you’ve said, and what you’ve said is 
something only similar to what she said, then it does not follow that 
if I utter X, meaning something similar to what you’ve said, I say 
something similar to what she said by uttering X (See Cappelen 
and Lepore 2007a). Generalise this argument, and you get the 
bizarre view that we would never get to understand each other! We 
could only guess what we say. In what follows, I present a case 
which illustrates this line of criticism. The link with metaphor 
should then be obvious: if there are some independent reasons to 
avoid modulation/ad hoc concepts construction since these are 
likely to generate wrong truth-conditions, then we should look with 
suspicion at the same kind of operations in the case of metaphor. 
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The Jessica Alba Case 
 
In the middle of a press conference, the famous actress Jessica 
Alba has been reported to have attacked the journalists in this way:  
 
(2)  She tried to turn the tables on reporters by asking them 
what they liked best about Obama. When she didn’t get an 
answer, Alba joked, “That’s right, be neutral. Be Sweden.”  
(http://popwatch.ew.com/popwatch/2009/01/jessica-alba-
an.html) 
 
According to RT’s comprehension heuristic, hearers of Alba’s 
utterances start to form hypotheses about their meaning during the 
act itself of Alba’s uttering the two sentences. They will be 
processing the word ‘neutral’, and will probably activate an 
assumption which associates the concept NEUTRAL to the 
encyclopaedic information relevant to the context of utterance. In 
this case they will recover the concept SWITZERLAND from their 
memory (Switzerland is, in fact, the prototype of a neutral country). 
This process of mutual adjustments is very fast indeed, so fast that 
– at least if we take the consequences of RT’s procedure literally – 
the explicit content of Alba’s second utterance would be accessible 
even before Alba utters the sentence ‘Be Sweden!’. On this 
hypothesis, hearers will be just attending a confirmation of the 
assumption which is most relevant to them. But instead of uttering 
what she was expected to utter, Alba uttered ‘Sweden’. Suppose 
now a defender of RT participated in the conference as a journalist 
in disguise. Then as defender of RT she could not accuse Jessica of 
misusing her word, since what she explicitly expressed was in fact 
‘Switzerland,’ not ‘Sweden’! However, in this way we give up a 
crucial distinction between ‘what the speaker actually said’ and 
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‘what she tried but failed to say’. This distinction was of course an 
integral part of Grice’s original ideas regarding his theory of 
conversation.14  
The story went on, and it turned out that Jessica Alba was right, 
after all. In effect, Sweden has always been a neutral state. 
However, suppose our relevance theorist still tried to correct the 
journalist who took the part against Alba, and said that the concept 
SWEDEN expressed by Alba’s utterance sufficiently resembles 
that of SWITZERLAND, which was the most relevant in that 
context, since the two concepts share encyclopaedic (both are 
examples of neutrality) and definitional features (both are 
countries). Alba’s utterance, then, justified by the RT’s heuristics, 
was felicitous after all. But this seems to be a desperate move for 
the relevance theorist, who is unable to see how the felicitous 
conditions of an utterance do not coincide with our expectations of 
relevance.  
This example is interesting, I believe, because it shows that 
TCP, including RT, has given up a crucial distinction: Austin’s 
distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts, which 
instead Grice’s picture incorporates better. On the Gricean picture, 
in order to determine what illocutionary act is made by a speaker, 
an interpreter has to determine the underlying locutionary act  
(Grice’s what-is-said). By ignoring such a distinction, RT conflates 
what it would definitely be better to keep separate: “what goes on 
in a cognitive process with what information is available to that 
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to conflate very different notions such as ‘saying’ in a locutionary 
sense and ‘asserting’ in an illocutionary one (on this see esp. Camp 
2006, 2007; also Soames 2008). The loss of the original Gricean 
spirit has another important consequence, directly connected to the 
previous point, which Bach (2006: 6) has thus pointed out: 
“Besides, this criticism does not address the conception of what is 
said as the concept of a locutionary act, which is performed by the 
speaker, not the hearer”. 
 This last observation seems to point, finally, to another problem 
for RT, namely, having ruled out Grice’s Principle of Co-operation 
too quickly. In this way, RT’s supporters are also precluding 
themselves from understanding how the example might have taken 
another rational direction: the journalist, instead of correcting Alba, 
could have easily played along with her ‘way of speaking’, in 
which the word was accepted with its non-standard connotations, 
without thereby destroying the speech’s point.  
 
 
4. The Objection from Lexicality 
 
A more specific worry against TCP concerns its merging, within 
the single category of modulated items, of expressions that can 
receive a metaphorical interpretation with expressions that clearly 
cannot. However, if everything can be modulated, why cannot 
words like ‘everybody’, ‘anyone’, ‘most’ be used as metaphors?  
Why, as Glanzberg (2008) points out, in any rich metaphorical 
discourse do these expressions, which linguists call determiners, 
still retain their literal meaning? Consider these two Shakespearean 
passages: 
 
(3) ‘Ant.:   Shee Eros has 
Packt cards with Caesars, and false plaid my Glory 
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Unto an Enemies Triumph.’ 
 
Shakespeare (Antony and Cleopatra, IV, xiv, 18ff, quot. in White 
1996: 25) 
 
 
(4)  ‘Kent:  Vex not his ghost. O let him passe! He hates him,  
That would upon the wracke of this tough world 
Stretch him out longer.’ 
 
Shakespeare (King Lear, V, iii, 313ff, quot. in White 1996: 26) 
 
Here I won’t be attempting to offer an interpretation of these 
metaphors, since the reader may find the interpretive observations 
made by White (1996), from whom these quotations are taken, 
more interesting. What is important to observe is that the 
determiners appearing in (3) and (4), e.g., ‘my’ and ‘the’, as well as 
the complementizer ‘that’ and the connectives ‘not’ and ‘and’ are 
all used literally, and cannot be interpreted otherwise.16  
Glanzberg uses this kind of evidence to distinguish between 
lexical categories and functional ones, by imposing a constraint on 
what can be metaphorised. In other words, only lexical categories 
(basically, nouns, verbs, adjectives, maybe prepositions), which 
have a ‘thick’ semantics, can be interpreted metaphorically. In 
contrast, functional categories (e.g., determiners, complementizers 
like ‘that’ and ‘which’, connectives like conjunction and negation) 
show only a ‘thin’ semantics’, and therefore cannot receive a 
metaphorical interpretation.  
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To illustrate this point, consider the syntactic derivation of this 
sentence, which can obviously lead to a metaphorical 
interpretation, whatever this interpretation may be. 
 
(5)  Every lawyer is a shark. 
 
S 
 
 
      NP                            VP 
          
                       D               N            V                 NP 
                                                     
        D                  N 
every       lawyer  is          a              shark 
 
A syntactic structure (i.e., tree) like this poses non-trivial 
constraints on the interpretation of any utterance of (5). We will see 
in the next section that this sort of structure respects the demands 
of compositionality for the language system, and allows us to make 
important generalisations as to the linguistic knowledge (i.e., 
competence for Chomsky17) of speakers.  
Also, the squared words at the final nodes of the tree are those 
that can be interpreted metaphorically.18 In the particular case, it is 
‘shark’ that actually receives a metaphorical interpretation, but we 
could alter the example so that both NPs in the subject and 
accusative positions would be interpreted metaphorically. I should 
also say that I am rather unsympathetic toward Glanzberg’s 
assumption that metaphor requires a very different conceptual 
system that operates on the language system. In defence of this ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((*-(>//(!:56;T3(?*@,)DE(*+(R( 06( 2/;;( ;71/( 0H578( 8:/( J5G720N(=:9J:N( 028:57P:( 98( I5/;(.58( ;//6( 85(H/(9.8/1G1/80H2/(6/80G:519J0223N(J0.(1/J/9</(.5.];80.I01I(9.8/1G1/80895.;E(
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view, he merely quotes a passage from Lakoff’s writings in which 
Lakoff states his conceptualist account of metaphor, without 
offering any argument in its defence. However, I am not interested 
here in what Glanzberg thinks about metaphor,19 but only on the 
kind of evidence he uses. 
Such evidence, it seems to me, can be used to offer an argument 
against TCP. The argument proceeds as follows: 
 
i. Metaphor is an instance of modulation. 
ii. Functional words like ‘everybody’, ‘most’, etc. can be 
modulated. 
iii. Therefore, functional words can be interpreted 
metaphorically. 
 
To show that premise (ii) is true, just consider these cases: 
 
(6)  Most were present.  
(7)  Everybody was silent. 
 
Applying the usual pragmatic machinery, (6) and (7) are 
interpreted in such a way that modulation functions determine new 
meanings for ‘most’ and ‘everybody’: 
 
(6*)  Most-ministers were present. 
(7*)  Every-member-of-the-committee was silent. 
 
In Recanati’s jargon, the meanings of ‘most’ and ‘everybody’, say 
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functions, e.g., F! and F!!  to the arguments µ1 and µ2 will get new 
interpretations for µ1 and µ2, say, µ!!  and µ!! (i.e., [6*] and [7*]). 
However, adding (ii) to (i) implicates that even functional words 
can be metaphorically interpreted. Nothing prevents a semantic 
system like that envisaged by radical contextualists to allow 
pragmatic functions to apply to functional expressions.20 In fact, 
Recanati (2010: 42) says: 
 
Metaphorical and metonymical interpretations result from the 
operation of such pragmatic functions, and the argument to the 
function may be the meaning of any expression, whether or not it is 
‘context-sensitive’ in the standard sense in which indexicals and 
semantically underspecified expressions are. (Recanati’s stress) 
 
Insofar as there is no constraint whatsoever on the types of literal 
meanings that can be interpreted metaphorically, TCP is unable to 
tell what exactly makes an expression metaphorical. Notice that the 
point I am making is not that radical contextualists actually 
consider it possible for a determiner to be metaphorical, only that 
there is nothing in their account of meaning that prevents this. In 
the next section I provide another reason of why the radical 
contextualists face this situation. 
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5. The Objection from Compositionality  
 
The way TCP ignores important distinctions at the level of lexical 
semantics mirrors its lack of attention to other levels of semantic 
representation. In this section I shall discuss TCP’s limits in 
dealing with a very important semantic property of a natural 
language like English: its being compositional.21  
What does it exactly mean to say that the language is 
compositional? In particular, how shall we interpret the classical 
formulation of compositionality as the principle saying that the 
meaning of an expression is determined by the meanings of its 
constituent parts, their way of combining and nothing else?22 
In this section, I will briefly review some of the ways in which 
the principle of compositionality may be interpreted. Then I will 
highlight the interpretation of the principle which radical 
contextualists, and in particular Recanati, have appealed to, and 
show how it is purely ad hoc, and hence unable to allow for any 
serious empirical generalisation. Finally, I will conclude the section 
by making some observations as to the way we should look at the 
whole issue of compositionality. 
To begin with, it is true that the principle of compositionality is 
open to several interpretations, some of which are more cogent than 
others. As Szabó (2012) points out, the principle of 
compositionality is ambiguous between different readings, 
depending on how we interpret the meaning of some of the words 
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that usually appear in the standard formulation of the principle. The 
standard formulation says: 
 
COMPOSITIONALITYstandard. The meaning of a complex 
expression is a function of the meanings of its constituents 
and of the way they are combined. 
 
However, COMPOSITIONALITYstandard is silent not only as to the 
way ‘function’ ought to be interpreted, but also as to the meanings 
of ‘the meanings of its constituents’ and of ‘they’, which appear in 
its formulation. First of all, ‘is a function of’ may have the meaning 
of ‘is determined by’ or the more technical one, according to which 
there is a function to the meaning of the complex expression from 
the meanings of its constituents and the way they are combined.  
 
COMPfunctional There is a function to the meaning of a 
complex expression from the meanings of its constituents and 
the way they are combined. 
 
COMPdeterminative The meaning of a complex expression is 
determined by the meanings of its constituents and of the way 
they are combined. 
 
As Szabó (2012: 68) claims, the reading in which ‘is a function of’ 
is taken to mean ‘is determined by’ is too weak to capture the idea 
of linguistic change. In fact, the meaning of a complex expression 
could change, although its constituent parts would still determine it. 
More reasonably, linguistic change of a complex expression should 
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Secondly, the meaning of ‘the meanings of its constituents’ can 
be interpreted individually or collectively: 25 
 
COMPindividual The meaning of a complex expression is a 
function of the meanings its constituents have individually 
and of the way they are combined. 
 
COMPcollective The meaning of a complex expression is a 
function of the meanings its constituents have collectively 
and of the way they are combined. 
 
Here Szabó seems to prefer the collective reading for the following 
reason: if we adopt the individual reading then it is difficult to 
account for cases of co-referential proper names like ‘Cicero’ and 
‘Tullio’. Taken in the individual sense, COMP would force us to 
say that the sentences ‘Cicero is Cicero’ and ‘Cicero is Tullio’ 
differ in meaning. The solution for Szabó is to allow for the 
collective reading of COMP, and to add to it a notion of ‘index’ so 
that two new representations are now given, i.e., ‘Cicero1 is 
Cicero1’ and ‘Cicero1 is Tullio2’. Sameness of index encodes 
semantically encoded coreference, and absence of coreference 
explains the difference in meaning.  
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I must confess that I am somewhat reluctant to accept this 
solution for a reason having to do with the hypothesis of a language 
of thought (LOTH), which I will discuss in the next section. To 
anticipate, the LOTH claims that thoughts are wholly determinate 
representational structures, individuated from the individual 
concepts that compose them. Now, this claim entails the view that 
there cannot be individual concepts that bear the same 
representation, for otherwise we would have to say that a thought is 
not wholly determined on the basis of the individual concepts 
constituting them. In fact, the same thought could be also obtained 
from other individual concepts. In other words, introducing the idea 
of indexing seems to open the LOT to an indeterminacy that 
contravenes its very idea. In contrast, the LOT seems to require that 
COMP be taken with an individual reading, not a collective one.26 
Finally, there is the ambiguity inherent in the expression ‘they’, 
as it appears in the formulation of COMPOSITIONALITYstandard. 
Does ‘they’ refer to the meanings of the constituent parts or simply 
to the constituent parts?  
 
COMPconstituents The meaning of a complex expression is a 
function of the meanings of its constituents and of the way 
those constituents are combined. 
 
COMPmeanings The meaning of a complex expression is a 
function of the meanings of its constituents and of the way 
those meanings are combined. 
 
As with the previous formulation, Szabó points out that one option 
is more restrictive than the other. The first option is rather 
restrictive in that, for instance, a quantified expression like ‘every ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((C,(%:9;(G59.8(/;J:/=;(96G5180.8(/LJ/G895.;(;7J:(0;(9I956;(?/EPEN( K"/(T9JT/I(8:/(H7JT/8M(Z( K"/(I9/IMDN(=:5;/(6/0.9.P(;//6;(85(H/(P9</.(J522/J89</23(0.I(.58(9.I9<9I70223E(
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man’ could not be subjected to domain restriction on pain of 
violating the principle of compositionality. In contrast, the second 
option is rather permissive in that it could allow bizarre semantic 
rules. For example, to stick to the quantifier case, Szabó asks to 
consider a rule that would intimate us to flip a coin and to restrict 
the domain of the quantifier to the set of blue things if the coin 
lands on tails. Obviously, if a semantic system has such 
compositional rules, then it is difficult to have a grasp of what 
compositionality is supposed to be. 
As with COMPindividually, I am more favourable to the restrictive 
reading of COMPconstituents. My preference is due to my reliance on 
a purely disquotational account of meaning, according to which the 
meaning of, for instance, 
 
(8)   Birds fly,  
 
is simply given by the operation of composing its individual 
concepts.  
 
(8*)  BIRDS ! FLY 
 
Such a theory takes individual concepts to be primitive, and 
explains the meaning of a complex expression by simply appealing 
to the way those primitives compose.  The theory remains silent as 
to what the ultimate meanings of, e.g., ‘birds’ and ‘fly’ consist in. 
Also, in virtue of there being a homomorphism between an 
appropriate syntactic structure for (8) and its semantic 
representation (i.e. (8*)), the theory explains why a complex 
expression has the meaning it has.27 In the lack of a constraint of ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((C-(f/;9I/;N(98(;//6;(85(6/(98(0<59I;(8:/(.5L957;(G15H2/6(54(;7H;898789<983(54(J5]1/4/1/.8902( 8/16;(7.I/1( 9.8/.;95.02(</1H;N( 9E/EN( </1H;( 29T/( K85(H/29/</NM( K85(:5G/NM( 85( I/;91/NM( /8JE( ( #8( 2/0;8( 0;( 401( 0;( 8:/( O_%( 9;( J5.J/1./I( 8:/( 8=5(;/.8/.J/;(Kh96(H/29/</;(!9J/15(9;(:0GG3M(0.I(Kh96(H/29/</;(%72295(9;(:0GG3M(I5(
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this sort, the following situation described by Horwich (1997: 513) 
can easily obtain:  
 
The intuition that any expression “e” can be given any meaning F–
that is, that it can be given the same meaning as any other 
expression “f”–is based on the correct idea that one can always 
decide to give “e” a use whereby it is interchangeable with ‘f’, by 
accepting the rules of inference  
 
…e…              …f… 
                                                           "   …f…        "   …e… 
 
And we can acknowledge that this sort of practice does indeed 
characterize a legitimate, actually deployed conception of 
“sameness of meaning”. But notice that such a practice cannot 
explain how a complex expression comes to acquire its normal 
meaning. Nor can it accommodate the notion of meaning that is 
relevant to translation. 
 
This passage seems to properly characterise what the contextualist 
point of view on the issue is. Certainly, there are contexts where 
two different expressions may be given the same meaning in virtue 
of there being inferences of the kind Horwich mentions. But by 
allowing for meaning adjustments that clearly do not obey any 
compositional route, as contextualism does, nothing prevents 
deviant cases to crop up. The objection to contextualism is that it 
cannot account for the systematic way in which the meanings of 
complex expressions are determined. To illustrate with an example, 
consider this sentence: 
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(9)  There is a garage round the corner.  
 
Now contextualists invite us to consider a scenario in which 
someone needs his car to be fixed, and thus asks a passer to 
indicate a local garage. The passer replies by uttering (9), which 
under, I think, any semantic account would simply take to express 
the proposition <#x (Garage(x) $ Round the Corner(x))>. However 
people like Carston (2004) and Recanati (2001) take an utterance 
of (9) to convey the proposition  
 
(9*)  There is an open garage round the corner, 
 
which is what the contextualist thinks the speaker intends to make 
available to her audience’s interpretation. If this were so, none of 
the versions of COMPOSITIONALITY discussed so far would 
capture what the contextualists have in mind, not even the weaker 
formulations. For COMPmeanings, for example, presupposes a view 
of meanings as standing meanings as opposed to the occasional 
meanings that the contextualists care about.28 Thus, the formulation 
of compositionality that contextualists have in mind is the 
following: 
 
COMPpragmatic The meaning of a complex expression is a 
function of the occasional meanings of its constituents and of 
the way those meanings are combined. 
 
However, this thesis is so trivial that makes composionality a 
vacuous property of the language system. Now the thesis simply 
claims that the meaning of a complex expression emerges from the 
meanings of its constituent parts, but it does not put any constraint ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((C+(%:/(9I/0(54(K;80.I9.PM(6/0.9.P(9;(.58:9.P(H78(8:/(9I/0(8:08(0.(/LG1/;;95.(:0;(0(J:010J8/1E(
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whatsoever on what arguments a sentence’s meaning can take.29 
Contrast this formulation with the formulation of 
COMPOSITIONALITY that Szabó attributes to linguists: 
 
COMPlinguistic The meaning of a complex expression is 
determined by its immediate structure and the meanings of its 
immediate constituents. 
 
How does this principle exactly work? To see how it works, we 
may consider another principle functioning at the syntax/semantics 
interface. 
 
C-COMMAND A phrase X c-commands Y iff X does not 
dominate Y, and Y does not dominate X, and the first 
branching node that dominates X also dominates Y.  
 
The principle states that, e.g., in the tree representing the syntactic 
structure of (5), ‘every’ c-commands ‘lawyer’ in that both nodes do 
not dominate each other and the first branching node (S in the tree) 
that dominates the first node dominates also the second. Similarly 
the node of ‘every lawyer’ c-commands the node of ‘is a shark’. As 
Larson and Segal point out (1995: 249) although the principle is 
assumed as axiom by most syntactic theories, its semantic 
equivalent, as formulated in predicate calculus, is more a 
consequence of how meaning is related to logical form.  In 
particular the resulting semantic constraint is that the node of ‘is a 
shark’ and its constituents is evaluated only with respect to the 
sequences determined by the NP ‘every lawyer,’ so that the traces30 
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within the node of ‘is a shark’ can only be interpreted as variables 
bounded by the NP ‘every lawyer.’  
But consider a pragmatic enrichment of ‘Every lawyer is a 
shark’:  
 
(10)  Every-lawyer-in-this-room is a shark. 
 
Now the meaning of ‘is a shark’ is not determined by its immediate 
structure but by a new NP, which will determine a very different 
sequence of elements that the predicate must satisfy. Sure, a new 
syntactic derivation may now be devised, but the question is how a 
speaker of English ever comes to understand a language if each 
well-formed and non-ambiguous sentence has, in fact, a potentially 
infinite number of syntactic derivations and semantic interpretation 
associated to it.  
Recanati tries to limit the import of this line of criticism by 
saying: 
 
Contextual modulation provides for potentially unending meaning 
variation. Meaning eventually stabilizes, making compositionality 
possible, because the (linguistic as well as extralinguistic) context, 
however big, is always finite. (Recanati 2010: 47) 
 
However, define F as the standard meaning-function 
determining the meaning-type of an expression %. P* is the relation 
of being the immediate modulation function which is the successor 
of a given meaning. Then, it is obviously possible to reiterate such 
a function, so as to determine an infinite list of new meanings. 
 
F(%) = µ 
 
P*(µ) = µ& 
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P*(µ&) = µ&& 
 
P*(µ&&) = µ&&& 
 
… 
 
Contrary to what Recanati says, meaning never stabilises in this 
way. 
Hence, by making compositionality subject to top-down 
influences, we can never predict what the meaning of a complex 
expression is. Considerations of relevance or cognitive finitude 
cannot block the argument, which is based on logical 
considerations, and not cognitive ones. Besides, making 
compositionality pragmatic means to abstract it away from the 
language system, i.e., the system of abstract representations the 
knowledge of which constitutes what, since Chomsky’s pioneering 
work, has been called ‘competence’. The question now is: why 
should contextualists appeal to compositionality in the first 
instance? 
One way to escape the argument is to use Lasersohn’s recent 
strategy (Lasersohn 2012) to say that pragmatics is compatible with 
compositional semantics in that it is based on a wholly different 
kind of aim, i.e., explaining the capacities of understanding of 
language users (whereas semantics is, roughly speaking, the study 
of the language as an abstract system). These capacities may 
perfectly turn out to be non-compositional (violating what Szabó 
calls the ‘psychological principle of compositionality’), without 
modifying the wholly compositional character of the language. 
Insofar as Recanati does not follow this route,31 my arguments ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((U*(R(8:9.T(8:9;(<9/=(9;(.58(9.(29./(=98:(8:/(=:52/(096(54(J5.8/L87029;8;(85(;:5=(H58:( 8:/( 409271/( 54( ;/60.89J;( 85( I/8/169./( 8178:]J5.I9895.;( 451( 788/10.J/;(
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against the contextualist appeal to pragmatic compositionality 
retain their force. 
In contrast, I wish to conclude this section by stressing the 
following points: 
 
• Generally, we should prefer restrictive formulations of 
COMPOSITIONALITY over permissive ones, since they 
allow us to explain certain phenomena better (e.g., 
linguistic change, LOT, an expression’s acquisition of a 
standard meaning, binding, etc.) 
• To say that strong forms of compositionality are better than 
weaker ones  is not to say that weaker forms are false. 
Whenever a strong form entails a weaker formulation, then 
the weaker form should be accepted. However, more often 
than not, the explanatory power of the weaker formulation 
is insufficient. 
 
I now turn to discuss another objection to TCP, namely, that it does 
not properly fit with the the hypothesis of a language of thought 
(LOTH). 
 
 
6. The Objection from the LOTH 
 
Since Fodor (1975), the hypothesis that thinking requires a 
language of thought (LOT) has been widely discussed.32 The idea 
consists in deeming thinking to be possible because the brain is 
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appearances of a language like English, except for the following 
features: 
 
• Unlike English, the LOT is not ambiguous. Every thought is 
disambiguated. The very idea of an ambiguous thought is 
incoherent. While the English sentence ‘Mary went to the 
bank’ is ambiguous between two reading, i.e., ‘Mary went 
to the financial institution’ and ‘Mary went to the 
riverbank,’ the LOT has two distinct representations, say " 
' # and " ( #. The two representations are tokened by 
distinct brain’s events.  
• Unlike English sentences, the LOT sentences are all eternal. 
Indexicality is not a possible feature of the LOT. It follows 
that the LOT sentences are context-independent, their 
semantic interpretations being context-free.  
 
Like English, the LOT instantiates these other features: 
 
• It is syntactically and semantically structured, in other 
words it is compositional. 
• It is computable: given the syntactic rules of the language, it 
is possible to specify algorithms that compute the meanings 
of the complex expressions (in a motto, semantics 
supervenes upon syntax). 
 
My focus in this section is going to be based on a straightforward 
consideration: the LOTH is not implementable by the kind of 
theory proposed by radical contextualists as based on the notion of 
‘underdeterminacy’. 33  This would not be a problem if 
contextualists did not accept the LOTH, but at least Carston (2002: ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((UU(#( 491;8(G1/;/.80895.(54( 8:9;(01P76/.8( 9;N(0;( 401(0;( R(T.5=N(I7/(85(%:560;("5IP;5.( 9.(:9;(QO988(m9;;/180895.(08(>8(#.I1/=;N( K%:57P:8N(c88/10.J/;(0.I(8:/(O0.P70P/(54(%:57P:8M(?CAA+DE(
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74ff.)34 commits herself to it, and thus it is good to pause on her 
motivations.  
I said that the idea of Underdeterminacy (for short ‘U’) does not 
fit well with the hypothesis of LOTH. The reason can be derived 
from a simple argument:  
 
i. LOTH sentences are wholly determinate thoughts. 
ii. Underdeterminacy states that no English sentence 
expresses a determinate thought. 
iii. In order for LOTH to be true there must be a thought 
that satisfies a scheme like the following: S Vs that '. 
iv. Underdeterminacy denies that ' picks out a wholly 
determinate thought. (from ii) 
v. Thus, LOTH and Underdeterminacy are incompatible. 
 
(i) follows from the condition that the LOT is computable, and a 
language is computable iff every sentence of the language is 
syntactically defined. (ii) is just a consequence of Carston’s 
formulation of U which I presented in the previous chapter.  
 
U.     [T]here are no eternal sentences in natural languages (that is, 
no sentences which encode a proposition or thought which is 
constant across all contexts), from which it follows that linguistic 
underdeterminacy of the proposition expressed by an utterance is 
an essential feature of natural language. (Carston 2002: 42. My 
emphasis) 
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(iii) is motivated by the fact that LOTH subscribes to a 
representational theory of mind (RTM). RTM can be formulated as 
the thesis that thinking (and, for that matter, other cognitive 
processes as well) consists in causal sequences of tokenings of 
mental representations. Given a subject S, a propositional attitude 
verb V, and a propositional schema ', a scheme like   
 
(11)  S Vs that ' 
 
must be such that there is a tokening of ' that allows the whole 
thought <S Vs that '> to be computed. For instance, in order for 
someone to compute the information associated to (12) 
 
(12)  Jim believes that Jane is happy, 
 
there must be a particular tokening of the thought embedded under 
the attitude verb ‘believes,’ i.e., the thought that Jane is happy.  
But now premise (iv) kicks in. The premise denies that ' picks 
out a determinate thought, since there are not any. Take the 
sentence embedded in (12), i.e. the sentence ‘Jane is happy.’ From 
U and the ‘ad hoc concepts’ hypothesis, it follows that the sentence 
fails to express a proposition insofar as the concept associated to 
‘happy’ may vary in its extension from one context to another. It 
may mean HAPPY*, HAPPY**, and so on. Thus a sentence like 
that embedded in (12) fails to pick out a proposition in the way the 
LOTH would require in order for it to be true. 
Thus, if your sympathies go with Carston, you are left with two 
options: either to abandon the LOTH or to reformulate it. Carston 
opts for the second option. She says: 
 
The particular concept is a component of the thought the speaker 
seeks to communicate (a ‘word’ of the Mentalese sentence 
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tokened) and, if communication is successful, of the thought 
recovered by the addressee. On this view, Mentalese must have a 
large stock of concepts that are not encoded by any element of 
natural-language form. (Carston 2002: 76) 
 
I think that this move does not have much force. If you accept this 
view, then you are exposed to the same kind of argument I have 
offered in the previous section. Now, nothing will prevent the LOT 
from being open to a regressum, which clearly is at odds with the 
way the hypothesis was formulated. One of the most attractive 
feature of LOTH is, in fact, that it explains the productivity of 
language understanding. Given a combinatorial syntax, it is 
possible to derive an infinite number of thoughts, most of which 
our brains will never token. Now the hypothesis is that LOT 
contains an infinitely number of concepts. How could a finite mind 
possibly store all of them? This observation provides, I think, a 
knock-down argument against Carston’s reading of the LOTH. It 
also stresses the importance the composionality has for the 
hypothesis, which is recognised by Fodor in his recent LOT 2 
(2008).35  
There is a further tension in relevance theory due to the relation 
between the hypothesis of ad hoc concepts and a constraint that 
Sperber and Wilson (1986 1995) imposed on reasoning. According 
to Sperber and Wilson, a concept is a sort of pointer containing 
three types of entries: a logical entry, an encyclopaedic entry and a 
lexical entry. The first contains the set of deductive rules that apply ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((U)(i5I51( ?CAA+B( *@]CAD( ;03;B( K_</1( 8:/( 20;8( J57G2/( 54( 3/01;( RM</( H/J56/(9.J1/0;9.P23( J5.<9.J/I( 8:08( J0G8719.P( 8:/( J56G5;9895.02983( 54( 8:57P:8;( 9;(=:08( '%Q(65;8( 71P/.823( 1/X791/;`( .58( Y7;8( H/J07;/( J56G5;9895.02983( 9;( 08(8:/(:/018(54(8:/(G15I7J89<983(0.I(;3;8/6089J983(54(8:57P:8N(H78(02;5(H/J07;/(98( I/8/169./;( 8:/( 1/20895.( H/8=//.( 8:57P:8;( 0.I( J5.J/G8;E( %:/( T/3( 85( 8:/(J56G5;9895.02983( 54( 8:57P:8;( 9;( 8:08( 8:/3( :0</( J5.J/G8;( 0;( 8:/91(J5.;8987/.8;ME(
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to the concept; the second contains information relevant to the 
extension of the term; the third contain the information properly 
linguistic (e.g., the phonetic form of the item). Now, as far as the 
logical entry is concerned, Sperber and Wilson make the following 
‘substantive’ claim:  
 
A logical entry consists of a set of deductive rules, each formally 
describing a set of input and output assumptions: that is, a set of 
premises and conclusions. Our first substantive claim is that the 
only deductive rules which can appear in the logical entry of a 
given concept are elimination rules for that concept. That is, they 
apply only to sets of premises in which there is a specified 
occurrence of that concept, and yield only conclusions from which 
that occurrence has been removed. (SW 1986 [1995: 86]) 
 
Prescinding from the consideration that the LOTH actually forbids 
a concept to have internal structure, the idea that only elimination 
rules are allowed is at odd with the notion of broadening of a 
concept, which is fundamental to RT’s account of ad hoc concepts. 
For instance, according to SW, elimination rules for concepts work 
in the same way as the elimination rule of conjunction in logic: 
 
(13)!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!  !"
Thus, an utterance of, e.g.,  
 
(14)           Jim is a bachelor. 
 
allows for the following inference 
 
(15)  Jim is a bachelor 
             "   Jim is an unmarried man 
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In contrast, introduction rules like the introduction rule of 
conjunction in logic is now allowed by SW.  
 
(16)!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!   !!!!!!!!! 
 
We cannot make the following inference from (14): 
 
(17)  Jim is a bachelor 
"    Jim is a bachelor and Jim is very sexy 
 
In the language of RT, (17) is unwarranted because it only 
introduces non-relevant assumptions in the process of interpreting 
(14).  
But now, take an utterance that can be obviously interpreted 
literally and metaphorically. E.g.,  
 
(18)  Mary is a princess. 
 
Suppose it is interpreted literally. Then, given SW’s constraint, we 
could make the following inferences: 
 
(19) Mary is a princess  
              "   Mary is a female  
   
 Mary is a princess 
              "   Mary is the daughter of a monarch or the wife or 
widow of a prince 
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but we should be prevented from making the following one, given 
that ‘being a spoiled girl’ is not a definitional feature of the lexical 
entry ‘princess’:  
 
 
 
(20)            Mary is a princess 
" Mary is spoiled girl     
    
However, in contrast to SW’s claim, (20) is the kind of inference 
that the relevance theoretic account appeals to in order to explain 
how language users derive the explicature behind an utterance of 
(18). If so, then there is a clear violation of their constraint that a 
concept’s logical entry allows only for elimination rules. More 
generally, if there is such a violation then it should be possible to 
say that the literal and the metaphorical do not coincide, against 
one of the basic assumptions of RT and TCP. 
I further develop this line of criticism in the next, and final, 
section of this chapter. 
 
 
7. VP-Ellipsis and Anaphora 
 
I conclude my attack on TCP by considering a test used by Stern 
(2000, 2006) to show that metaphorical interpretation is sensitive to 
VP-ellipsis and anaphora. However, contextualists have problems 
to deal with such kinds of constructions, and the purpose of this 
section is to reinforce the point that their account of metaphor does 
not put sufficient constraints on acceptable interpretations.  
A property anaphoric links generally require is identity of sense 
between antecedent and anaphor (Lakoff 1970). For instance: 
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(21)  That building over there is a bank, and so is that grassy bit 
of land by he river. (From Kennedy and McNally 2008) 
 
(21) is clearly infelicitous because the sense ‘bank’ has in the first 
conjunct differs from the interpretation given to ‘bank’ in the 
second conjunct. This shift of interpretation creates a conflict with 
the independent identity of sense constraints imposed by so-
anaphora.  
We can find a similar patter in cases in which the anaphor is 
metaphorical. Stern invites us to consider the following utterances: 
 
(22)  Juliet is the sun. 
(23)  The central body of our solar system is the sun. 
(24)  # The central body of our solar system is the sun, and 
Juliet is, too. 
 
As we will see better in the next chapter, Stern thinks that although 
(22) and (23) are two legitimate utterances, (24) is ill-formed 
because there is a tension due to there being two distinct characters 
for the expression ‘the sun’, one literal and the other metaphorical. 
Similar bizarre results could be obtained in the case of anaphora, 
but let’s focus on a case which looks more acceptable. Consider the 
anaphoric link in (24), 
 
(25)  Quine demolished Carnap’s argument. 
(26)  Anne demolished Carnap’s argument.  
(27) Quine demolished Carnap’s argument and so did Anne. 
 
Imagine that (25) is uttered to represent  a scenario in which Quine 
rejected Carnap’s argument by giving a very detailed logical 
argument, using all the technicalities of mathematical logic to do 
so. Also imagine that Anne gave another argument to dismantle 
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Carnap’s argument, this time based on a very simple but 
efficacious observation. Now as far as (27) is concerned, the 
contextualist explanation is that the VP-ellipsis leads to infelicity 
because two different ad hoc concepts are expressed. But given that 
(25) and (26) also express two different ad hoc concepts, (27) 
should equally be infelicitous. However, (27) sounds much more 
acceptable than (24). 
It is not easy to exactly say what is wrong with the contextualist 
account, but here’s my concern. Contextualists do not have any 
story about what makes an expression metaphorical. They actually 
deny there is any dimension peculiar to metaphor. This is a very 
harsh conclusion, which not only deprives metaphor of its felt 
speciality, but it also shows an empirical inadequacy in accounting 
for the kind of examples Stern uses.  
An account of metaphor should not only explain why (24) 
differs from (27), but also give the right importance to the 
metaphorical dimension of these utterances. By reducing such a 
dimension to the content conveyed by a metaphorical utterance, 
contextualists are unable to explain why mixed metaphors are 
generally infelicitous, or what makes it possible for a an expression 
to receive a metaphorical interpretation instead of a literal one. 
 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter I have done two things. First of all, I have presented 
a number of objections to TCP and RT. I have argued that 
contextualism does not offer satisfactory solutions to a number of 
issues in the philosophy of language and mind, e.g., 
compositionality, LOT, lexicality. Secondly, I have related these 
issues to some problems specific to metaphorical interpretation, 
arguing that contextualism offers proposals that are either 
!"#$%&'()((
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incoherent with some of its tenets or inadequate. More specifically, 
I have severely criticised the idea that metaphorical interpretation 
requires processes of modulation affecting the level of what-is-said 
by utterances. What I have not done is to offer an alternative to the 
contextualist account. This is something I set out to do in the next 
chapter, where, after presenting and criticising an account of 
metaphorical interpretation leaning on ‘bottom-up’ semantic 
processes, I will discuss my own proposal. 
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Chapter 6 
 
The Semantics of Metaphor: 
Indexicalism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter I have offered a series of objections to TCP, 
which can be summarised as follows:  
 
(a) TCP’s account of truth-conditionality is so loose that it 
allows for improper truth-conditions; 
(b) Such an account does not square with important restrictions 
on the proper input of a semantic system, e.g., it does not 
respect compositionality (or at least it does not respect its 
most plausible readings); 
(c) TCP does not offer a plausible story as to how language and 
thought interact;  
(d) TCP is unable to explain what makes an expression 
metaphorical and, also, what relationship (if any) there is 
between the literal and the metaphorical. 
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More generally, I have identified the source of all these problems 
with the fact that TCP identifies the meaning of an expression with 
the contribution contextually given by it to the content expressed 
by an utterance containing that expression. Such contribution being 
open to the widest pragmatic intrusions makes the meaning of an 
expression a semantic entity that is intractable from a theoretical 
point of view.  
The identification of meaning with content is unwarranted not 
only for the reasons given by (a)-(d), but also because there is a 
more plausible candidate for being the meaning of an expression, 
namely, its character. Put in a friendly way, the character of an 
expression is a rule the knowledge of which guarantees that, given 
a context, its application delivers a content. More formally, a 
character is that function which yields an intension or content, 
namely, a function from circumstances of evaluation to extensions.  
 
CHARACTER = F(context of use)                  content 
 
CONTENT = F(circumstance of evaluation)             extension 
 
In detail, the character of an indexical is that function that takes 
a certain parameter from an index and returns an appropriate 
content for it (e.g., an individual in the case of ‘I’, a location in the 
case of ‘here’, and so on). Also, the character of a predicate can 
usually be seen as a constant function from contexts to another 
function, the intension of the predicate which yields the sets of 
individuals having the property associated with the predicate.1 The 
main difference between the semantics of indexicals and that of 
other expressions like predicates and definite descriptions is that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 In many cases the character of a predicate coincides with the content expressed 
by any of its utterances (Leezenberg. 2001: 175, fn. 1). But there are cases in 
which the identification is not that simple since other contextual factors need to 
be considered, as was shown in the previous chapter. 
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only for the former does the semantics provide a rule which 
directly establishes the semantic value for these expressions in 
context. In this sense, indexicals are the paradigm of directly 
referential terms, terms whose semantics gives rules stipulating 
that their semantic values, once fixed, are the same in all 
circumstances of evaluation (Kaplan 1989: 493).2 
Once the character has fixed a content, that content can be 
evaluated with respect to a circumstance, which in the traditional 
Kaplanian framework is just a pair constituted by a world and a 
time. The final output of this system is the assignment of a 
semantic value or extension 3  to that content relative to an 
opportunely selected circumstance of evaluation, usually the one 
initialised by the context of utterance. This, in a nutshell, is the 
basic picture of Kaplan’s double-index semantics.4,5 
As anticipated, it is commonly assumed by the semanticists 
working within the Kaplanian tradition that the character of an 
expression is what should properly be considered as its meaning, 
namely, that linguistic aspect the knowledge of which allows a 
speaker to use the expression correctly in a given context. Also, the 
character of an expression is that aspect that constrains its possible 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2  Interestingly, indexicals have other uses: for instance, they can be used 
anaphorically and they can be bounded. Kaplan took the existence of these uses 
to be evidence for a lexical ambiguity in the meaning of these expressions. In 
contrast, Kamp (1981: 191-93) started developing a new theory, nowadays called 
Discourse Representation Theory, in which all these uses are grouped under a 
single rule selecting opportune referents from ‘antecedently available entities’ in 
discourse representations. What differs in these uses is the nature of these 
entities: real world individuals in the case of deictic uses of indexicals, other 
types of representation in the case of bounded ones. 
3 A referent in the case of proper names and definite descriptions, a set of 
individuals in the case of predicates, a truth-value in the case of sentences.  
4  The motivation behind the adoption of the double indexing system is 
“essentially to allow expressions buried underneath one or more operators 
(modal, temporal, epistemic) to ignore the current index of evaluation and only 
look at what’s happening at the designated index” (Stojanovic 2007: 58). 
5 See Westerståhl (2012) for an accurate analysis of how compositionality is 
respected by Kaplan’s semantics. 
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contexts of utterance, by individuating the class of its possible 
semantic values. 
Now, I think that the only way of demonstrating that metaphor 
is within the domain of semantics is to show that there is a 
systematic connection between the meaning of an expression (i.e., 
its character) and the metaphorical dimension that, given a context, 
it may give rise to. This need is well expressed by the words of 
Josef Stern (2008: 267), who is probably the most strenuous 
defender of a semantic approach to metaphorical interpretation: 
 
If we are to develop a semantic theory of metaphor, we must, first, 
demonstrate how we can capture its context-dependence without 
totally obscuring the boundary between the linguistic and extra-
linguistic and, second, we must show why, given the substantial 
contextual input to our understanding of metaphor, a level of 
semantic knowledge is explanatory. 
 
Stern offers an ingenious semantic account, which respects this 
basic theoretical need for a connection between meaning, 
metaphorical dimension and context. Such an account pivots 
around the idea that for each individual lexical item or expression 
there are two characters, one literal and the other metaphorical. 
Following an indexicalist route, Stern (2000: 16) believes that the 
metaphorical character of an expression is a non-constant function 
which yields different contents in different contexts. However, in 
contrast with indexicals such as ‘I’ or ‘here’, the character of a 
metaphor is more similar to an operator, whose function is to attach 
to a literal expression of a certain syntactic category and semantic 
type and to deliver a new expression of the same category and 
same type.6,7 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 The story is a bit different for nominative metaphors, as we will see later on.  
7 A first important difference between indexicals and metaphors can be traced: 
the mechanism underlying the semantics of indexicals is direct, not so for the 
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Stern identifies the character of a metaphor with an ‘Mthat-
operator’, which attaches to its literal vehicle in the sentence’s 
logical form.8  Its function is to determine a content. When the 
expression is used literally the operator is idle. Instead, when the 
interpretation required is metaphorical the metaphorical character 
gets selected and goes to look for properties saliently associated 
with the literal vehicle of the metaphor, which are presupposed in 
the context of utterance. These become the argument of the 
metaphorical character for the property actually predicated in 
context.9 
This account provides a number of interesting hypotheses as to 
the semantic behaviour of metaphors especially in linguistic 
constructions like VP-ellipsis and anaphora. In this respect, it is 
clearly superior to those pragmatic accounts which I have dealt !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
semantics of metaphors. In other words, given a context an indexical directly 
selects the appropriate parameter from the context. In the case of a metaphor, the 
character does not simply look at the context of use, but also at the literal vehicle 
itself. Stern (2000: 198-99) makes this point: “[P]art of what the speaker knows 
when she knows how to interpret a metaphor ! is not simply something about 
the single expression !. Her knowledge of metaphor is closer to knowledge of 
an operator, of an interpretive operation she can perform on any (literally 
interpreted) expression. And in this respect the character of a metaphor is more 
like that of the demonstrative interpretation operator ‘Dthat’ than that of any 
individual indexical (type) such as ‘I’ or ‘here’ ”. Thus while in both indexicals 
and metaphors the final output is a directly referred term, the mechanisms 
underlying these expressions are in one case more direct than in the other. As 
Stern (2000: 256) puts it, there is ‘a continuum’ of uses from pure indexicals and 
demonstratives to demonstrative uses of descriptions and metaphors. This point 
should be separated from the further thesis of rigidity that applies to indexicals 
and, according to Stern, also to metaphors. 
8 More appropriately, the presence of this operator is traceable at the level of the 
LF of a given sentence-in-context. Sentences-in-contexts should, in fact, 
according to Kaplan, be regarded as the proper input of a semantic system. In 
Predelli’s theory (Predelli 2005), the input is said to be the pair constituted by a 
clause and an index, where a clause is nothing but a disambiguated sentence, 
whereas the index is, as usual, a collection of contextual parameters. Predelli 
adopts the further convention of naming Kaplan’s notion of content ‘t-
distribution’, namely, a function that maps points of evaluation (Kaplan’s 
circumstances of evaluations) onto truth-values. Here I will stick to Kaplan’s 
terminology, although as I said in the previous chapter I have opted for Predelli’s 
notion of ‘index’ instead of Kaplan’s more general choice of ‘context’.  
9 We can reformulate Stern’s view using Predelli’s terminology: given an index, 
which now includes also a metaphorical parameter, a metaphorical utterance 
expresses a content that is the result yielded by an appropriate selection of the 
metaphorical parameter in that index. 
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with so far. However, it does not escape several criticisms that can 
be addressed to it from both a syntactic point of view and a 
semantic one. My plan in the first part of this chapter is, therefore, 
to show both the advantages and the disadvantages of this account, 
so as to pave the way for my own theory, which bears some 
similarities with Stern’s but is different in crucial respects. 
The plan for this chapter is as follows: in § 2 my starting point is 
a consideration of the form of indexicalism about metaphorical 
interpretation mostly due to Stern’s work. I will offer a series of 
counter-arguments to it in §§ 3-4, and show how the entire project 
of explaining metaphorical expressions by adding characters to 
these expressions is bound to fail. I believe this failure is due, 
mostly, to the consequences of enriching the language’s expressive 
power, which come with considerable theoretical costs, especially 
in terms of elegance and simplicity, and also adequacy. In § 5 I will 
pause on the general philosophical consequences of adopting 
Stern’s indexicalist strategy. 
 
 
2. Metaphor & Indexicalism 
 
In my discussion of indexicals in the previous chapter I pointed out 
that, according to the traditional semantic approach to indexicality, 
a properly situated semantic system should be able to assign the 
truth-value Truth to an utterance of a sentence containing an 
indexical whenever the content assigned by the system relative to 
an index is true at that index relative to the world and time of the 
context of use.10 Formally, we can give the following truth-clause 
for sentence !: 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Cf. Predelli 2005: 42. 
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(1)  !!"Mf, c, t, w   = T11  iff given a model M, an assignment f 
of values to variables, {!}(c)12 is true relative to (ct, cw). 
 
Equivalently, 
 
M, f, c, t, w ! !  iff given a model M, an assignment f 
of values to variables, the content expressed by ! in c is 
true relative to (ct, cw). 
 
There, I also mentioned the possibility of scenarios the semantic 
evaluation of which requires ‘improper’ indexes, namely, indexes 
which do not return the standard parameters for indexicals (e.g., the 
location where the utterance takes place). In contrast, Kaplan 
thought that an appropriate logic of demonstratives should only 
deal with proper indexes (in his way of speaking, ‘contexts’), 
indexes that always return the standard parameters. Kaplan also 
considered the possibility of operators that shift the standard 
parameter of an index to a non-standard one,13 such as in (2): 
 
(2) In some context or other it is true that I am not tired. 
 
in which the character of ‘I’ does not have anything to do with the 
speaker of the context of utterance of (2) in virtue of being 
preceded by the operator ‘in some context or other it is true that’. 
Kaplan (1989: 510) calls these kinds of operators ‘monsters’ and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Read: “! is true in a model M, under an assignment f, given an index c and 
relative to the circumstance of evaluation constituted by the pair (t, w) of the 
context of use”. 
12 When ‘!’ is surrounded by curled brackets, it means ‘the character of !’. 
When this expression is accompanied by ‘(c)’, it means ‘the content expressed 
by ! in c’ (cf. Kaplan 1989: 547). 
13 Predelli (2008: 292): “An operator M of this sort could then be defined as 
!M!"c,w = T iff !!"c’,w = T for K(c"), where K is some condition on the relevant 
context(s)”. 
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adds that English is not a language containing any such operators. 
Many philosophers and linguists (Schlenker 2003; Predelli 2005, 
2009; Stojanovic 2007 among others) have attacked Kaplan’s 
orthodox, showing inadequacies and counter-examples to it. 
Here I won’t deal with these analyses here since they do not 
approach the topic of metaphor directly, but Kaplan’s view has 
important consequences for a semantic theory of metaphor, and 
thus deserves my attention. To begin with, let me point out that 
when I say that Kaplan’s theory is the orthodox view on 
indexicality, what I have in mind is that, apart from the obvious 
consideration that it was the first model-theoretic semantics 
devised for it, it combines two quite strong independent claims: 
 
(i) The proper logic of demonstratives countenances only 
proper indexes; 
(ii) The semantics of English does not contain monsters. 
 
Now, these two claims have a specific importance for my 
discussion of metaphor. In fact, two scholars working within the 
Kaplanian tradition have investigated their import for a semantic 
account of metaphor. Both Stern (2000, 2006, 2008) and 
Leezenberg (2001) believe that metaphorical constructions should 
be accounted for by appealing to features of the Kaplanian 
semantics for demonstratives. Stern does so by considering that 
each metaphorical interpretation of an expression may be fixed 
only relative to an improper index for that expression, whose 
appropriate parameter is selected by a special operator that he calls 
‘Mthat-operator’. In contrast, Leezenberg makes the interesting 
observation that there is no need to appeal to improper indexes, and 
therefore to special operators that are ‘internal’ to an expression’s 
semantics, since the semantics of metaphorical predication does not 
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really differ in kind from that of literal predication.14 Both types of 
predication require specific contextual parameters, which 
Leezenberg calls ‘thematic dimensions’.15 However, in order to 
defend this claim, Leezenberg contemplates the possibility of 
linguistic operators which shift contextual parameters, so as to 
determine new interpretations for expressions used metaphorically. 
If there are such parameters, then we would have some reasons to 
abandon one of the orthodox claims of Kaplan’s theory, namely, 
that English does not contain monsters. On the other hand, if Stern 
is right about claiming that the semantics of English requires 
metaphorical characters, then we will have to consider some 
substantial change in our current conception of linguistic 
competence. 
In what follows I will argue that we do not need to include a 
new metaphorical character, as Stern claims, in order to give a 
semantic account of metaphorical interpretation. A more 
parsimonious and elegant solution is available, which may also be 
seen as vindicating Stern’s original claim that metaphor is a 
phenomenon requiring a semantic explanation. On the other hand, I 
will also defend the view that there are no operators that behave 
like monsters, at least not of the kind whose existence Leezenberg 
assumes. The presence of predicate-limiting adverbials, which 
Leezenberg deems to be a problem for Kaplan’s view, is not a real 
problem since these do not work as sentential operators at all. As 
the term already suggests, the precise grammatical role of these 
expressions is to specify the respect in which a given expression is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Thus, it seems to me that Leezenberg, more than Stern, adheres to the 
‘continuity’ view of contextualists like Recanati and relevance theorists. To 
remind the reader, the continuity view claims that the interpretation of 
metaphorical utterances does not differ in kind from the interpretation of other 
literal utterances, but only in degree. Of course, Leezenberg disagrees with the 
contextualist theories of metaphor in pretty much every other respect. 
15 We will see that the main difference between my account and Leezenberg’s is 
that mine includes thematic dimensions in the circumstances of evaluation 
instead of positing them as contextual parameters.  
CHAPTER 6 
 
! ! "#$!
to be interpreted. They do not modify the character itself of these 
expressions. 
I shall devote the next section to sketch Stern’s view. In §§ 3-4 I 
will focus on some evidence against Stern’s operator, while in § 5 
on understanding some important issues surrounding the interfaces 
between syntax and semantics in relation to Stern’s semantics. 
Since my own theory shares more similarities with Leezenberg’s, I 
shall discuss it in relation to mine in the next chapter. 
 
2.1 Stern’s Account 
 
The reader will remember that in the previous chapter I mentioned 
a view on indexicality which Predelli (2005: 46) aptly named the 
Many Characters View. On this view an indexical expression is 
ambiguous between a standard reading, in which the character of 
the indexical selects a parameter from a proper index, and a non-
standard one, in which another character associated with the 
indexical expression type selects a different kind of parameter from 
an improper index.16 
Adapting this story to Stern’s account, it turns out that we have 
a specular situation in the case of metaphorical interpretation. 
According to Stern (2000, 2006, 2008), expression types such as 
predicates containing indefinite descriptions (e.g., ‘is a princess’) 
or definite descriptions (e.g., ‘is the sun’) are not only associated 
with a ‘literal’ character, but also with another, very different 
character, which is responsible for the appropriate contextual 
interpretation of a metaphor. Thus, expressions that can be 
metaphorically interpreted are ambiguous: they have two 
characters, one literal and the other metaphorical, and an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 As a reminder, a ‘proper’ index is one whose parameters “correspond in an 
obvious manner to the parameters of the context of utterance (or inscription)” 
(Predelli 2005: 41-42). 
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appropriate semantic system should be put in a position to receive 
as input not only a disambiguated sentence, but also one for which 
an appropriate selection of a literal vs. metaphorical character has 
been made. I will show in a moment how Stern’s theory works in 
practice.  
Apart from explaining how a semantic system takes into account 
the context-dependence of metaphors, Stern’s theory has as other 
desideratum the need for an explanation of how the metaphorical 
dimension depends on the literal one. It should immediately be 
noticed that Stern does not maintain that there is a psychological 
dependence of the metaphorical upon the literal, which could be 
characterised as the requirement that hearers first have access to the 
literal meaning of an utterance and then derive a new metaphorical 
interpretation. In fact, Stern agrees with contextualists like 
Recanati, Bezuidenhout and relevance theorists that there is no 
need to first compute the literal meaning of an expression in order 
to determine its metaphorical content. What Stern wants to explain 
is how the metaphorical dimension of an expression semantically 
depends on its literal meaning.17   
Recapitulating, we have two basic requirements that Stern’s 
theory intends to satisfy: 
 %&' the need for a semantic explanation of the context-
dependence of metaphorical expressions; %&&' the need for a semantic explanation of the 
dependence of an expression’s metaphorical 
interpretation upon its literal meaning. 
 
In order to formally satisfy these requirements, Stern makes use of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Thus Stern rejects the contextualist view that literality and metaphoricality are 
on the same level and adopts a weak form of Davidson’s thesis that a metaphor 
depends on its literal meaning. However, unlike Davidson, Stern fully endorses 
the view that a metaphorical utterance expresses a fully truth-evaluable content. 
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a complex semantic machinery. In analogy with Kaplan’s ‘Dthat’ 
operator for dthat-descriptions, he introduces an ‘Mthat’ operator 
for mthat-descriptions, which is characterised as follows: 
 
[The Mthat-operator is] a function from the ‘metaphorically 
relevant’ set(s) of properties presupposed to be 
m(etaphorically)-associated with [an expression] ! in its 
containing sentence S in the context c to a set of properties P. 
(Stern 2000: 115)  
 
Since it is not immediately evident how Stern’s definition captures 
the tasks inherent in (i) and (ii), some explications of what Stern 
means by his terminology is, I believe, opportune here. But, first, 
the reader may find the box below useful to integrate the present 
discourse with a sketch of Kaplan’s original motivation for 
introducing his ‘Dthat’-operator. 
 
Dthat 
 
Keith Donnellan in his classic ‘Reference and Definite 
Descriptions’ (1966) observed that definite descriptions, phrases 
containing a determiner like the article ‘the’ and a property like 
‘being the Italian first minister’, have not only an attributive use, 
but also a referential one. The former use coincides with a generic 
reading of the description, according to which the descriptive 
property is ascribed to whoever has it in the world and time 
determined by the context of utterance. 
The latter use allows a speaker, and indirectly her audience, to 
determine the referent of her utterance without this referent 
necessarily satisfying the description used to individuate him or 
her. For instance, we are at a party and I make you a gesture toward 
the table in front of us. I tell you: “The man who is drinking martini 
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is republican”. Suppose the individual in question is actually 
drinking water. Have I said something true? Most people would 
probably nod insofar as my predication is effectively successful 
(the man referred to is actually republican), although my 
description is not completely accurate.  
Kaplan (1978) takes this kind of example as evidence for an 
ambiguity in sentence types containing definite descriptions. 
According to one reading, the attributive one, the article is taken to 
be the traditional Russellian quantifier, while, according to the 
other reading, the referential one, the description works as a 
demonstration which is ‘captured’ by an operator that Kaplan 
introduces, namely, the ‘Dthat’-operator. This term-forming 
operator has the function of “converting an arbitrary singular term 
into one which is directly referential” (Kaplan 1989: 521). 
The referential reading of the abovementioned example is now 
treated in the following way:  
 
(3)  Dthat [‘the man who is drinking martini’] is republican.  
 
Notice how the material within the scope of the operator is under 
quotation marks. This is because this material is not used, at least 
not primarily so, to ascribe whichever property the expression 
would ascribe without quotation marks. The quoted description 
functions more like a demonstrated index, which is used to refer to 
whomever the description applies to. Kaplan wants to maintain that 
in different circumstances of evaluation, different demonstrated 
indexes will determine different demonstrata (Kaplan 1978 [1997: 
685]). Of course, once a demonstratum has been trapped into the 
proposition expressed by one of its utterances, it will behave as any 
other directly referential term: its evaluation will not vary with 
respect to different circumstances of evaluation.  
The main difference between the Dthat and the Mthat is that the 
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Dthat is partially denotational in the sense that it contributes the 
object denoted by its embedded definite description to the 
proposition expressed. On the other hand, the Mthat is, like 
indexicals, parametric in the sense that it yields a parameter, whose 
value is supplied by the context of use (Stern 2000: 200; see also 
Camp 2005: 717-18). 
 
Breaking down Stern’s definition of the Mthat-operator, we 
have the following clauses:  
 
(i) [The Mthat-operator is] a function from the 
‘metaphorically relevant’ set(s) of properties; 
(ii) Such properties are “presupposed to be 
m(etaphorically)-associated with [an expression] ! in 
its containing sentence S in the context c”; 
(iii) The function yields  “a set of properties P”. (Stern 
2000: 115)  
 
(i) means that when the operator gets activated18 it looks for those 
properties which are saliently associated with the vehicle of the 
metaphor in virtue of there being presupposed in the conversation 
by its participants. Given that the notion of salience invoked by 
Stern (2000: 149-54) belongs to the psychological domain, and not 
to semantics, I do not have much to say about it in this place. 
I have more to say about (ii), in which the term ‘presupposed’ 
makes its appearance. Stern (2000: 117) makes appeal here to a 
Stalnakerian conception of presuppositions (Stalnaker 1999, 2002). 
This account characterises presuppositions both as a kind of mental 
attitude speakers have to some propositions in the common ground 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 The activation itself happens at the so-called pre-semantic level, in which 
disambiguation and reference assignment are effectuated.  
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of a conversation19 – where propositions are taken to be sets of 
possible worlds – and also as felicity conditions on the assertability 
of sentences in context.20 
Now, these presuppositions are associated with the literal 
vehicle of a metaphor, in virtue of there being some connection 
between them and the literal meaning of the expression used 
metaphorically.21 In other words, such properties are properties that 
an appropriately situated interpreter would associate with the literal 
meaning of the expression used metaphorically. As Stern (2000: 
121) notes, these properties do not need to function in the same 
way as Black’s ‘systems of common places’ (Black 1962, 1979), 
which are invariably associated with the literal vehicle of the 
metaphor. The pragmatic conception of presuppositions only deals 
with presuppositions the presence of which makes a certain stage 
csn of a conversation progress to the successive stage cs(n+1).  
Finally, there is the final output of Stern’s semantic machinery, 
the propositional content which is ultimately delivered. On this 
account, the interpretation of metaphorical utterance such as  
 
(4)  Juliet is the sun   
 
is a three-staged process. First, we have the selection of the 
appropriate character for each semantic constituent of (4). In the 
particular case, this representation will be: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 This attitude has been characterized by Stalnaker (1999) as a sort of pretence.  
20 An advantage of this way of taking the issue of presuppositions is that, as 
Stalnaker notes (2002), we weaken the ‘semantic’ requirement that 
presuppositions are inherited by both asserted and denied tokens of the same 
sentence.  In this picture, a proposition which is associated with an utterance 
does not need to be presupposed by the denial of the same sentence. 
21  Stern (2000: 124-25) makes the observation that the conventional 
presuppositions are different from the metaphorical ones in that computation of 
the first, but not of the latter, is necessary to make an interpretation appropriate. 
In metaphors, there is no pre-established set of presuppositions such that “must 
belong to any context set in which an occurrence of a token of the metaphor 
(type) receives an appropriate interpretation” (Ibid, 124. Stern’s emphasis).   
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(5)  Juliet is Mthat [‘the sun’]. 
 
The selection of the metaphorical character activates the search for 
salient properties in the context of utterance, which then get 
trapped in the proposition expressed by (4): 
 
(6)  <j, {Mthat [‘the sun’]}(c)>. [where j = Juliet] 
 
Finally we get the evaluation of (4) at a world and a time: 
 
(7)  !Juliet is the sun"c, t, w = T iff <j, {Mthat [‘the sun’]}(c)> is 
true at (ct, cw), 
 
where t and w are the time and the world parameters in the 
circumstance of evaluation fixed by the context of utterance. 
It should be immediately noticed that Stern’s semantic analysis 
instantiates what, in Chapter 4, I have called the Fregean Premise. 
This is the view that the same sentence s, as uttered in two different 
contexts, c and c!, will express two different contents in virtue of 
encapsulating in them those contextual features which are relevant 
to the interpretation at hand.22 In other words, by changing the 
relevant contextual parameter in the context of use a different 
content gets expressed: 
 
(8)  <j, {Mthat[‘the sun’]}(c!)>,  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 My formulation there was the following: “Taking v and n to be variables 
ranging over circumstances (i.e., contextual parameters), FP can be thus 
formulated: 
 
(i) An utterance u of a sentence s expresses the proposition <s, v> in C. 
(ii) An utterance u! of the same sentence expresses the proposition <s, n> 
in C!. 
(iii) Therefore, <s, v> may be true in C!!, while <s, n> false, or vice versa”. 
CHAPTER 6 
 
! ! "#$!
 
which may end up being assigned a different truth-value, even 
though the circumstance of evaluation is the same: 
 
(9)  !Juliet is the sun"c’, t, w = F iff <j, {Mthat[‘the sun’]}(c!)> 
is true at (ct, cw). 
 
I have already expressed criticism of this view in relation to 
contextualist views of metaphor, which I will extend to Stern’s 
soon. However, before launching my attack on Stern’s account, I 
would like to discuss a potential virtue of it. 
 
 
3. VP-Ellipsis & Anaphora: Stern’s proposal 
 
Stern’s account is important for a number of reasons. First of all, it 
is the first account that has shown how metaphor could be 
systematically treated in a semantic way. Secondly, it has also 
contributed to debunking the contextualist challenges that I have 
explored in chapter 4. By treating metaphors as indexicals, Stern 
shows how metaphorical interpretations vary across contexts, and 
how, nevertheless, they are still within the domain of semantics 
given that the speakers’ ability to produce and interpret metaphors 
is governed by their character-like rule.  
Stern’s account has apparently another merit, which I would like 
to discuss in this section. It offers an explanation of cases of VP-
ellipsis and anaphoric links involving at least one metaphorical 
interpretation, which are problematic for the contextualist. Let’s 
see how Stern deals with this issue. To begin with, let’s consider 
this pair of sentences: 
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(4)  Jim went to the bank, and so did Mark. 
(5)  Turin is a cold city, and Milan is, too. 
 
Under any reasonable semantic analysis of anaphora and ellipsis, 
the interpretation of the second clause must be ‘copied’ from the 
interpretation of the first clause. In other words, the interpretation 
of the consequents in (4) and (5) must be the same as the 
interpretation of their respective antecedents. However, it is rather 
unclear in which sense ‘must be the same as’ is to be understood. 
Should we require that the sameness in question is syntactic 
sameness, or semantic sameness or possibly both? An answer to 
these questions is pressing insofar as it may reveal interesting 
aspects of metaphorical interpretation. 
Suppose now that what (4) says is that Jim went to the local 
financial institution, whereas Mark went to the local riverbank. 
Then the anaphoric link would not be preserved, so that (4) would 
be infelicitous. Also, suppose in (5) the first conjunct is interpreted 
literally, while the second conjunct is given a metaphorical 
interpretation. Then the resulting ellipsis makes the utterance at 
least odd, unless a further clause, specifying that the respects in 
which Turin and Milan are cold are different, is added. Leaving 
aside for a second the nature of this further clause, let’s concentrate 
on Stern’s explanation of ellipsis. He takes this sort of evidence to 
demand the postulation of metaphorical meanings in addition to our 
stock of literal ones. But is he right? 
In the previous chapter I briefly dealt with other mixes of 
literal/metaphorical constructions. There I expressed my concerns 
against the contextualist theories of metaphor, which I believe are 
unable to explain what is wrong (or acceptable) with these. For 
instance, we find different patterns of acceptability for utterances 
of sentences such as (6)-(9): 
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(6)  # Quine demolished Carnap’s house, and he demolished his 
argument, too. 
(7) Quine demolished Carnap’s argument, and so did Anna. 
(8)  ? Juliet is the sun, and Achilles is the sun, too. 
(9)  # The central body of our solar system is the sun, and 
Juliet is the sun, too. 
 
The problem for the contextualist, I claimed, is that given her story 
about ad hoc concepts together with her underlying assumption that 
the metaphorical dimension and the literal one do not belong to 
different kinds, it is difficult for her to explain why, for instance, 
(9) is much less acceptable than (6) and (8), not to mention (7). 
Given, in fact, that the contextualist takes all the predicated 
material in these examples to be ad hoc concepts, she cannot 
explain the differences in acceptability between (6)-(8) and (9).23 
In contrast, Stern’s account does deal with these examples. On 
this view, the explanation of the differences in (6)-(9) is that (6) 
and (9) are type violations, whereas (8) is an example of content 
violation. (7), on the other hand, is just fine because we have the 
same type interpretation in both clauses and the context does not 
differ between them. In other words, (6) and (9) are infelicitous 
because there is a mix of literal/metaphorical types, and the 
anaphoric link generates a deep violation of grammatical rules 
(under Stern’s assumption that the knowledge of a metaphorical 
character is part of the grammar). (8), in contrast, is simply odd 
because, although both antecedent and consequent receive the same 
type of interpretation (i.e., they are both metaphorical), their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 One possible explanation is the relevance-theoretic appeal to the notion of 
cognitive effort. On their view, (9) could be said to be less acceptable than (8) 
because it requires more cognitive efforts for the hearer to be processed. I think 
this is not a good explanation. Actually, I think it is not an explanation at all. We 
need to offer a clear semantic account of both why (9) is not acceptable, and why 
(8) is judged as more acceptable. Psychological considerations do not help make 
any serious prediction here. 
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contextual parameters differ. In fact, when the Mthat-operator 
attaches to the first occurrence of ‘the sun’ in the antecedent of (8), 
it selects a certain parameter from the context c!, whereas when it 
attaches to another occurrence of ‘the sun’ in the consequent, it 
looks at a different context c!! and therefore selects a different 
parameter.24  
In this way, Stern obtains the results required: it explains the 
infelicity of (6) and (9), and it also offers a way to understand why 
they differ from (8): their infelicity is due to a type-violation, 
whereas that of (8) concerns the pragmatically determined 
interpretation of the two clauses. More formally: 
 
(6*)  # <q, {demolished}, Carnap’s house> " <q, {Mthat 
[‘demolished’]}(c!), Carnap’s argument>. 
(8*)  #  <j, {Mthat [‘the sun’]}(c!)> " <a, {Mthat [‘the 
sun’]}(c!!)}> 
(9*)  # <The x: Blob (x), {the sun}(c)> " <j, {Mthat [‘the 
sun’](c!)}>. 
 
[where q = ‘Quine’, j = ‘Juliet’, a =  ‘Achilles’, Blob = ‘Central 
body of our solar system’; the parts emphasised are those in which 
the oddity lies: characters in 6* and 9*, contextual parameters in 
8*.] 
Insofar as Stern has an explanation for the oddity of these 
examples, whereas contextualists do not, I think his account 
deserves a special mention. 
However, Camp (2005) disagrees with Stern’s reading of the 
data. She first notices that the intuition that (8) and (9) are 
semantically ill-formed can be explained away by pointing out that 
each sentence employs a single definite description to refer to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Stern’s explanation (Stern 2006: 260) of cases like (8) is just good. 
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distinct objects. She then adds that a pragmatic explanation is 
preferable, for the link between the antecedent and the consequent 
of (8) can be cancelled: 
 
(10)  Juliet is the sun and Achilles is, too, but in their own ways. 
 
Given that cancellability is a clear pragmatic test, Camp concludes 
that this provides an indication that we are in presence of a 
pragmatic phenomenon, contrary to what Stern believes. 
Interestingly, the same test can also apply to (6), yielding: 
 
(6**) Quine demolished Carnap’s house, and he demolished his 
argument, too. Of course, not in the same sense. 
 
If Stern’s explanation starts looking weak, this feeling is reinforced 
by the following example: 
 
(11)  Mark may leave tomorrow, and Jim, too. 
 
Suppose the first interpretation of ‘may’ is deontic (roughly, ‘it is 
permissible for Mark to leave tomorrow’), whereas the second 
elided occurrence is simply epistemic (‘it is possible that Mark will 
leave tomorrow’). Then you cannot ‘cancel’ (11), on pain of 
producing some oddity: 
 
(12)  # Mark may leave tomorrow, and Jim, too, but in different 
ways. 
 
I have already expressed doubts about the use of this sort of test in 
Chapter 2, where I showed both that Recanati was wrong to think 
that cancellability applies to cases of demonstratives’ resolution 
and also that cancellability is, likewise, not a test that applies to 
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metaphors. We have a specular situation here in the sense that I do 
not believe that Camp’s test concerns a pragmatic property such as 
cancellability. The utterer of (10), for instance, is specifying the 
respect in which Juliet and Achilles are taken as ‘the sun’. In 
contrast, (11) does not allow for such a specification because we 
are in presence of two distinct lexical items, which we may 
distinguish as ‘mayD’ and ‘mayP’. Their co-presence produces the 
obvious oddity in (12), as the co-presence of two distinct lexical 
items did in (4). In other words, as the privileged interpretation of 
the first occurrence of ‘may’ is fixed, its reading is syntactically 
distributed over the second. This does not happen in (8) in so far as 
the first occurrence of ‘is the sun’ is syntactically identical to the 
second occurrence. The oddity is semantic, requiring the 
specification of the respect in which the interpretation of the two 
occurrences of ‘the sun’ must be taken.25 
I think that Stern may resist Camp’s accusation by simply 
insisting that whichever interpretation an expression is actually 
endowed with, that is not part of semantics to deliberate. What !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Manuel García-Carpintero pointed out to me that this asymmetry is predicated 
on an unjustified assumption, namely that the two modals are distinct lexical 
items, and that this goes against one of the most popular accounts of modality, 
i.e. Kratzer's. I agree with his point, although I think that reformulating my view 
in Kratzer’s semantic terms would leave the main point in the argument intact. 
So, according to Kratzer (1981) modals are not ambiguous, but the difference 
between, for instance, an epistemic and a deontic modal lies in the different 
conversational backgrounds chosen in the context (cf. Portner 2009: 48).  
Leaving aside a further aspect of Kratzer’s theory, namely, that modals are 
interpreted not only relative to a modal base, which provides the relevant set of 
worlds at which the modal statement is to be evaluated, but also relative to an 
ordering source, which ranks the relevant worlds according to some accessibility 
relations, we have the following picture: a modal sentence s’s semantic value is 
!s"c, f. In other words, s is assigned a semantic value only relative to a context 
and a conversational background, a function that assigns the content expressed 
by s at c at some relevant world. Now, it is clear that given the presence of an 
anaphoric link in the sentence (11), it cannot be the case that the relevant worlds 
at which the two conjuncts are evaluated be different. Under this account, 
anaphora is supposedly copying the first conversational background function 
onto the second one. Furthermore, I think that the contrast between (10) and (11) 
is not a contrast, after all. Besides, I do not see why you could ‘cancel’ the two 
different interpretations in (10), but not in (12). Camp does not provide any 
reason why this should be so. See my discussion on cancellability in chapter 2. 
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semantics does is to explain why the expression receives a certain 
interpretation instead of another.  
Still, I think Camp is also right to claim that a different 
explanation is available, although I disagree with her view that it is 
pragmatic. She suggests that one and only one definite description 
is used by each single sentence to refer to two distinct objects in the 
same context. This is an interesting observation, which I would like 
to integrate in my theory modulo a correct understanding of 
Camp’s modifier ‘in the same context’. A question, therefore, starts 
getting pressing for my analysis: how is it possible for an 
expression !, such as the definite description ‘the sun’, to end up 
referring to two distinct objects, and therefore being assigned 
distinct semantic values? I will deal with this question in chapter 7. 
I shall now conclude this section by formalising the argument 
against Stern. 
Stern has adopted the following explanation of VP-ellipsis and 
anaphora: 
 
(i) Infelicity concerning cases of VP-ellipsis or anaphora 
are more serious when they are cases of type violation 
insofar as knowledge of types is part of the grammar; 
(ii) Given that the determination of a content in context is 
pragmatically intruded, this level falls properly outside 
the grammar; 
(iii) Given (i) and (ii), utterances of (6) and (9) are 
ungrammatical because of a type-violation. An 
utterance of (8) is felt more acceptable because it does 
not violate grammatical principles.  
 
However, it is possible to use Camp’s test to show that: 
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(iv) An utterance of (6), which according to Stern 
instantiates a type-violation, becomes acceptable by 
adding a further clause specifying that the 
interpretations of ‘demolished’ differ (in some aspects 
whose nature needs to be investigated yet). 
(v) Therefore, Stern’s generalisation is wrong. 
 
(v) is reinforced by appealing to examples like (11) in which a 
clear case of type-violation cannot be modified by adding a further 
clause such as that appearing in (6)**. The conclusion seems to be 
that (6), and, presumably, (9) as well are not cases of type-
violation. This is problematic for Stern because his theory is wholly 
based on the distinction between literal and metaphorical types. 
In conclusion, what I have done in this section is to argue that 
although Stern’s explanation of VP-ellipsis and anaphora for 
crossed literal/metaphorical interpretations is interesting, an 
argument can be devised against it. Camp’s test supplies the 
additional premise to build up the argument, although I disagree 
with Camp’s pragmatic reading of the test. In the next section I 
shall provide further evidence against Stern’s semantic account, 
and prepare the reader for my own theory, which avoids Stern’s 
problems altogether.  
 
 
4. Criticism of Stern’s Account 
 
We saw in the previous section that Stern’s account does not offer 
a fully satisfying answer to the problem of VP-ellipsis or anaphora 
involving crossed interpretations. In this section, I will show that 
Stern’s account succumbs because of more pressing issues. 
Therefore, the outcome of this section will be that indexicalism is 
CHAPTER 6 
 
! ! "#$!
not a viable solution to the problems surrounding a theory of 
metaphor. 
First of all, I take Stern’s explanation of the dependence of the 
metaphorical dimension of an expression upon its literal meaning 
rather weak. On Stern’s account, the dependence is reduced to the 
fact that the metaphorical operator attaches to the literal vehicle of 
the metaphor, and goes to look for properties saliently associated 
with it. However, since there are too many properties that can be 
‘associated’ to the literal meaning of an expression, there is no 
principled way to say why we should count all of them as good 
(remember Searle’s example of the gorillas who are not aggressive, 
prone to violence, etc.?). What is more, Stern undoubtedly 
abandons any attempt to give a semantic explanation of this 
dependence. He rather opts for a pragmatic, or better 
psychological, explanation in terms of generic ‘associations’. 
Secondly, Stern’s appeal to Stalnaker’s notion of 
presuppositions is rather too liberal. For Stalnaker’s conception is 
fully propositional, whereas Stern refers to presupposed properties, 
whose semantic status is less than clear. In the literature, a 
discussion on presupposed properties can be found in Stojanovic’s 
brief discussion (2007: 62-69) of conventional properties 
associated with indexicals.26 For instance, consider an utterance of: 
 
(13)  She is tall. 
 
Here the speaker’s use of ‘she’ presupposes that the subject who is 
being talked about is female. Is this property relevant to the truth-
conditions of the utterance? Not at all. Suppose the subject is 
actually female, and she is tall. Then the fact that the subject is 
female is clearly irrelevant. Suppose now that the subject is tall, but !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 But see also Maier’s work (2009: http://ncs.ruhosting.nl/emar/em_rigpres.pdf). 
Thanks to García-Carpintero for pointing to me his work. 
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he is male. Then you may feel reluctant to accept (13), although the 
asserted content is actually true: the subject (who happens to be 
indistinguishable from a female body) is actually tall. 
Be that as it may, it is unclear that we have anything like this in 
metaphorical interpretation. Imagine I utter: 
 
(14) He is a gorilla. 
 
What is exactly the property presupposed in (14)? Is it the property 
of being violent or being prone to violence? However, we know 
that gorillas are not violent at all. Stern adheres to Stalnaker’s 
definition of presupposition (2002: 701): “To presuppose 
something is to take it for granted, or at least to act as if one takes it 
for granted, as background information – as common ground 
among the participants in the conversation”. Although Stern’s 
adherence to this definition is consistent, it does not explain much. 
For one may still want to know how it is possible that something 
already taken for granted be actually asserted. Besides, the case of 
creative metaphors poses a problem to this view since a 
metaphorical interpretation may arise without anything being taken 
for granted at the moment of the utterance.  
Furthermore, given that we may basically presuppose anything 
in Stern’s sense, then we do not have any satisfying criterion to 
distinguish a good metaphor from a bad one.27  This problem 
already affected other accounts of metaphor, and Stern is therefore 
no exception. Stern could reply that a semantic theory of metaphor 
does not have the task of distinguishing good metaphors from bad 
ones. This is something, he may add, that pragmatics or perhaps 
rhetoric should deal with. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Incidentally, I take metaphors like (14) to be bad metaphors insofar as they do 
not give us any original insight of the subject of the metaphor, but only an 
unoriginal picture based on stereotypical properties of the vehicle. 
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I must say that I completely disagree with such a potential line 
of answer. A good semantic theory of metaphor must individuate a 
correct criterion to distinguish ‘apt’ metaphors from ‘unapt’ ones.28 
Likewise, a good semantic theory needs to distinguish what makes 
a predication more correct than another. 
Thirdly, things get worse when we turn to consider the final 
clause of Stern’s definition of his ‘Mthat’-operator, claiming that 
its function is to contribute a set of properties P to the proposition 
expressed by the metaphorical utterance. Here Stern is clearly 
endorsing a descriptivist account of metaphorical interpretation. A 
descriptivist account is one that exclusively focuses on the role of 
descriptive information in interpretation, instead of determining 
appropriate extensions for metaphorical expressions. I am not 
against the idea that metaphorical expressions are endowed with 
descriptive information which is relevant to their interpretation. 
What I am going to deny is that this information has the role Stern 
gives it in the semantic system. I am going to give here two 
examples that clearly show how problematic Stern’s third clause is. 
Consider an utterance of: 
 
(15) The spring awakes the flowers.  
 
in a context of students’ revolt against a University’s controversial 
decision.29 For the sake of argument let’s believe that the following 
literal interpretations for ‘the spring’ and ‘awakes’ obtain:30 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 I believe that the term ‘apt’ entered in the philosophical vocabulary concerning 
metaphor with Hills (1997). 
29 The sentence is taken from White (1996: 18), but I have adapted the context to 
my purpose. 
30 I am avoiding the usual relativization to contexts and worlds here, pretending 
that there is a ‘literal’ interpretation of these terms which is the same across 
contexts of use and circumstances of evaluation. Also, it is perfectly legitimate to 
imagine other contexts in which ‘the spring’ and ‘awakes’ are interpreted 
metaphorically. White (1996) provides interesting observations regarding the 
variety of subtle metaphorical modifications a sentence can be subject to. 
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(16)  !The spring"  = the spring  
 
 !awakes" = !x !y (Awakes(x,y))  
 
In other words, I am assuming the semantic meaning of ‘the spring’ 
as nothing but the season of the year, whereas the semantic 
meaning of ‘awakes’ as a relational property that obtains just in 
case there are an x and a y such that x awakes y. What about the 
semantic meaning of ‘the flowers’? Here, given that the plural 
definite description is to be interpreted metaphorically, we should 
apply the Mthat-operator to get the interpretation required: 
 
(17)  !Mthat(‘The flowers’)"c, t, w  = ? 
 
But what exactly is the interpretation required? According to Stern, 
Mthat takes the properties associated with the literal vehicle in 
context c as input and get new properties as output. This seemed to 
work well in the case of ‘Juliet is the sun’, a case of predicative 
metaphor, but it seems pretty awkward to say that in the present 
case what get semantically derived from combining the operator 
with the plural definite description are properties.  
Now consider this other example: 
 
(18)  A storm broke loose in my mind, 
 
said by Einstein to describe the exciting period of his life, between 
the spring and the summer of 1905, in which he wrote several 
papers. Let’s pretend that the only metaphorical interpretation 
regards the indefinite description ‘a storm’. What is the semantic 
meaning of such an expression in the discussed context? 
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(19)  !Mthat(‘a storm’)"c, t, w  = ? 
 
Can the meaning of ‘a storm’ be a set of properties? That cannot be 
right, otherwise the utterance of (18) would receive the absurd 
interpretation that a set of properties (whatever these could be) 
‘broke loose’ in Einstein’s mind. But, clearly, properties are not the 
kind of semantic object required for the interpretation of (18) to 
proceed, to start with. Einstein is describing some kind of event 
that happened in his life, and we should expect that, semantically, 
an event or some similar object appear in the interpretation of his 
utterance. Similarly, we need individuals, and not properties, as the 
right kind of object required for the interpretation of (15).  
Stern (2000: 228-229) has made two proposals to deal with 
nominative metaphors, but they both seem to me unsuccessful. The 
first is to say that an utterance of, for instance, (15), conveys the 
singular proposition that the spring awakes the students. In 
addition, (15) presupposes another proposition to the effect that 
there exist a unique class of things whose properties are the content 
of ‘Mthat [‘are the flowers’] in c. In other words, this 
presupposition is that which actually contains the ‘metaphorical 
mode of presentation’: 
 
(21)  <There is exactly one class of things that possesses {Mthat 
[‘are the flowers’]}(c)>. 
 
The problem with this view is that it locates the metaphorical 
dimension at the level of the utterance’s presupposed content, 
while allowing the asserted content to be the ‘literal’ proposition 
having the class of students as its constituent. But in this way the 
metaphorical dimension is somehow divorced from the truth-
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conditions of (15), a result which I think is quite unappealing.  If 
one, like Stern, wants a theory that explains how the metaphorical 
dimension of an utterance relates to its truth-conditions, then an 
explanation along these lines is clearly not fruitful.  
The other solution sketched by Stern is more interesting, but 
makes the semantics of a metaphorical utterance quite a complicate 
process. The strategy consists in applying first the Mthat-operator 
to the description, and then Kaplan’s Dthat-operator to its outcome, 
namely, a property, so as to pick out the individual who has that 
property in context. In the case of (15), we would have the 
following interpretable string: 
 
(22)  The spring awakes Dthat [‘The x: x Mthat [‘the 
flowers’]’]. 
 
As Stern notes, on neither proposals is the metaphorical content 
(the set of properties) of the nominative metaphor an immediate 
constituent of the content asserted by (15). However, according to 
Stern, such content has a clear explanation in its semantics.  
As I said, the first explanation given by Stern is not satisfying 
because it consigns the metaphorical interpretation to a level other 
than the truth-conditional one. According to the second explanation 
appealing to the ‘Dthat’, instead, we have that the metaphorical 
content only indirectly enters in the semantic content asserted by a 
metaphorical utterance having a nominative metaphor as its 
constituent. Again, it seems to me that in this way all the 
interesting semantic properties of a metaphor are lost or made 
become not relevant to the truth-conditions of the utterance. 
Besides, it is a legitimate worry that a semantics of an utterance 
such as (15) makes things too complicate by deriving interpretable 
strings such as (22). 
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My question to Stern and to anyone hoping for a semantics of 
metaphorical interpretation is: wouldn’t it be better to have a 
unique rule specifying both the metaphorical dimension of an 
expression and its (direct) contribution to the content expressed by 
its utterance? My claim in the remnant part of this dissertation is 
that it is actually the case that we have a unique rule for 
metaphorical interpretation. This rule does not only simplify the 
whole interpretative process a lot, but it also provides a general 
understanding of what it is for a metaphor to be apt or not, 
something which is missing in Stern’s account. 
To sum up what I have done in this chapter so far, here is a 
bunch of issues that Stern’s account is unable to deal with properly: 
 
(i) The dependence of the metaphorical dimension of an 
expression upon its ‘literal’ meaning; 
(ii) The semantic import of a nominative metaphor to the 
content expressed by its utterance; 
(iii) The aptness of a metaphor: what makes a metaphor 
good? 
 
My ‘big’ claim in the next chapter is that my theory offers a clear 
and straightforward answer to all these issues, outclassing Stern’s 
theory in terms of simplicity, elegance, and also adequacy. Besides, 
I will show that my theory also solves some interesting problems 
concerning belief reports of metaphorical contents and the 
semantics of denial. Before moving to the final step of this 
dissertation, I would like to conclude this chapter by pausing on 
some philosophical consequences of adopting Stern’s indexicalist 
strategy. 
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5. Conclusions: M-that and Semantic Theorising 
 
In this final section I pause to reflect on the consequences that 
Stern’s introduction of an ‘Mthat’-operator has for the semantic 
theorising. I am going to argue that such introduction may be 
resisted on more general theoretical grounds than those I offered in 
the previous sections. 
Let’s begin with Stern’s rule for metaphorical interpretation, 
which is based on the presence of an operator at the level of the LF 
of any lexical expression in the grammar: 
 
(Mthat) For every context c and for every expression !, an 
occurrence of ‘Mthat[!]’ in a sentence S(=...Mthat[!]...) in c 
(directly) expresses a set of properties P presupposed to be m-
associated with ! in c such that the proposition <...P...> is either 
true or false in the circumstance of c. (Stern 2000: 115) 
 
With this rule Stern believes he has shown two things: on the one 
hand, the dependence of the metaphorical on the literal as based on 
the fact that the character associated with the metaphorical 
expression is individuated by the character of its literal vehicle; on 
the other hand, the context-dependence which apparently 
characterises most metaphorical expressions, apart from those more 
routinized which are context invariant. In fact, ‘Mthat’ is that 
operator ‘at the level of logical form which, when prefixed to a 
(literal) expression !, yields a context-sensitive expression 
‘Mthat[!]’ whose tokens in each context c express a set of 
properties presupposed in c to be m-associated with the expression 
!, such that the proposition <...{Mthat[!]}(c)...> is either true or 
false at a circumstance.’ (Stern 2006: 262)  
In particular, Stern believes that knowledge of this operator 
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guarantees that metaphor lies within the speakers’ semantic 
competence. He says:  
 
What the speaker does know in virtue of his semantic knowledge is 
the character of the metaphor, that is, a rule or directive to map a 
parameter of the context into the content of the metaphor in that 
context. Metaphorical character constrains which contents can be 
metaphorically expressed by which expressions in which contexts. 
(Stern 2008: 270) 
 
More specifically, 
 
The speaker’s semantic competence in metaphor, like the semantic 
competence that underlies her ability to use demonstratives, 
consists in knowledge of that meaning, or character, namely, a 
function from the metaphorically relevant associated properties in 
the context set of presuppositions to the particular subset of 
properties that constitute the content of the metaphor in that 
context. Together with its contextual presuppositions, the character 
yields the content of the interpretation, but the meaning is not itself 
part of that content. (ibid, 278) 
 
Most criticisms Stern’s has incurred seem to have focussed on the 
analogy made by Stern between the Mthat operator and Kaplan’s 
Dthat operator. The analogy breaks down in a number of ways. 
Here I will try to question more directly the use of such an operator 
for my immediate purpose at hand. In particular, I want to question 
Stern’s claim that “Mthat is a rule of character that a speaker 
knows simply in virtue of his knowledge of language” (2000: 115). 
Unfortunately, after more careful considerations, and also 
perhaps influenced by motivations similar to Kripke’s in rejecting 
the ambiguity theories of Donnellan’s referential/attributive 
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reading of definite descriptions,31 I think that Stern’s introduction 
of this operator has very bad consequences and, even 
independently of these consequences, its presupposed tacit 
knowledge is not required at all. 
A very serious problem is the fact that if this operator functions 
at the level of the logical form of sentences, then it introduces some 
suspicious syntactic ambiguity. In fact, given a pre-semantic 
treatment of metaphorical expressions and by having accepted the 
‘no presumption of literalness’ claim, Stern is committed to the 
view that a sentence like 
 
(23)  Juliet is the sun, 
 
has five metaphorical ways of being interpreted and one literal, all 
of which have equal right of being initially processed by an 
interpreter: 
 
(23.L) Juliet is the sun, 
 
(23.1)  Mthat[‘Juliet is the sun’], 
 
(23.2)  Mthat[‘Juliet’] is the sun,  
 
(23.3) Juliet is Mthat[‘the sun’], 
 
(23.4)  Juliet Mthat[‘is the sun’]. 
 
(23.5)  Juliet Mthat[‘is’] the sun. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 The idea advanced by Kripke (1977) was that the ambiguity that some like 
Kaplan considered to be present in the case of definite descriptions could be 
resolved pragmatically by allowing the generic reading to be part of the 
semantics of the description and the referential one to be pragmatically derived. I 
am not a supporter of this view, but I see the force it may have in questioning 
examples like Stern’s. 
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None of these readings has an interpretive priority over the other, 
but all have in principle a chance of being selected, even the first 
literal reading, depending on how the context, or sets of 
presuppositions shared by the speaker and hearer, turns out to be. 
This, as Catherine Wearing has recently pointed out, has a 
potentially disruptive effect due to the ‘massive overgeneration’ of 
characters it introduces into syntactic operations:  
 
[I]f ‘Mthat’ is to appear in syntactic representations, there must be 
a syntactic projection in those representations into which it can go. 
In other words, there must be an appropriate branch on the 
syntactic tree to which ‘Mthat’ can attach. However, it is not clear 
what this branch might be. M-that operator does not seem to 
belong to any of the standard lexical or functional categories–it is 
not a noun, a verb, and adverb, a complementizer, or a determiner. 
At the same time, the Mthat-operator can apply to almost every 
type of syntactic constituent–whole sentences, nouns, noun 
phrases, verbs, verb phrases, adverbs and so forth, whereas existing 
syntactic categories are quite restricted with respect to how they 
can be combined. (Wearing 2006: 318) 
 
The postulation of such aphonic elements seems therefore to be 
not only ad hoc, but also quite unconstrained syntactically. Stern 
seems to have fallen in what Stephen Neale describes as a scene-
reading trap. A scene-reading trap is one in which a semanticist 
falls whenever “he postulates a reading of some particular sentence 
S in order to explain data which, upon examination, has suggested 
itself to the semanticist because (a) a condition obtaining in a 
particular scene that he is articulating with a view to assessing for 
truth or falsity the proposition expressed by someone uttering S on 
a given occasion (or by a given utterance or use of S, as the 
semanticist might put it), has been erroneously built into (b) the 
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conditions necessary and sufficient for the truth of that proposition” 
(2007: 84-85). In other words, from the fact that a sentence such as 
(23) can, on certain occasions of use, have a reading in which ‘the 
sun’ is metaphorically interpreted, Stern concludes that this reading 
should be ‘built into’ the logical form of the sentence, opening in 
this way the sentence to unwelcome ambiguity.  
What Neale further stresses is that such postulation of aphonics 
into the LF of a sentence are “wholly non-constant, 
nonperspectival, and non-descriptive in what they encode. In short, 
if they exist at all, they are expressions whose values are identified 
wholly pragmatically, without any guidance from their own 
meaning properties!” (ibid., 82) I will provide some discussion of 
this claim. For now, my point is that Stern, in order to preserve a 
dependence of the metaphorical on the literal, is reversing the order 
of explanation and making the literal subject to the quirks of the 
metaphorical. In other words, in trying to capture all the scenarios 
(scenes) in which a given sentence may take a metaphorical 
interpretation for some of its parts or its whole, he goes on to offer 
a model of understanding the truth-conditions of a sentence where 
one has to assume at a deep level all these readings from the start 
before being able to determine any truth-evaluable content. As a 
result, in this way it is difficult to see what kinds of advantages we 
are supposed to gain from having postulated such massive 
ambiguity in the LF (Cf. Stern 2006: 265-66).  
There is also another worry, and it concerns the finitude of our 
semantic learning. The worry against Stern’s account is that it 
makes semantics incredibly rich by multiplying characters. The 
objection is that although Stern takes the operator itself to be a sort 
of character the knowledge of which makes a speaker linguistically 
competent in using metaphors, the semantic role of the operator is 
to generate new characters for each new metaphorical expression. 
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‘Mthat’ is something that selects a character. So, e.g., 
the character of ‘warm’ is a function that gives the 
property of having a high temperature. But ‘Mthat 
[‘warm’]’ selects a different character, I suppose often 
the property of being friendly and generous. If this is the 
picture, the question is: what does this character select 
from? If it is a function, what is its argument? Not 
context (in Kaplan’s sense) of course: context is the 
argument for character, and if you already have a 
character you do not need to select it. Maybe the idea is: 
‘Mthat’ operates on ‘wide context’ (presuppositions, 
intentions, etc.). So, in a certain wide context where we 
are not talking about temperature but about personality 
traits, when applied to ‘warm’, Mthat yields the 
character which, given a context, picks out the property 
of being generous in that context. [This way of putting 
the worry is due to Stefano Predelli, whom I thank.] 
 
Here I think that a reasonable characterisation of Stern’s view 
would be to say that a sentence containing an expression ! is 
endowed with two characters, one literal and the other 
metaphorical. Given a context, one of the two characters has to be 
selected (we are at the pre-semantic level here). Once one of these 
two characters is selected, it does its usual job. It yields a content in 
context. But where it goes to look for its argument is different: a 
‘narrow’ context in the literal case, a ‘wide’ context in the 
metaphorical one. Furthermore, the metaphorical character is like 
an operator32 in the sense that it is a function whose argument is not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 “[P]art of what the speaker knows when she knows how to interpret a 
metaphor ! is not simply something about the single expression !. Her 
knowledge of metaphor is closer to knowledge of an operator, of an interpretive 
operation she can perform on any (literally interpreted) expression. And in this 
respect the character of a metaphor is more like that of the demonstrative 
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a Kaplanian context, sure, but presupposed properties associated 
with the literal vehicle, which, as the objector says, are picked out 
from a ‘wide context’. So the metaphorical character of an 
expression is that function whose argument are presupposed 
properties associated with the literal vehicle and whose value is a 
new property in context. 
Treating the M-that operator as an operator which selects a new 
character for each expression used metaphorically in a given 
context is problematic. For there would be too many characters, 
and given that our linguistic competence is finite, Stern would have 
to say that it isn’t, after all. Besides, in that way you would treat the 
operator more like a monster. These could be the reasons why 
Stern opts for a sort of lexical ambiguity instead. Still, I see the 
force of the objector’s point. It would make sense to say that Mthat 
selects appropriate characters for metaphorical expressions.  
I guess part of the issue comes from Stern’s merging the idea of 
a character-like rule for metaphorical interpretation, and the 
different notion of operator he uses. Given that an operator is 
generally a function which operates either on characters or 
contents, it is somewhat misleading to identify the notion of 
operator with that of character.  
Be that as it may, this section had the purpose of showing that 
there are further important worries about Stern’s account. One is 
that it syntactically multiplies readings, the other is that it 
overgenerates characters. Insofar as these worries are plausible, and 
Stern gives no clear answer as to how he could accommodate these, 
I think this is sufficient ground to abandon the project of explaining 
metaphor by adopting Stern’s indexicalist route. My last chapter is 
entirely devoted to the defence of a non-indexical contextualist 
view of metaphor. This account will be proven to be superior to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
interpretation operator ‘Dthat’ than that of any individual indexical (type) such 
as ‘I’ or ‘here’ ” (Stern 2000: 198-99. My emphasis). 
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Stern’s in that it eschews the kinds of syntactic and semantic 
objections to it, and it also offers an interesting perspective on 
some important semantic issues concerning the semantics of 
metaphorical interpretation: in particular, the semantics of belief 
ascriptions and the semantics of denial. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Metaphor & Non-Indexical 
Contextualism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In Chapter 5 I briefly discussed the case of Pia’s leaves, in which 
two utterances or inscriptions of the same sentence: 
 
(1)  The leaves are green 
 
were said to lead to the assignment of distinct truth-values in two 
contexts of utterance, although the environment in which the two 
utterances took place did not change. There I showed how different 
options are available for the treatment of this type of utterances. 
Let me quickly go through them again. 
 
Contextualism: Two utterances of (1) express different 
propositions, which are given distinct truth-evaluations. 
Minimalism: Although one proposition is expressed by the two 
utterances, what the utterers of this sentence mean in their different 
contexts is different. 
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Indexicalism: Each new utterance of (1) expresses a different 
content in virtue of the fact that the predicate ‘are green’ is 
indexical. 
Ambiguist: A predicate like ‘is green’ is ambiguous between, say, 
two different, but wholly lexicalised, readings: one reading picks 
out a certain property, another reading picks out a different but 
related property. 
In the previous chapter I have discussed and criticised Stern’s 
theory of metaphor. This account is, basically, a combination of 
indexicalism and ambiguism: the former aspect is due to the idea 
that each metaphorical expression has a character that yields a 
different content in each context of use, whereas the latter is due to 
the presence of two distinct characters for each expression, which 
are responsible for either a literal interpretation or a metaphorical 
one. 
In this chapter I will contemplate the idea that the picture just 
given is not exhaustive. I will, in fact, present and defend a view 
which has nowadays gained support in different areas of the 
philosophical debate. The view I am going to propose is usually 
called ‘non-indexical contextualism’ (henceforth NIC) after 
MacFarlane’s original definition (2007, 2009). This view is 
basically Kaplanian in the sense that it works within Kaplan’s 
semantic framework, with an important emendation: instead of 
having the ‘standard’ pair <world, time> as the circumstance of 
evaluation determined by the context, NIC considers an additional 
parameter in it. The nature of this parameter is generally related to 
the discourse topic: it may be a knowledge parameter in the case of 
knowledge ascriptions, or a taste parameter in the case of 
predicates of taste, or what you like.1 Also, what distinguishes NIC 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Kaplan himself allowed that his notion of circumstance of evaluation could be 
expanded to include new parameters (Kaplan 1989: 502): “A circumstance will 
usually include a possible state or history of the world, a time, and perhaps other 
features as well. The amount of information we require from a circumstance is 
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from contextualism is that it gives context an additional role: fixing 
the relevant circumstance relative to which the content of an 
utterance is to be evaluated.2 Additional sensitivity to a dimension 
of ‘assessment’ is what differentiates NIC from relativism, at least 
in the sense given by MacFarlane to this doctrine (MacFarlane 
2005). 
In detail, I am going to argue here for a non-indexical 
contextualist view of metaphorical interpretation, which draws 
support from NIC and its most recent applications to several 
philosophical debates such as the semantics of knowledge 
ascriptions (MacFarlane 2009) and the semantics of predicates of 
taste (Lasersohn 2005; 2009, Stephenson 2007). This view is based 
on a clear distinction between aspects of context-dependence which 
are merely indexical, and other aspects which concern the 
dimension of evaluation of an utterance, that is, its circumstances.3 
As far as cases of knowledge ascriptions are concerned, NIC states 
that two grammatically identical ascriptions of knowledge to an 
individual may differ in truth-value without there being a 
difference in the proposition expressed by the utterances of those 
ascriptions.4 In the Kaplanian jargon, the input the semantic system 
receives from the two utterances is the same, the initialiser of the 
contextual parameters being identical, but the difference in the 
circumstances of evaluation, which is determined by the presence 
of different knowledge parameters in them, makes the two !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
linked to the degree of specificity of contents, and thus to the kinds of operators 
in the language”. 
2 MacFarlane (2009: 234) distinguishes between two roles of context: a ‘content-
determinative’ role and a circumstance-determinative’ one. 
3 In Kaplan’s words (1989: 506): “Indexicals have a context-sensitive character. 
It is characteristic of an indexical that its content varies with context. 
Nonindexicals have a fixed character. The same content is invoked in all 
contexts. This content will typically be sensitive to circumstances, that is, the 
non-indexicals are typically not rigid designators but will vary in extension from 
circumstance to circumstance” (Emphasis in italics in the text, my emphasis in 
bold). 
4 In other words, given two contexts, C and C’, two utterances of the same 
sentence, e.g., ‘Jim knew that his keys were in his jacket’, may turn out to have 
two distinct truth-values in C and C’, although the proposition expressed in both 
contexts is the same. 
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ascriptions differ in truth-values. Likewise, the view I am going to 
put forward locates the context-dependence of a metaphorical 
utterance at the level of its circumstances of evaluation, instead of 
positing such a dependence in some features of the context of use. 
After having read the previous chapter my reader may be already 
persuaded that by treating the context-dependence of metaphors on 
the model of indexicals, we enormously complicate the semantics 
of natural language. I will show here that no complication follows 
if we treat metaphorical expressions non-indexically and on the 
model given by NIC to cover other semantic phenomena. 
There is a possible argument against my appeal to circumstances 
of evaluation in accounting for metaphorical interpretation. The 
criticism could be put in this way: 
 
Appealing to circumstances of evaluation is a clever 
way for you to say that metaphorical interpretation is 
semantic, while allowing context to play a big role in 
determining what an actual circumstance of evaluation 
is. Thus you’re trying to have the cake and eat it too, so 
what you’re doing sounds more like cheating. Since 
what fixes a metaphorical interpretation always varies 
from context to context, and since you reject the 
indexicalist model, we must conclude that 
understanding metaphors is a matter of pragmatics, 
after all. 
 
I will take up this objection in due course, as well as the objection 
that my view of what a circumstance of evaluation is overgenerates 
parameters. 
My plan in this chapter is to give the reader a critical overview 
of NIC, so as to pave the way for its application to the case of 
metaphor. I believe that we can apply NIC to the case of metaphor, 
while leaving Kaplan’s system intact. Not only, I think, has this 
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strategy a number of advantages over Stern’s account, but also 
gives a more correct understanding of metaphorical interpretation, 
which is based on powerful connections with the semantics of other 
phenomena. Moreover, while my strategy may sound somewhat 
conservative, it is not necessarily devised with the aim of defending 
Kaplan’s orthodoxy. It may well be that we need to revise Kaplan’s 
system for other good reasons. It is just that it does not seem to me 
that metaphor provides any serious threat to the system. Actually, 
the system can be fruitfully explored as it stands, or expanded 
without altering its essence. 
My discussion will proceed in this way: in the next section I 
present four cases for NIC, so as to motivate my introduction in § 3 
of what I call the thematic dimension of an utterance. There I am 
going to argue that the same metaphorical sentence, as used in 
different contexts of utterance, does not express multiple contents, 
but a minimal content which ends up being assigned different 
extensions at different circumstances of evaluation. In this sense, I 
propose that we shift our attention away from indexicalist and 
radical contextualist views, and focus instead on the problem of 
determining appropriate circumstances of evaluation for 
metaphorical utterances. Here is my major proposal: I introduce a 
non-standard circumstance of evaluation, which does not include 
just a world and a time, but also a specific parameter for the 
metaphorical dimension of a given utterance, namely, what I call 
its ‘thematic dimension’. In § 4 I will discuss a number of 
interesting problems surrounding a theory of metaphor. These 
include the issue of disagreement and belief reports over 
metaphorical contents. There I will show why my account is 
superior to other proposals in dealing with these issues. Finally, in 
§ 5 I will conclude my analysis by reflecting on the relative ‘open-
endness’ of metaphors, arguing that this aspect fits well with my 
account.  
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2. The Case for Non-indexical Contextualism 
 
In this section I shall provide my reader with an assessment of 
cases whose explanation is in harmony with NIC, or with some 
other doctrine relevantly associated to it. This should put her in a 
comfortable position when, in the next section, I introduce the 
version of NIC which is appropriate for metaphor. 
 
Case #01. An illustration of what NIC is can be found in Predelli 
(2005a, 2005b), where he presents the following consideration 
about Pia’s case, which I introduced in Chapter 4, § 3.3: 
 
The sheer fact that a sentence such as [1] may be uttered truly 
on some occasions, but falsely on others, is hardly a reason 
for philosophical excitement. If it is granted that neither 
indexicality nor ambiguity play a role in this example, it 
follows rather immediately that, in a certain sense, 
uniqueness of meaning may be compatible with truth-
conditional discrepancy. This (at least from the semanticist’s 
point of view) not too-exciting conclusion is, however, 
elevated to the status of a momentous philosophical tenet 
within the contextualist approach. (Predelli 2005b: 373. My 
emphasis)  
 
Predelli considers, without being very generous with details, the 
idea that two utterances of the same non-indexical and non-
ambiguous sentence expresses the same content (i.e., have the same 
intension) which, when evaluated at two distinct circumstances of 
evaluation (points in his terminology), yields two distinct truth-
values (t-distributions, as he puts it).  
A question Predelli does not address directly is how the relevant 
circumstance of evaluation of an utterance is selected and how it 
CHAPTER 7 !
! "#$!
effectively determines the appropriate extension for the content 
expressed by it. In other words, a potential objection to this account 
is that once the appropriate input of the semantic interpretation is 
given,5 the system delivers its extension or semantic value in a 
purely ad hoc way. The next case is supposed to supply that 
element which allows Predelli’s consideration to work in the 
desired manner. 
 
Case #02. John MacFarlane (2007) reflects upon the philosophical 
foundations of semantic minimalism, the theory that any utterance 
of a non-indexical and non-ambiguous sentence expresses the same 
content across contexts. In Chapter 4, § 3.1, of this dissertation I 
have expressed my worries about this view, and I will not stress 
them again. However, MacFarlane lends a hand to minimalists such 
as Cappelen and Lepore, offering a potential solution to the 
problem of characterising the role of minimal propositions in 
semantic theorising: 
 
I believe that most philosophers’ worries about 
minimal propositions are rooted in puzzlement over the 
question this claim provokes: At which circumstances 
of evaluation is the proposition that [Nicola is really 
smart] true? Here I’m using the technical term 
‘circumstance of evaluation’ the way David Kaplan 
taught us to use it in ‘Demonstratives’ (1989). A 
circumstance of evaluation includes all the parameters 
to which propositional truth must be relativized for 
semantic purposes. Though Kaplan himself included 
times in his circumstances of evaluation (and 
contemplated other parameters as well), the current 
orthodoxy is that circumstances of evaluations are just !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 To remind the reader, according to Predelli, the input of a semantic system is 
the pair constituted by a clause (i.e., a disambiguated sentence) and an index. 
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possible worlds. In this setting, our question becomes: 
At which possible worlds is the minimal proposition 
true? I’ll call this the intension problem for minimal 
propositions (using the term ‘intension’ for a function 
from possible worlds to truth values for propositions, 
or to extensions for properties and relations). 
(MacFarlane 2007: 242; also quot. in Cappelen and 
Hawthorne 2009: 135-36) 
 
The ‘obvious’ solution for minimalists is to let their notion of 
minimal proposition merge with Kaplan’s framework and, in 
particular, with his ‘division of semantic labour’. On this account, 
the semantic labour is a function of three levels: a pre-semantic 
level, a properly semantic one, and a post-semantic level. The first, 
as I pointed out elsewhere in this dissertation, is the level at which 
reference assignment and disambiguation take place; the semantic 
level is the level at which contents are assigned by the system to 
utterances (better, to sentences-in-context); post-semantics is 
finally the level at which the content is assigned its extension at an 
appropriate circumstance of evaluation. In a nutshell, MacFarlane 
suggests that minimalists should consider their minimal proposition 
as nothing but Kaplanian characters, functions that determine other 
functions from circumstances of evaluation to extensions. 
Here, however, I am not really interested in the question of 
whether the minimalist notion of proposition is compatible with 
Kaplan’s semantics.6  What I am interested in is MacFarlane’s 
substantial agreement with Predelli’s claim that the problem of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Ultimately, I do not think this is going to work anyway. For minimalists take 
minimal propositions to be fully-fledged propositions, whereas Kaplanians take 
characters to be functions from properties to contents. Thus, from the semantic 
point of view we have two distinct mathematical entities here. An implicit 
suggestion in Recanati (2007) is to take them as narrow content, the content of 
the speakers’ attitudes, which is what is ‘in their head’. I am favourable to this 
option, although I do not see how Recanati’s suggestion would work within his 
truth-conditional pragmatic framework discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, in which 
minimal propositions do not have any role whatsoever. 
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non-indexical and non-ambiguous sentences with variable truth-
conditions reduces to the problem of assigning extensions to the 
contents expressed by their utterances. This problem finds a natural 
solution within the Kaplanian system. The variation of truth-
conditions in the utterances of a non-indexical and non-ambiguous 
sentence is due to the variation of circumstances of evaluation 
across contexts of use. This is already captured by Kaplan’s truth-
clause in his LD: 
 
Definition  !!"Mf, c, t, w   = T iff given a model M, an 
assignment f of values to variables, {!}(c) is true 
relative to (ct, cw). 
 
Still, given this particular truth-definition one may wonder how on 
this account the assignment of different extensions or semantic 
values to a non-indexical content is made possible, together with 
the intuitive variation of truth-conditions across contexts, if the 
world and the time of the contexts of evaluation are the same. 
It is at this point that MacFarlane suggests (2007: 246) that we 
introduce a ‘count-as’ parameter in the circumstance of evaluation. 
The parameter can be considered as a function from properties to 
intensions (functions from circumstances of evaluation to 
extensions/truth-values).7 
In this way, the truth-value of a given sentence or expression is 
allowed to vary across contexts, although its content remains fixed. 
The suggestion can be formalised in the following way: take two 
utterances of (1) in two contexts whose truth-conditions intuitively 
diverge. Now we have that the proper semantic representations of 
the two utterances of (1) are (1*) and (1**): 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 “The count-as” parameter is so called because it fixes what things have to be 
like in order to count as having the property of tallness (or any other property) at 
a circumstance of evaluation” (MacFarlane 2007: 246). 
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(1*)   !The leaves are green"c, t, w, ! = T iff <{The leaves}(c), 
{Green}(c)> is true at (ct, cw, c©), 
 
(1**)  !The leaves are green"c, t, w, !’ = F iff <{The leaves}(c), 
{Green}(c)> is true at (ct, cw, c©’). 
 
Here ‘©’ represents Macfarlane’s ‘count-as’ parameter. Notice how 
the index parameter ‘c’ is the same in both (1*) and (1**). 
However, the count-as parameter is different in the sense that the 
shift from the context in which the first utterance takes place to the 
context in which the second utterance does is distinguished by the 
presence of two distinct judgement criteria: the photographer’s 
perspective in one case, the botanist’s perspective in the other.8 
MacFarlane (2009) applies this strategy to the case of 
knowledge ascriptions. In this paper, MacFarlane systematises the 
following suggestion by Kompa (2002: 87-88): 
 
 . . . an unspecific utterance is true or false, as the case may 
be, only relative to the imposed standard. The standard in 
turn is determined by contextual features like the speaker’s 
and hearer’s presuppositions, interests, intentions, their 
conversational goals &c. So a truth condition of an unspecific 
utterance could be roughly stated as follows, where ‘... is F’ 
be an unspecific predicate: 
An utterance of “X is F” [sic] is true iff X meets the 
contextually relevant standard for F-ness. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Cf. Predelli 2005a: 146. Let me add a word on the notion of truth-conditions I 
am working with. It should not to be confused with the idea of wordly 
conditions, which is only contingently related to it. I subscribe to Stojanovic’s 
consideration here: “I submit that there is no good theoretical or practical reason 
to insist that truth conditions should necessarily be worldly conditions. Maybe 
there is some historical reason. But once we see that the assumption is arbitrary, 
there is no reason to stick to it, not even for historical reasons. Instead, we should 
rehabilitate the term ‘truth conditions’ so that it means what it really means – and 
that is, simply, truth conditions, which may be conditions pretty much on 
anything” (Stojanovic 2007: 23).  
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Accordingly, the view defended by NIC is that ‘know’ expresses 
the same relation at every context of use, namely, the relation 
between a subject S, a proposition p and a time t such that S knows 
that p at t. More precisely, ‘know’ can be characterized as a 
function from circumstances of evaluation (world, epistemic 
standard) to extensions, such that a subject S is in the knowing 
relation to p and t at (w, e) iff p is true at (w, e) and S is in a 
sufficiently strong enough epistemic position at w and t with 
respect to p to meet the standard e (cf. MacFarlane 2007: 6). 
Suppose I now utter: 
 
(2)  As far as I know, the bank closes at 12:30. 
 
This proposition contains an element of epistemic modality, which 
makes its reading to be, roughly, ‘For all worlds which are 
compatible with my knowledge in w, the bank closes at 12:30’. 
Given the purposes of my utterance and the strong epistemic 
position I am in at the moment of my utterance, the proposition I 
express by uttering (2) is true at the time of my utterance relative to 
the epistemic standard determined by my context. If it turns out 
that the bank’s regulation has changed the day my utterance takes 
place, and now the bank closes at 12:00, this would falsify any 
utterance of (2) taking place after this piece of information is 
updated in the common ground, but not before the update.  
Let’s define k as the count-as parameter which enters into the 
circumstance of evaluation of a knowledge ascription such as (2). 
Let’s also take the clause following ‘know’ in (2) to be the 
proposition p. The semantic representation of (2) is: 
 
(2*)  !As far as I know, the bank closes at 12:30"c, t, w, k = T iff 
<{Know}(c), ({I}(c), p)> is true at (ct, cw, ck). 
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In other words, the sentence ‘As far as I know, the bank closes at 
12:30’ is true in context c iff the speaker of counts as being in the 
relation of knowledge with the proposition p at the circumstance of 
evaluation (cw, ck), where the last parameter represents the 
knowledge parameter determined by the context. 
Suppose we move to a different context, one in which it is quite 
important for the participants in the conversation to be sure that 
what I am saying is true (for whichever reason). Then the standards 
for evaluating my knowledge ascription arise, to the point in which 
my utterance of (2) can be judged as false. Semantically this may 
be represented as follows: 
 
(2**)  !As far as I know, the bank closes at 12:30"c, t, w, k’ = T iff 
<{Know}(c), ({I}(c), p)> is true at (ct, cw, ck’). 
 
As the reader can see, the content embedded on the right-hand side 
of the bi-conditional is the same in both (2*) and (2**). What 
changes is the circumstance of evaluation, which includes different 
values for the knowledge parameter determined by their respective 
contexts. Since in this new context the knowledge parameter 
introduces a different epistemic environment, the same proposition 
expressed by an utterance of (2) may well turn out to be false.  
I believe this view is empirically adequate and formally correct. 
It gives a clear and efficacious representation of the layers of 
context-dependence involved in this type of utterance, without 
making the unreasonable claim that an utterance of (2) expresses 
different propositions in different contexts.  
In light of the examples just discussed, I follow MacFarlane in 
distinguishing two ways an expression can be dependent on 
context. We have, in fact, context-dependence and context-
sensitvity: 
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Given a contextual feature !,9 we have either of the two 
situations: 
 
Context-dependence: An expression is !-dependent iff 
its content at a context depends on the ! of that context. 
 
Context-sensitivity: An expression is !-sensitive iff its 
extension at a context depends on the ! of that context.  
 
The reader should by now be able to see a connection between 
MacFarlane’s definition of context-dependence and my definition 
of the Fregean Premise in Chapter 4, § 2.1: the idea that a 
contextual aspect is relevant to the truth-conditions of an utterance 
iff it is part of the content expressed by the utterance. 
Contextualism and indexicalism both conform to MacFarlane’s 
context-dependence and my Fregean Premise. In contrast, NIC 
conforms to context-sensitivity and rejects the Fregean Premise. 
There is a potential worry for NIC that MacFarlane (2009: 239-
41) briefly considers. This concerns indirect reports such as the 
following:  
 
(3) Francesco: I know that the bank closes at 12:30. 
 (later on in the day) 
Bill: Francesco said/asserted/believed that he knew the bank 
closes at 12:30. 
Ivonne: That’s false. 
 
Suppose that my standards of knowledge were such that my 
relation to the proposition that the bank closed at the indicated time 
in the context of my utterance counted as knowledge. Suppose that, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 I have substituted MacFarlane’s notation for stylistic reasons. 
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actually, the bank closed at 12:00 for a new policy. Then given that 
this new policy has been brought to the fore in discussion, I did not 
know that the bank closed at 12:30, although at the time of my 
utterance I was in a position to know that proposition. The reader 
should bear in mind that we are in a different context now (just 
consider my use of the past). Now it is seems natural to say that, 
although the context has changed, Bill’s report is true because his 
report is sensitive to my standards of knowledge tuned to the time 
in which my utterance took place, not to his current standards. This 
is what Ivonne completely misses with her denial of Bill’s report. 
This intuitive fact needs a clear semantic explanation, which I am 
going to provide in the next case. 
For now, I want to progress a little bit more with my discussion 
and add that a case such as (3) is problematic for the contextualist 
because the knowledge relation I have with the that-clause when I 
utter (2) and the relation is attributed to me when Bill reports me is, 
on this doctrine, supposed to be dependent on features of the 
context of use, as also the indexicalist believes. In this sense, the 
relation should be sensitive to the speakers of the respective 
contexts, but is clearly not. 
Finally, what about a case like the following (modelled on 
MacFarlane’s example on page 240 of his paper): 
 
(4)  # Francesco knows that the bank closes at 12:30, but he 
doesn’t know that the bank closes at 12:30. 
 
How to explain the oddity of (4)? I follow MacFarlane in holding 
that the oddity is due to the fact that a context of use should 
determine one knowledge parameter, but we are here in the 
presence of two conflicting standards. Notice how the oddity 
disappears or diminishes if you shift the temporal coordinate of the 
first utterance to the past: 
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(5) Francesco knew that the bank closed at 12:30, but he 
doesn’t know that the bank now closes at 12:30. 
 
Interestingly, a knowledge parameter seems to be sensitive to the 
fixation of a value for other parameters like the time parameter. It 
seems in fact odd that given the same time parameter, two 
knowledge parameters are both in force. The dynamics of 
conversation requires that at each time one knowledge parameter 
should be in force. If you shift the time parameter, then the 
knowledge one may be shifting, too, without disrupting the 
conversation. 
There are other worries that need to be considered, but at present 
I am happy with the formulation of NIC which I have just given. It 
offers a clear and adequate semantic analysis of knowledge 
ascriptions and adjectives as well.10 It also offers some interesting 
prospects for a correct understanding of the dynamics of 
conversation, in which speakers may hold different points of view 
on the same content expressed either by two utterances of the same 
sentence or by one utterance as evaluated against different 
situations.11 
 
Case #03. 
 
Suppose we have just watched the latest David Lynch movie. I 
think it is quite boring, while you think it is quite exciting. I assert: 
 
(6)  It was quite boring, wasn’t it? 
 
To which you reply: 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 See Åkerman, J., and Greenough, P. (2010) for an application of NIC to the 
semantics of vague terms.  
11 I am using the word ‘situation’ in the technical sense given by Barwise and 
Perry in their situation semantics (Barwise and Perry 1983).  
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(7)  It wasn’t boring. I found it exciting. 
 
What exactly are you denying? And what exactly am I asserting? 
The problem with these utterances is that someone could report us 
in this way: 
 
(8)  Francesco said/asserted/believes that David Lynch’s latest 
movie is boring. Greg said/asserted/believes that it is not. 
They are both right, from their own perspectives.  
 
From (8) it may seem to follow that the ascriber of these beliefs is 
falling into a contradiction: for he thinks that X is P and, at the 
same time, not P. How can that be possible? The obvious reason 
why he is not contradicting himself is that he is allowed to report 
Francesco and Greg as being both right because his report collects 
the different perspectives from which my assertion and Greg’s one 
have been made, and there is nothing strange with that. Of course, 
we need a semantic explanation for this fact. 
Suppose now I utter: 
 
(9)  Stanley Kubrick was British. 
 
And you reply: 
 
(10)  He wasn’t. 
 
Here the ascriber of our asserted contents/beliefs could not report 
us in the way he did in (8), on pain of being inconsistent: 
 
(11)  Francesco said/asserted/believes that Stanley Kubrick was 
British. Greg said/asserted/believes that he was not. They 
are both right, from their own perspectives.  
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Perspectives, intended as standards a speaker has or adopts during a 
conversation, are things which allow her to make assertions about 
subjective issues, but do not have any role whatsoever in assertions 
about facts of the matter, which are supposed to be objective. 
Hence reports of these assertions are also indifferent to the points 
of views speakers may have in asserting whatever they are 
asserting about the world and its states of affairs.12 
Recent developments in relativistic semantics (Lasersohn 2005, 
2009; Stephenson 2007), in line with contributions from the 
philosophy of relativism (MacFarlane 2005; Köbel 2002), have 
recognised the importance of semantically distinguishing these 
features of ‘subjective’ assertions, arguing for the need to include a 
judge parameter in their semantic evaluation.  
How does this work? Take an utterance of ‘It is boring’ as 
uttered by me, about the latest David Lynch movie. Its semantic 
representation is: 
 
(6*)  !It is boring"c, t, w, j = T iff <{It}(c), {Boring}(c)> is true at 
(ct, cw, cj). 
 
(6*) says that the sentence ‘It is boring’ as uttered in context c by 
me is true iff the last David Lynch movie is boring at the time and 
world of my utterance, relative to the judge parameter which is 
contextually determined by the context as the speaker of the 
context of utterance (i.e., Francesco Gentile). 
This, once again, is nothing but NIC as applied to predicates of 
taste. It should also be noticed that there are cases in which the 
judge parameter does not coincide with the speaker. In other words, 
there are cases involving predicates of taste that do not have a de se !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 The reader should take this observation cum grano salis. I am not endorsing 
any strong metaphysical view based on a rigid separation of the ‘subjective’ 
from the ‘objective’. Actually, as I will explain in the next case, even certain 
‘objective’ facts can be taken as perspectival. Or better, it is legitimate to think 
that our descriptions of these objective facts are perspectival (more on this later). 
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reading (Lewis 1979b). This is especially common in free indirect 
discourse (see Lasersohn 2009: 364; see also Schlenker 2004). For 
instance: 
 
(12)  Jim went to the beach yesterday. It was good fun. 
 
Here the speaker is not saying of herself that she had fun the day 
before. She means that Jim had a lovely day at the beach. 
According to Lasersohn (2009: 364), it is “normal practice in such 
cases to assess [the claim] relative to a pragmatically salient person 
who was involved”. In (10) the person involved is supplied by the 
linguistic context, and we assess the whole claim easily, as for 
cases of pronominal anaphora. 
Let me reflect on two considerations before moving to the next 
case. First of all, as for the previous case it is quite easy to show 
that contextualists have problems when dealing with predicates of 
taste. The reason is double: on the one hand, they lose track of 
‘faultless  disagreement’, that is, the idea that two speakers may 
disagree about the same content and be both right. On the other 
hand, they are unable to explain the interaction of predicates of 
taste with truth-conditional operators like negation. The two 
problems are obviously related, as the argument below shows. 
Consider an utterance of ‘It is funny’ uttered by me, and an 
utterance of ‘It isn’t funny’ as uttered by you. Here are the 
renditions of (13) and (14) given by the contextualist and the non-
indexical contextualist. 
 
(13)  It is funny. 
(14) It isn’t funny. 
 
(13*)  It is funny-to-me. (Contextualism) 
(13**) Relative to me (i.e., my aesthetic standards), it is funny. 
(NIC) 
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(14*)  ? It isn’t funny-to-you. (Contextualism) 
(14**)  Relative to my aesthetic standards, it isn’t funny. (NIC) 
 
If the proposition expressed by an utterance of (13) is equivalent to 
(13*) then the denial of (13) should be equivalent to (14*). This 
absurd conclusion is another unwelcome consequence of the 
contextualist theory of meaning.13 Much more in line with the 
intuitions of speakers is the idea that the assertor of (13) and her 
denier are asserting their claims from their respective perspectives, 
but still disagree about the same content.14 What this also shows is 
that the truth-conditional operator of negation does not scope over 
the judge parameter and, obviously, it could not. Parameters of this 
kind are intensional elements, and it is a conceptual error to allow 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Glanberg (2008) and Stojanovic (2008) among others have attempted to make 
the relativistic stance less cogent by showing that contextualists can both have 
their own semantics for these kinds of predicates and also accommodate the 
notion of disagreement. As to the semantics, Glanzberg proposes a semantics for 
predicates of taste as based on the notion of scalarity, which has been 
investigated for other types of adjectives (see Kennedy 2007). As far as 
disagreement is concerned, Stojanovic attempts at showing how the very notion 
of faultless disagreement is not faultless, after all (see also Glanberg 2008: 16). 
Ultimately, I do not think either attempt succeeds in diminishing the force of 
relativism. In the case of Stojanovic’s criticism, I think that faultless 
disagreement is still disagreement and not just misunderstanding. It is 
disagreement in that there is a content the disagreement is about, and the 
contenders tacitly agree that the disagreement is about this content (see my 
discussion of the disagreement test in chapter 2). However, the disagreement 
may result to be faultless insofar as there is no objective fact of the matter such 
that one stance is more correct than the other. Crucially, no notion of 
misunderstanding is active within relativistic semantics. As to Glanzberg’s 
criticism, it may be argued that whether or not the notion of scale that Glanzberg 
appeals to is present for these adjectives, such notion is irrelevant to assessing 
the question of whether truth must be relativized to a judge parameter. So it 
seems to me that Glanzberg’s argument just begs the question of whether there is 
independent evidence against relativism. Glanzberg then appeals to Creswell’s 
general criticism against the montogovian conception of index, based on the fact 
that there does not seem to be a principled way to say what an index should (or 
should not) include. Similarly, relativism seems to be open to the same 
parametric open-endness, which would make our semantic competence difficult 
to explain. I find this objection weak since it does not present any direct 
evidence against relativistic semantics. As such, it is not so much an argument as 
a concern, for reasons already stressed by MacFarlane (2009: 245-46).  
14 A similar pattern can be found in epistemic modals, see Stephenson (2007: 
492). 
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extensional operators to operate on them. It follows that the 
appropriate truth-clauses for (13) and (14) are: 
 !w, t, j <{X}(c), {funny}(c)> 
 !w, t, j’ <Not <(X)(c), {funny}(c)>> 
 
[where X is the salient subject of conversation.] 
 
Secondly, there is another interesting aspect to consider concerning 
the semantics of attitude constructions. In this case, I follow 
Lasersohn (2009) who holds that a theory of attitude verbs is 
indexical in the sense that it treats predicates of taste like ‘is funny’ 
as involving a hidden argument. This argument works as a de se 
pronoun which, whenever it is embedded within an attitude verb, 
gets contextually saturated by the verb’s subject. A number of 
cases can be given as evidence: 
 
(15)  Mark believes liquorice is (to be) tasty. 
(16)  Mark considers liquorice to be tasty. 
(17)  Mark thinks liquorice is tasty. 
(18)  Mark imagines liquorice to be (is) tasty. 
 
Now at least (15) and (17) allow for an exocentric reading, roughly 
equivalent to: 
 
(15E) Mark believes liquorice is tasty w.r.t. the standards of taste 
of person y/ community z. 
(17E)  Mark thinks liquorice is (to be) tasty w.r.t. the standards of 
taste of person y/ community z. 
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(Try to get the same readings with (16) and (18) and you’ll get less 
clear-cut results15). 
However, in general, we read (15)-(18) to be saying that the 
complement-clause is true with respect to Mark, the subject of the 
ascription. It is, in fact, natural to take (15)-(18) as requiring an 
assessment relative to the subject’s autocentric perspective. This 
also explains the example discussed in the previous case: 
 
(3) Francesco: I know that the bank closes at 12:30. 
 (later on in the day) 
Bill: Francesco said/asserted/believed that he knew the bank 
closes at 12:30 today. 
Ivonne: That’s false. 
 
Bill’s report is obviously sensitive to Francesco’s standards of 
knowledge, not her owns. This seems to imply that it is not correct 
to characterise the semantics of attitude verbs as simply involving a 
relation between the subject and the proposition she is said to be in 
a relation with. We need to have a relation between a subject, a 
proposition and an appropriate parameter determining how the 
relation between the subject and the proposition is to be taken.16  
 
(19)  !believes that p" c, t, w = !x. x believes that p at (ct, cw), 
w.r.t. ", the parameter which determines what it is for x to 
stand in the relation of ‘believe’ with p. 
 
[where " = j or " = k, etc.] Here, as I will make more clear in the 
next section, the parameter " is fixed by c, so it does not appear in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Actually ‘imagine’ followed by an infinitive is autocentric, while ‘imagine 
followed by a that clause can be both autocentric and exocentric. 
16 In § 4 I will argue that the relation in question should not be seen, as 
Lasersohn claims, as indexical but anaphoric.  
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the semantic evaluation of the complex phrase because, to 
paraphrase Lasersohn (2009: 365), it is fixed pragmatically. 
I will now conclude my introduction to NIC by discussing an 
important doctrine which is at the intersection between the 
philosophy of language and the philosophy of time: temporalism. 
 
Case #04. 
 
In this introduction to NIC I should mention its most important 
historical precursor, which is Prior’s temporal logic and, more 
generally, the philosophical doctrine which is named 
‘temporalism’. In my presentation of this doctrine I will mainly 
follow Recanati’s comprehensive discussion of the topic in 
Recanati (2007). Since Recanati’s adoption of what he calls 
‘moderate relativism’ shares a lot of features with NIC, I think it is 
opportune to sketch it also in relation with temporalism. 
Temporalism is the view that a sentence such as “It is raining” 
expresses a proposition which is true at certain times and false at 
others. In contrast, eternalism is the view that the same sentence, 
when it is uttered, expresses a proposition which is absolutely true 
or false in virtue of including a precise time parameter in it.  
I think temporalism is a plausible view, although I am aware 
there are important objections to it.17 Reasons of space oblige me to 
stay focused, so I will only sketch the theory and its advantages.  
Take an utterance of  
 
(20)  It is raining. 
 
as uttered by me on the 16th of September 2012 at 12:30pm in 
Nottingham. It seems correct to say that the truth-evaluation of (20) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 An important collection of essays on this topic is Joki!, A., and Smith, Q. 
(2003). See esp. Richard’s introduction. A careful analysis of the Priorian 
semantics of time can be found in an Italian book, which is more oriented to 
linguistics:  Bonomi and Zucchi (2001). 
CHAPTER 7 !
! "#$!
will vary, depending on the situations in which its content is 
assessed. 18  Adapting a well-known formalism in situation-
semantics to our case, and taking ‘e’ to be a variable for events, we 
could represent what I have just said in the following way: 
 
!1: <Rain_Nottingham (e); yes> 
!2: <Rain, Nottingham (e); yes> 
. 
. 
, 
!n: <Rain, Nottingham (e); no> 
 
Given a collection of time parameters <t1,…, tn> we may ask 
whether the content expressed by (20), namely the temporal 
proposition that it is raining in Nottingham, is true w.r.t. each one 
of them: whether it is true at 12:30pm, at 12:31pm, …, at 15:38pm, 
and so on. Under this framework, propositions are functions from 
<worlds, times> to truth-values.  
The reader will remember Frege’s objection (Chapter 4, § 2.1) 
to a similar view on the ground that for the purposes of doing logic 
we cannot allow the truth-evaluation of propositions to be relative. 
Propositions are absolutely true or false. The objection is easily 
disposed of if we adopt the following stance: a temporal 
proposition becomes a fully-fledged proposition when a temporal 
circumstance is added to it. In the words of Kaplan: 
 
There is another kind of ‘content’ associated with a fugitive 
sentence like [20], namely, the content of a particular 
utterance of [20]. In a sense, any particular utterance (token) 
of a fugitive sentence (type) is an eternalization of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Kaplan (1978 [1997: 683]): “without disputing the facts, if [20] were true at 
one time, it would fail to be true at some later time”. 
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fugitive sentence. The relativization to time is fixed by the 
time of the utterance. (Kaplan 1978 [1997: 683]) 
 
Kaplan is here implicitly endorsing a view which Perry and 
Barwise attribute to Austin (1970): the view concerning what they 
call ‘Austinian propositions’. An Austinian proposition is the result 
of completing a propositional function with a situation against 
which the function is evaluated. In other words, it is the ‘total truth-
conditional package’ of information conveyed by an utterance.  
This view is also shared by Recanati’s adoption (2007) of what 
he calls a ‘moderate’ form of relativism (in short MR), in which 
Recanati distinguishes between two levels of content, the lekton 
and the Austinian proposition. 
According to MR, the lekton is the content expressed by an 
utterance modulo its saturation and, possibly, its enrichments. 
Adding a circumstance to the lekton allows one to determine the 
Austinian proposition of an utterance. In turn, the lekton can be 
narrowly or broadly individuated. The lekton is narrowly 
individuated when it only concerns what is said by an utterance 
modulo its saturation (basically, Grice’s notion of what is said). 
This is the level of psychological content, the content of our 
attitudes.19 The lekton is broadly individuated when it coincides 
with Kaplan’s notion of character: a function from contexts of use 
to contents.20 We get the following picture: 
  
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 See  fn. 6. 
20 Here I will not investigate how this framework fits with Recanati’s truth-
conditional pragmatics. Interesting questions arise as soon as we start asking 
whether the two systems are really compatible with each other. Let’s pretend that 
the Recanati I am discussing in this section is not the same Recanati I discussed 
in the previous chapters. Let’s pretend that this Recanati is Recanati*, an English 
philosopher and not a French one. 
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                                                               Austinian Propoition 
                                                                      
Kaplanian content 
 
Lekton 
                                  
                   
                                             
Recanati argues for the need of Kaplanian contents between the 
lekton and the Austinian proposition precisely for the reason that 
we need functions which take us from circumstances of evaluations 
to truth-values.  
As already discussed by Kaplan in the previous quotation, an 
utterance will determine a circumstance of evaluation with respect 
to which the content narrowly individuated will be evaluated. But 
nothing prevents the circumstance of evaluation of the context of 
utterance from shifting to another or being shifted by an operator, 
like in the case of world-shifting operators in modal logic.21 The 
presence of temporal operators in natural language demonstrates 
this: 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 In modal logic we use, for instance, ‘!’ ‘"’ to represent the ‘necessity-
operator’ and the ‘possibility’ operator. Given an accessability relation between 
possible worlds R, the following conditions for these two operators are: 
!!!" = T iff For all v such that R(w, v) !!"v = T 
!"!" = T iff For some v such that R(w, v) !!"v = T. 
Other operators include fictional operators (operators that shift the world of evaluation to a fictional  
one), deontic operators, epistemic operators, etc.  Fictional operators  
   
 
The most inner white circle corresponds to the sentence uttered, while 
the most inner black circle is its lekton. Then we have the Kaplanian 
content, which is determined by the lekton and, finally, the whole 
Austinian Proposition which encircles all the other contents in virtue 
of being a function of all them.  
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(21)  In a month it will be the case that it rains in Nottingham. 
 
If the embedded sentence expressed an eternal content determined 
by the coordinates of the context of utterance, then we would have 
the following inconsistent propositional rendering of (21): 
 
(21*)  # In a month it will be the case that it rains in Nottingham 
on the 16th of September 2012. 
 
Kaplan infers from this that propositions are temporally neutral. It 
goes without saying that the same strategy can also be applied to 
locations, and that the need for propositions which are locationally 
neutral is given by the presence of operators that shift the location 
parameter. Consider an utterance of ‘It rains’. It is perfectly 
legitimate to ask whether the proposition expressed by me, in 
Nottingham, on the 16th of September is true with respect to 
different locations (indicated by ‘!’ + specific location in 
subscript), to a greater or lesser extent related to the place in which 
I utter the sentence: 
 
!FOREST FIELD/nottingham: <Rain(e); yes>. 
!NOTTINGHAM: <Rain(e); yes>. 
. 
. 
. 
!EDINBURGH: <Rain(e); no>. 
 
Given the shiftability of these parameters we can formulate this 
principle: 
 
Neutrality: The Proposition expressed by an utterance 
is neutral with respect to the parameters of possible 
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circumstances, unless the parameter is fully articulated 
by the sentence uttered. 
 
A further principle, which is modelled on (Kaplan 1989: 
504), can be formulated with respect to the possibility of 
adding operators that specify those parameters: 
 
Operator: If we wish to isolate a particular parameter ! 
and regard it as a feature of possible circumstances we 
can introduce operators " that shift !: ‘"(it is the case 
that_)’, etc. To make such operators interesting we 
must have contents which are !-neutral. 
 
It should be noticed that on the previous page I have basically 
presented a view which, strictly speaking, crosses the borders of 
NIC. Giving the possibility of several situations in which an 
utterance can be evaluated as to its truth, none of which has a 
privileged status, we would be better off saying that we are dealing 
with relativism. NIC offers a weaker claim: only one circumstance 
is the one at which an utterance is evaluated and this is determined 
by the context of utterance.  
Trying to summarise some of the main points of discussion in 
this section, we have that NIC is committed to the following theses: 
 
• Is indexicality the only form of context-dependence? No: 
we also have a form of context-sensitivity due to the 
determination of circumstances of evaluation. 
• What enters in a circumstance of evaluation? Two answers: 
whatever serves to determine the circumstance of 
evaluation (MacFarlane); Whatever can be shifted by an 
appropriate operator (Kaplan). 
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• What shifts during a conversation and what remains fixed? 
Contents or parameters? At least in the case of certain 
phenomena (e.g., predicates of taste) it is the parameters 
that shift, for otherwise disagreement would not be 
possible. 
• Operators: a contextual aspect relevant to the truth-
conditions of an utterance goes in the circumstance of 
evaluation if there is an operator that can shift it (Kaplan). 
 
In the next section I will investigate how these claim fit with a non-
indexicalist contextualist account of metaphor. 
 
 
3. Non-indexical Contextualism and Metaphor  
 
In this dissertation I have taken a stance against those theories that 
treat metaphorical utterances as expressing different contents in 
different contexts. My criticisms have been addressed to both 
pragmatic accounts that attempt to explain metaphor by appealing 
to modulation processes and, also, semantic accounts like the one 
favoured by Stern that appeal to a combination of pre-semantic and 
semantic processes. My criticisms have testified the presence of 
several problems or unresolved issues for these views, but two 
main criticisms stand up more prominently: these concern the 
overgeneration of content, which affects the contextualist accounts, 
and the overgeneration of characters, which is a consequence of 
Stern’s theory. 
If we agree that fixing a metaphorical interpretation does not 
work in the way contextualists or indexicalists propose, how then 
do I plan to explain metaphor at all? In the previous section I have 
offered some evidence coming from different topics in the 
philosophy of language and semantics which may give a 
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straightforward answer to this question: metaphor requires a non-
indexical contextualist treatment, along the lines suggested for the 
cases of knowledge-ascriptions and predicates of taste. The main 
feature of NIC is that it treats these other cases by appealing to 
enriched circumstances of evaluation, involving specific 
parameters the presence of which is necessary to determine 
appropriate extensions for the expressions of an utterance. 
The task for the rest of this chapter is to, first of all, individuate 
an appropriate parameter in the circumstance of evaluation of 
metaphorical utterances. Secondly, the subsequent task is to 
investigate whether the presence of this parameter behaves in a 
way similar to the other parameters like the knowledge parameter 
or the judge parameter, which I have already discussed. To that 
effect, it will be important to see how this parameter behaves in 
certain contexts: for instance, attitude verbs and denials. In this 
section, however, I will only focus on the nature of the parameter I 
introduce in the semantics of metaphors and on the issue of 
whether there are operators in a natural language like English that 
specify the value this parameter can take. In the next section I will 
extend my discussion to attitude verbs and denial. 
The main claim of my theory is that the metaphorical dimension 
of an utterance is not identifiable with the content expressed by it. 
Nor is it part of the meaning (i.e. a Kaplanian character) of the 
expression to be interpreted metaphorically. A metaphorical 
interpretation is given by what I call the particular thematic 
dimension at which an utterance is evaluated. In other words a 
thematic dimension ‘specifies the theme of a discourse, or what the 
discourse is about’ (Leezenberg 2001: 166). Sometimes, the literal 
meanings of a sentence is sufficient to determine what the thematic 
dimension of the utterance is, but more often it is context and the 
extra-linguistic information it carries that determines it. In this case 
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we need to recover the thematic dimension, so as to determine the 
appropriate extensions for each constituent of an utterance.22 
This framework can be better illustrated with a simple example. 
Suppose we are at an artist’s exhibition and I utter: 
 
(22)  This painting is grey.  
 
Suppose we are also discussing the different colours chosen by this 
artist for his paintings. The painting in question is an abstract 
painting representing a grey circle. My utterance then is true in 
virtue of being a correct classification of the painting as grey with 
respect to the thematic dimension ‘the most salient colour’. It 
should be noticed that here it is not essential to my argument that 
this thematic dimension is the kind of ‘wordly’ dimension which 
usually makes utterances of (22) count as true. The fact that 
speakers assume this dimension to be part of the meaning of the 
predicate ‘is grey’ is not a valid reason to consider it as such. 
Consider a variant of the modal argument applied to predicates:23 
 
(23)  The most salient colour of this painting could have been 
grey (in fact, it is). 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 This ‘recovering’ does not involve inferential processes, which are based on 
fully conceptual representations. It has more to do with non-conceptual 
information, that is, information which may be useful to determine a fully-
fledged representation, but which does not need to be fully represented by the 
thinker. Information of this kind can usually be given in terms of a description 
(see examples below), but this is something that comes as the result of an 
attempt made by us to conceptualise it.  
23 The modal argument was originally given by Kripke (1972) to show that 
proper names cannot be equated to definite descriptions, for they behave 
differently when evaluated at different possible worlds. Proper names behave 
rigidly, that is, they refer to the same individual across possible worlds, whereas 
definite descriptions do not. Kripke used the argument against descriptivist 
accounts of proper names. A version of the argument for indexicals can be found 
in Stojanovic (2007), to which my present discussion is in debt. 
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(24) The most salient colour of this painting could have been 
the most salient colour of this painting (in fact, it could not 
have been otherwise).   
 
(23) is contingently true, (24) is necessarily true. Given that the 
truth-conditions of these utterances differ, I infer that ‘grey’ does 
not mean the same as ‘the most salient colour’. More generally, I 
infer that thematic dimensions are not aspects of the meaning of an 
expression. 
Now consider another utterance of (22) in a context in which we 
are discussing a very depressive painting. In this case the thematic 
dimension relative to which my utterance is to be evaluated is 
something like: ‘the painting’s main emotive aspect’. My utterance 
is true iff its content, the proposition that the salient painting is 
grey, is true with respect to the thematic dimension determined by 
the context. 
Thus, my theory accounts for the variability of truth-conditions 
of a sentence in context without requiring that the sentence 
expresses different contents in different contexts of utterance. This 
is a welcome result given that I avoid in this way all the problems 
affecting TCP and Stern’s theory. Neither does my theory 
overgenerate contents, nor does it overgenerate characters. In my 
account, expressions have just one character and determine just the 
same content across all contexts. However, being sensitive to 
which particular thematic dimension they are evaluated at, every 
expression will be assigned a different extension for each context 
of utterance. Defining !" as the thematic dimension operative in the 
first utterance of (23), we have that the extension of grey is: 
 
(25)  !grey"c, t, w, !" = {x: x are grey at t in w relative to !"} 
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Defining now !"" as the thematic dimension operative in the second 
context of utterance of (23), the extension of grey is now: 
 
(26)  !grey"c, t, w, !"" = {x: x are grey at t in w relative to !""} 
 
The reader may find herself appropriate truth-clauses for (22), as 
uttered in the two imagined contexts, following the non-indexicalist 
contextualist account I have proposed. 
An interesting application of the theory is the case of so-called 
‘twice-true’ metaphors’. These metaphors are both metaphorically 
true and literally true, like for instance: 
 
(27) Jesus was a carpenter. 
(28)  No man’s an island. 
 
Suppose the context in which (27) is uttered is such that the 
speaker wants to both impart the information that Jesus’s job was 
carpentry and, at the same time, impart the information that Jesus’s 
role in people’s life is identical with the role a carpenter has with 
the things he works with. 24  In other words, someone who is 
asserting (27) metaphorically is attempting to reconceptualise Jesus 
in a particular way (Nogales 2009). To that effect, knowing the 
literal meaning of ‘carpenter’ is essential to determine the thematic 
dimension of the context of utterance, say Role played by 
carpenters. Calling this dimension !role, the metaphorical truth-
clause of (27) becomes:  
 
(27met)  !Jesus was a carpenter"c, t, w, ! role = T iff <Jesus, Carpenter> 
is true at (ct, cw) w.r.t. !role 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Be careful: don’t confuse this information with the metaphorical claim itself. 
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whereas the literal truth-clause of (28) is the same except that the 
thematic dimension is here idle: 
 
(27lit) !Jesus was a carpenter"c, t, w = T iff <Jesus, Carpenter> is 
true at (ct, cw). 
 
Notice how a metaphor like (27) is a good metaphor or, in Hills’ 
words (1997), an ‘apt’ metaphor because the presence of a clear 
thematic dimension allows the whole metaphorical predication to 
succeed. Metaphors based on very stereotypical properties like ‘Jim 
is a gorilla’ or ‘Jim is a pig’ are much less apt in this sense. In these 
cases there is, in fact, no thematic dimension provided by the 
linguistic context or extra-linguistic context of the utterance. We 
just rely on very conventional properties of these terms to 
determine a very conventionalised type of meaning, similar in 
many respects to slurs that are shared by some culture or groups of 
people, and that are devoid of serious assertive force.  
Let me now consider this objection to my account, which is 
modelled on MacFarlane’s attempt (2009: 244) to reply to 
Stanley’s objection (2005: 147-152) against an epistemic standard 
parameter:  
 
i. We should only countenance a parameter of circumstances 
if there is an operator that shifts it. 
ii. There is no operator that shifts thematic dimensions. 
iii. Therefore, we should not countenance a thematic dimension 
parameter. 
 
A defender of a non-indexical contextualism for a particular area of 
discourse has two strategies to reply to this argument. On the one 
hand, he can adopt MacFarlane’s defence of an epistemic standards 
parameter, which pivots around the non-necessity of operators for 
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the purposes of providing a semantics of the discourse under 
analysis. On the other hand, he may try to show that English is a 
language that allows for operators that shift the relevant parameter. 
My defence of NIC for metaphor will lean on the second strategy. 
I believe there are operators that shift a thematic dimension 
parameter. Consider this utterance, which is taken from Leezenberg 
(2001): 
 
(29)  As far as style is concerned, this book is good. 
 
Now, according to Leezenberg adjectives like ‘good’ are weakly 
thematically determined in the sense that in order to deliver an 
appropriate extension an interpretive system must supply a 
thematic dimension. Usually, it is context which provides it, but 
here we have the presence of an operator, ‘as far as style is 
concerned’, which designates the appropriate thematic dimension: 
style. Formally: 
 
(29*) !As far as style is concerned, this book is good"c, t, w, ! = T 
iff <Booki, Good> is true at (t, w) w.r.t !style 
 
[where the subscript ‘i’ indexes the noun phrase to the salient book 
of the context.] 
This account parallels Lasersohn’s intensional treatment of 
expressions like ‘for you’ or ‘to Jim’ in the semantics of predicates 
of taste. For instance, the prepositional phrase ‘to Mark’ in 
 
(30)  Avocado tastes good to Mark. 
 
is treated under this account in the following syncategorematic 
way: 
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(30*)  !Avocado tastes good to Mark"c, t, w, j = !Avocado tastes 
good" c, t, w, mark 
 
I therefore disagree with Leezenberg’s claim (2001: 168) that 
operators of this kind are Kaplanian monsters in the sense that they 
operate on the characters of expressions such as ‘good’. Allowing 
thematic dimensions to be part of the index of sentences-in-context 
like ‘Avocado is tasty’ or ‘This book is good’ would make the 
whole system work in a Lewisian/Montogovian way, which does 
not countenance a distinction between index and circumstances of 
evaluation. Besides, there is an obvious disanalogy between 
Kaplanian monsters and these operators. While operators like ‘as 
far as style is concerned’ help determine the extension of a given 
expression, a monster selects a different content. But for reasons 
made clear in this chapter and in the previous one it is an 
unwelcome feature of a semantic system to deliver different 
contents for expressions which are non-indexical. 
Turning back to metaphor, I said we find the same kind of 
operators for expressions used metaphorically. Here are two 
examples: 
 
(31)  Financially, the last Moody’s rating was a quake. 
(32)  Kripke is the Bobby Fischer of philosophy.  
 
The evaluation of (31) is basically identical to that of (29) and (30), 
and is based on the following rule: 
 
(31*) !Financially, the last Moody’s rating was a quake."c, t, w, ! = 
!the last Moody’s rating was a quake" c, t, w, !finance 
 
On the other hand, I am treating a phrase such as ‘of 
philosophy’ as an intensional operator working in the same way 
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adverbials do in the cases just discussed. Assuming that an NP like 
‘Bobby Fischer’, when preceded by an article, expressed the 
property being Bobby Fischer, which is weakly thematically 
determined, we have the following truth-clause for (32): 
 
(32*)  !Kripke is the Bobby Fischer of philosophy"c, t, w, ! = T iff 
<Kripke, {Bobby Fisher}(c)> is true at (t, w) w.r.t 
!philosophy 
 
The fact that phrases like ‘the Bobby Fischer’ alone do not express 
a complete property should not be a mystery when we compare it 
with other cases: 
 
(33) Rome is the capital (of Italy). 
(34)  Switzerland is the country (between Italy and Germany). 
(35)  Obama is the president (of the U.S.). 
 
Alternatively, we could treat these phrases adopting Recanati’s 
treatment of ‘variadic functions’ discussed in Chapter 4, in which 
the thematic dimension modifies the acidity of the predicate with n 
arguments, generating a new predicate with n+1 arguments:25 
 
Thematic dimensionphilosophy _(P(k)) = P*(k, Philosophy) 
 
Thematic dimensioncountry _(P(r)) = P*(x, Italy) 
 
[Where P is a predicate, k = Kripke, r = Rome and P* is a new 
property which is the result of applying the thematic dimension to 
P and its arguments.] 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Zeman (2011) provides an argument to the effect that Recanati’s account of 
variadic functions can be implemented by a relativist semantics. 
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I wish now to conclude this section by considering two worries 
about my theory, which have already been addressed in the 
literature. One is the worry that my account overgenerates 
parameters, while the other is that the role of context is 
predominant in my explanation of metaphor. If it is, then it is not 
clear why we should consider my view semantics.  
I believe that both claims are rather weak. In reply to the first 
objection, I follow MacFarlane: 
 
A…reason for resisting an epistemic standards parameter is 
a worry about opening the floodgates. If “know” is context-
sensitive but not indexical, it is unlikely that is the only such 
expression. Very likely we’ll also want nonindexical 
contextualist treatments of other expressions, too. To handle 
each new expression, we’ll need a new parameter of 
circumstances. Pretty soon our nice ordered pairs will 
become ordered n-tuples! One might advise stopping this 
proliferation of parameters right at the beginning. 
So stated, this isn’t much of an objection. Maybe you just 
need a lot of parameters to do semantics. This doesn’t make 
semantics intractable, unsystematic, or impossible (we have 
computers, after all). And there’s no reason why we can’t 
ignore most of these parameters when we are trying to 
illuminate the semantics of a particular class of expressions 
(say, epistemic words) (MacFarlane 2009: 245-46). 
 
So long as the postulation of a parameter follows determinate 
semantic patterns (and that’s what I am trying to show here with 
thematic dimensions), then it is no objection to say that we are 
multiplying parameters. The situation is identical to other fields of 
science: suppose a physicist has theoretical reasons to postulate a 
certain entity in his explanation of a certain phenomenon. If the 
entity plays a certain role in his model, then that is sufficient 
ground to entail its existence. If it turned out that his explanation of 
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the phenomenon is not adequate for other reasons, then we would 
have strong reasons to doubt about the existence of such entity in 
our physical ontology.  
The second objection concerns the role of context, and 
presumably of things like intentions or presuppositions, in 
determining an actual circumstance of evaluation. If this is so, why 
not consider the whole strategy pragmatic, after all? This somehow 
reminds me of the case discussed in the philosophy of mind 
concerning Mary, the physicist who knows everything about the 
functioning of colour experience, but never experienced any 
colour. Well, likewise here, the fact that the mechanisms of 
metaphor understanding require a brain to function properly in a 
given environment is no objection to the presence of those 
mechanisms, whose explanation is semantic. The fact that in order 
for those mechanisms to work we need that speakers also share an 
environment and be able to recognise their attempts at 
communicating is not very surprising. But it is one thing to 
experience a metaphor, it is another to understand its functioning.    
In conclusion, in this section I have argued for the theoretical 
need for thematic dimensions in the evaluation of a metaphorical 
utterance. I have given evidence for a non-indexicalist contextualist 
account of these thematic dimensions, and proposed a general 
hypothesis concerning what makes a metaphor apt: the presence of 
a thematic dimension which allows us to precisely determine the 
extension of a given expression used metaphorically. Putative 
metaphors that do not follow this pattern are either not metaphors 
at all or, perhaps, are the kind of poetic metaphors whose 
sophistication does not allow for a determination of their 
extensions in context. I will now proceed to provide a non-
indexicalist contextualist account of belief reports of metaphors 
and metaphorical denials.   
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4. Belief reports and Denial  
 
In the previous section I have introduced my non-indexical 
contextualist account of metaphor, which pivots around the 
postulation of an appropriate parameter in the circumstance of 
evaluation of a metaphorical utterance. I have also argued for the 
presence of operators that shift the value of such a parameter. 
Finally, towards the end of the section I have made some general 
remarks on the role of parameters in a semantic system like the one 
I favour. One point I have stressed is that we should contemplate 
their presence only so long as our explanation of a certain 
phenomenon requires it for its empirical adequacy.26 Thus, what I 
am going to do in this section is to check whether the postulation of 
a thematic dimension is effectively required by the system for its 
adequacy. My answer is that it is, as the presentation of the next 
two cases is intended to show. 
The issues I will consider here concern belief reports and denials 
of metaphors. Both issues seem to share a common feature: if 
someone utters a metaphor within a belief report or if the metaphor 
falls under a truth-conditional operator such as negation, the 
contribution the metaphor brings is clearly truth-conditional. 
Consider: 
 
(36)  John is not a bulldozer. 
(37)  Juliet is not the sun. 
(38)  Romeo believes that Juliet is the sun. 
(39)  Paris believes that Juliet is not the sun. 
(40)  Paris believes that Romeo believes that Juliet is the sun. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Where by ‘empirical adequacy’ I roughly mean ‘conformity to the speakers’ 
intuitions about the truth-conditions of those utterances for which the system is 
asked to deliver correct judgements’. 
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Doubtless, there are contexts where the embedded sentence in these 
complexes, e.g., ‘John is a bulldozer’ and ‘Juliet is the sun’ are to 
be intended metaphorically. Actually, this is what most of the time 
an appropriate system requires in order to deliver appropriate 
semantic values for utterances of these sentences. Of course, this 
aspect constitutes a strong objection to all those views that deny 
that metaphors are primarily truth-conditional. In this respect, 
Davidson’s view, Grice’s and even Searle’s all fall short of an 
explanation of why utterances of these sentences manifest a clear 
truth-conditional profile and, therefore, it must be concluded that 
their accounts are not empirically adequate. The question I am 
going to tackle in this section is therefore: how does my account 
explain the truth-conditional profile of cases such as (36)-(40)? I 
will start with belief reports, and then progress to discuss cases of 
denial.  
 
4.1. Belief Reports.  
 
In the previous section I followed Lasersohn in claiming that in the 
case of knowledge ascriptions and predicates of taste under belief 
reports we need to treat attitude verbs indexically in the sense that 
we should envisage a slot in their lexical entries, whose function is 
to collect those parameters that appear in the semantic evaluation 
of their unembedded sentences. A slot of this kind should be filled 
by an appropriate parameter, which is fixed by the context. In other 
words, against the ‘simple-minded’ view that treats an attitude verb 
as a binary cognitive relation which exists between a subject and a 
content, this view requires that the relation be a three-place relation 
between a subject, a content and a parameter which fixes what it is 
for the subject to be in that relation with that content. Hence in the 
previous section, I formulated the following clause for attitude 
verbs: 
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(19)  !believes that p" c, t, w = !x. x believes that p at (t, w), 
w.r.t. ", the parameter which determines what it is for x to 
stand in the relation of ‘believe’ with p. 
 
[where " = j or " = k or " = #, etc.] 
 
Without this requirement, the semantic system would not be in a 
position to deliver the appropriate truth-conditional evaluations for 
knowledge ascriptions and predicates of taste under the scope of 
attitude verbs.  
However, here I want to claim that it is more correct to treat the 
argument for the slot in the attitude verb as anaphoric and not 
indexical. By this I mean that it is not the context of the reporter 
which settles how the slot is to be filled, but appropriate anaphoric 
links with the linguistic or extra-linguistic context. This change is 
not a radical departure from Lasersohn’s view since I maintain that 
‘believe’ and other affine verbs show a tripartite relational 
structure. 
In detail, a system that would not be capable of distinguishing 
between these two reports should be considered as inadequate on 
any reasonable view: 
 
(41) Mark believes that liquorice is tasty (to him). 
(42)  Mark believes that liquorice is tasty (to his community). 
 
(41) is felicitously assertable only in a context which has made 
clear that the interpretation of ‘tasty’ is sensitive to Mark’s 
standards: 
 
(41*)  Marki believes that liquorice is tastyi (to him). 
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In contrast, (42) is felicitously assertable only in a context which 
has made clear that the interpretation of ‘tasty’ is sensitive not to 
Mark’s standards, but to those of his community, which are this 
time supplied by the extra-linguistic context: 
 
(42*)  cj: Mark believes that liquorice is tastyj (to his community).27 
 
This sensitivity to different dimensions of evaluation characterises, 
I believe, attitude reports of metaphors, too. Suppose I want to 
report Romeo’s belief that Juliet is the sun.28 To remind my reader, 
according to my account Romeo’s utterance ‘Juliet is the sun’ is 
true iff the content expressed by his utterance, that Juliet is the sun, 
counts as true with respect to a particular thematic dimension, say, 
the centrality Juliet has in Romeo’s life. The semantic evaluation of 
Romeo’s utterance with respect to the abovementioned thematic 
dimension is: 
 
(43)  !Juliet is the sun"c, t, w, ! = T iff <Juliet, {Sun}(c)> is true 
at (ct, cw) w.r.t !centrality 
 
In other words given Romeo’s particular context which determines 
that thematic dimension, the semantic value for ‘Juliet’, namely, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 A linguistic context that would make (42) true could be the following story: 
“Mark is a child who, having a strange alimentary disorder cannot eat liquorice. 
However, all his friends told him great things about liquorice. His sister Mary 
always eats liquorice and she seems to enjoy it very much. Mark now believes 
that liquorice is tasty”.  
28 Objector: “What sort of belief could this be? Nobody believes that human 
beings are stars”. Reply: “And nobody believes that France is hexagonal, that 
Holland is flat and that Italy is a boot, but we assert these things all the time and 
most of the time we assert truths”. Objector: “I am not convinced”. Reply: “Do 
you remember Recanati’s distinction between lekton as narrow content and 
Austinian proposition as lekton plus circumstance?” Objector: “Yes, I do”. 
Reply: “Good, then we have a specular situation here. In the narrow sense, the 
content of ‘Juliet is the sun’ is something that no rational being would entertain. 
In the ‘Austinian’ sense nothing is wrong with entertaining the full ‘idea’ that 
w.r.t a certain aspect Juliet and the Sun are identical”. Objector: “I am still not 
convinced”. Reply: “Sir, this is philosophy. It’s your turn, give me a better 
explanation then”. 
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the individual Juliet,29 is in the extension of ‘the sun’ relative to the 
designated thematic dimension. Again, if we are careful not to 
confuse wordly conditions with truth-conditions, there is nothing 
bizarre with my account: it just systematises what it is for someone 
to utter a metaphorical sentence and say something true.  
Now, the following step for my account is to capture this 
sensitivity to the designated thematic dimension of Romeo’s 
utterance in my report of his belief. The truth-clause for (38) is: 
 
(44) !Romeo believes that Juliet is the sun"c, t, w = T iff 
<{Believe}(c), (Romeo, (Juliet, {Sun}(c)))> is true at (ct, 
cw) w.r.t !centrality 
 
My claim is that ‘believe’ is associated with a free variable, whose 
value is anaphorically supplied by the thematic dimension 
‘centrality’. This, in turn, is inherited by Romeo’s previous claim 
which had introduced it in the common ground of the conversation. 
This aspect of the interpretation is not captured by (44). The 
conversational dynamics of my report of Romeo’s utterance of the 
sentence ‘Juliet is the sun’ is best captured in the following way:   
 
(45)  “<Juliet is the sun>j: !centralityi”. Romeo believesi itj.  
 
 
Here the subscript ‘i’ marks the anaphoric link between the 
thematic dimension determined by Romeo’s context of utterance 
and the attitude verb, whereas the subscript ‘j’ marks the link 
between the content of Romeo’s assertion and the object of 
Romeo’s belief. I am also using double quotation marks in a 
technical sense here: they indicate that the material within them 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Let’s pretend we are not dealing with a fictional context here, and that Juliet is 
a real individual in the world. 
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represents the Austinian proposition expressed by Romeo’s 
utterance. 
Suppose now we move to a different context, in which I want to 
deny that Romeo believes that Juliet is the sun. Here we have two 
possibilities. On the one hand, I can deny that Romeo literally 
believes that Juliet is the sun. Or I can deny that with respect to the 
designated thematic dimension of ‘centrality’, Romeo does not 
believe that Juliet is the sun. 
 
(46)  !Romeo does not believe that Juliet is the sun"c, t, w = T iff  
<{Believe}(c), (Romeo, (Juliet, {Sun}(c)))> is false at (ct, 
cw). 
 
(47) !Romeo does not believe that Juliet is the sun"c, t, w = T iff 
<{Believe}(c), (Romeo, (Juliet, {Sun}(c)))> is false at (ct, 
cw) w.r.t !centrality 
 
In other words, what (47) says is that it is true that Romeo does not 
believe that Juliet is the sun because it is false that w.r.t the !centrality 
Romeo believes that Juliet is the sun. In contrast, (46) is true iff it 
is false that Romeo believes that Juliet is the sun, tout court.  
Adopting the formalisation I have used in (45), we can represent 
the anaphoric link between ‘believe’ and the thematic dimension 
present in (47) in the following way: 
 
(48)  “<Juliet is the sun>j: !centralityi”. Not: Romeo believesi itj.  
 
 
Here the subscript ‘i’ marks the anaphoric link between the 
thematic dimension determined by Romeo’s context of utterance 
and the attitude verb, whereas the subscript ‘j’ marks the link 
between the content of Romeo’s assertion and the object of 
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Romeo’s belief. Also, notice how this representation of my 
utterance of ‘Romeo does not believe that Juliet is the sun’ would 
especially make sense in a context in which the utterance was 
followed by another along the lines of: ‘He now thinks that Juliet is 
a spiny cactus’. 
In contrast, (47) can be simply represented in this way: 
 
(49)  <Juliet is the sun>i. Not: Romeo believes itj.  
 
Here the representation simply makes clear that Romeo does not 
believe the absurd proposition that Juliet is the sun. Absence of 
double quotation marks is indicative of the fact that we are not 
dealing here with a whole Austinian proposition and, therefore, 
there is not a thematic dimension that may serve the purpose of 
providing an anaphoric link with the attitude verb in the second 
clause. 
Finally, I wish to spend a word on constructions such as (40) 
involving more than one embedding of propositional attitudes. 
How does the theory deal with such cases? Here again there are 
precise patterns which the semantics of attitude verbs embedding 
metaphors shares with the semantics of attitude verbs embedding 
predicates of taste. Consider: 
 
(50)  John believes that Mark believes liquorice is tasty.  
 
It is natural to take and utterance of this sentence as stating that 
John believes that Mark believes liquorice is tasty to Mark.30 
 
(50*)  John believes that Marki believes liquorice is tastyi.  
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 Stephenson (2007) makes the same observation also in regard to epistemic 
modals. 
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If this is so, then it is more natural to treat the dependence of the 
‘judge’ parameter for ‘tasty’ upon Mark as evidence for the 
anaphoricity of such relations, more than for the indexicality of it. 
If the judge depends on something other than Mark’s stance, then 
we can treat (50) along the lines sketched for (42*): the anaphoric 
link is not given by the immediate linguistic antecedent, but by the 
extra-linguistic context: 
 
(50*)  cj: John believes that Mark believes liquorice is tastyj. 
 
 
We have a similar patter in metaphorical interpretation. Reconsider 
(40):  
 
(40)  Paris believes that Romeo believes that Juliet is the sun. 
 
It is natural to take an utterance of (40) to state that Paris believes 
that Romeo believes Juliet to be the sun w.r.t the thematic 
dimension (whatever that is) used by Romeo to assert his content: 
 
(40)  Paris believes that Romeo believesi that Juliet is the suni. 
 
We do not take Romeo’s belief to be influenced by what Paris 
believes about Juliet, as we do not take Mark’s belief that liquorice 
is tasty to be influenced by what John believes about liquorice. 
All this evidence seems to show that my prediction that the 
semantic system requires thematic dimensions for the evaluation of 
attitude ascriptions embedding metaphors is correct. What is more, 
my account finds support from the semantics of attitude verbs 
embedding predicates of taste and, although I have not focused on 
those, a similar pattern is traceable in the semantics of attitude 
verbs embedding epistemic modals. I will now move on to discuss 
my view on metaphorical denials.  
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4.2 Metaphor & Denial  
 
One of the assumption my account is based on is that instances of 
the following schema are, generally, not evaluable: 
 
An utterance u of a sentence s at C is true iff the 
proposition p expressed by s at C is true (MacFarlane 
2009). 
 
Confining my present discourse to metaphor, the correct 
consequence I draw is that we would not be able to evaluate any 
metaphor if a thematic dimension did not accompany an utterance 
of the sentence in which one or more expressions used 
metaphorically appear. This is true of declarative sentences used 
metaphorically as well as of their denials. Without the provision of 
a thematic dimension we would not be able to determine what 
exactly someone who wants to deny a metaphor is denying.  
Still, a contextualist could argue that her theory is able to 
explain the same data by appealing to her view on explicatures. 
Someone who replied to Romeo by uttering: 
 
(51)  Juliet is not the sun. 
 
would be taken to mean something like: 
 
(52)  Juliet is not THE SUN*, 
 
whatever the ad hoc concept THE SUN* meant for her.  
However, and prescinding from the reasons I have already 
provided in Chapter 5 to not adhere to a contextualist account of 
metaphor, I agree with Camp (2006: 296ff.) that contextualists 
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have problems to explain cases in which a speaker is not denying 
the metaphorical interpretation, but is simply ‘opting out’ like in 
the following beautiful exchange from Dostoevsky’s Crime and 
Punishment : 
 
(53) Raskolnikov: I only killed a louse. 
Sonya: A louse. A human being! 
 
Here Raskolnikov is confessing his crime (the murder of Alyona 
Ivanovna and her sister Lizaveta) to Sonya, and he is attempting to 
justify it by describing Alyona as a louse.  
The core of Camp’s criticism is that given the contextualist 
account of ad hoc concepts, we should expect Sonya’s reply to 
target Raskolnikov’s metaphorical interpretation. 
 
[T]he crucial point is this: if the original speaker’s 
utterance had genuinely ‘lodged’ a new, temporary use 
for them, then that meaning should necessarily be 
inherited by any later use of those same words in that 
same context which responds to the initial claim 
(Camp 2006: 297)  
 
However, Sonya is rejecting Raskolnikov’s words altogether,31 and 
we need a clear explanation of her behaviour. Unfortunately, Camp 
has none. 
I believe my account nicely deals with this sort of construction, 
and in the remaining part of this section I will spell out my 
proposal. But, first, since Sonya’s reply does not include the 
negation, and I am here interested in the interaction between this !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 The issue I am discussing nicely intersects with the philosophical literature on 
the topic of ‘imaginative resistance’. The expression was, I believe, introduced 
by Richard Moran in a paper on metaphor (Moran 1989; see also Moran 1994). 
For discussion of the phenomenon in relation to fiction, see Gendler (2000) and 
Currie (2002).  
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operator and metaphor, let me slightly modify her utterance, 
without modifying the substance of her claim: 
 
(53*)  Raskolnikov: I only killed a louse. 
Sonya: You didn’t kill a louse. You killed a human 
being! 
 
Now, on any charitable hypothesis about what Sonya is denying it 
is evident that she is not denying that Raskolnikov actually killed a 
louse. Her rejection targets the whole metaphorical mode of 
Raskolnikov’s assertion. Since a louse is, by definition, a small, 
parasitic insect, we can, in a non-tendentious way, interpret 
Raskolnikov’s claim with respect to the thematic dimension: 
meanness. Leaving aside the presuppositional contribution of 
‘only’ to Raskolnikov’s entire signification of his utterance, we can 
represent his primary claim in the following way: 
 
(54)   !I killed a louse"c, t, w, ! = T iff  < Killed, (Raskolnikov, {a 
louse}(c))> is true at (ct, cw) w.r.t. !meanness  
 
If Sonya wanted to deny that Raskolnikov actually killed someone, 
but leaving the metaphor intact, her denial would be: 
 
(55)  You didn’t kill the louse. 
 
This leaves as common ground the presupposition that it would be 
correct to describe  Alyona as a louse. But her denial has exactly 
that as a target, namely, the presupposition that it is appropriate to 
describe Alyona as a louse (given that she is a human being). Her 
denial appeals to what since Horn (1989) linguists have called 
metalinguistic negation, a pragmatic operator which does not scope 
over propositions, but rejects the entire force of an utterance due to 
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its defectiveness. In other words, her denial can be thusly 
described: 
 
(56)  It is not appropriate to assert “I killed a louse”, given that 
you killed a human being. 
 
We have here two recurrent patterns in metaphorical denials: either 
a denier denies the metaphorical interpretation or she denies the 
metaphorical utterance itself because she considers the thematic 
dimension chosen inadequate. I have opted to call this latter form 
of disagreement ‘verbal disagreement’, while I shall call the former 
‘substantial disagreement’. 
 
Verbal disagreement: 
Not! ! ‘s’ 
 
Substantial disagreement: 
c, t, w, ! ! ¬p 
 
In conclusion, my theory has shown a clear application of thematic 
dimensions even to the case of denial. Either a metaphor is rejected 
as part of the utterance’s force (verbal disagreement) or it is 
accepted as the dimension relative to which a certain content is 
denied (substantial disagreement). In both cases we have a clear 
application of thematic dimensions to the process of interpretation. 
 
 
5. Conclusions: On the open-endness of metaphor 
 
My desideratum in this chapter was to show that thematic 
dimensions are things required by the semantic interpretation of 
metaphorical utterances. The plan was to demonstrate that an 
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appropriate semantic system requires these entities in order to 
deliver appropriate judgements of truth-conditionality concerning 
metaphorical utterances. Insofar as I have been able to show that 
we actually need these parameters in the case of belief reports and 
denials, I feel that my account is in good shape. Actually, I think 
my account is in better shape than any other account I have dealt 
with in this dissertation. I wish then to conclude this chapter by 
reviewing some of the advantages that my non-indexicalist 
contextualist account of metaphor has. After that, I will briefly 
mention a further pleasing aspect of this theory which I have not 
dealt with before, namely, the ease with which it deals with the 
open-endeness of many metaphors. 
First of all, my account avoids the problematic claim 
contextualists make regarding the propositional component of a 
metaphorical assertion. In their view, a metaphorical utterance will 
deliver different propositions in different contents. I showed how 
this creates problems at the level of the compositionality of 
language, at the level of the LOT, but also at the level of linguistic 
constraints required for the interpretation of certain constructions 
such as those involving VP-ellipsis and anaphora.  
In contrast, my account neatly divides between two levels of 
content: the minimal level constituted by what Recanati calls the 
lekton of an utterance, and the ‘Austinian’ proposition which is the 
result of combining the lekton with an appropriate thematic 
dimension. Between these two levels, I also showed the need for 
Kaplanian contents, functions from circumstances of evaluation to 
truth-values. It is my belief that far from making things more 
complex, this account, which is based on a rigorous ‘division of 
labour’, is in line with important projects in the philosophy of 
cognition (above all, Fodor 1983 and Dennett 1991). 
Secondly, my account of metaphor shares a number of important 
features with the semantic explanation of other phenomena: for 
instance, knowledge ascriptions and predicates of taste. This fact is 
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welcome to my project, it shows how language understanding is 
based on recurrent semantic patterns, and metaphor seems to be no 
exception. 
Thirdly, my account is empirically adequate: it clearly goes in 
the direction of meeting the speakers’ intuitions about a number of 
interesting cases, which I have discussed in this chapter. What is 
more, it does so without incurring any unwelcome outcomes. 
There are certainly things that would need to be added, 
improved, or perhaps just discussed in more depth. The nature, for 
instance, of the anaphoric links I have discussed in § 4.1 is just an 
iceberg point, below which important syntactic and semantic issues 
reside. It will be the next step of my future investigation, I hope. 
There is a last element of discussion I wish to at least mention 
here. Metaphors are things we enjoy because we can always go 
over them and complete their ‘meaning’. In this sense, I have found 
this passage on the nature of a song very helpful also in 
understanding the experience of metaphor. It comes from an artist 
whom I love, Bonny Prince Billy: 
 
I feel like a song is completed when the writing is done 
and I present it to a friend, partner, or group of 
musicians. Then it’s completed when we record 
together and finish mixing. Then it’s completed each 
and every time someone listens. I think that a song, for 
the most part, is completed by the listening experience. 
It enters into people’s brains and mutates and then 
might get completed again—in their dreams, in mix 
tapes that they make, or in new listening experiences 
that they have. So it isn’t ever finished because there’s 
never going to be a definitive listening experience. 
 
Some metaphors have the same kind of effect: how many times 
have I gone over Shakespeare’s metaphor “And Juliet is the sun”? 
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How many thematic dimensions did I look for before my whole 
experience of this metaphor could be said to be completed? 
Metaphor lovers are like hitchhikers: they jump from a vehicle 
to another for the simple pleasure of assessing their journey from 
different perspectives. The idea behind thematic dimension was 
nothing but an attempt to give a scientific profile to this metaphor. 
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Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During these years of research I met several types of philosophers: 
those who thought metaphor to be a worthless thing, not to be 
dignified by a true philosophical mind. Luckily, these were the 
minority of philosophers I met. To these philosophers I do not have 
anything to say. A second class of philophers (luckily again, a 
small group, although with a number of very good philosophers in 
it), told me that Grice had already shown us everything to be shown 
concerning metaphor. If you are among these philosophers, but 
have approached this thesis with an open-minded attitude, then I 
believe you will by now agree with me that Grice’s pragmatics 
does not offer any valid solution to the problems surrounding a 
theory of metaphor. Chapter 2 should have made clear why a 
model of metaphor as based on the notion of implicature is a non-
starter. 
A different type of philosopher is the one who thinks that 
metaphor is a special speech-act, whose structure differs from 
literal assertion. I suspect you may be this philosopher, so let me 
tell you that Chapter 3 should have given you some hard times. If 
you want to defend the view that metaphor is a special kind of 
speech-act, many questions are at the moment left unresolved: why 
should we consider metaphor special in the first instance? Are you 
sure that the structure of metaphorical assertion follows the patterns 
you predict? How do you intend to answer the question of how 
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metaphors represent? What is your view on the compositionality of 
language? Do speech acts compose in the same way meanings do? 
If not, how do you want to explain things such as the productivity 
of language and its learnability? So long as we do not receive clear 
answers to these questions, I doubt that an account of metaphor can 
be given in your terms. 
Then there were those philosophers who, though fascinated by 
the topic, found it difficult to believe that metaphor could be 
treated in semantically systematic terms. If you were or still are 
among these philosophers, who seem to share a Davidsonian spirit, 
let me tell you this: I hope my account of metaphor has given you 
some reasons to be more positive as to the possibility of 
approaching metaphor with a spirit of scientific research. Things 
can certainly be improved, but the presence of many recurrent 
patterns in the interpretation of metaphors, as shown in Chapter 7, 
allow us to be moderately positive as to the applicability of 
semantic ideas to metaphor. 
Finally, there is the group of philosophers I have been more 
engaged with: the ‘new’ wave of more or less young contextualists 
who have attempted to offer me a theory of everything, but with 
very poor results. If you are among these philosophers, I believe 
you may have not even reached the end of this work. But if, lucky 
chance, you have, then let me tell you that you are still in time to 
abandon your attempts to explain everything and follow me in the 
modest task of finding specific solutions to our needs of scholars 
devoted to the comprehension of linguistic problems. My work in 
Chapter 5 to 7 has been to show how an explanation along your 
lines is faced with considerable general theoretical problems, while 
your view of metaphor is, to say the least, gappy. 
An account of metaphor along the non-indexicalist contextualist 
lines I have offered here is a project which I hope someone may 
find not just attractive, but also worth being put into practice and 
extended to cover new cases of metaphor or, why not, to cover 
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other tropes or linguistic phenomena which are still in need of a 
semantic treatment.   
 
 
Nottingham 27 September 2012 
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